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Evidences of natural and
revealed theology





EVIDENCES
OF
NATURAL AND REVEALED
THEOLOGY.

BY
CHARLES E. LORD.



PHILADELPHIA:
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TO

MY WIFE,

MY BEST COUNSELOR AND FRIEND,

I Affectionately Dedicate

THE FOLLOWING PAGES.

P R E F A C E.

It seems most suitable that the first truths which lie at the foundation of all Revealed Theology should be considered in the light of Natural Theology; both have a most intimate relation to each other. The present treatise on those subjects, which would properly come under the range of Natural Theology, is written with the great end in view of making more forcible and clear the evidences of the Christian religion, and giving to the mind a deeper conviction of the supreme authority of *Revelation*. It will be seen, also, that a book that should in one volume treat of the great variety of subjects that would come under the head of Natural and Revealed Theology, must of necessity be but a *compend*, and aim chiefly at brevity, rather than at elaborate argument upon any one department of truth, especially as this might not be so favorable for general reading, or make it so desirable for use in our schools or higher institutions of learning.

I send forth this work with the hope that it may not only be acceptable to the general reader, but prove a welcome help to those who are engaged in the cause of education. The Index to Authors will be found of service to all who may wish to enter upon an extended investigation of any of the subjects treated upon in this book.

CHARLES E. LORD.

BEVERLY, N. J., September 1, 1869.

CONTENTS OF NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

EFFICIENT CAUSATION AND FINAL CAUSATION.

	PAGE
What is to be understood by Efficient Causation and Final Causation?—Mind and Matter.—Consciousness the Instrument of the Knowledge of Immaterial Substances.—Distinction between Matter and Mind.—Author of the Human Mind.—Argument of the Materialist.—Material Laws.—Sir John Herschel.—Theory of Gradual Development.—Physical Causation.—Common Idea of Cause.—Cause and Existence.—Brown.—Mental Causation.—Distinction between Person and Thing.—Necessarian and Libertarian Theories.—No Infinite Series of Causes.—Paley on Final Causes.—Miracles.—Atheism in Relation to General Laws.—Bowen	19

CHAPTER II.

WHAT ARE MATTERS OF FACT?

What are Matters of Fact?—Consciousness.—The Senses.—Classification of the Facts of Consciousness.—The Sphere of the Senses.—Why the Facts of Consciousness are investigated.—Law of Facts.—Distinction between the Facts of the Senses and Consciousness.—Fundamental Law of the Consciousness.—Jouffroy	33
---	----

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL LAWS OF THE EARTH AND SUN.

Definition of a General Law.—Whewell.—Laws of Gravity.—Distribution of the Day and the Year.—Exactness in the Length of the Day.—The Sun.—Newton.—Properties of Light.—Laws of Heat.—The Atmosphere.—Water.—Laws of Friction.—Stability of the Solar System.—Laplace	39
--	----

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY.

Vestiges of Creation—M. Müller.—Law substituted for God in the Development Theory.—Derogatory to Human Nature.—Creation by Miracle.—Researches of Geology fatal to the Development Theory.—Agassiz.—Sedgwick.—Hitchcock.—Hugh Miller	55
--	----

CHAPTER V.

MUTUAL ADAPTATION OF THE VEGETABLE AND ANIMAL KINGDOM.

Vegetable Growth.—Generation of Animals.—Principles of Compensation and Equalization.—Buckland.—No Abortive Creation of Species.—Fitness of Constitution	62
--	----

CHAPTER VI.

PROCESS OF GENERATION IN ANIMALS AND GERMINATION IN PLANTS.

	PAGE
Generation a Process.—Incorrect Use of the Language <i>Principle of Generation</i> .—Elementary Cause of Animal and Vegetable Existence.—Fichte.—The Artist's Studio.—Bowen.—No Evidence of Mechanism in the First Germs of Vegetable and Animal Life.—Threefold Union of Mechanism, Life, and Mind	65

CHAPTER VII.

PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES OF ANIMALS.

Recuperative Power of the Animal Economy.—Prospective Contrivances of Animals.—The Heron and Cormorant.—Solan Goose.—Tongue of the Woodpecker.—Air-bladder of the Fish.—Fang of a Viper.—Bag of the Opossum.—Stomach of the Camel.—Young of Animals.—Proboscis of the Elephant.—The Crane.—The Spider's Web.—The Lobster.—Gizzard of Birds.—Locomotion of Reptiles and Birds	72
--	----

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SENSES.

Relationship of the Senses to the Nerves.—Adaptation of the World without us to the World within us.—The Connection of the Senses with the Mind.—Sir Charles Bell.—The Eye.—Dr. Dick.—The Hearing.—Seat of the Senses	76
---	----

CHAPTER IX.

LIFE AND INSTINCT.

Definition of Life by Stahl, Humboldt, Kant, Bichat, and Schmidt.—Life and Organization.—Chemical Affinity and Change.—Origin of Life.—Instinct.—Its Distinction from Reason	81
--	----

CHAPTER X.

THE HUMAN BODY AND MIND, AND THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORY AND SCIENCE UPON THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

Man a Complex Machine.—Regularity of the Animal Structure.—Package.—Beauty of the Body.—Pelling.—Testimony of History and Science upon the Origin of Man	86
--	----

CHAPTER XI.

COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY, AND PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

Relation of the Inorganic Kingdom to the Organic.—Globules of Blood in Herbaceous and Carnivorous Animals.—M. Jussieu.—George Taylor.—Agassiz.—Harmony existing in the Laws of Heat and Light in the Vegetable Kingdom.—Hunt.—Chemical Composition of the Animal and Vegetable Kingdom.—Physical Geography of the Earth	90
---	----

CHAPTER XII.

MEANING OF THE TERMS NATURE AND CHANCE.

Meaning of the Word Nature.—Original Power and Imparted Power.—No Self-creation.—First and Second Causes.—Fortuitous Concurrence of Atoms and Chance unmeaning	95
--	----

CHAPTER XIII.

UNITY OF DESIGN IN NATURE.

	PAGE
Dependencies of One Part of Nature upon Another.—Collocations and Adjustments of Nature showing Unity of Design.—Plurality of Gods impossible.—Cuvier.—Unity of God shown in the Intellectual and Moral World.—No Infinite Series of Causes and Effects.—Pascal	99

CHAPTER XIV.

GENERAL HAPPINESS OF ANIMAL EXISTENCE, AND INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ACTION
REVEALING THE GOODNESS AND MERCY OF GOD.

Happiness the Rule of Animal Existence.—Suffering the Exception.—Absolute Dependence upon God.—Gratuitous Nature of Divine Blessings.—Sportive Movements of the Young of Animals.—Physical, Mental, and Moral Happiness.—Benevolence of God.—Uniform Rule of Mental and Moral Action.—Variety of Pleasures springing from each.—Divine Goodness bearing the Impress of Mercy.—Jeremy Taylor	105
---	-----

CHAPTER XV.

THE ÆSTHETIC NATURE OF MAN.

Æsthetic Nature of Man.—Elements of the Beautiful and the Sublime.—Their Relation to the Moral Nature.—Milton.—Developments of the Principle of Taste	115
---	-----

CHAPTER XVI.

THE IMAGINATION.

The Imagination.—External World adapted to it.—Its Existence revealing Divine Wisdom and Goodness.—Gray.—Early Development of the Imagination.—Chatterton.—Hebrew Poetry.—The Imagination degraded	120
--	-----

CHAPTER XVII.

CONSIDERATION OF ANGER AND SHAME, THE LOVE OF AMITY, OF SOCIETY, AND THE
POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.

Anger instinctive and deliberate.—Under certain Relations right and useful.—Brown.—The Emotion of Shame.—How serviceable.—Love of Family.—The Support it gives to Society.—Industry, Foresight, and Kindness called by it into Exercise.—The Love of Possession.—Care of Society to protect the Rights of Property.—The Constitution of Man under all its Aspects showing the Workmanship of God	125
--	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, AND SPIRITUALITY OF GOD.

Omniscience and Omnipresence of God.—Our Knowledge of the Attributes of God derived from their Manifestation.—Dewar.—Presence of God in His Works.—Spirituality of God.—Matter finite.—God not circumscribed to the Sphere of Matter.—Not restricted by Time or Space	130
---	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

THE EQUITY AND BENEVOLENCE OF GOD SHOWN FROM THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

PAGE

The Nature of Conscience.—The Question of Happiness and Duty.—The Moral Constitution of Man.—The End aimed at by God in Man's Moral Constitution.—The Peculiar Prerogative of Conscience.—Conscience unperverted an Indication of the Moral Character of God.—Conscience *as it is*, and *as it should be*.—Sir James Mackintosh.—Consciousness.—The Decision of Conscience.—Dugald Stewart.—The Relation of the Intellect to the Moral Sense.—Upham.—Butler.—Conscience as a Law, a Feeling, and a Judge.—The Law of Association.—Bowen.—Virtue.—McCosh.—Personality.—Freedom.—Pantheism.—Wilson.—Self-evident Truths.—Fenelon.—Alexander.—Pascal.—The Heart and the Mind.—The Professed End of Human Government.—Evidence of the Attributes of God arising from the Moral Constitution of Man 134

CHAPTER XX.

"THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL."

Leibnitz.—The Present Universe in its Totality may have in it more Happiness than any other.—The Possibility of Sin necessary to Moral Freedom.—Lactantius.—The Infinite cannot be restricted to Actual Development.—President Appleton.—The Greatest Good Virtue, not Happiness.—Pain and Death in the Brute Creation.—Sin, and Man's Freedom.—Suffering essential for the Trial of Virtue.—Horace Bushnell 170

CHAPTER XXI.

THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

Law not causative, but expressive.—Prof. Nichol.—The Natural the Sphere of Second Causes.—Regularity in Natural Law.—The End for which Nature is made.—Limitations of Nature.—The Supernatural.—Prof. George Fisher.—Tendency at the Present Day to Pantheism.—Cause of Natural and Revealed Religion bound up together.—Nature and its Laws do not conflict with the Development of the Supernatural.—The Six Great Epochs of Creation.—Prof. Tayler Lewis.—Miracle necessary.—The Cyclical Law of all Natures.—Arnold.—The Human and the Divine.—Constitution of Nature as to Mind and Matter.—The First Links in the Chain of Causation concealed.—Different Aspects of the Supernatural.—Polytheism.—Romanism.—Ideal, and Materialistic Pantheism.—Deism.—Rationalism.—Philosophy of the Intuitions and the Feelings.—Infidelity contrasted with Superstition.—Horace Bushnell . . . 184

CHAPTER XXII.

THE HUMAN, THE SUPERHUMAN, AND THE DIVINE.

What is comprehended in the Human.—No Part of Man's Nature supernatural.—Universality of the Law of Cause and Effect in all Creatures and Things.—Human Volitions self-caused.—Necessity the Condition of Force in Things.—Freedom of Human Volitions.—Evidence of Consciousness.—Sophistry concealed under the Language "Strongest Motive."—The True Idea of Human Liberty.—The Complex Nature of Motives.—Identity of the Supernatural with the Divine.—The Sphere of its Activity.—The Mental Constitution of Man.—Twofold Character of Human Freedom.—Distinction between the *Strongest Motive* and the *Successful Motive*.—Force in the World of Matter and Mind.—The Superhuman.—The Miraculous restricted to the Supernatural.—Law as applied to the Deity.—Second Causes.—The Divine Action upon Things and Persons.—The Law of Causality in Things and Persons.—Distinction between Wonders and Miracles.—Proper Classification of the Human, Superhuman, and the Divine.—What is Sin?—Sin toward God.—Sin toward Man.—Necessity of the Interposition of the Divine in Human Affairs . . . 213

CHAPTER XXIII.

LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN THOUGHT.

	PAGE
The Senses and Consciousness the Instruments of Human Thought.—Variety of Development in Different Minds.—Original Differences in the Human Faculties.—Limitations of the Mind respecting Things Material and Immaterial.—Primary Ideas.—Essence of Soul and Body.—Objects of the External World.—The Accommodation of God to the Limitations of Human Thought.—Influence of Sin in shutting out God from the Mind.—The Real Knowledge of Man mostly confined to Simple Facts.—Belief as related to Human Conduct.—Mode of the Manifestation of God to Man.—Law of Cause and Effect.—Divine Purposes and Free Agency.—The Finite and the Infinite.—The Incarnation of Christ considered simply as a Fact.—God in the Incarnation of His Son coming under Human Limitations.—First Cause and Second Causes.—Mind and Matter.—Time and Eternity.—The Absolute and the Created.—Self-Existence, and Existence begun.—Human Personality and Divine Personality.—Divine Government and Probation.—Punishment and Reward . . .	227

CHAPTER XXIV.

ATHEISM.

Atheism upon the Supposition that there is no God.—It removes the Highest Incentive to Virtue, and the Greatest Restraint upon Vice.—It does not help to Usefulness in the Family Relation.—The Atheist is deprived of one great Source of Pleasure springing from the Recognition of an Intelligent Cause.—His Highest Rule of Conduct must be Human Authority.—Atheism, true or false, is revolting to the Conscience.—It gives to the Future nothing but Gloom, Uncertainty, and Doubt.—Atheism upon the Supposition that there is a God.—God's Existence reveals the Fact of His Government.—The Impress of the Divine Authority manifested in the Constitution of Man.—Divine Government always on the side of Virtue.—Law and Grace.—Atheism especially seated in the Heart.—Nature and Revelation both opposed to Atheism.—Atheism considered under the Ills of Life.—Atheism destitute of all Reason and an Enemy to the Progress of Society in Intelligence, Virtue, or Happiness.—It shuts the Mind up to the Present Hour.—The Atheist Code of Morals contrasted with Christianity.—Atheism as developed in the French Revolution.—Its Criminality and Ruin	247
--	-----

CONTENTS OF REVEALED THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

NECESSITY OF A REVELATION FROM GOD.

	PAGE
Insufficiency of the Light of Nature.—Objections of Infidelity to the Christian Scheme.—The Law of Belief.—Real Question at Issue.—Probability of a Revelation from the Character of God.—Revelation necessary from the Existing Condition of the Conscience, and from Human Experience.—Plato, Socrates, Seneca, Ovid, Pliny, Clement.—What has Natural Religion accomplished?—Ancient and Modern Paganism.—Natural Religion unable to discover an Effectual Remedy for Sin.—The Voice of Conscience.—Doctrine of Revelation as to the Remedy for Sin.—Contrast existing between the Bible and all other Systems of Belief and Practice	261

CHAPTER II.

CHRIST.

The Interval of Thirty-five Years between the Death of Christ and the Persecution of the Christians under Nero.—Testimony of Tacitus.—Jewish Accounts of Christ.—Character of Christ.—Christ as portrayed by the Four Evangelists.—Christ's Humanity.—Christ in what He said of Himself.—Testimony of Thomas.—Unity of Purpose in Christ's Life.—Unworldly Nature of Christ's Life	281
--	-----

CHAPTER III.

CHRIST AS A MORALIST, LEGISLATOR, REDEEMER, AND KING.

State of Morality at Christ's Coming.—"Ecce Homo."—The Legalists and Common People.—Morality as taught by Christ.—Teaching of Christ as to the Fatherhood of God, the Soul, and a Future State.—Legislation of Moses and Christ contrasted.—Address of Christ to the Samaritan Woman.—Motives to Obedience presented by Christ.—Adaptation of Christ's Legislation to the Success of His Cause.—The Radical Change Christ introduced into Society.—Christ as the Redeemer.—Necessity existing for a Vicarious Sacrifice.—The Incarnation.—Young.—Christ as a King.—Jewish View of the Kingship of Christ.—Spirituality of this Kingship.—The Tribute Money.—Christ's Mission to the World.—Kingdom of Christ built upon Love	295
--	-----

CHAPTER IV.

EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES.

Probability of Miracles.—Necessity of Miracles at the Commencement of the Christian Era.—Christ's Testimony to the Value of His Miracles.—False View of Nature.—Redemption an End worthy of Miracles.—No Presumptive Evidence against them with this End in view.—Miraculous Interposition at Great Epochs of Time.—Moral Element connected with Scripture Miracles.—Miracles of the Bible contrasted with other Miracles professed to be worked.—Definition of a True Miracle	315
--	-----

CHAPTER V.

MIRACLES OF CHRIST.

PAGE

Miracles of Moses contrasted with those of Christ.—Superiority of Christ's Miracles to all other Miracles.—The Age when Christ worked Miracles.—Confession of their Reality by the Pharisees, but Ascription to Beelzebub.—Miracles of Christ, unless true, must have been exposed.—How Christ's Miracles excelled all others: 1. Number. 2. Freedom and Ease. 3. Larger and more glorious. 4. Worked in His own Name and Power.—Trench.	330
--	-----

CHAPTER VI.

BIRTH, RESURRECTION, AND ASCENSION OF CHRIST, AND MIRACLES OF HIS APOSTLES.

Circumstances connected with Christ's Advent into the World.—Resurrection of Christ.—Impossibility of Deception.—Substantial Agreement of the Four Evangelists.—Ascension of Christ.—Peter on the Day of Pentecost.—Miracles of the Apostles	341
--	-----

CHAPTER VII.

MIRACLES OF MOSES.

The Ten Plagues of Egypt.—Idol-Worship of Egypt.—Necessity of the Mosaic Miracles.—Condition of the Israelites previous to the Destruction of the Egyptians in the Red Sea.—Forty Years' Wandering in the Desert.—Design of the Mosaic Miracles	348
---	-----

CHAPTER VIII.

EVIDENCE OF PROPHECY.

Oracles of Delphos and Dodona.—Prophecies of the Bible contrasted with other Prophecies.—Fulfilled Prophecies.—The Position Prophecy holds in the Bible.—End secured by Prophecy.—Special Minuteness of Detail and Accuracy of Fulfillment.—Prophecies respecting Babylon, Tyre, Egypt.—Three Sons of Noah.—Ishmael.—Abraham.—Jacob and his Twelve Sons.—Daniel.—Calmet.—Bishop McIlvaine	357
---	-----

CHAPTER IX.

PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHRIST AND BY CHRIST.

Minuteness of Specification in the Prophecies concerning Christ.—Daniel's Prophecy of Christ.—Zechariah's Prediction of the Thirty Pieces of Silver.—Birth-place of Christ designated by Micah.—Predictions of Christ by Isaiah.—Predictions of our Saviour in the Psalms.—Christ's Predictions of His Death, His Resurrection, Rapid Spread of the Gospel and Persecutions of His Disciples, the Precise Manner of Peter's Death, and the Destruction of Jerusalem	376
---	-----

CHAPTER X.

THE SUCCESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

Obstacles the Disciples had to encounter.—Method of Christ's Coming opposed to the Desires of the whole Jewish Nation.—Conduct of the Jews toward Christ and His Disciples.—Mission of the Twelve Apostles.—Condition of the World in the First Century of the Christian Era.—Success of the Apostles.—Testimony of Pliny, the Roman Governor.—Justin Martyr.—Gibbon.—Sincerity of Belief and Practice in the Early Christians	382
--	-----

CHAPTER XI.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO HUMAN NATURE AND THE CONSCIENCE.

PAGE

- Manner in which the Bible should be approached.—Secret Cause of Infidelity.—Bible adapted to Human Nature as a Key to a Lock.—Bible meets the Demands of the Conscience.—Sanctions imposed by the Bible on the Conscience.—How the Conscience is treated in the Bible, as contrasted with other Religions.—Bible a Guide to the Conscience.—Revealer of New Truths.—Bible meets the Natural Sense of Justice.—It furnishes a Perfect System of Ethics.—Cannot be imposed upon.—It takes no Undue Advantage of the Conscience.—Relation the Bible sustains to Science, History, and Physical Geography.—Bible alone meets the Consciousness of Guilt 391

CHAPTER XII.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO THE AFFECTIONS AND THE WILL.

- Popular Language of the Bible respecting the Affections.—Philosophy of the Temptation of our First Parents.—Predominance of the Sensuous Part of Man's Nature.—The Bible a Regulating Power over the Affections.—Bible adapted to the Social and Family Relation, to the Religious Sensibilities, to Seasons of Affliction and Adversity.—Adaptation of the Bible to the Will.—Intimate Connection of the Affections with the Will.—Motives presented to the Will on the side of Fear and of Hope.—The Bible a Restraining and Energizing Power 409

CHAPTER XIII.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO THE INTELLECT AND TO THE IMAGINATION.

- Relation of the Intellect to the Truth.—New Truths communicated by the Bible.—Number and Variety of the Books in the Bible.—Different Styles of Biblical Composition.—Bible reveals the best kind of Knowledge.—Adaptation of the Bible to the Imagination.—Stewart.—Bible a Regulating Power to the Imagination.—It gives Perfect Models for Imitation 419

CHAPTER XIV.

MORAL POWER OF CHRISTIANITY.

- Exclusive Supremacy the Bible gives to God.—Christianity a Divine Power.—Harmony created by it between Reason and Faith.—The Right Relation instituted between the Sensibilities and Faith.—Alliance of the Bible with the Spirit of God 430

CHAPTER XV.

THE HARMONY OF SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

- The Value of a True Interpretation of the Bible.—What constitutes the Great End of Revelation.—Universal and Undeviating Uniformity of Belief upon all the Minutiae of the Bible impossible.—Distinction between the Essential and the Unessential.—The Use of Popular Language in the Bible.—No Opposition between Right Science and Revelation.—The Four Fundamental Truths of Geology.—The Mosaic Narrative of the Six Days' Creation.—E. B. Pusey.—Dr. Buckland.—Chalmers.—Nichol.—Gaussen.—President Green 438

CHAPTER XVI.

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

	PAGE
Earliest Accounts point to the First Period of Human Existence as innocent and happy.—Paul's Mission to the Athénians.—Central Region of Asia the Cradle of the Human Race.—No Greater Varieties in the Human Species than in the Species of Animals.—The Two Great Laws of Species.—Origin of the Human Family from Adam.—Superfluity of Miracles connected with many Distinct Creations of Animals and Men.—Difference between Diversity and Monstrosity.—Testimony of History.—Miraculous Interposition in Combination with Natural Law.—Layard.—Confusion of Tongues at Babel	454

CHAPTER XVII.

INTEGRITY OF THE SACRED CANON.

Age of the Apostles.—Testimony of Clement, Hermas, Ignatius, Polycarp, Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Jerome, and Augustine.—Indirect Testimony of the Enemies of Christianity, Celsus, Porphyry, Julian.—Canon of the Old Testament indorsed by Christ.—Testimony of the New Testament and Jewish Writers.—Josephus.—Early Christian Fathers.—Prof. Sampson	477
--	-----

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE.

Distinction between General and Plenary Inspiration.—Divine and Human Element in the Bible.—Plenary Inspiration regards the Condition of the Writing rather than the Mind of the Writer.—What is not meant by plenary inspiration.—Three Forms of Error into which the Mind falls in respect to the Plenary Inspiration of the Bible.—What constitutes a Proof of Plenary Inspiration.—Consideration of Objections to Plenary Inspiration.—Testimony of Sacred Writers of the Old and New Testaments.—Separate Chains of Evidence upon which the Inspiration of the Bible rests	487
---	-----

CHAPTER XIX.

HISTORIC OUTLINE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

Old Testament in its Revelation of God.—Mosaic Dispensation.—Contrast between the Theism of the Bible and the Pagan Polytheism.—Cudworth.—Deification of the Creature in Ancient Polytheism.—Alliance of Church and State.—Paul's Picture of Heathenism.—Design of the Jewish Theocracy and Jewish Ritual.—Principles of the Hebrew Polity	511
--	-----

CHAPTER XX.

HISTORIC OUTLINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

The Dream of Nebuchadnezzar.—Christianity.—Its Relation to the World.—Its Ultimate Condition.—Croly.—Christianity and Paganism.—Antagonism of Christianity to the World.—Relation sustained to the Individual and to Society.—Gilfillan	526
---	-----

CHAPTER XXI.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF SKEPTICISM.

	PAGE
The Bible a Religion of Facts.—Relation of the Bible to Human Reason.—Infallibility of Revelation.—The two great Errors of Skepticism.—Difficulties of Skepticism: 1. Degradation of Reason in its Sphere. 2. Makes no Provision for the Highest Want of the Nature. 3. Stumbles upon the Incomprehensible alike of Nature and of Revelation. 4. Removes the best Standard of Virtue. 5. Has no Unity of Belief	537

CHAPTER XXII.

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF SKEPTICISM.

Skepticism cannot improve upon the Morality of the Bible.—Objections of the Skeptic frivolous and inconsistent.—The Skeptic cannot prove any of the Facts of the Bible untrue.—Twofold Class of Facts in the Bible, both mutually sustaining each other.—Skepticism a System of Doubt, and not of Evidence .	546
--	-----

INDEX TO AUTHORS	555
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NATURAL THEOLOGY.

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NATURAL THEOLOGY.

CHAPTER I.

EFFICIENT CAUSATION, AND FINAL CAUSATION.

THE reasoning from effect to cause has two leading divisions:—first, that kind of argument which is based upon efficient causation; secondly, that which is based upon final causation. Efficient causation is where the effect or result is of such a nature that we can attribute it in no sense to any other being than the First Cause, or God. Final causation is reasoning from the character of the effect, or result, to God. The former rests upon the proof that such is the effect, or result, that we know of no other cause but the First Cause, or God. We cannot suppose any intermediate, or what is called secondary, cause. The latter relies for the proof of God upon the design, adaptation, or intelligence displayed in the effect or result. The one reasons from nature directly up to nature's God, or from effects otherwise inexplicable to the First Cause that solves all difficulties; the other relies upon the character of those effects to show an infinitely intelligent and designing cause.

We classify all things under two great divisions, mind and matter. One has thought, perception, sensibility to emotions of joy or grief, pleasure or pain, love or hatred, and, above all, the great attribute of will, or instinct, which decides all action or controls all conduct. The other substance we call matter, which has length and breadth, form and divisibility. All matter that comes under the inspection of the senses has also color and weight. The great instrument by which we attain to the knowledge of immaterial substances is pecu-

liarily the consciousness; while the senses bring us directly into contact with matter, and afford us a certain knowledge of it. Observe, then, that man, compounded of two directly opposite substances, perfectly distinct from each other, yet linked together by the mysterious cord of animal life, comes for the first time into existence. What brought man thus compounded into being? What introduced the first man into the world? What combined together two substances so foreign from each other? Let us suppose, with the atheist, that some peculiar modification of matter brought him into being, some fortunate position of particles, some wonderful combination of atoms under the mysterious agency of chemical or mechanical law. Incredible as this is, let us, for argument's sake, admit it. But what are we to do with the mind of man? How came that into being? Is it not an axiom that no substance can impart that which it has not? Matter is not mind,—how can it give it? Material atoms have not thought, will, perception, and feeling. We do not attach the ideas of weight, color, length and breadth, form and divisibility, to mind; and yet that which has not intelligence, which has none of the properties of mind, did produce thought, and, more than all, impart a moral nature, a sense of accountability and of free agency! Are we not intuitively struck with the absurdity of such a supposition? Even if matter had in itself an efficient power of producing, without a First Cause, every modification of matter and every diversity of mechanism, yet it cannot produce mind; it cannot be the architect of thought, will, perception, a moral sense, or free agency. Who can conceive of matter engendering, by its own inherent power, the conscience, the perception, and feeling of right and wrong? If one infinite mind was not the author of the human mind, then the conclusion must be that mind owed its parentage to matter, to a substance whose exclusive properties are extension, weight, form, divisibility, and color. Before the atheist can give the least plausibility to his theories, he must deny the existence of spirit, and of all things immaterial.

Let us, then, see if, upon the theory of the atheistic mate-

rialist, there is any virtue in the argument that matter was the sole cause of the human body. Imagine, now, that thought, feeling, will, perception, and reason are only refined modifications of matter; simply the subtile phenomena of materialism. What is the question to be solved? Simply this: can any or all of the known or supposed laws of matter account for the origin of the human body and mind? Most certainly not. Material laws are simply the *mode* under which material phenomena develop themselves. Thus, we have the general law of gravity, or attraction; mechanical law, which relates to position and direction; chemical law, which relates to affinity and combination. Here are material atoms, or inorganic particles. Can we imagine any juxtaposition, or combination, or attraction of atoms to come together and form the mysterious framework of the human system? Remember, we cannot ascribe intelligence to atoms of inorganic matter: we give to them their appropriate laws; but do they or can they produce the human organism? Who can conceive of blind, unconscious particles of matter jostling together a human frame, bone, muscle, heart, blood, veins, arteries, hands, eyes, ears, feet, and all in one harmonious system, all in due proportion, with no superabundance and no defect? We must disown our own consciousness and the first principles of reason, before we can harbor such a thought. Remember, we have inorganic particles to produce a perfect, living organism. Denying an infinite intelligence to fashion the body, our only resort is unintelligent atoms. By the law of gravity we suppose worlds are kept in motion, and matter is attracted to matter; by mechanical law we give position and direction to different substances; by chemical law we secure affinity, and the intimate combination of elements together. But can one or all of these laws of inorganic substances account for the living body of man? No. We trace their operation out, and we find they have their own peculiar sphere. Neither moving worlds nor moving atoms can engender living bodies. No chemical law can give birth to the lowest organism. The sphere of chemical law is as distinct from the vital principle of living

organisms as the act of volition from a stone. The first man is an effect, a result of something; but that something cannot be floating atoms of matter, or any conceivable mechanical, chemical, or gravitating law. We cannot with sane minds believe in what we never have seen done nor can show can be done. Thus, whether we conceive of man as only material, or both material and immaterial, we know that no law of gravity, no mechanical force, and no chemical affinity can be a sufficient reason, or any reason whatever, for the living organism. We know that no jumbling together of atoms, no chance combination of particles, no blind floating of lifeless substances could engender the human system. But more than this,—we know that the principle that gives vitality to the living body of man is constantly at war with the laws of inorganic substances. Man only lives by holding in incessant check those inorganic laws that rapidly, when they have the mastery, reduce the system to the dust of the ground. Who has not noticed how soon, when the vital laws suspend their action, the body decomposes? The wear of the elements, the friction of the human machinery, the agency of chemical affinities, all combine to destroy the human body. But the vital law of all living organisms holds all other laws in abeyance; but when death comes, and the principle of vitality no longer exists, then these inorganic laws reduce to dust the human frame. How great, then, the absurdity of attributing to any inorganic law, or all combined, the living body of man! We then come to the conclusion that, if man has had a beginning, we can find no cause for it in nature: we must find that cause in God.

“Without going into any subtilities,” says Sir John Herschel, “I may at least be allowed to suggest that it is at least high time that philosophers, both physical and others, should come to some nearer agreement than seems to prevail as to the meaning they intend to convey in speaking of causes and causation. On the one hand, we are told that the grand object of physical inquiry is to explain the nature of phenomena by referring them to the causes; on the other, that the inquiry into causes is altogether vain and futile, and that

science has no concern but with the discovery of laws. Which of them is the truth? Or are both views of the matter true on a different interpretation of the terms? Whichever view we may take, or whichever interpretation we may adopt, there is one thing certain—the extreme inconvenience of such a state of language. This can only be reformed by a careful analysis of the widest of all human generalizations, disentangling from one another the innumerable shades of meaning which have got confounded together in its progress, and establishing among them a rational classification and nomenclature. Until this be done, we cannot be sure that by the relation of cause and effect one and the same kind of relation is understood.”

The half-atheistic theory of gradual development to account for the commencement of the human race, is as much opposed to true science as it is to the express declarations of Scripture. Consequently we are shut up to the only possible alternative to account for the origin of man, even the direct and miraculous power of God. But the form of argument to prove the existence of God the most impressive, is that founded upon design and adaptation. This comes more properly under the name of final causation. But if the argument of final causation is more impressive, and of far wider application, it may be doubted if it is as direct and positive as the argument of efficient causation. The atheistical mind will often confound the reasoning of design and adaptation to prove the existence of God with the operation of natural law. Under the vague language of laws of nature there will be lost all true ideas of a personal God, and thus these very evidences of contrivance and adaptation, that should lead directly to the great First Cause, are perverted by the wrong use of laws of nature. When the theist, filled with admiration in the contemplation of a wonder-working God, would point to the diversified evidences of design, the skeptic shuts out the conviction of God from his mind by worshipping law in his place. Consequently to give the highest logical accuracy as directness to the argument for a God, it is necessary to go back to the commencement of the

human race, and of the varied species of animate creation, when the great law of production, or the generation of animals, had no existence. Here we say to the skeptic, Much as you may defy law, you cannot bring in law to account for the origin of man, and quadrupeds, reptiles, birds, and the fishy tribes. Before these living creatures had an existence, where was the law of reproduction? Where was the law of propagating species before species had any being? To speak of the animate world before its existence is the greatest of absurdities. It is the same as to say, there is a uniform mode or principle of reproduction, of growth, and life, before even generation, growth, and life had an existence. Thus, immediately when we come to the first links of each chain that represents the different species of animals, we are compelled to have recourse to an infinitely intelligent and powerful being as their sole and only adequate cause. The laws of nature in respect to animals can have no actual existence until the different species of animals are created. By confounding cause and effect with the general phenomena of the law of production, the author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*" fell into the blunder of gradual development. He did not consider that the human mind, dissatisfied with the vague abstraction of general law, demanded something better to account for the origin of man and the different species of animals. So also Spinoza, by making no distinction between physical causation and mental causation, between material and immaterial substances, the laws of body and the laws of thought and will, constructed a theory whose iron fatalism destroyed alike all virtue and all freedom,—a theory where God becomes nature, and both are bound together with the chain of an irresistible necessity. So Hume, by overlooking the distinction of substances and their properties or modes of action,—mental causation and mental effects,—overturned the certainty of all human knowledge, and introduced a state of unlimited doubt. The pantheism of Spinoza was fatalism; the skepticism of Hume, endless uncertainty. So also the atheist, by making cause and existence identical, and giving too wide a meaning to the axiom of cause and

effect, reduces the theist to the alternative of admitting either that God had a cause, or that the earth was uncaused. Consequently we see how necessary is correct reasoning upon cause and effect. The argument from design, as well as that from efficient causation, is deeply affected by a correct understanding of cause and effect, of laws mental and material, and what are matters of fact in distinction from the abstract relation of ideas.

What is the common idea of cause with all persons universally? Is it not that which produces effects? Is not efficiency, or power of some sort, always included in the idea of a cause? A cause, then, is a substance, material or mental, that produces effects. Can we have the idea of cause and not also of effect with it? Is not effect the necessary and invariable consequent of cause? Take away the idea of effect from cause, and can we have any idea of cause? Certainly not. A cause is that which causes, produces, or influences. Cause, therefore, must with it comprehend power. Can there be an effect and no power to produce it? Impossible! For what is an effect unless it implies the result of action, or change of some sort? If the idea of power could be separated from cause, then we could separate cause and effect; for if cause has no power, then effect has no cause, for all action, motion, or change must imply a power to produce such action, motion, or change. We can no more divorce power from cause than we can cause from effect. But in what sense does cause imply power? Exclusively in the sense of power in action, for cause and power passive, or not put forth, is a contradiction in terms. This is our first idea of cause. What is our second idea of cause? It is, that cause not only includes power in action, but substance for existence. We know of only two perfectly distinct kinds of substances: one we call mind, the other body; one is spiritual, the other material. When we speak of causes in the world of matter, we mean physical causes; in the world of mind, mental or spiritual causes; and both include the two fundamental ideas of power and substance. We come, then, to consider if cause and existence are identical propo-

sitions, or synonymous terms. Existence and substance are identical, for there can be no substance without existence, and no existence without substance. We cannot speak of nothing existing, except as a figure of speech. We can have no idea of existence divorced from substance, and its properties divorced from existence. But is existence in the same manner identical with cause? Can existence never be spoken of without the idea of cause? Upon a correct solution of this question depends essentially the strength of the argument for the existence of God. It has been seen that cause is always that which produces; that it always includes power in action of some sort: not power passive, but power leading to effects, movements, or changes. Now, do we not often have the idea of substance passive in a quiescent state, not acting? Certainly no idea is more uniformly familiar to the mind; but substance is synonymous with existence: then of course there can be the idea of existence without action, or causation. While a cause uniformly implies existence, existence does not uniformly imply a cause. One is general, the other specific. One always comprehends substance, the other substance in action. Thus we come to the conclusion that, while cause always implies substance, energizing or producing effects, existence may or may not include substance, energizing or causing effects; and therefore that it is stretching the axiom too far to say that because every effect must have a cause, therefore all substance or existence must have a cause. The atheist, misusing this axiom, tells us that since every effect must have a cause, and every cause a substance, therefore there is an endless series of causes and effects, and consequently that God himself has a cause, and therefore there is no First Cause. If the mind, revolting from such a conclusion, denies the axiom that every effect must have a cause, then the atheist turns to this earth, and asks if the world itself is not uncaused and existing from eternity, since there are some effects without a cause. How is the theist to extricate himself from this dilemma? Simply by showing that the axiom, that every effect must have a cause, is restricted exclusively to substances energizing, or producing effects;

that it has relation to *power in action*, not *passive power*; to an existence that produces changes, not an existence not caused. Thus, viewing substance without movement, change, or action, with no previous knowledge of that substance or how it came into existence, we cannot say that it had a cause; but no sooner do we see power operating in change or movement than we say at once there is an effect, and therefore a cause. Is it not, then, admitted that existence does not necessarily or inevitably imply a cause? Then God, who is an existence, is not an effect from a pre-existing cause. God is uncaused, self-existing, the great First Cause and effect. From within himself there is a sufficient cause for all his works. In his own nature, not out of it, there dwells the mighty fountain of cause and effect. In himself reside infinite knowledge and power. Thus, by limiting a general axiom to its peculiar sphere, do we disentangle our minds of that web of sophistry that leads to fatalism and the denial of a personal, uncaused God. "Matter, as an unformed mass," says Brown, "could not, of itself, have suggested the notion of a Creator, since in every hypothesis something material or mental must have existed uncaused, and mere existence, therefore, is not necessarily a mark of previous causation, unless we take for granted an infinite series of causes."

Let us examine the distinction between physical causes and mental causes, and get the essential idea of the two. When we speak of causes in the world of matter, what do we mean? Do we mean that simple uncompound substances, or substances apart from other substances, can produce effects? Then matter is not essentially passive; like volition, it is self-active: certainly this is not meant by physical causation. We mean by physical causation the relation of cause and effect under certain prescribed conditions. Thus, there must be two or more substances to produce effects, and then a certain relation of those substances to each other. In other words, cause and effect can only exist in physical substances when there is more than one substance, and then under a certain prescribed order or law, or relation of these substances to each other. We must combine the two, or there is no effect.

We can dissolve salt in water, but not glass. We can mingle together milk and water, but not oil and water. Thus, we see in all material substances mechanical laws and chemical laws, and to produce effects there must be two or more substances, and then a right adjustment of those substances. Consequently all action in matter comes from without; all effects are *ab extra*. Matter itself is passive, and must be moved upon. Alone it never changes, never moves, never acts. We do not discuss the nature of second causes, but simply their mode of manifestation. We do not define the phenomena of physical causes, but exhibit them as they appear to all minds. Matter itself is essentially passive. All effect, all action, is from without, not within; therefore matter has no intelligence, no freedom, no accountability. What, now, is mental causation? Mental causes differ as widely from physical causes as the mind itself from matter. The mind is a unit, a person, a substance indivisible, endowed with will, which is self-active. Self is the invariable attendant upon mind, a simple, pure idea of consciousness, self-evident and intuitive. Thus, the idea of person, and that of self, go together. Every volition of mind, every perception of the senses, every feeling of the heart, every emotion of sensibility, carries with it the consciousness of self, of a person, of *me*, a free agent. Thus, we see a wide distinction between person and thing: a person is individual; a thing, general; a person is unity; a thing, complexity. One is indivisible, the other divisible; one self-active, the other acted upon; one embodies essential freedom, the other uniform necessity. A thing produces effects from without; a person, from within. One is caused, the other self-caused. One is irresponsible, the other accountable. Thus, a person has a kingly will, free to act right and wrong, moving within itself, making tributary to it as instruments the diversified objects of sense; but a thing is irresistibly bound to the law of necessity; it cannot act except in connection with another substance, and then only in accordance with some invariable law of order or proportion: doubly enchained in itself, it is essentially passive. Thus we see how different are the causes of the physical and of the

material world,—how unlike are each in their action. Here it is, by compounding mental causes and physical causes together, we see the error of the extreme necessarians, and by overlooking physical causes, or the great law of cause and effect, in mind as in matter, we see the difficulties of the extreme libertarians. The former, by a mode of reasoning adapted only to physical causes, make even the will forced, and a compulsory state of the volitions, thus virtually leading to the ruin of all true liberty; while the latter, denying cause and effect in the mental world in relation to the will, not only war against the clearest axiom of consciousness, but remove away all certainty of human action, all foundation for character, and the only principle by which we can possibly judge of human or divine conduct. If there is no great law of causality in the mental world, then consciousness and the senses falsify their trust; liberty even ceases to be true liberty, and becomes a variable, lawless liberty, where unlimited fickleness marks all character, and eternal uncertainty all action. The laws of the mental world cease to have any meaning, and endless doubt rests upon every anticipation of human or divine volition. But it is equally hazardous not to draw the line of separation heaven-wide between physical and mental causes. If we borrow our reasoning upon mental causes from any physical analogy, we are inevitably forced over the precipice of a relentless necessity. We may cover up our language with ever so many smooth names, but we shall be compelled either to contradict over and over again ourselves, or, if consistent, there can be no alternative but the fatalism of Fichte or Spinoza. We are not safe for a moment if we lose the idea that the mind acts from within, while the body from without; that in the will cause and effect are *ab intra*, while in matter *ab extra*; the one self-active, the other acted upon. The only idea of power with mind is internal, while with the body it is external. Consequently physical and mental causation are distinct altogether. Not more wide apart is the substance of matter from mind, than is the law of causality that reigns in both. Let the necessarian purge his mind of physical causes when he enters the mysterious

temple of human thought and volition. Let him disentangle himself of the ambiguous reasoning about the strongest motive. It is the man that determines the motive, vastly more than the motive the man. And let the extreme libertarian remember that the law of causality exists in the world of matter and of mind; that in the mind it exists in perfect consistency with human freedom; that consciousness and the senses confirm this law, and that without it all things would be afloat, even as they would be did it not exist in the material world. Having now considered the distinction between physical and mental causes, let the person who would lose sight of God in second causes, or deny them, consider the language of Lord Bacon :

“For certain it is that God worketh nothing in nature but by second causes; and if they would have it otherwise believed, it is by mere imposture, as it were in favor toward God and nothing else, but to offer to the author of truth the unclean sacrifice of a lie. But further, it is an absurd truth, and a conclusion of experience, that a little or superficial knowledge of philosophy may incline the man to atheism; but a further proceeding therein doth bring the mind back again to religion; for in the entrance of philosophy, when the second causes, which are next unto the senses, do offer themselves to the mind of man, if it dwell and stay, then it may include some oblivion of the highest cause; but when a man passeth on farther and seeth the dependence of causes and the works of Providence, then, according to the allegory of the poets, he will easily believe that the highest link of nature’s chain must needs be tied to the foot of Jupiter’s chair.”

It has therefore been seen that God could not have a prior cause, because existence does not necessarily imply a cause; because, when we trace back ever so far cause and effect, we reach at last the first cause, and the only sufficient cause; and that there we must stop, because in God cause and effect are self-existing, and that consequently there can be no infinite series of causes. Here we feel that the existence of God is placed upon an immovable foundation. When then we come

to reason upon final causes, the adjustment of general laws, the adaptation of means to an end, and all the evidences of design shown in the works of nature, we can see far more clearly than before the varied and wonderful proofs of the being of God; we extricate ourselves from all the sophistry disguised under the unmeaning language of laws of nature, and that pantheism that confounds God and nature together; but especially do we relieve ourselves of the metaphysical subtilities comprehended in an infinite series of causes directly leading to the deification of the powers of nature, and the denial of all true freedom of will.

Unsurpassed as is the reasoning of Paley upon the evidences of contrivance in nature, and the clearness of all his proofs of intelligence in the construction of the world, yet his admirable work upon final causes and design evinced in this world cannot clearly combat the profound subtlety of German infidelity, and all the atheistical sophistry disguised under the language of laws of nature and an infinite series of causes. To give the highest effect to all reasoning upon final causes, it is very important to show efficient causation in the works of nature from God, when in no sense general law in respect to that causation could have an existence. Thus removed from the sphere of law, efficient causation leads directly, without any intermediate agency, to the First Cause. God, then, being clearly demonstrated by the most convincing induction, all other proofs from final causes, from the laws of nature, or the adaptation of means to an end, come clothed with far greater power to the mind. This is easily seen when there is the direct suspension of some law of nature, as in the case of miracles. How irresistibly is the mind led to the acknowledgment of God! How striking, how direct is the proof of divine agency! Should some man, as in the time of Christ, be raised from the dead, or walk, as our Saviour did, upon the waves of the sea, how convincing would be the immediate power of God! Thus the mind that so unreasonably confounds God with nature, and the Deity with his laws, is forced, however reluctant, to confess the being of God. Because efficient causation in

the origin of man and the brutes partakes so clearly of the character of *miracle*, where no known law and no second causes have any existence, we see how irresistibly the atheism embodied in the wrong idea of general laws of an infinite series of causes is swept away. We see how plainly an infinite God is seated upon the throne of the universe, revealing himself directly in creation and all miracles, and indirectly, but no less certainly, in the phenomena of general laws, their adjustment together, and the adaptation of means to an end.

“It is no doubtful inference,” says Francis Bowen, “no long and tedious process of reasoning, which connects all events in the history of the universe with the being and attributes of God. The conclusion is so obvious, the connection so close and striking, that it is difficult to believe that any mind not willfully obtuse, and not perverted by logical subtilities and metaphysical abstractions, ever failed to conceive it with perfect trust at first sight.”

CHAPTER II.

WHAT ARE MATTERS OF FACT?

MATTERS of fact may be distinguished into things which exist and events which take place. Thus the earth is a matter of fact, and its movement is equally so.

What are matters of fact?

All material things, and all events in connection with them, must be classed among matters of fact. But the question is, Are matters of fact exclusively confined to objects of sense and their changes, or can matters of fact have a wider range? Are those things which we see, handle, touch, hear, or taste, with their changes, alone matters of fact; or may there not exist other matters of fact, entirely distinct from the world of visible things, that cannot come under the cognizance of any of our senses? If so, then the instrument by which we attain unto a knowledge of these matters of fact must be altogether different from the senses. Is there such an instrument? Certainly; in consciousness is found the instrument, as real in its operation and clear in the knowledge it imparts, as is seen in the agency of the senses.

What is the consciousness?

The consciousness is that which directly gives the knowledge of the volitions of the mind and all the desires of the heart. Is not an act of will a matter of fact? Is not to us the certainty of our volitions as great as the certainty of the earth we tread upon? Does any person doubt whether he wills to do this or that thing? Does he doubt whether he feels pleasure or pain? Is the mind less certain of the feeling of sorrow or joy, of hatred or love, of confidence or distrust, than of the stars that sparkle in the sky, or the flower that adorns the field? But the acts of the volition, or feeling, cannot come under the cognizance of the senses. The anatomo-

mist, with his knife and microscope, may dissect the body, and view the minute wonders of the human frame; but can his microscope and knife avail him in dissecting the vastly more mysterious mechanism of thought and feeling? No. This belongs to the domain of psychology, not physiology. The instrument by which we analyze the former is consciousness, the latter the senses. It is in making the senses comprise *all matters of fact*, and confounding all the facts of consciousness with simply *the relation of ideas*, as that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, or the whole is greater than a part, that the mind is led to depreciate the commonest and clearest facts of our being. But are the facts of the consciousness equally clear? Certainly not. No more than are all the facts of the senses. The naturalist, in observing the phenomena of nature, varies in degree of certainty. In his scale of facts there is a belief based upon the highest certainty, and a belief less sure, ranging down even to the lowest probability. To arrive at certainty the senses must have ample opportunity for observation; they must not be limited in respect to their exercise, but must have ample field for operation. Much is said of the deception of the senses; but the senses, properly understood, never deceive. The senses only promise a true decision when suitably used. If but partially used, if but limited in their legitimate sphere, their decision must correspond to the character of their exercise; precisely the same is it with the consciousness. The consciousness, properly understood, never can deceive; but then it must have a fair field for its exercise. There are innumerable facts of consciousness, ranging from those which all believe in to the more obscure and less defined. But what is the remedy for a true classification of the facts of consciousness? Just the same which the naturalist resorts to in the true classification of the facts of the senses—*careful observation*. The instrument of the consciousness must be used with as much discrimination as that of the senses. But here consists the difference. The senses have to do with that *without us*; while the consciousness is limited exclusively to that *within us*. We cannot run after the facts

of the consciousness; they must be observed at the same time they appear in the consciousness. The mind must be abstracted from the external world, must retire within itself, and ponder upon those facts that constantly present themselves in the soul. Self-demonstration to us will be the highest demonstration. It will be proof as great as any derived from the observation of the senses. But more than this: the facts of consciousness exist with all; for the facts of the senses we go abroad; but the facts of the consciousness are found at home. It will not do to form a system, and bend the facts of consciousness to that system. It will not do to theorize: we must observe. Like the naturalist, we must content ourselves with ascertaining facts, not building systems. Our minds must be limited to strict observation of facts, and then induction from facts. By this way all the leading facts of consciousness will be distinctly recognized, and perfect agreement will exist; because there will be the same self-demonstration with all of the same facts. But if, instead of careful observation of facts, and deductions from facts, the mind abandons itself to system-building, it will fall into errors equally as pernicious as those errors that existed in physics before the Baconian principle of induction took the place of the old philosophy of ages of ignorance and presumption. From units we must go to universals, and not from universals to units. Having seen that the phenomena of the intelligence, the sensibility, and the will are facts as real as the phenomena of the external world, we are prepared to answer the question, For what purpose do we investigate the facts of consciousness? Let us confine ourselves to the facts of consciousness universally admitted. Who doubts that he wills, or thinks, or feels? Who is there that is not persuaded of his acts of volition? Who does not believe as certainly in his thoughts and feelings as in any of the phenomena of the external world? But by what instrument is it that he knows that he feels, wills, or thinks? Simply the consciousness. Certainty in these facts is as absolute as certainty in any of the facts of the senses, and man must be annihilated before he loses his belief in

thought, feeling, and will. It is as impossible to doubt these facts as that of the existence of an external world. Why, then, do we examine matters of fact, be they of the senses or of the consciousness? The reply is, To find out the *law*, the principle of order that reigns supreme in all matters of fact. To what purpose to us would it be to have a collection of facts, be they of the senses or of the consciousness, if we could not find out the law of facts, if *order* was unknown, and if by induction we should be unable to ascertain the laws that link together every separate class of facts.

What, then, is meant by the law of facts? Simply the uniform relation of antecedent and consequent. For instance, "fire burns the hand." The induction is that always it will burn the hand. "A weight falls to the ground." The induction is that invariably, under like circumstances, heavy bodies will fall to the ground. "Oil mixed with water rises to the top." The induction is that water and oil will not mingle together. Thus, in the observation of the facts of the external world, we study the laws of those facts; we examine into the invariable relation of antecedent and consequent. Is it not the same with the facts of consciousness? Are there no laws except what relate to the sphere of the senses? Do not the facts of consciousness have their own peculiar laws adapted to their own mental and normal state? Is it not the law of the will to lead to action?—of the sensibility to awaken emotion and to influence the will?—of the intelligence to secure knowledge? We come, then, to the conclusion that internal phenomena, that the facts of the senses and consciousness are entirely distinct; that we cannot bring the senses to analyze the consciousness, or the consciousness the senses. Each have their separate sphere. The one has to do alone with the world without us, while the other is exclusively confined to the world within us. We come, then, to the conclusion that the universal law of every phenomenon, whether of the senses or of the consciousness, is founded upon an inherent principle of the mind: the relation of antecedent and consequent, cause and effect. The sufficient reason is not so much seen to be as known to be. It is a pure conception of reason. A first truth, an ab-

solute necessity of the very construction of the mind. The simple uncompounded ideas cannot be defined. Thus the knowledge of our identity, of our self-existence, the fact that I exist, is a truth of consciousness; it does not admit of argument or of definition. I know that it is so, because I feel it, I realize it. I cannot doubt it. I act every hour upon the belief of it. I labor for it. I eat, drink, and sleep for it. I cannot persuade myself out of it. This is all that can be said, and it is enough. It is a truth of intuition, of pure reason, of the highest consciousness, and therefore cannot be compounded or defined, or made any clearer by any amount of argument or process of reasoning. Equally evident is it that in the consciousness the universal law of every phenomenon must be intuitively seen and felt and acknowledged by all. Thus the relation, or law of cause and effect, or sufficient reason; and the result is not so much seen as known. It is instantly, and upon all occasions, felt as a first truth, a fact of pure reason, and an invariable attendant upon every act of consciousness. We all believe in it, because we feel it; we always act upon it, because we know it. Every person in his own experience is fully persuaded of it. As soon as a change is perceived, we know it must have a cause. As soon as an effect is produced, we know something must have produced it. We feel intuitively that every consequent must have an antecedent; every operation a sufficient reason. Such is the fundamental law of our consciousness; otherwise all the facts of the world within us would avail us nothing. We would be lost in all induction; rather we could have no induction. For what is induction? It is simply a right classification of facts to arrive at the law of those facts. But if there is no invariable relation of antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, how can the mind ever attain unto the law of facts? If fire burns one person and freezes another, if gravity brings one heavy body to the ground and raises another up from the ground, where is the induction of the law of heat, or of gravity? Of what use is reasoning from facts to their law when there is no law, or an endless contradiction of law? If there is no invariability of antecedent and consequent, but an endless discord between

them, then all facts would be a confused jumbling together of materials that would either lead to no knowledge, or only lead to misguide. Is it not, then, the first axiom of pure reason, the most immediate and invariable truth of consciousness, that every effect must have a cause, every consequent an antecedent, every result a sufficient reason? Can there be any mistake here? No. We must admit this law or rush into absolute skepticism. One only alternative is to doubt everything, or admit this law. We must doubt an external world and an internal world, our own existence, and the existence of things without us, all matters of fact, and all the relation of ideas. We must rush into self-annihilation, disown our own being, and live, feel, and act as if there was neither a world within us nor without us. We must deny all rules of obligation and every principle of duty; all faith, all reason, all induction, and all consciousness.

But can we do this? Impossible! There is a point reached when the most obstinate skepticism is compelled to cure itself, when the most unlimited doubts are forced to work their own ruin. Whether we will or not, the facts of the external world enter, by the avenue of the senses, into the mind. To doubt the facts of the world without us, we must destroy the senses; and to doubt the facts of the world within us, we must destroy the consciousness; and we can deny neither,—we are compelled to admit the facts of both.

“The law of every phenomenon,” says Jouffroy, “is a pure conception of reason; like all legitimate axioms, as soon as we perceive any change whatever, we know at once that it is an effect, that it has a cause, that this cause has acted to produce it,—that it has been determined to produce it by some deciding influence, and, finally, that this effect becomes itself a cause, and produces in its own turn some new result. All this is the product of reflection alone, before observation has ascertained the cause, the operation, the sufficient reason, and the result. All this appears to be true, not because we see that it is, but because we know that it must be; and precisely on account of this necessity our reason confidently applies it to all possible cases, and regards it as the universal law of every phenomenon.”

CHAPTER III.

GENERAL LAWS OF THE EARTH AND SUN.

“WHAT we call a general law,” says Whewell, “is in truth a form of expression including a number of facts of the like kind. The facts are separate, the unity of view by which we associate them, the character of generality and of law resides in those relations which are the object of the intellect. The law once apprehended by us, takes, in our minds, the place of the facts themselves, and is said to govern or determine them, because it determines our anticipations of what they will be. But we cannot, it would seem, conceive a law founded on such intelligible relations to govern and determine the facts themselves, any otherwise than by supposing also an intelligence by which these relations are contemplated and these consequences realized. We cannot, then, represent to ourselves the universe governed by general laws, otherwise than by conceiving an intelligent and conscious Deity, by whom the laws were originally contemplated, established, and applied. This, perhaps, will appear more clear, when it is considered that the laws of which we speak are often of an abstract and complex kind, depending upon relations of space, time, and other properties, which we perceive by great attention and thought. These relations are often combined so variously and curiously that the most subtle reasonings and calculations which we can form are requisite, in order to trace their results. Can such laws be conceived to be instituted without any exercise of knowledge and intelligence? Can material objects apply geometry and calculation to themselves?”

When we have ascertained the law of facts in the physical world, we are compelled by the very existence of that law to attribute it to some intelligent cause. By this principle alone can we account for the operation of laws acting all in due

proportion and harmony, never conflicting with each other, and so adjusted as to secure the wisest purposes.

Consider the law of gravity by which the earth is kept in its peculiar sphere, and all other worlds are controlled in their position and velocity. By this law all bodies are attracted inversely as the square of their distance. How happened it that a mathematical law so exact is so universal? Why do all our researches in astronomy reveal the same uniform law? Our essential idea of chance is irregularity, and blind, meaningless action. We may imagine a fortuitous concourse of atoms, but we never can ascribe to *fortuitous concourse* an undeviating principle of regularity, binding in harmony all worlds, and preserving the harmless equilibrium of all motion. Suppose the law of attraction different from what it now is, one thing can, with certainty, be predicted. The existing state of things upon this earth would be altogether changed. Imagine this law, instead of inversely as the square of the distance, to be directly as the square of the distance, what would be the result? Under this law the gravity of bodies at the surface of our world would be destroyed. There would be nothing that would weigh or fall downward. A ball thrown up in the air would revolve like the moon around the earth. All stability would cease, and no sooner would things be raised from the ground than they would describe a circle around the earth. And yet it has been shown by Newton that, so far as the solar system was concerned, planets would revolve round their suns in circular orbits. Why, if there is no designing mind, should precisely that law take place that would secure orbits nearly circular, and yet not interfere with the gravity of each planet? If, on the other hand, the law had been inversely as the cube of the distance, it would follow that a planet would describe a spiral line about the sun, and either come perpetually nearer to him, or go farther from him. If, again, the attraction had been inversely as the simple ratio of the distance, it would have altogether interfered with the stability and harmony of the system. Why, then, was precisely that law instituted that is in every respect most adapted to the preser-

vation of the earth and the comfort of all who live in it? Why, then, if there was no designing mind, would it not have been different? Gravity, as Newton himself declares, is an appendage to the essential qualities of matter, not an inherent property of all matter. If, then, we imagine it *universal* to all matter, we have yet in right to consider it necessary to matter. When we thus consider the simplicity of this law with its universality, when we reflect that the same law holds good with the atoms of matter, as all spherical bodies, what reason have we to ascribe a principle of attraction so indispensable, and yet so uniform, to anything but an intelligent cause? That all particles of matter and all worlds should obey thus harmoniously this law, and yet no contriving mind to originate it, seems in the highest degree incredible. Observe the mass of our earth. The earth moves in a slightly oval orbit around the sun, and is nearer the sun in the winter by one-thirtieth of the diameter of its orbit. So far as we can judge, the force of gravity depends upon the mass of the earth. If, now, the force of gravity was much greater or much less than it is, the whole order of things would be deranged upon this earth; we would see all things too light or too heavy; all voluntary or involuntary motion would be either painful through the increase of weight, or unstable through its decrease. With difficulty would we walk or run, and the muscular exercise of all animals would be attained with extreme fatigue, or our movements would be too quick and unstable. Thus the earth would be like an ill-adjusted machine. It is well known that vegetables have the power of pumping up into the branches and leaves the sap that nourishes the plant. This internal force is great, as has been proved by experience. Hales found, for instance, that a vine in the *bleeding* season could push up its sap in a glass tube to the height of twenty-one feet above the stump of an amputated branch. Now, the whole support of the vegetable creation depends upon the exact adjustment of the force of gravity. It has been found that not only are different vegetables adapted alone to a different climate, and a particular season of the year, but

the power of gravity must be what it now is, neither less nor more, or, as the consequence, the vegetable creation withers and dies. Was our earth twice as heavy or as light as it now is, vegetation, as now constituted, would not exist. The sap would run in that way as effectually to preclude all growth. Thus, we see that the law of gravity is exactly adjusted to existing laws of the vegetable world.

Consider also the distribution of the day and the year: the one marks the revolution of the earth upon its axis; the other, the revolution of the earth around the sun. Now, the year is adjusted to the cycle of the vegetable world, even as it is to the wants of the animal creation. Thus also it is with the length of the day. Was the day six hours long instead of twenty-four, the existing relations of the vegetable and animal world would be altogether changed. So also if our year was six months instead of twelve months long. Why, then, should we have our days and our years exactly to correspond to the necessities of animals and vegetables? Why the solar year so invariable in its length? Can it with reason be imagined that no design is shown in the wonderful harmony that prevails in the length of the year and day, and the existing wants of the animal and vegetable world? If our day was but six or twelve hours in length, what derangement would ensue to the earth! Neither the proper period of sleep or action would exist. Our days would be too short for labor or for rest. If also the year was but six months long, the system of vegetation would be wholly interrupted. Thus, in every respect, we see deep foresight in the adjustment of the day and year for living in the world. But how could such an adjustment be developed from the constitution alone of man, animals, and plants? Upon the supposition of an infinitely wise Creator it can easily be accounted for, but it cannot be attributed to any other cause. Consider the wonderful exactness in the length of the day. According to the calculations of Laplace, it is impossible that the difference of one-hundredth of a second of time should have obtained between the length of the day in the earliest ages of the world. Why is it, then, we see no retarding of

motion in this machine, when under no circumstances is it possible for us to construct one with invariable motion? Is there any inherent principle in the matter of the earth that for thousands of years sends it spinning round its axis without losing even a second of time? Had the earth slackened in its motion but the hundredth part of a second of time in a revolution, the day would be lengthened, during six thousand years since the creation of man, six hours, and thus the whole animal and vegetable economy of our earth would be deranged. But the same law is also necessary for the preservation of the annual motion of the earth. If the motion was retarded by any other law instead of the one we now have, the earth would approach nearer and still nearer to the sun, until it reached the center. Thus also with the other planets. They would all at last fall into the sun, and the whole solar system would become one chaotic mass. Of all laws, then, the one selected for the earth's motion on its axis is the best. Of all possible ones, it is the only one that secures stability and harmony to the planetary system. But what would the earth be without the sun? And yet the sun is a self-luminous body, while the earth and all the planets are opaque bodies. That the sun should be the center of our planetary system, itself luminous, while all the bodies revolving round it are wholly different, and still no designing mind to construct the one to give light and heat, and the rest to be only the recipients of light and heat, is impossible. For with what appearance of plausibility can we suppose the planets to be by some unknown principle struck off from the sun, and yet not partake of the light-imparting and heating power of the sun? Our solar system without the sun would be locked up in the chains of eternal cold and darkness: no life or vegetation would be possible; and yet the planets, if they were not created distinct from the sun, having no self-luminous and heating property, then they must have had their origin from the sun. But if the planets originated from the sun, which is a light-bearing and heat-imparting agent, how then could they be directly the reverse? If, as has been supposed, the light and heat of the sun proceed from its

coating or peculiar atmosphere, why have not the planets the same? How happens it, if they have a common origin, that we should see no semblance between the planets and the sun? Now, although the sun is the machine that lights up and warms the planets, yet without this it could be the center of attraction; but then the planets would revolve round the sun only as a rayless and dead assemblage of clods, utterly cold and repulsive. The light and heat are super-added to the more mechanical arrangements of the universe. Suppose, now, no interposition was necessary to regulate the movements of the system, how can we account for the peculiar condition of the sun, by which, in all the planetary revolutions, we have days and seasons? Can gravity be any solution to this difficulty? If the solar machine can move of itself, what first set it a going, and then gave days and seasons? Light and heat are immeasurably different from gravity. How came, then, the sun to have light and heat, and not the planets that revolve round it? Thus clearly did the greatest of astronomers perceive the necessity of some designing mind.

“And thus might the sun and fixed stars,” says Newton, “be formed, supposing the matter were of a lucid nature. But how the matter should divide itself into two sorts, and that part which is fit to compose a shining body should fall down into one mass and make a sun, and the rest, which is fit to compose an opaque body, should coalesce not into one great body like the planets, or the planets’ lucid bodies, like the sun, how he alone should be changed into a shining body while all they continue opaque, or all they be changed into opaque ones, while he continued unchanged, I do not think explicable by mere natural causes, but am forced to ascribe it to the counsel and contrivance of a voluntary agent.”

There is nothing more wonderful than light: when we consider the vast variety of purposes that it subserves, the intimate relation that it sustains to all vegetation, and its absolute necessity for all sight, we are not more impressed with the universality of its agency than with the greatness of its beneficence. How would all vegetation and animal life cease,

did one long night of Egyptian darkness rest upon the earth! Consequently among all the material emblems to represent the peculiarities of the mental state, the figure of light is most impressive and most common. So wonderful is light in its action, so needful is it for our wants, that we embody as our highest idea of wretchedness a state of interminable darkness. But light possesses laws of the most remarkable nature. Whether light be the emission of luminous particles from the sun, or vibrations through a most subtile and elastic ether pervading all space, has not yet been fully determined, although the latter view is most common at the present day. But light possesses an amazing velocity. When, then, we consider the rapidity of its movements, vastly greater than that of any other substance, with its properties of reflection, refraction, polarization, and periodical colors produced by crystals and by their plates; when we reflect upon its perfect adaptation to vision, painting with inimitable beauty upon the retina of the eye not only every diversity of color, but the most exact proportion of objects, taking into the field of its vision alike the lofty mountain, the ocean, with its ceaseless motion, the bird, the flower, and the minutest insect, how impressive is the evidence of design! Was there any appreciable weight to the sun-ray, the eye would be instantly destroyed. Could the subtile process of chemistry discover the most attenuated size to the particles of light, their amazing velocity from the sun would be as fatal to all vegetable and to all animal life as a deluge from the heavens of cannon-balls. Why, then, should weight be imparted to matter precisely where it is needed, and all appreciable weight taken away where it is not needed? Here is a substance most intimately related to heat, lighting up the world with glory, painting the sky with a thousand tints of beauty, imparting heat to all vegetable existence, and joy to all animal motion; unveiling the loveliness of every landscape, and the grandeur of revolving worlds, and yet in itself so harmless, so beneficial, so universal, that, penetrating through the vast regions of space, it shows forth the mute praise of all inorganic substances, and inspires with electric pleasure all sensitive existence. How

can atheism, when there is contemplated the properties of light, its essential dissimilarity from all material things, its power of reflection, by which it is reflected and scattered by all objects, and then comes to the eye from all; its power of refraction, by which its course is bent when it passes obliquely out of one transparent medium into another, and by which, consequently, convex, transparent substances, such as the cornea and the humors of the eye, possess the faculty of making the light converge to a *focus* or point; with its power of *polarization*, by which, when the vibrations of light are transverse, they may be resolved into two different planes, or *double refraction*; by which, when they fall on a medium which has different elasticity in different directions, they will be divided into two sets of vibrations,—how, when light possesses peculiarities so wonderful, can it ever imagine that no designing mind made the light, and adjusted it to the varied wants of the universe?

Contemplate the laws of heat in respect to the earth, the atmosphere, and the water. The earth, like all solid bodies, is capable of conducting heat and of radiating heat. There is this peculiarity in respect to the earth,—that if this mass of matter varied much from its present magnitude and density, or from the laws of heat now pertaining to it, all vegetation and animal life, as now existing, must cease. There are laws of mathematical precision that limit the degree of heat in its conduction and radiation to its prescribed measure. Now, there is no reason why the earth should conduct and radiate heat as it now does necessarily. The earth might possess different elements, and then the measure of heat would be altogether changed. If the earth were a globe of pure iron, it would probably conduct heat twenty times as well as it now does; if its surface were polished iron, it would only radiate one-sixth as much as it does. Changes far less than these would subvert the whole thermal condition of the world, and make it unfit for habitation. Consider the laws of heat in respect to the atmosphere. We live in an aerial ocean most beneficently adjusted in its composition to vegetable and animal life. The atmosphere possesses, in different propor-

tions, dry air, or air free from water and aqueous vapor, both transparent and highly elastic. The machinery of the weather is not only extremely complex, but most happily adjusted to the wants of vegetables and animals. The heat of different climates is diffused and tempered by the atmosphere. Its range of influence is from the poles to the equator: thus it circulates over the whole earth. It executes many smaller circuits between the sea and the land. It enters, as an essential element, into the growth of plants and animals. It is the atmosphere that converts sunbeams into daylight. It is the great medium of sound, and thus performs the distinct office of communication between intelligent creatures; and yet such is the weight and due quantity of the atmosphere, that the most violent winds soon subside, and perform the friendly office of purifying the climate, and affording facility to all navigation. While the atmosphere is ever present, it is never in our way; adapting itself to the endless changes of heat, it combines every element essential to our happiness; possessing a mobility the most remarkable, it contains properties so distinct, that it subserves purposes the most varied. Was the amount of the atmosphere much greater, or was its weight different from what it now is, either too heavy or too light, all existence, animal or vegetable, would be in the highest degree endangered; were the proportion of the elements that enter into the atmosphere in any considerable degree changed, life would not exist. Possessing a small portion of carbonic acid, it imparts the carbon, when light is present, to vegetables, while at the same time it receives from plants the disengaged oxygen. Thus an element essential to animal life is absorbed in the atmosphere; while carbon, which, beyond a certain proportion, is highly pernicious, is by plants extracted from the atmosphere. Did this atmosphere possess a proportion of oxygen one-fourth or one-third greater than its present amount, there would be too much fuel for animal life; was the proportion of nitrogen much greater than it now is, there would be too little to support life. Thus the exact amount of nearly one-fifth oxygen to four-fifths nitrogen is proved to be the degree most conducive to life. Was it chance that

mingled these subtile gases thus appropriately together? The aqueous portion of the atmosphere varies from the one-hundredth to the one-twentieth part of the whole aerial ocean that encircles the earth. Observe that the aqueous air is as essential as the dry air; both combined are necessary for vegetable and animal life. The atmosphere is the vehicle to convey the aqueous vapor. Was now this vapor administered pure, it would not have subserved the wants of the organized creation; it must be diluted by the agency of the dry air to be serviceable. Suppose there were no other atmosphere but the vapor which arises from its watery parts, we can easily anticipate the result. The heat being greater at the equator, there would ensue greater rarity and elasticity to the vapor than what existed toward the poles. There would then be a perpetual current of steam toward the poles, which, coming in contact with the colder vapor of the poles, would be precipitated into rain or snow; and thus, while there would be a cloudless sky at the equator, in all other latitudes there would be perpetual clouds, fogs, and rains, and near the poles an incessant fall of snow. While had we only *dry air*, we should find most seriously injured all plants and animals. Now we have both so adjusted together that we have just that variety in the climate essential for the welfare of the organized creation. But more than this, amid incessant change there is a constant tendency to a proper equilibrium. We never find such an excess of only one element of the atmosphere, or such a violence of it, as permanently to interfere with the welfare of vegetation and animal existence. Steam and air, both elastic and transparent fluids, while so nearly alike, yet vary in respect to their expansion by heat so much as to be useful antagonistic forces. Thus, the same degree of heat applied produces currents in different directions, and there is such a mixture and balancing of these fluids that our fields and fruits have alternate sunshine and water, and thus in the happiest degree is the growth of vegetation developed. The influence of these two fluids upon the temperature is most important: one moderates the other. Now, among so many conflicting laws of heat operating upon the

elements that compose the atmosphere, it is remarkable that the adjustment is so uniform that every derangement of the atmosphere has a certain limit where it must stop. Here are different laws of heat: each acting unrestrained would bring ruin upon the earth; but they are so counterbalanced by opposite laws, are so restrained by antagonist forces, that altogether they move in harmony, or when that harmony is temporarily interrupted, they carry within themselves a principle of self-preservation that soon restores the deranged equilibrium. Thus, a tempest, however violent, is soon over; and the ocean waves, however lashed by the wind, never pass beyond a prescribed limit. But why should it be so, if there is no controlling mind to regulate the laws of the weather? Why, when the ship oscillates to and fro, and the tempest wave beats upon it, should that oscillation not keep on increasing in intensity until it results in the ruin of the vessel? Why, when it has reached a certain point, should it suddenly stop and begin a retrogressive movement? What inherent necessity is there in the atmosphere that perpetually should teach it the same unvarying moderation, and bind the unstable winds within a sphere of action as exact as that which controls the raging of the sea? The exact adjustment of conflicting laws, so that all should act in harmony, is the highest evidence of infinite skill.

In observing the transmission of heat through water, we perceive a marked difference from the transmission of heat through solids. Heat is communicated through water, not by being conducted from one part of the fluid to another, as in solid bodies, but by being *carried* with the parts of the fluid by means of an intestine motion. The general law of heat is to expand, and make lighter water by means of the colder portion of the water descending to the warmer part, and that taking the place of the warm water. Opposite currents are engendered, by which there is a speedy equalization effected of temperature unlike the slow process of conduction of heat through solids. Hence we see the temperature of water much more uniform than the surrounding atmosphere, and inequalities much less than in solids. Conse-

quently a reciprocal influence is exerted by land and water. The heat of the former is greatly modified by the presence of water, so that both extremes of heat and cold are diminished. Water, by heat, expands, while by cold it contracts. Observe how deviations from a law so uniform take place under those circumstances adapted for the preservation of all organic life. Was this law not departed from in any state of the water, the result would be that all the lakes and rivers would be locked up in ice. Animal and vegetable existence would eventually cease whenever there was the prevalence of cold. The reason is obvious. As the heat declined the cold water would be congealed into ice and form upon the bottom of bodies of water, since the heavier particles of water would naturally descend to the bottom, and thus there soon would be formed a solid body of ice, which would gradually increase until the whole was frozen. Now, water contracts by cooling down to forty degrees of Fahrenheit's thermometer; in cooling further it expands, and when cooled to thirty-two degrees it freezes. Thus we see, however much it cools, it cannot form upon the bottom of rivers and lakes in ice, for as soon as it contracts by cold down to forty degrees it begins to expand, and thus by its superior levity rises to the top. Another peculiarity of water is, that in the very act of freezing at the temperature of thirty-two degrees it experiences a new and sudden expansion, by which the ice at all temperatures ever floats upon the top as specifically lighter than the surrounding water. Thus, by this remarkable deviation from the law of expansion by heat and contraction by cold, we see obviated the most terrific evils. The ice, being a very bad conductor of heat, while it equalizes the temperature of the water, can never become too thick for subsequent melting, unless in the extreme polar regions; while water, by cold, assumes the form of ice, by heat it takes the form of steam. The moisture that floats in the air is essential for all vegetation. The aqueous vapor by condensation produces clouds; when there is an increase of cold the aqueous vapor becomes snow through a process of crystallization. There is a peculiar circumstance attending the change of ice to water, and

water to steam. This takes place according to an invariable degree of heat, but not *suddenly*; when we increase the heat to this degree where thaw commences, and where boiling takes place, there is a *stand* taken in the temperature. Thus, the temperature of a thawing mass of ice cannot be raised until the whole is thawed; nor can the temperature of steam rising from water be raised until the whole is converted into steam. By this arrangement all changes occupy a considerable time; if it was different, thaw and evaporation would be instantaneous: consequently all water, when reaching the boiling point, would flash into steam, and at the first touch of heat, snow and ice would be dissolved into water. Observe, that in condensation and evaporation there is an obvious violation of a law at a certain point; thus, while by this reverse movement ice is made lighter than water, so as to float upon it, the change at a certain degree of heat is so gradual that the most beneficial results ensue. How happened it, if there was no designing mind, that this law of contraction by cold and expansion by heat should at a certain point be reversed, and thus adapt itself to the wants of the world? With other fluids other laws do in fact exist,—why, if there is no contriving mind, should we see with water so singular an adaptation to the necessities of the world?

No laws are so indispensable for existence upon this earth as the laws of *friction*. In ordinary cases with solids, their movement through the agency of friction often exceeds one-third, one-half, and sometimes even the whole of their weight. Observe now, that friction is intermediate between two great forces: the property of cohesion that exists in the growth of vegetation with the ever-movable power of growth, and the pumping up of the sap into the branches and leaves, and the fixed property of crystallization that exists in solids. If friction partook of the mobility of the former, the highest instability would exist upon the earth; or if of the immobility of the latter, all things would be enchained in bonds that would preclude all life. Without friction we could not walk: we should be prevented from making anything, and the most ordinary purposes of life would be wholly frus-

trated. Observe the singular adaptation of friction to the world we live in. Did friction exist in the heavens where the planets move, all motion would be stopped, and there would be ruin to every planet and sun in the universe. Did friction not exist upon the earth, a ruin equally as great would ensue. Thus we see that it exists where it is wanted, and does not exist where it is not wanted. Was friction not intermediate between the crystalline forces that bind rocks together, and the perpetual mutability of vegetables, equally impossible would be existence. What is needed in friction is the capacity of readily receiving alternately the states of rest and motion. And thus we find it, because objects can easily be put in motion, and yet soon by friction return to a condition of rest, there is an unlimited sphere opened up for the contrivance and the energy of man. Thus, friction is neither abolished upon the earth, nor active in the heavens. But we have no reason to believe that friction is a necessary result of other properties of matter, as of their solidity and coherency. So far as we know, friction is a separate property of matter, and bestowed upon it for the wisest ends. Observe the stability of the solar system. It has been seen that there is no appreciable friction in the heavens, consequently all the deviations observed during the different ages of the world reveal, even if there be a resisting medium, a proportion of irregularity infinitely small. The movement of the earth on its axis has not changed the hundredth part of a second. The perpetual perturbations of the planets in each other's motions are found to be not indefinitely progressive, but periodical. They reach a maximum value and then diminish. Thus, in the solar system we find a constant provision for its stability; and whatever may be the irregularities existing, they are only periodical, and even tend to adjust themselves. Reflect upon the infinite value of such a state of things. Did the perturbations of the planets continue progressive, those perturbations would increase to a degree as to destroy all stability in the universe. The planetary orbits, from being nearly circular, would tend incessantly to a more oval form, until such would be the eccentricities of

motion as that planet would jostle against planet, and all eventually would tumble into the sun. How, without divine foresight, could the adjustments of the thirty different bodies connected with our solar system be so made as that, while mutually attracting each other, each describing different orbits, and all diverse motions, they yet would never interfere with each other's movements, and continue upon the whole in one undeviating course of regularity? When, in the greatness of this problem, we must include the fact that even the perturbations are periodical, and estimate also the different velocities of each planet around its axis, as well as around the sun, and then reflect that the different degrees of weight of every planet enters as an essential element into the calculation, is it conceivable that any cause than an infinitely powerful and intelligent Being could preserve such harmony, and bring about such perfect stability?

"I have succeeded in demonstrating," says Laplace, "that, whatever be the masses of the planets, in consequence of the fact that they all move in the same direction in orbits of small eccentricities, and slightly inclined to each other, their secular inequalities are periodical, and inclined within narrow limits; so that the planetary system will only oscillate about a mean state, and will never deviate from it, except by a very small quantity. The ellipsis of the planets always will be nearly circular. The ecliptic will never coincide with the equator, and the entire extent of the variation in its inclination cannot exceed three degrees."

Now, when we consider that of the simple substances that enter into the composition of our world there may be about fifty, and that each of these substances possesses different mechanical and chemical laws, operating in a way perfectly distinct from each other, how can it be supposed that these simple substances would, by their own accord, adapt themselves to each other? Be it remembered they no more make up our earth, of themselves, than do the iron and timber and all the varied materials of a man-of-war floating upon the water make up the vessel, when they are originally taken in their native state. These materials have got to be adjusted

together; they must be put into their proper place; each separate part of the ship must develop the contrivance of some mind; there must be order and proportion and exact weight observed. There must be a skillful collection of the whole; foresight shown in the proportion of every plank, the driving of every nail, the length of every rope, and the fastening of every sail. All these distinct materials do not jostle themselves together into the stately vessel that marches in majesty over the waters. There must be a contriving mind. Even so is it with the arrangements of the substances that make up our world. A wisdom, whose profound depths no finite intelligence can fathom, is revealed in the machinery of the world and the universe, giving harmony to every diversity of law, disarming the power of every antagonistic element, adjusting every separate force, giving due proportion to every substance, and uniting all in one sublime and glorious whole.

CHAPTER IV.

THE DEVELOPMENT THEORY.

THE author of the "Vestiges of Creation" holds, in his development theory, the same ideas, essentially, as Oken and Lamarck. Thus, he says: "The fundamental form of organic being is a globule forming within itself, and that globules can be produced in albumen by electricity, consequently that electricity is the cause of life." "All animals pass in embryo through phases resembling the general as well as the particular character of those of lower grade." "Man himself is not exempt from this law,—his first form is that which is permanent in the animalcula. This organization gradually passes through conditions generally resembling a fish, a reptile, a bird, and the lower mammalia; at one of the last stages of his foetal career he exhibits an intermaxillary bone, which is characteristic of the *perfect ape*; this is suppressed, and he may then be said to take leave of the simial type, and become a true *human creature*." Sex, too, in the "Vestiges of Creation," is spoken of as a matter of development. "All beings are at one stage of the embryotic process female, and a certain number of these are afterwards to be of the more powerful sex." "The first step in the creation of life upon this planet was a chemico-electric operation, by which simple germinal vesicles were produced. The next step was an advance, under favor of peculiar conditions, from the simplest forms of being to the next more complicated, and this through the medium of the ordinary process of generation; and finally, that the simplest and most primitive type, under a law to which that of like production is subordinate, gave birth to the type next above it, and this again produced the next higher, and so on to the very highest."

The researches of science show, in direct opposition to the development theory, that man and all the species of animals owe their origin direct to miracle. Says the celebrated German physiologist, M. Müller: "All the phenomena hitherto observed in the animal kingdom seem to prove that the species were originally created distinct, and independent of one another. There is not a remote possibility that one species has been produced from another."

Unless we would have the force of the argument from effect to cause immeasurably weakened in respect to the origin of man, and the Deity lost sight of in natural law, we must beware of the insidious sophistry disguised under the shibboleth of law. Miracle, instead of development, is claimed for the origin of man and every species of animals. It is in the light of this most essential feature of our argument from effect to cause that the researches of geology are deserving of such careful consideration. Those researches most conclusively prove the miraculous origin of man, as declared in the Holy Scriptures. The development theory is in all respects shown to be false, and thus natural law is confined within its legitimate sphere. Consequently nature is not deified at the expense of the great First Cause, and indirect as well as direct atheism is disrobed of its pretensions. While Lamarck, Oken, and the author of the "*Vestiges of Creation*" admit the existence of God, they yet remove him back to the creation of atoms, infusoria, and monads, and supersede a superintending God for a fatalistic principle, whose rigid certainty of continuance is as revolting to the most cherished sentiments of an unperverted nature as it is to the clearest assertions of Revelation. But the development theory not only substitutes law for God, but it is infinitely derogatory to human nature. There is something noble in the idea of man created by God, with a perfect physical, moral, and intellectual organization adapted to the loveliness of Paradise. The Eden without was but a faint emblem of the fairer Eden within. But how mean, in contrast, is the theory of gradual development, through ages of time, from the infusoria or animalcula created or brought into existence by the

contact of electricity and albumen, and then from that the development of the worm, the fish, the reptile, the bird, the quadruped, and finally man ! But the development theory is equally as revolting in its teachings respecting the progress made from a low type to a high type of sensitive existence. Creation by miracle draws a wide line of demarkation between genus and species. It not only denies that the fish ever can be developed into the reptile, or the bird into a quadruped, or that into man, but it also precludes the development of one species of animals into another of the same genus. The mackerel never produces the shark,—the snake never originates the crocodile,—the eagle never a sparrow,—the dog the cat, nor the elephant a lion. And, although in man genus and species are synonymous terms, since all mankind come from one stock, yet we see that when there is a fundamental difference, as in the male and female sex, there is no development changing man into woman, or woman into man. The difference existing between the two sexes is as great now as at the first creation of Adam and Eve. The great error of the development theory is that it confounds all the original distinctions instituted by God between different races or species. It acts the part of an ignorant child in comparative anatomy, who takes all the bones of fishes, reptiles, birds, and mammals carefully laid on separate shelves, and jumbles them all up together in one confused medley. This the development theorizer would call the discovery of unity ; but the man of true science can find no unity with individuality destroyed. The development theory, in its absurd generalization, overlooks those unalterable distinctions between one species and another, or one genus and another, that God has made the invariable attendant of creation. A theory that develops a monkey from a fish, and man from a monkey, has a hundredfold more of the marvelous than creation by miracle, while it finds no support either in science or Revelation. In considering the development theory we have confined our remarks to animals ; but the objection is equally strong when applied to the vegetable and inanimate creation. How absurd is the theory that makes, by the slow progress

of natural law, the suns, planets, and comets of the universe to be developed from fire mists, with all their motions and harmonious revolutions! Two great facts fatal to the development theory are made known in the researches of geology. First, miraculous interpositions have introduced the races of fishes, reptiles, quadrupeds, and man at distinct epochs of time, and in a way that reveals each dynasty of fishes, reptiles, quadrupeds, and man not developing a higher dynasty from a lower by the actual destruction of its ruling magnates. In other words, the supremacy of the dynasty of reptiles over that of fishes, and of quadrupeds over that of reptiles, is attained unto, not by gradual development, but by great epochs of ruin to a lower dynasty making room for a higher one. There was a time when fishes were the highest type of animals, and the magnates of that genus held an undisputed sway. Afterward there followed a period of great ruin to the highest species of fish, by which countless numbers were destroyed, leaving room for animals of a higher organization. Then followed the dynasty of reptiles, and the world saw the most magnificent specimens of saurians, and other reptiles of terrific strength. After their great epoch of supremacy had run out, we are introduced to the dynasty of birds and quadrupeds, taking the place of the wide-spread destruction of those reptilian monarchs who held in a previous age an undisputed sway. Here we see great periods of ruin introducing animals of higher organization; but, instead of a gradual development of a superior type of being from a lower, we find actually that the superior type of being follows the ruin of that which precedes it. Thus, we see that the ruin of an inferior organization of animals, instead of preventing the existence of a superior type of creatures, is actually necessary for the existence of animals of a nobler organization. Each epoch of time witnesses at its commencement the creative power of God, and at its close great catastrophes of ruin. But the development theory overlooks these miraculous interpositions; and while it offers no reason why the extinct species of animals are not now living, it vainly attempts to bridge over the mighty gaps in the series

of distinct creations by a chain of gradualism that connects the highest with the lowest. But there is no such chain. Gradual development only extends to one species or distinct class of animals; it is only designed for the perpetuation of them, but when it has reached this point it stops. Thus, the whale may have a great variety of forms and singularities of construction; but how can the whale develop the lobster, or the lobster the whale? The second great geological fact fatal to the development theory is, that there has been in each dynasty of fishes, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds a process of degradation going on, or a passing from a high organization in different species to a lower type of being. Thus, at the commencement of each dynasty of fishes, reptiles, birds and mammals, we see the beginning of each dynasty giving us the best, and not the poorest type of organization. The process of degradation is of a twofold nature. There is first a gradual extinction of different species in each dynasty, and then an inferior type of organization of the same species of animals now existing. Thus, we find not only no fishes, or reptiles, or birds, or quadrupeds of so high an organization as once existed, but even a process of degradation in existing species. What can be more fatal to the development theory than this! The whole error of the development theory consists in the confounding the *progress of epochs* of time with *progress in epochs*. Because a later epoch of time introduces animals of a higher organization, it does not show either no miraculous interposition of God, or that the animals of a preceding epoch were not the best of their kind. It would be poor reasoning to assume that because man is superior to the monkey, that therefore the monkey developed the man.

“It is now a truth, which I consider as proved,” says Professor Agassiz, “that the *ensemble* of organized beings was renewed, not only in the intervals of each of the great geological formations, but also at the time of the deposition of each particular member of all the formations.” “I also believe very little in the genetic descent of living species from those of the various tertiary layers, which have been regarded

as identical, but which, in my opinion, are specifically distinct. I cannot admit the transformation of species from one formation to another." Says Professor Sedgwick: "All our most ancient fossil fishes belong to a high organic type; and the very oldest species that are well determined fall naturally into an order of fishes which Owen and Müller place, not at the bottom, but at the top of the whole class." Says President Hitchcock: "Numerous races of animals and plants must have occupied the globe previous to those which now inhabit it, and have successively passed away as catastrophes occurred, or the climate became unfit for their residence. Not less than thirty thousand species have already been dug out of the rocks, and, excepting a few hundred species, mostly of sea-shells, occurring in the uppermost rocks; none of them correspond to those now living on the globe. In Europe they are found to the depth of about six and a half miles, and in this country deeper; and no living species is found more than one-twelfth of this depth; all the rest are specifically, and often generically, unlike living species; and the conclusion seems irresistible that they must have lived and died before the creation of the present species."

"The fact that fishes and reptiles were created at an earlier day than the beasts of the field and the human family," says Hugh Miller, "gives no ground whatever for the belief that the peopling of the earth was one of a natural kind, requiring time, or that the reptiles have been not only the predecessors, but also the progenitors of the beasts and of man. The geological phenomena, even had the author of the 'Vestiges' been consulted in their arrangement and permitted to determine their sequence, would yet have failed to furnish not merely an adequate foundation for the development hypothesis, but even the slightest presumption in its favor."

Is it not, then, evident that every distinct species of fish, birds, and mammals came immediately from the creative energy of the great First Cause? Do we not see that the first link of the human chain, and of every distinct genus and species of animals, must especially have a beginning from

God? These diversified species of creatures were effects so great, results so wonderful, that no adequate, no conceivable cause can be found but God. We look to the laws of the inorganic or organic world, to the atoms that compose all matter, but we find in them no reason for the origin of animals. We have investigated the half-atheistic theory of development, but all its deductions are found chimerical and opposed to the facts of true science. The development theory has nothing to commend it in the history of the past. The beginning of the human race, and of every species and genus of animals, assure us of effects so peculiar and so mighty, that we must look alone to miracle for their cause.

CHAPTER V.

MUTUAL ADAPTATION OF THE VEGETABLE AND ANIMAL KINGDOM.

ALL vegetables have their distinct localities, and their peculiar spheres of growth. Observe that one great chain of dependence runs throughout nature. Without the elements of heat, air, water, and earth, all vegetables would die. Without vegetables the great support of the animal creation would be taken away; without animals the world would be a solitary waste. But not only is there an intimate dependence of one department of nature upon another, but a great principle of compensation runs through the whole. The generation of animals keeps pace with the vegetable growth. Where in one department of nature there is a deficiency, there is in another department a superabundance to make it up. There is constantly seen the operation of the principle of equalization, by which an excess of one department of nature is counteracted by a deficiency in another. Passing over the peculiarities of the vegetable creation, consider the animal kingdom. This world is a living world: myriads of animals people it. From the short hour of joy that marks the boundary of the most ephemeral of creatures to the long years of man, there is seen the constant play of life. If we wonder at the thought of man, yet those animalcula that live in one drop of water present to us their miracles of art.

“If there be one thing,” says Buckland, “more surprising than another in the investigation of natural phenomena, it is perhaps the infinite extent and vast importance of things apparently little and insignificant. When we descry an insect, smaller than a mite, moving with agility across the paper on which we write, we feel as incapable of forming any distinct conception of the minutiae of the muscular fibers which affect their movements, and of the still smaller vessels by which

they are nourished, as we are of fully apprehending the magnitude of the universe. We are more perplexed in attempting to comprehend the organization of the minutest infusoria than that of a whale. And one of the last conclusions at which we arrive, is a conviction that the greatest and most important operations of nature are conducted by the agency of atoms too minute to be either perceptible by the human eye or comprehensible by the human understanding."

The researches of geology assure us that in the past ages of the world there are the remains of innumerable species of animals,—that successive layers of the surface of the earth make known an amazing extent of animal organization,—that in mountains, composed to a large degree of minute shells, forming vast masses of limestone deposits, there is every indication of myriads of animals once living upon the earth. These countless creatures, so far as the investigations of science can ascertain, had as perfect an adaptation to a former condition of our earth as those animals that now inhabit it. The great fact is made known that no abortive creation of species come upon the stage of life; that, trace back the long years of the past to its remotest boundary, and the same adjustment of animals to the sphere of their existence is revealed as now takes place in every living species; that the types of animal life were as perfect in their kind, and had as great an adaptation to their local habitation, as now exists upon the earth. Now, adaptation means almost a countless number of conditions of existence. The air, the earth, the water, the degree of heat, the kind of subsistence, must all have in the animal a corresponding fitness of constitution. Reflect how much that one word constitution includes! It means the proper number and proportion of limbs, the exact adjustment of all the senses, the internal structure that shall precisely correspond to the outward sphere of its existence. Not one suitable condition can be wanting, or the whole animal mechanism is spoiled. Not one of the apparently minute circumstances of its being can be missing without detriment to animal life. Two things are indispensable to secure the highest excellence to any work.

First, skill in the construction, and then a wise purpose in the use. How many a work of man has been spoiled from the uselessness of its design ! The pyramids of Egypt evince skill and power ; but who is there that can show a wise use in their construction ? But not so with the works of God ; they display both skill and a wise end, not only exact adjustment to time, place, subsistence, and climate, but wisdom is seen in the *end* of those adjustments. From the noblest specimens of animal life to the humblest forms of being, each not only have their appropriate sphere, but each have some wise end to subserve in that sphere.

CHAPTER VI.

PROCESS OF GENERATION IN ANIMALS, AND GERMINATION IN PLANTS.

PALEY has well said generation is not a *principle*, but a *process*. Generation is no solution to the question, What is the great cause that brings man into being? The power in organized bodies of producing bodies of like organization must itself be accounted for. How came this power in organized bodies is the question? How came the reproductive energy that gives birth to man? How came this wonderful process, mysteriously wrapped up in the living body, by which a like body is generated? The language, "principle of generation," explains nothing. It is itself to be accounted for. The deepest researches assure us of a most wonderful laboratory, where the first process of life goes on. We are instructed in the knowledge that a mechanism connected with a vital energy works out its miracles of art infinitely surpassing all the contrivance of man. Who, then, should speak of the principle of generation accounting for animals, when that very principle itself is to be accounted for? But the use of the language *principle of generation*, as often held, is an absurdity. *Principle* is confounded with process. If principle means anything, as often used, it must be the *elementary cause*. But this cause is a power distinct from the process itself of generation. We have another step to take before we can stop with the principle of generation; that step must be the elementary cause itself that gives to generation its vital energy. As well might a factory-girl show a stranger the wheels and cogs, the straps and iron, that enter into the machinery of some great workshop, and pretend to account for the operation of the whole by expatiating upon the advantages of some particular parts. The stranger knows full well

that the result effected can be accounted for only by a vast variety of exact adjustments; by the skillful position of every wheel, cog, and strap; by the suitable composition of each separate material that enters into the whole; by some force constantly applied; and, above all, by some designing mind capable of constructing the machine, competent to effect its suitable adjustment, and able to secure the agency of a power which, though blind in itself, could yet by proper arrangement bring about the desired result. But all analogies drawn from human mechanism fail to give a just idea of the variety, the exquisite adjustments of material, position, time and place, the elaborate architecture of the bodies of men and animals, and the sublime mystery of the complicated process that takes place before birth. When a house is built, two things are necessary: first, the house itself, and then the scaffolding needful for its erection. Before birth we find made the mysterious elements of the body; we find formed the complicated tissue of nerves and arteries, millions of blood channels in the system, sinews and cords, and pores for the circulation of the different fluids. We find a laboratory for the digestion of food surpassing all the imitation of man; an apparatus for breathing of the most wonderful nature. And yet a very large part of the fœtal process is exclusively prospective. Everything is preparing for the mighty change that shall soon introduce the child into a new world. Not more conspicuous is the house itself than the scaffolding that is used only for a temporary purpose, and is removed as soon as circumstances demand. Can any person affirm that the complicated instruments of the body, with their exact adjustments, are to be accounted for exclusively on the principle of generation? But generation is only a *process*; this process itself is to be accounted for. Can a pin, a needle, the simplest work of a man, lead us to the conclusion of some designing mind? And yet we blunder when we come to a workmanship that infinitely surpasses all human ingenuity! If the intelligence of the parent is incompetent for self-construction, equally incompetent is it to fashion the body and the mind of the child. Neither the parent nor the child can

achieve a wonder so mysterious. "I have not come into existence," says Fichte, "by my own power; it would be the highest absurdity to suppose that before I was at all I could bring myself into existence; I have then been called into being by a power out of myself." What makes the process of generation all the more conclusive of an infinitely designing mind, is the fact that we can trace back the earliest commencement to a point where no evidence can be shown of either the bones or members of the body, where not even the faintest outline is perceptible of the human system. When we enter the studio of an artist we find at first only the simple canvas upon which is to be sketched the well-known features of a friend; but if at successive times we enter the room where the painter busies himself in his task, we find that the first rude outlines are gradually filled up, until, when the work is done, we find the perfect image of our friend. Just so it is in filling up the outlines of the human system, a divine artist at successive stages fills up the outlines. From the first origin, where are undistinguished the faintest lineaments of the human form, there appears at distinct periods a bolder filling up of the sketch until the whole is perfected. The proof of design is peculiarly shown when adaptation is seen developed at each separate period; when from the earliest origin of the human form to its perfect consummation there are revealed higher and yet higher evidences of a Divine foresight. There are those who think that when they have got a principle, as they call it, they have discovered a cause. In the principle of germination in plants and generation in animals, they flatter themselves they have found out all that is needful to know in respect to the true cause. Here, say they, exist in miniature all the different materials, all the curious mechanism of the animal or the plant. But how do they know this? How have they found out a mechanism that the highest powers of the microscope fail to discover? How do they know that the perfect plant, or the animal, exists in a compass so infinitely small, when the highest researches of the magnifying-glass fail to discover even the rudest outlines? Confessing the almost infinitesi-

mal nature of the first germs of vegetable or animal life, why do they presume to draw upon their imaginations for a mechanism in miniature that no researches in science have ever been able to find out? True, that mechanism is found at a later period in an embryo state, but does that show that it existed in the earliest germs of vegetable or of animal life? Does it throw any light upon the mystery of the first commencement of all animal or of all vegetable organization? Will any pretend to prove that it is the mechanism in the germ or the plant that by its own power produces vegetables and animals? How can this be shown? "Suppose," says Francis Bowen, "that two grains of sand, looking just alike, were placed on the floor before us, and while we were watching them they began to expand, shoot up, alter their forms, take on all the aspects and qualities of life, and finally become distinct and recognizable, the one a giant oak-tree, and the other a living and moving creature. On witnessing so strange a phenomenon, we could not help concluding that some personal agency had produced it, some power transcending that of man. After satisfying ourselves that there was no deception or mystification in the matter, we should at once refer it to a supernatural or miraculous cause; nor would this conclusion be at all less logical if the phenomenon were a frequent one,—if there were a mountain of such sand, from which particular grains being taken at the proper season, and carried to the proper place, both time and place being determined by experience, these results invariably followed. Now this is a statement but very little disguised, and varying in no essential particular from the description of what is actually and constantly taking place all around us in living nature. The beginning of all life, and of all tissues, whether animal or vegetable, is in certain primitive cells or germinal vesicles, perfectly resembling each other in external appearance, and so minute that they can be discovered only under high powers of the microscope. The germs are alike to the eye, but according to the place which each is taken from, whether from one side or another of the sand-heap, it is developed by a regular process into a plant or an animal. If

you say that there are specific differences between these microscopic grains, each one veiling some curious and elaborate machinery, peculiar to itself, by which this astonishing result is brought about, I answer that your assertion is both gratuitous and incredible. It is gratuitous, for certainly we see no such machinery, and have no indication whatever of its existence; we see nothing but a little rectangular cell with a dot in it. It is incredible, for we can no more conceive of the possibility of a machine under such circumstances producing such results, than we can believe the automaton really plays an admirable game of chess solely by means of wheels, springs, and cylinders. In both cases we declare with positive conviction, that intelligence, will, and conscious activity are somewhere at work in this matter, that some *unseen person* is actually causing the phenomena."

A dead mechanism of bones, sinews, veins, arteries, limbs, and organs of sight, taste, touch, hearing and smelling, would avail nothing if the mysterious principle of life was wanting. What makes the human mechanism so wonderful is the great fact that it is a living mechanism,—a mechanism that will endure when years shall have passed away; a mechanism so delicate and yet so tenacious, so refined and yet so strong that it may survive the helplessness of infancy, the vicissitudes of youth, the dangers of manhood, and the decrepitude of old age; a mechanism that in some instances shall pass the remote boundary line of a century. In considering the generation of the human body and its subsequent growth, the mind often rests too exclusively upon the material part of man. Absurd as the conclusions may be, that the microscopic germs of animal or vegetable life embody all the mechanism of the vegetable or animal organization, or that inherent powers exist in the germs capable of developing the bodies of animals or vegetables, yet in the union of mind with body the evidence is greatly increased of the agency of God.

It has been seen that in the first germs of vegetable or animal life there is no evidence of the complicated mechanism of the future state. These germs appear alike to the eye;

they present to the microscope simply little rectangular or circular cells with a dot in them. Can we then suppose that in such cells is wrapped up the miniature mechanism of the future body, with its elaborate contrivances, its subdivisions of material, and curious diversity of bones, muscles, veins, arteries, and nerves? Do we ever dream, when we look upon some curious specimen of human mechanism, that this cylinder of its own accord jumped into its proper place, that this band cut itself out of the raw material, and, after passing through a dozen processes to fit itself for the machine, did in reality go to work to adjust itself to the great water-wheel, and then that this wheel put itself into that position by which, through the motive power of water, it intelligently turned the whole machinery? But those persons who talk about the human mechanism as if it was a self-perpetuating, self-acting, and self-adjusting machine,—as if its own inherent powers gave miniature types of human bodies, and bestowed just where was needed the bone and muscle, the veins and arteries, the cords and sinews, the hair and nails, the five senses and the different limbs, are precisely as blind to the designing hand of God as in the other illustration they are to the contrivance of man. They overlook essential distinctions in the one as in the other. Three things most distinct enter into the living organization of man: the body, the animal life, the soul, or mind. Now, because we see a complicated result, such as baffles all imitation, is this result to be attributed to the human organization independent of a divine agency? If from the unshapen marble a beautiful statue should be chiseled out, no person is so blind as to say the statue chiseled itself out; but should that statue reveal the great miracle of walking, sitting, and breathing, and manifest life, then the more should we say a foreign power was at work to enable the statue thus to do; but if, more wonderful still, that statue should reason and think, should feel pleasure and pain, should discriminate right from wrong, who, for a moment, would doubt the personal agency of God? But consider that we have millions of statues produced—living, thinking, feeling, reasoning, and knowing right from

wrong. We have every diversity of material, every perfection of art, every ingenuity of design, all wrapped up in the human body : we see a threefold union of mechanism, life, and mind ; we see earth, air, and water adapted to the body. Is there not, then, the most conclusive evidence here of the work of an infinite mind ? When we consider the wonders wrapped up in the mind, life, and body of man, his growth from the smallest germs, his adaptation to time, place, and sphere of existence ; when we contemplate this living organism picturing forth every feature of the mind and sympathy of the soul, and manifesting in every movement the grace becoming an intelligent being, is there not meaning in the words of inspiration ?

“ Canst thou by searching find out God ? Canst thou find out the Almighty unto perfection ? It is as high as heaven ; what canst thou do ? deeper than hell ; what canst thou know ? The measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea.”

CHAPTER VII.

PROSPECTIVE CONTRIVANCES OF ANIMALS.

ONE remarkable principle connected with the animal economy, most singular in its operation, is the vital energy that is constantly repairing the waste of the body, and instantly applying a remedy to the injury that may happen to the flesh or bones. If a bone is broken, a new bone begins to form over the fracture, and actually makes the broken part stronger than ever before. If a flesh wound is inflicted, nature summons all her resources to repair the waste, and secures, if possible, a healthy condition to the wound. Thus the body seems always to keep in it sentinels secretly upon duty, unobserved, while all goes well, but as soon as accident or crime inflicts a bodily injury, then all nature's resources are called to the rescue. Mark how soon, when the peace of a city is disturbed, the warning rattle is heard, and its guardians fly to the rescue! Thus, in the animal economy there walks also, unnoticed, through every avenue of the system, sentinels who keep the peace. When all is well we have no warning rattle, but let some ruthless invader attack the body, and then observe how nature calls upon her sentinels to preserve her rights! Nature reveals a recuperative power and a warning power. The instinctive principle of fear, and the surface of the skin, where the seat of pain peculiarly lies, especially subserve the end of a good police to give warning of danger; while the recuperative energy of the animal economy is the best of physicians, to counteract the injuries that happen to the body. Whether we go to the top of the scale of animal life, or descend to the lowest type of sensitive being, we see a peculiar fitness for the sphere in which each animal moves. Everything is perfect in its kind. When man works, he slights the humble workmanship, and exhausts his time upon the nobler specimens of his invention.

Not so with God: the body of a bee is as perfect in its make as that of a man.

“Birds in cleaning their feathers are supplied with a kind of oil for this purpose. There is on each side of the rump of birds a small nipple, which, by pressure, yields for their purpose a butter-like substance, by which the bird anoints and adjusts the feathers. Why, unless *designed by God*, should not *unfeathered* animals have the same?”

“The heron and cormorant are great fishers; the middle claw is toothed and notched like a saw. This greatly assists them in holding their slippery prey. The gannet, or solan goose, has the edges of its bill irregularly jagged, that it may hold the faster its prey. Can we attribute these peculiar structures to the manner of using these parts? Another simple contrivance is the *tongue of the woodpecker*. This bird lives upon insects chiefly lodged in the bodies of decayed trees. First, it is furnished with a straight, angular, hard and sharp bill; with this it bores into the wood, until it reaches the cells of the insects, then comes the tongue, of such length that the bird can dart it out three or four inches from the bill. Not only in this respect does it differ from the tongue of other birds, but it is tipped with a sharp, stiff, bony thorn; then this tip is dentated on both sides like the beard of an arrow or barb of a hook. When the bird has discovered the retreats of the insects, with a motion exceedingly quick, it darts out this long tongue, and then transfixes them upon the barbed needle at the end of it, and thus draws its prey within the mouth.” As Paley has well said (in these and the following illustrations), “If this be not mechanism, what is?”

“The *air-bladder* of a fish is a plain evidence of contrivance. It is a philosophical apparatus in the body of a fish. By the relaxation or compression of the muscles of the fish, the air-bladder renders the fish specifically lighter or heavier than the water, and thus at pleasure the fish rises or sinks in the water.

“The *fang of a viper* is a perforated tooth loose at the root; close to its root, and communicating with the perforation, is a small bag containing the poison. When irritated, by the

pressure of its root against the bag underneath it the poison is forced through the tube in the middle of the tooth. What an effectual weapon for inflicting injury !”

“The *bag of the opossum* is a singular contrivance for the protection and support of its young. There is a false skin that forms a pouch, into which the young are received. Nor is it a mere doubling of the skin, but a new organ furnished with bones and muscles of its own ; this forms the cradle and conveyance of the young. Was not intention shown in this contrivance ?”

“The *stomach of the camel* retains large quantities of water, and keeps it unchanged for a considerable time ; this is absolutely needful to enable the camel to journey in the desert, where so seldom are they enabled to get water. What, then, is the internal organization that secures a purpose so beneficent to the camel ? There are a number of distinct sacs or bags (thirty have been discovered in the dromedary) that lie between the membranes of the second stomach, and open near the top into the stomach by small, square apertures through these orifices. After the stomach is full the annexed bags are filled from it, and the water so deposited is not liable to pass into the intestines, and is kept from the solid aliment, and preserved from mixture with the gastric juice.”

The prospective contrivances of the young of animals afford clear illustration of some great designing mind. Observe that the period before birth is a sphere of being essentially different from an after-state of existence. The teeth, the eyes, the lungs, are all useless at that time, but infinite foresight has prepared them to exercise, precisely when wanted, their appropriate office. They lie wrapped up securely in their first habitation for the eventful period when they shall be called upon to perform their new functions. Here we see the same provident care displayed by God as afterward is shown in leading animals to provide for their young. Thus, whatever may be the sphere of action, each sphere has its own appropriate duties, and the whole life, with all its changing seasons, from its earliest dawn to the last closing scene, makes known the watchful care of an infinite mind. Consider the principle of compensation in nature. If

we take the elephant, we find that his short, unwieldy neck is compensated for by a long and highly flexible proboscis, by which the food is secured. The crane kind, who live in the water, and secure from this element their food, having no web feet, have instead long legs for wading and long bills for grasping. The spider, without wings to fly, and yet who lives upon insects, has a web as a compensating *contrivance*. The lobster, so singular in construction, unable, like other animals, to grow by the gradual expansion of the skin with the rest of the body, casts off at proper periods its old coat of shell, and slipping his feet out of their bony incasement as a man takes off his boots, in this way secures the same purpose of growth that other animals do by a method entirely different.

Birds have no teeth, but how can granivorous and herbivorous birds live? They may be said to carry about with them a coffee-mill in their gizzards. So constructed is the gizzard that it breaks and grinds the food as effectually as a mill. Now the gastric juice, by experiment, is found not to operate upon the whole grain, even when softened by water, but only when broken into fragments. Without this peculiar apparatus the chicken would starve upon a heap of corn. How happens it that gizzard and bill go together, and that the gizzard is never found where there are teeth?

It is a curious problem for the artist to contrive a way of locomotion for those animals who have no feet, but a designing mind, in reality, has secured that which would puzzle the most ingenious to conceive of. Reptiles reciprocally shorten and lengthen the body by means of the joint action of strings and rings, or longitudinal and annular fibers.

"Contraction and expansion," says Paxton, "is the mode of progression in *worms*, but not in *reptiles*. In the class of serpents, locomotion consists simply of repeated horizontal undulations, viz., flexion and extension. Thus, the head being the fixed point, the body and tail assume several curves; the curvatures are straightened, and thus the animal advances with serpentine motion. By alternating it moves forward at each step nearly the length of the whole body, the ribs having nothing to do with locomotion unless as affording a fulcrum for the muscles."

CHAPTER VIII.

THE SENSES.

THE senses are to be looked upon as the instruments of the mind. They are the tools with which the mind in a material organism works. The senses are also most intimately connected with the nervous system. Through the medium of the nerves the senses peculiarly act. Observe, then, the intricate relationship which the senses sustain to the nerves, and the nerves to the mind. Whenever we hear a sound, or perceive an object, three things are necessary: the senses, the nerves, and the mind. Thus, while we are able to trace some of the steps by which the nervous system acts, through the agency of the senses, we are wholly incompetent to understand anything of the deep mystery of the connection of the nerves with animal life and mind. From the effects produced, we know that nerves are not mind, any more than mind is the five senses. Thus, with three distinct agencies, material and immaterial, we have to do with the external world. How could any principle of generation, or law of nature, ever produce three agencies so intimately connected together and yet so distinct from each other? Mechanism so profoundly adapted to the external world, and so wonderfully associated with mind! Observe that the world within and the world without are so adapted to each other that, in a healthy state of the material organism, our mental ideas exactly correspond with the actual realities of things. Ingenious philosophy has disputed this; but all the laws of common sense and human belief never for a moment have questioned this great truth. When we see a great mountain, and climb its lofty summit, our mental idea of an actual mountain, and not an imaginary one, gives us the precise truth of a positive outward existence of this

mountain, of which the ideal conception is the faithful picture. Thus, by the most clear law of our nature, the senses, as exercised in their appropriate sphere, with opportunity for action and healthy condition of the nervous system, never can deceive us. Millions may be ignorant of the adjustment of these instruments to the external world; they may be able to describe nothing of the actual mechanism and the mutual dependence of one sense upon another, and yet there is not one mind capable of intelligent thought that knows not and feels that the senses are precisely adjusted to the world without, that their mechanism is the most elaborate, and such as cannot be imitated by the highest stretch of human ingenuity. All can tell the use of the microscope, or the telescope, even if few can give a good description of them. All know that these instruments are the work of intelligence; but when we contemplate the senses, we consider not dead mechanism, not merely living mechanism, but mechanism in connection with the mind, that may well be called *thinking mechanism*. Here is a step to show a designing God, far in advance of the common argument of a watch, with the wheels in motion, so celebrated in the masterly treatise of Paley. It is because these instruments of the senses feel and taste and hear and smell and see. It is because these senses, in their connection with mind, introduce us into the glorious harmonies of the universe, and open up the majestic movements of countless worlds, and give the consciousness of the deep beauty of nature, that we see so clearly the proof of a God.

“What is termed the structure of the organs of sense,” says Sir Charles Bell, “is that apparatus by which the external impression is conveyed in words, and by which its force is concentrated on the extremity of the nerve. The mechanism by which their external organs are suited to their offices is highly interesting; it serves to show (in a way that is level to our comprehension as most resembling things of human contrivance) the design with which the fabric is constructed. Thus the eye is so seated and so formed as to embrace the greatest possible field of vision.

We can understand the happy effects of the convexity of the transparent cornea, the influence of the humors of various densities acting like an achromatic telescope; we can admire the precision with which the rays of light are concentrated on the retina, and the beautiful provision for enlarging or diminishing the pencil of light in proportion to its intensity; but all this explains nothing in respect to the perception that is excited in the mind by the impulse on the extremity of the nerve. In like manner in the complex apparatus of the eye, we see how this organ is formed, with reference to a double course of impressions, as they come through the solids, or through the body, and as they come through the atmosphere; we comprehend how the undulations and vibrations of the air are collected and concentrated; how they are directed through the intricate passages of the bone, to a fluid in which the nerve of hearing is suspended; and we see how at last that nerve is moved, but we can comprehend nothing more from the study of the external organ of hearing."

It is not necessary to enter into a description in detail of the separate senses of the body. So many and accurate have been the illustrations by the anatomist of the senses, that it would be doing the greatest injustice to the senses to give a hasty sketch of them. For the purpose of our argument, it is quite enough to state facts which all admit. Of all the senses, that of the eye presents itself as the most elaborate work of art. Protected by a bony socket, with its three humors, its transparent cornea, its concave retina, and moved by six muscles in every direction needed, with a power of adjusting itself to near or distant objects, it shows itself precisely adapted to the rays of light, and all the diversity of spheres in which it is called to act. No matter what may be the peculiarity shown in the elements of air, earth, or water, the eyes of all animals are exactly adapted to the wants of every creature. Thus the eagle, that soars in the air, has an eye unlike that of man, and yet neither could exchange places without the greatest detriment. The eye of the fish is useless out of the element of water; but in that element

subservient all the demands of the fishy race. In those extreme circumstances where the eye is not needed, we do not find the eye. Thus eyeless fish are taken from the dark waters of the Mammoth Cave of Kentucky. Here was a sphere where no eye was wanted, for in the perpetual absence of light the eye is useless. Could it be chance that made some fish eyeless and other fish with eyes? Is there not as much intelligence seen in adapting circumstances to the eye as in the making of the eye itself? The precision with which objects and colors are delineated upon the retina is very wonderful. Thus the retina of the eye is a constant and ever-changing panorama of the outward world, with all its varied scenery.

“Could a painter,” says Dr. Dick, “after a long series of ingenious efforts, delineate the extensive landscape now before me on a piece of paper not exceeding the size of a silver sixpence, so that every object might be as distinctly seen in its proper shape and color as it now appears when I survey the scene around me, he would be incomparably superior to all the masters of his art that ever went before him. This effect, which far transcends the utmost efforts of human genius, is accomplished in a moment in millions of instances by the hand of nature, or, in other words, by ‘the finger of God.’ All the objects I am now surveying, comprehending an extent of a thousand square miles, are accurately delineated in the bottom of my eye on a space *less than half an inch in diameter.*”

Volumes could be written upon the five senses—of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smelling—in their relation to the external world, and the theme not be exhausted. If through the eye, as an instrument of the body, such necessities are relieved and such pleasure secured; if in relation to man such ideas are awakened by this miracle of art, equally true is it that the other senses perform offices as pleasant and essential to the welfare of the body. Take away hearing, and what a void is made in human existence! Take away touch or taste, and what a blank is made in the happiness of creatures! By the senses the world without us is brought

into intimate sympathy with the world within us. The senses unite us to both. Upon the mode of their union impenetrable mystery rests. But one truth is clear: the senses are only instruments of the body. They do not constitute in themselves any of the phenomena comprehended in the language, sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smelling. Back of the nerves lies that mysterious principle called animal life, in connection with the instinct and the mind; *here* resides the true seat of the senses. The greatest wonder of all is that instinct and mind, as bound up in animal life, can bring, with these instruments, the world without us into such intimate sympathy with the internal part of our nature. Thus the bird that warbles his little song, the ocean with its myriads of fish, the deer bounding over the plain, the savage lion, the entombed remains of the denizens of far-distant epochs of time, and, above all, man speak of God.

“The smallest dust which floats upon the wind
Bears the strong impress of the *eternal mind*;
In mystery round it, subtle forces roll;
And gravitation binds and guides the whole.
In every sand before the tempest hurled
Lie locked the powers which regulate a world,
And from each atom human thought may rise
With might to pierce the mysteries of the skies;
To try each force which rules the mighty plan
Of moving planets, or of breathing man;
And from the sacred wonders of each sod
Evoke the truths, and learn the power of God.”

CHAPTER IX.

LIFE AND INSTINCT.

LIFE has been defined by Stahl to be "the condition by which a body resists a natural tendency to chemical changes, such as putrefaction." Humboldt says living bodies are "those which, notwithstanding the constant operation of causes tending to change their form, are limited by a certain *inward power* from undergoing such changes." Kant defines life "as an *internal faculty*, producing change, motion, and action." Bichat's definition is, "life is the sum of the functions by which death is resisted." Schmidt says, "life is the activity of matter according to laws of organization."

Life by materialists is the same as organization, or is confounded with it. But is there no difference between a dead man and a live one? And yet the organization after death is the same in the one case as in the other. But how different the one from the other! Life is something superadded to organization; a perfectly distinct power. The one is only mechanism; the other is the mysterious force that makes the mechanism go through with its revolutions. The machine is good for nothing without some power applied to set it in motion. Now, life is the power that moves all the wheels of the animal economy. It is the mysterious agency which, with unintermittent force, daily propels the workmanship of the artist. Consequently, a living body reveals far more distinctly the power of some great architect than a dead body. Observe this peculiarity in all living organisms. It is constant change and constant motion: unlike inorganic substances, the condition of existence is ceaseless activity. Sleep may suspend some of the action of the body; but not for a moment does the blood cease to flow, or the heart to beat, or the inhaling or the exhaling of air. The laboratory within is ever in constant activity. What is it that thus

keeps up the circulation of the blood, or the breathing of air? It is the animal life. Here, then, do we see the constant play of a force that, with untiring energy, sets in daily movement all the mechanism of man. Here we see the generation of new bodies; the wonderful principle of compensation, by which, when a bone is broken, when a wound in the flesh is inflicted, nature has ever in store a new material to supply the loss or waste of the old. A new bone forms over the fracture, new flesh speedily restores the old, and thus is the body seen not only capable of introducing types of similar organization, but of repairing the waste or injury inflicted upon the old. Now, life is the direct opposite of chemical affinity: it holds while the body lives; wars with those chemical laws that are seen in inorganic substances. Here are two forces showing themselves in the human body: that of life and that of chemical affinity and change. Yet the latter is restricted to its proper sphere as long as life continues; when that ends, chemical laws begin their work of change and dissolution. If, now, there is no power independent of the animal organization, why is it that the first germs of animal life, with no appearance of an elaborate mechanism, with not the slightest indication of its subsequent state, should by their own inherent agency give birth not only to the complicated machinery of the body, but the mysterious energy of life? There is not the slightest plausibility in the reasoning that confounds life with organization, and organization with the first germs of animals. If the earliest germs of animals reveal not one trace of mechanism; if the elaborate tissue of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, and arteries is the work of a subsequent period, then this cannot be true. Equally certain is it that life and organization are two distinct things. How came the principle of life to incorporate itself with the human mechanism without a divine agency? Animal life is a secret force, a mysterious power, but it is not an intelligent force or a reasoning power. It is not mind, it is not instinct, it has nothing in it that corresponds with thought. It is an undefined agency that works after its own peculiar laws. It has its distinct sphere of movement; and yet how valueless

the body without life! How soon does its beautiful mechanism return to ruin without this force applied to preserve it! What is the body without life to animate it! We esteem the mechanism of inorganic substances, even if the distribution of force makes them useless. But the dead mechanism of the body, how fearful it is! Life, then, is a principle as indispensable for the existence of all animals as the body itself. All the amazing variety of instruments that the body presents only make more deplorable the ruin when the grand agency of life has departed. But if life is such, did it come by chance into the body? If the seat of life, its mode of exercise, its commencement, is an unscrutable mystery, is there any doubt of the fact that life itself owes its origin to the mind of an infinitely wise God? We judge of the proof of design and adaptation by the intricacy and multiplicity of the instruments that bring it about. We consider the more artistic the machine, the more refined the different parts, the more evidence there is of a contriving mind. If, then, mechanism evinces contrivance, does not mechanism, instinct with life, show far more a contriving mind? When we consider the vast array of instruments, all useless without life, should we not be more impressed with the agency of God, when the great wheel that turns all the lesser ones begins to move, and there goes on in full power the complicated economy of physical existence? But life in animals without instinct is not of itself sufficient for continued existence. Instinct comes in as a mysterious force imparted by some foreign agent. While life is the condition of all animal existence, instinct is the condition necessary to make life of any service. We see in animals not merely living mechanism, but this mechanism directed by instinct, enabling every creature to fill the sphere of its being. Instinct is to the external world what animal life is to the body; that which adapts the body to that which is essential for continued being. No animal could live but a short time destitute of instinct, because instinct is indispensable as the preserver and guide of animal life. It stands as the ever-watchful sentinel over the principle of life in the body. While the sphere of life is the body, the sphere of instinct is the external world, ever adapting the

animal life to the conditions of the world without. Thus, while life keeps the mechanism of the body in due order and preservation, instinct comes in to adapt this mechanism to the outward relations of the body. Life, in its agency, is universal; instinct is particular. The reign of life is internal; instinct is external. The one is uniform in its action, the other is diversified in its agency. But instinct is distinguished from mind, in that it has no trace of reason or conscience. Instinct never thinks: it acts. It is a mysterious faculty implanted to subserve certain indispensable ends in creation. Animals must live; they must be able to provide for the wants of their offspring, or all animal existence would cease. Now, instinct is given to attain with unerring certainty the indispensable ends of animal life. In many respects we see in it a marked difference from the human mind. In the first place, instinct is incapable of improvement. It exists as perfect in animals in one age as in another. Centuries neither alter it nor improve it. The bee is as wise now as a thousand years ago. The ant builds no better houses now than when first created. The nest that the bird provides for her young is precisely alike, so far as material and dexterity is concerned, at one period as at another. There is no such thing as improvement in instinct: however it may develop itself in each species of animals, it is always precisely the same. But another peculiarity is seen in instinct to distinguish it from reason. Instinct jumps at one bound into perfection: it is as good in the first stages of it as the last. As soon as it can fairly develop itself, it is of its kind perfect for the end designed. Thus, the young duck takes as readily to the water as the old duck. The young beaver appears as wise in architecture as the old beaver. The young bee fabricates a cell with as much geometrical precision as the old bee. The first efforts of instinct are as well directed as the last. How different from reason! Feebler in its commencement than instinct, it gradually expands, grows more perfect with the flight of time, and in its highest maturity looks upward with longing eyes to yet nobler heights of excellence! But instinct also is extremely limited in its range; it only takes in few ends. It never goes out of a prescribed

circle. Not more uniformly do the planets move in their destined circuits, than does instinct move in its allotted sphere. Another peculiarity of instinct is, that it bears the clearest possible mark of a foreign agency. The accuracy of instinct is an imparted accuracy; some infinitely higher power than the animal gives instinct. How can it be otherwise? Does a person believe that the young crocodile, that takes to the water as soon as it leaves the egg, has any thought or design about water?—that the bee, which builds a cell more perfect than the art of man can imitate, does so as the result of study or of experience?—that the nest of the bird is fashioned by reason? Does it enter the head of a man that what human reason or experience blunders in, animal thought perfects itself in? No! Instinct is a mysterious power communicated by God, that, blindly, yet with absolute certainty, impels the animal to certain wise ends. The toil of learning may do for reason, but instinct has no time for it. Is there not then the highest proof of a designing mind, that what the animal left to itself would be utterly incapable of attaining unto by thought or experience, instinct secures immediately, and when in the highest degree needed? Is it thought that leads the bird to meditate upon the wants of her future offspring, and leave the habit of ceaseless activity for the long, the inactive process of sitting upon her eggs? Yet we see, without the slightest trace of reason, an end secured as wise as if the bird had been endowed with the intelligence of a Newton. How came the faculty of instinct in animals, if God did not give it? Can it for a moment be presumed that the animal originated by any powers of his own instinct?—that, without thought or any knowledge of his subsequent wants, he yet devised a faculty that in its appropriate sphere was better than the highest reason?

How came an animal without foresight to get up something for certain ends better even than the most disciplined reason could secure? How came such matchless subserviency to contain few but most wise ends, to come from a source where experience was impossible and thought altogether out of the question? Does not instinct, equally with life, reveal the agency of an infinite God?

CHAPTER X.

THE HUMAN BODY AND MIND, AND THE TESTIMONY OF HISTORY AND SCIENCE UPON THE ORIGIN OF MAN.

MAN is a complex machine, comprehending organized matter, life, and mind. The human form embodies a three-fold union, not more mysterious in principle than complex in construction. Man himself is a miracle of art. It may appear a small thing to stand upon the feet; but the most perfect statue cannot thus do: the slightest wind will overturn it; and yet with what ease and safety a man stands erect or walks the earth! Now, then, the different postures of man are owing to the imperceptible yet constant balancing of the body by the muscles. One of the hardest works of art is to make both sides of the body and head alike,—one precisely resembling the other. And yet how uniform and exact the proportions of the human frame! Of the millions who compose the human family, no two persons can be found having exactly the same features. Thus, while in all essential respects there runs through the whole race one great principle of resemblance; yet there is diversity of feature enough always to distinguish one man from another. Observe the regularity of the animal structure. While externally there is the most perfect resemblance in the limbs in opposite sides of the body, while there is exact correlation of parts, yet internally this is far from being the case. A line drawn down the middle of the breast divides the thorax into two, similar in all respects; yet the two sides inclose very different contents. The heart lies on the left side, and a lobe of lungs on the right, balancing each other neither in size nor shape. Thus the external proportion in this and other parts of the body does not arise from any equality in the shape or contents of the internal body. One great perfection in the animal mass is *package*. Observe the variety and number of instruments all securely stowed away in the

most convenient compass! Here at the center is the heart, pumping at the rate of eighty strokes in a minute; here are two different sets of pipes, one carrying the blood from the heart, the other returning it to the heart; here are the lungs distending and contracting their thousands of vesicles by constant reciprocation; here is the powerful chemistry of the stomach, with the bowels silently propelling the changed aliments; here are the liver, the kidneys, the pancreas, the parotid, all performing their peculiar office; here is the intestinal canal, five times the length of the body, so important in the animal economy, securely protected by being knit to the edge of a broad, flat membrane, called the *mesentery*; here is the brain, incased in bone, the spinal marrow so delicate, secured from injury by the wonderful mechanism that surrounds it. And yet with so many movements and offices, with such diversity of construction and position, such peculiarities of exercise, this living mass of heterogeneous substances and motions always keep in their respective spheres. Man, unconscious of the mechanism within, moves through life; day and night does he carry about a laboratory, where nature performs her mysterious work, and existence passes away through innumerable diversities of operation. Thus the body is a moving machinery, so compact, so beneficently arranged, that the flight of years and the changing seasons do but evince a stronger proof of an origin from an all-wise mind. Observe also the beauty of the body. An infinite taste, a refinement of art, transcending all description, has fashioned the human frame, has painted with hues more expressive than the rainbow the face of man, throwing into every feature the passions of the soul, giving to every movement propriety and grace, and revealing in every lineament the impress of mind. Thus, if so decisive the evidence of design in the body of man, much more clear is that evidence in the soul or the intellect of man. It is man, as compounded of the material and the immaterial, that demonstrates the handiwork of God with absolute certainty. Give to matter all the powers you please, none so wild as to imagine it ever can originate will, perception, imagination, reason, con-

science, and affection. These are the attributes alone of the mind; they have no affinity, no likeness to the properties of matter.

“Clay cannot cogitate,” says Pelling, “nor can any moving wheel reason, nor can the most spirituous parts of the blood *philosophize*, nor can the finest motes that dance in the sun *consult* or *deliberate*; nor can that glorious and enlivening creature, the sun itself, entertain those *meditations* which bubble and spring out of one’s mind; nor can all the material parts of the world put together form those contrivances, desires, and affections which are the operations of the human soul; and to suppose, as some pretenders to sense and wit do, that all these actions proceed from little restless atoms capering about in the head, and falling accidentally into various forms and contextures, doth argue rather that the brains of such men are infested with flies and nits, than that they understand anything of right reason and philosophy.”

Upon no one subject is history more agreed than in fixing some few thousand years ago a beginning to the human species. No nation so savage, none so dark as to believe that the human race existed from eternity. Consult all Roman or Grecian poetry, study the legends of all the sages of Eastern literature, investigate all the books of heathen philosophy, and among them all the one great fact is recognized,—the creation at some time of man. This fact, whatever may be the obscurity or contradiction respecting the mode of it or the time, runs through all tradition, it interweaves itself in all ancient philosophy and poetry. That some thousand years ago man had an origin is recorded in the written and the unwritten language of all nations upon the face of the earth. The golden age of man, his once primeval innocence, with the brazen and iron age that succeeded, is pictured forth in all the poetry and philosophy of the world. No matter how confused the notions in respect to the fall of man, most clearly is the fact made known of the existence of the first man. So far as the voice of history, sacred and profane, is concerned, we cannot doubt that there was a time when the human race had a beginning. Science unites her voice with history to confirm the fact of man’s

origin. The records of all investigations among the monuments of antiquity point to the central region of Asia, whence anciently proceeded the descendants of Shem, Ham, and Japheth. Here was the cradle of the human race, here originated the three great streams of population from the three sons of Noah. Tradition, even as the Bible, teaches us that the deluge destroyed a corrupt race of men, who were the descendants of that happy pair that once lived in a state of innocence. Science makes known to us that, among the remains of the extinct species of animals that lie entombed in the earth, there are no vestiges of man among the earliest species of fish, reptiles, birds, and quadrupeds. If man had existed from eternity, why so recent and late the records of his being? Why do we not at least find his remains among the earlier species of fish, birds, and quadrupeds? So far as the investigations of geology go, they are all opposed to the eternity of the human race. Geology discloses to us the fact that the human remains are the last and the most recent, while other races of organized creatures existed before. History and science testify to the comparatively recent origin of man. The Bible record of man's creation is confirmed by history and science. If, then, we look to the origin of man simply as a fact to be established by testimony, there will be found a weight of evidence that man came from the creative power of God vastly greater than we can adequately conceive of, so that not only the first link in the great chain of humanity, but every link in that chain, viewed separately or collectively, point to the infinite mind.

"Humanity proper," says Professor Tayler Lewis, "or the human proprium, did not *grow*, was no work of nature, but had a divine, a supernatural, an instantaneous beginning. There was a time, a moment, when man,—*a* man,—the *primus homo*, began to be, who a moment before *was not*. There was one in whom humanity commenced, and from whom all subsequent humanity has been derived. There was one who first began to be a man, and this principium has its date from the first energizing of that higher life, which came from a direct inbreathing of the Almighty and Everlasting Father of Spirits."

CHAPTER XI.

COMPARATIVE PHYSIOLOGY, AND PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY.

ONE of the most significant indications not only of design in the world, but of a constant superintending Providence, is the intimate relation which the inorganic kingdom sustains to the organic, and the adjustment of laws most opposite in their character to the general harmony of the system. The development theory, by ascribing all the inorganic and organic changes to powers inherent in matter, and to a principle of transmutation, by which one species of vegetables or animals generates a different species, and all from a gradual development through great ages of time, has in it nothing that confirms it in nature. Geology reveals how untrue this theory is in the past ages of the world. Let us, then, as peculiarly revealing the superintendence of God, notice some of those minute but most important changes constantly going on in the world. As we direct our inquiries into the department of nature where are made known the first developments of being, we are most forcibly impressed with the absurdity not only of a theory which denies distinct creations to distinct species, but which, under the vague phraseology of general law, dispenses with the necessity of an overruling Providence. The microscope reveals to us the forms of the globules of blood in herbivorous and carnivorous animals. Now these globules differ in form and number according to the character of the animal. In man, the globules are small and nearly circular; the globules are larger and of an oblong spheroidal form in fishes and birds. The form is different and still larger in reptiles. The form of the globules of blood is also marked in the grand orders of the herbivorous and graminivorous animals. Upon this wholly arbitrary distinction in the form and number of globules depends the vital

energy. Should an animal be bled to syncope, and the blood be permitted to flow on, death will ensue; but if the same kind of blood taken from another animal be injected into the veins, the animal, if not dead, will recover; but the blood of the herbivorous animal cannot answer for injection into the carnivora. Thus while dissimilar globules have power to rouse the animal for a short time, the animal cannot recover. Here we see in the rudimentary particles of the body a distinction upon which life itself depends. If, then, according to the development theory, the blood had been transmitted from one animal to another of different species, the blood would have changed its primary character. In vegetable cells or utricles, there is the same diversity of form as in the globules of the blood. Thus the cells are oval, round, or lengthened, and sharpened at both ends, or they assume tube-like forms.

“Observation,” says M. Jussieu, “which proves the truth of theories, determines the contrary on watching the development of a vessel. We do not find any one which, in its different phases, would have represented all the other kinds of vessels; and the same thing may be said of cells. Remark, moreover, first, that in each part of a plant, such and such modifications of cells, of fibers, of vessels are found. We have, for instance, in certain places, unrollable tracheæ, though in others we never meet with them; second, that in spite of the similarity of the chemical composition of the walls, that of their contents is quite different, and like the shape constant in appearance, and agreeing with the place which the cavity occupies in the vegetable. Thus, therefore, if all the elementary organs of vegetables commence their growth as utricles, among which we cannot discover any appreciable difference, except in their form, it is no less true that each utricle is destined from the beginning to assume in its ulterior development such a form and no other; or to elaborate such a substance and no other: it is not, therefore, the same organ.”

Most appropriately is it remarked by George Taylor, “There must be something in the embryo which gives di-

rection to the individual growth, or there is an infinite power presiding over the development growth of each one. This position proves the immediate interposition, as well as the omnipresence of the supreme cause; and the former establishes the distinct and unchangeable character of each class. One of these positions must be correct; and as both of them contradict the idea of transmutation or development, it is not important which one we force our antagonists to accept." Says Agassiz, "We know that one sort of an egg will only give rise to one sort of an animal, therefore we must admit that as an egg of one kind gives rise only to one sort of an animal, there must be an immaterial principle presiding over these changes, which is invariable in its nature, and is properly the cause of the whole process."

Consider the harmony existing between the laws of heat and light and the vegetable kingdom. It has been proved that a ray of solar light contains several distinct principles; one portion represents color, another portion affects the temperature, while a third contains the chemical principle which is invisible, and has no influence on the thermometer. What agency does the action of these distinct principles of a ray of solar light perform in vegetation? The British Association submitted the question to Mr. Hunt for investigation. In his report, he says that light transmitted through yellow glass has little or no influence upon the germination of seeds, as the chemical portion of the ray does not pass through that color. Every vegetable demands a proportion of all these principles, and cannot survive without a certain portion of these principles. Thus, germination, growth, and fructification depend upon changes in the proportion of them. These changes are in harmony with the seasons. Says Mr. Hunt, "It is now an ascertained fact that the solar beam during spring contains a large amount of the actinic principle so necessary at that season for the germination of seeds and the development of buds. In summer there is a large proportion of the light-giving principle necessary for the formation of the woody parts of the plant. As autumn approaches, the calorific or heat-giving principles of the solar

ray increase. This is necessary to harden the woody parts, and prepare them for the approaching winter. It is thus that the proportions of the different principles are changed with the seasons, and thus that vegetation is germinated, grown, and hardened by them."

In looking upon the vegetable kingdom we find that it subserves to man two great purposes: one that of food, clothing, and protection from the elements; the other a chemical and medicinal end. We find every country and diversity of climate having its distinct order of vegetables. Those vegetables most needed are most abundant. Thus, the *cereals* most useful are cultivated as far north as the seventieth degree of latitude. In the tropics, the banana, date, yam, and bread-fruit trees are scattered over the whole tropical zone. We find that nature is one vast storehouse where are deposited everything necessary for the support of man. Unlimited provision is made to gratify the different tastes of man. Ornament is consulted as much as utility. In the chemical composition of the animal and vegetable kingdom, we see a marked difference. The cellular mass of plants is composed of nearly equal parts of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen; but in animals, gelatine, composed of unequal parts of carbon, hydrogen, nitrogen, and oxygen, is the primary material. Vegetables in their growth absorb inorganic particles by the extremity of their roots; animals feed upon organic particles; and by the nervous and lymphatic vessels in the intestinal tube they absorb their nutriment. In animals and vegetables respiration is altogether different: that of animals is performed without intermission the whole of life; while light is absolutely necessary for vegetables. Wide as may be the difference in respiration and nutrition in the vegetable and animal kingdom, the organic apparatus is even greater which performs these functions.

In the physical geography of the earth, we notice that a large proportion of the continental element lies north of the equator. The eastern hemisphere has a much larger area of land than the western. Its greatest expansion is from east to west, while the new continent has its greatest length from

north to south. The northern continents contain nearly two-thirds of the continental area, or about twenty-two and a half millions of square miles, while the southern contain sixteen and a third millions only. The northern continents are more indented and articulated, and therefore present in their contours more variety: they are also possessed of inland seas and gulfs; while the southern are more compact, have fewer indentations, and no inland seas. The northern continents are almost entirely in the temperate zones; while the southern are confined to the tropical and warm temperate zones. The mountains, according to their arrangements, materially affect the temperature of the continental climates. In the old world the principal chains follow the direction of the parallels, while in the new world they take the direction of the meridian. The law, as in the case of the major axis, seems to be entirely different in the eastern and western continents. "The highest elevation of the continental masses," says George Taylor, "following the direction of the mountain chains, are uniformly located on the sides of the continents, and not as might be expected at the center. The mountains descend gradually towards the Atlantic and frozen oceans; while their slopes are rapid and precipitous towards the Pacific and Indian oceans."

"If the order were reversed," says Professor Guyot, "and the elevation of the lands went on increasing toward the north, the most civilized half of the globe at the present would be a frozen and uninhabited desert."

Thus we find, even in the arrangement of the continents, and the position of the mountain ranges, a clear indication of divine wisdom and goodness.

CHAPTER XII.

MEANING OF THE TERMS NATURE AND CHANCE.

So often and so loosely is the word nature used, so frequently is it misapplied, that its true import is deserving of careful consideration. Nature comprehends the universe, but yet is used with more peculiar reference to the objects that come under our immediate notice in the visible world. But we cannot speak of the powers of nature abstracted from the individual objects of nature. Nature, as the universe, with which in its largest acceptation it is synonymous, is made up of parts, and these parts, however related to each other, are comprised in an infinite variety of objects. Thus, to speak of nature in the aggregate as something distinct from the objects of nature is most absurd, and yet the powers of nature are often spoken of as if something resided in nature as an original cause of all things. When adaptation and design are admitted, we often hear the phrase, *nature itself is the cause*. But why thus delude the mind with language so wanting in intelligence and sense? Why suffer the mind to be deceived with the jingle of words absolutely without meaning? Is there no distinction between the first cause and second causes? Is there no difference between original power and imparted power? Do we speak of a self-active machine because we see the wheels move? Do we confound a landscape revealing a hundred tints of beauty upon the canvas with the painter of that canvas? Do we admire the artistic work of the statue, and lose sight of the genius that fashioned it? Nature has numberless objects, animate and inanimate; it has infinite diversities of collocation and adjustment, adaptations of the utmost beauty and usefulness. If, commencing with the objects of the inanimate world, we ask how came these objects in existence, is it any solution to the question to say

nature brought them in? But nature is only an assemblage of objects. It is no explanation to say that the whole introduced the separate parts, that the aggregate of all things produced each separate member. The question is, how did each separate object, animate and inanimate, come into being? Not how did the whole come into being. The question is, what was the cause, the efficient author of the particular objects that sum up the whole? Now to shift the proof from the part to the whole is poor logic, and worse sense. If there is one truth more self-evident than any other, it is, that existence does not prove self-creation. Because *I am*, it is no proof that therefore I made myself. Because the world is, that does not prove its self-creation. But the very phrase self-creation involves an absurdity. That which is not, cannot engender itself. I could not create myself before I had an existence, even had I the power afterwards of creating a world. When once it is seen that existing things have a beginning, then the cause of that beginning must reside out of itself. The question then is, did the separate objects that go to make up nature have a beginning? *If so*, then nature in no sense was the first great cause. Nature itself must be accounted for by a power out of itself, and distinct from itself. As, by separating the several parts that go to make up nature, we reduce it to nothing, so when we account for the separate things in nature, we cannot go for their cause to the great whole. An aggregate of different things is no cause of those things. Numberless second causes cannot do away with the first cause. Thus, when nature is properly viewed, we see the absurdity of making it the cause of the objects that go to make it up. As well may a person enter some great palace, and, viewing all around its wonders of art, its noble proportions, its lofty walls, its stones of polished marble, its well-formed windows, its walls decorated with the richest paintings, and its numerous contrivances of comfort and elegance, say the palace is the cause of all these things. Is now the reasoning any less sophistical that confounds nature with the author of nature? Is it not absurd to make nature the cause of its separate parts, and lose sight

of an intelligent cause that created the whole, and each member of the whole?

So much has been said of chance and of the fortuitous concourse of atoms, that in considering the personal agency of God, it would be well to give these phrases a passing notice. Whatever may be our view of the agency of God, or his personal manifestation of power in the works of nature, one thing is certain,—the great law that every event must have a cause embraces all actual events, all changes, all modifications of matter, and all begun existences. Adopt either the hypothesis of no cause but God, or that of the first cause and second causes, and in either case we are compelled to the belief that there is no such thing as chance or a fortuitous concourse of atoms; if by either supposition we mean causeless events or things, why is the word chance used at all? It is simply a term appropriate to human ignorance. When we speak of anything taking place by chance, all that is meant is, the cause is unknown or the thing or event not directly the object of our purpose. But because in relation to man in the restricted sphere of his mind and his thoughts we do not see many things or events the objects of human will or thought, yet everything is caused as really as the most designed object of human workmanship. An artist may chisel out a statue, but the chips of marble that lie like useless rubbish at his side, the very dust that floats in the air are caused as much as the statue itself. Where, then, is the difference? Simply here,—in the workmanship of the statuary the main object of thought and purpose is the due proportion of the body chiseled out of the marble: that we say is designed, while the dust and broken fragments of marble are not designed. But in what sense are they not designed? Simply in the sense of the statue itself. But as necessary to that statue they are designed; they form the balance of design, or, so to speak, the residuum of design. They are remotely objects of purpose and desire, as the statue is directly an object of purpose. So far as cause goes they are as really caused as the most perfect workmanship of man. But if chance is so restricted in its meaning

when applied to man, and if in no proper definition of the term there can be such a thing as chance, more true is it in relation to God that there can be no chance. The mind of God is unlimited, his wisdom and knowledge as boundless as the universe, his foresight extends to all events. Even the fortuities of existence are as much under his control and knowledge as things that happen after the most regular and precise order.

The far-reaching law of cause and effect reigns in the universe of mind and matter. God alone is *uncaused*, for he alone is self-existent: he alone has no beginning or end. In him reside the infinite depths of all causes. Chance with God is impossible, for contingencies are as really under his knowledge and direction as certainties. Contingencies with God when he purposes are certainties.

CHAPTER XIII.

UNITY OF DESIGN IN NATURE.

NATURE reveals through her vast domain one divine unity of wisdom and goodness. Not only the first truth of philosophy teaches us the absurdity of calling in more than one great cause for the formation of the universe, but the universe itself carries with it the essential mark of divine oneness of construction. Every separate province is intimately associated with the collective whole. Every part seems to be made after one great pattern, and the mighty aggregate, from the greatest to the least, appears to be tied together by one chain of Divine Providence. Dividing the universe into three parts, viz., that which pertains to matter, that which may be included under the endless developments of mind and instinct, and that which is comprised in the moral and accountable part of our nature, and there will be found running through the whole the clear trace of an origin from one infinite source. Naturalists have often exercised their minds in investigating the great dependencies of one part of nature upon another; they have found that, remove one element from the atmosphere, or change the constitutional principles of water, or modify but a little the external appearance of our continents or mountains, or reverse their present locality, or alter the ethereal combination of the solar ray, or remove any of the primary ingredients of the earth, or derange but ever so little the chemical properties of heat, and the result is ruin to man as he is now constituted. Changes that at first sight would appear unimportant, would soon propagate their influence by a thousand channels of communication, until one wide derangement would affect the whole. Thus, to change but a few degrees the relative position of the earth's axis, would work an entire difference in the climate and condition of the

world. Thus, if we look at the world we find air, heat, land, water, light, all having towards each other a relation so peculiar, that alter that relation in the least and the whole is permanently deranged. The collocations of matter, their adjustments that show so signally the wisdom of God, reveal also their oneness of design and origin. Not only does philosophy teach us that the supposition of more than one great cause is absurd and unnecessary, but all nature cries out against a plurality of self-existing and independent deities. No trace is there of such an absurdity in nature. Nature points us to one infinite God and there leaves us. A plurality of Gods must all have one design, or different designs. All must act in the same way, or differently. If the latter were the case, nature would reveal herself one mighty scene of disorder and contradiction. The condition of nature would be abnormal, and all sensitive existence as now constituted would be impossible: but should the former supposition be correct, then nature would give the lie to herself, and every page of her records would reveal one systematic deception, since man would be compelled to believe in one God while in reality there was a plurality of Gods. Such an idea is to the last degree absurd. Search through all nature, and one vast chain of dependence runs through the whole. One all-pervading unity is seen from the smallest to the greatest. Thus it will be seen that the universe is made up of innumerable parts all linked together; one great principle of gravitation reaches to the remotest star. In the minute, even as in the great objects of nature, there is seen the unity of God's workmanship. As we go through the animal kingdom we find that every species, every great genus carries throughout one uniform pattern. Thus so marked is the unity of design, that having made ourselves familiar with any one species of animals, we shall find our great end secured through all the diversities of this species.

"Every organized individual," says Cuvier, "forms an entire system of its own, all the parts of which must mutually correspond and concur to produce a certain definite purpose, by reciprocal reaction, or by combining towards the same

end. Hence none of these separate parts can change their forms without a corresponding change in the other parts of the same animal, and consequently each of their parts, taken separately, indicates all the other parts to which it has belonged. Thus, if the viscera of an animal are so organized as to be fitted for the digestion of recent flesh only, it is also requisite that the jaws should be so constructed as to fit them for devouring prey; the claws must be constructed for seizing and tearing it to pieces; the teeth for cutting and dividing its flesh; the entire system of the limbs or organs of motion for the pursuing and overtaking it; and the organs of sense for discovering it at a distance. The shape and the structure of the teeth regulate the forms of the claws; so that a claw, a shoulder-blade, a condyle, a leg or arm bone, or any other bone separately considered, enables us to discover the description of teeth to which they have belonged; and so also reciprocally we may determine the forms of the other bones from the teeth. Thus, commencing an investigation by a careful survey of any one bone by itself, a person who is sufficiently master of the laws of organic structure may, as it were, reconstruct the whole animal to which that bone had belonged. The smallest fragments of bone, even the most apparently insignificant apophysis, possess to the class, order, genus, and species of the animal to which it belonged: insomuch that when we find merely the extremity of a well-preserved bone, we are able by careful examination, assisted by analogy and exact comparison, to determine the species to which it once belonged, as certainly as if we had the entire animal before us."

Thus it will be manifest that unity of design is seen through the whole animal kingdom. There is equally clear one mighty chain of dependence all centering in one end. The elements of earth, air, and water are indispensable for the vegetable kingdom, and these three great departments of nature are so adjusted to each other, and all so essential for the intellectual and moral development of man, that any change, however apparently small, in their relative position would most vitally affect the whole. So adjusted is one part

of the world to another, and so connected is one world with other worlds to their central sun, and so associated is one solar system with another, that it would seem that the whole universe, with all its countless worlds and revolutions, was constituted upon one mighty plan with a mutual connection so intimate that everything not only had its proper place, but nothing could be spared out of its place. Thus, be the catastrophes of nature ever so great, these are made to subserve purposes most wise, and even through the greatest confusion are ordained to bring forth order and beauty.

But the unity of God is as clearly manifest in the intellectual and moral world. The world without us is exactly adapted to the world within us. If God was not wise and good, this never would have been so: if there were distinct and independent authors of nature, such harmony of the external with the internal, such order and wise arrangement, such unity of end and means never could be expected. Not only would there be different plans, but discord in the plans; not only would we see no unity of end, but great diversity of end; least of all should we see the outward world made to correspond so exactly with the internal world, so that each should so sympathize together and make both to act in such unison. The things that are objective are so bound up with the things subjective, that mutual concord in their normal state ever exists. Not more dependent is the body upon air, water, and food for life, than is the intellect and moral nature dependent upon the external world for development. Remove the senses that ally us with the world without, and what becomes of the mind and heart existing in an embodied condition in the world? The partial derangement of the senses, or the loss of any one sense, shows to us clearly how greatly fettered the mind is in its exercise. Whether existence upon the earth would be possible with all the senses removed is extremely questionable. Certainly, in such an abnormal state the mind would be of no benefit to the body, and all human life would be restricted to a very short time. Through the medium of the senses we are brought into intimate communion with the infinite developments of matter:

we hear the countless modifications of sounds, we inhale the fragrance of flowers, we see the beauty of nature, we touch the smooth and the rough, we taste the sweet and the bitter; but do we consider that upon which the senses are built? Are we conscious of that mysterious union of the senses with the mind, by which so intimate a sympathy is kept up between the external and the internal, the material and the immaterial? If unity of end, the oneness of one great plan is not here displayed, where is it displayed? That substances so opposite in their nature, so essentially diverse in their essence, should yet associate together in an intimacy so great can be attributed only to one great design, revealing one mind unlimited in wisdom and goodness. Thus the unity of design in nature involves also the idea of the oneness of the first great cause of nature, and intelligently considered exposes the fallacy of an infinite series of causes and effects. Does not the idea of effect involve the idea of power? Must not all power in action or effects have a commencement somewhere? If a person should dream of an infinite chain of cause and effect, no dreaming could do away with the fact that each link in that chain involves a supporting power somewhere. It is impossible to get rid of support by increasing to infinity the number of links in this supposed chain of cause and effect. The more links demanded for this chain, the greater ultimately must be the strength of the supporting power that holds the chain up. The mind is driven irresistibly to the conclusion of the absurdity of an infinite series of effects and causes, because the unity of design in nature not only points to the oneness of its great author, but shows, however incomprehensible God may be in himself, that yet he must be the first great cause, whose power, infinite in manifestation, holds up that chain of links surpassing in number all finite estimation.

Our conclusion is the same if we consider especially those effects bearing the clear marks of adaptation and design. If one effect of contrivance cannot exist without a designing mind, certainly no number of effects, however augmented, could exist without such a mind.

“Unity added to infinity,” says Pascal, “does not increase it any more than a foot measure increases an infinite space. What is finite vanishes before that which is infinite, and becomes nothing. Thus does our understanding before God, and our righteousness before his righteousness.”

“We may certainly know there is a God without comprehending what he is; and you ought by no means to conclude there is no God, because you cannot perfectly comprehend his nature.”

CHAPTER XIV.

GENERAL HAPPINESS OF ANIMAL EXISTENCE, AND INTELLECTUAL AND MORAL ACTION REVEALING THE GOODNESS AND MERCY OF GOD.

LIFE upon the whole is a scene of enjoyment. Animal existence is one of pleasure rather than pain. Happiness is the rule, while suffering is the exception. Animal existence is generally one long scene of happiness, not indeed uniform, not unattended with pain, but the proportion of suffering is to the amount of enjoyment but very small. The uneasiness or fear experienced is usually only enough to secure from greater evils. One thing is made to counteract another. If pain is long continued, it is small; if violent, it is short. But freedom from suffering, and with it long enjoyment, is the condition of most of our existence. From the highest scale of animal life to the lowest we find that life has its pleasure. How does every day disclose new scenes of happiness for creatures! How pleasantly glide the hours away of sensitive existence! Moments of rapture may be few, but the serene current of quiet pleasure, how uniform, how great! Night and day is given to us,—one for rest, the other for action. Our toils sweeten the repose of night, our rest invigorates us for the activity of the day. When we look upon some great city as the sun goes down in the skies, and the moon marches with noiseless step over the heavens, what keeps so many thousands in slumber so sweet, and then awakes them to the joys and duties of another day? Why so uniform this succession of activity and repose? Why fly so swiftly the mighty hours? Why do man and brute so unconsciously give way to rest? Is it not a peculiar mark of the divine goodness that the wants of our nature so great are met with such uniformity? As night brings with it repose for the exhausted

body, and day returns with its active pleasures, do we not with every passing hour see new proof of the benevolence of God? Could we conceive God thus kind if not good? Does the mother carefully prepare a bed for her infant and smooth his pillow, and hush him to slumber with her lullaby song, unless she cares for her child? Is her maternal solicitude no proof of her love? And when a care infinitely greater is exercised over us, and our hours of weakness are protected from a thousand dangers, and we are kept from the destruction that wasteth at noonday, and the pestilence that walketh in darkness, have we not high proof that God is good? Remember, man is dependent upon the author of his existence in a way that no creature is dependent upon another. Dependence in the one is relative, but with God it is absolute. Not less constant is it than intimate and peculiar. The creature receives everything and gives nothing. Man is infinitely in debt to God, while God owes not a farthing. An eternity cannot cancel man's obligations. We are constantly inclined to the error that possession of life gives a right to life. But how is this shown? Is not the existence of one hour of happiness a boon by the Creator? Is not the gift of one day of pleasure a greater bequest? Is not the gift of a week, a month, a year of enjoyment a favor greater still? But if before existence it would be absurd to speak of a right to it, does its possession give a better title to it? When we speak of the kindness of creatures, their benevolence, we speak of that which is relative, which must be restricted by a thousand qualifications, which is dependent in its exercise by innumerable contingencies; but the benevolence of God is absolute, it gushes forth from a well of fathomless depth, from a fountain low down as the heart of God and vast as his own boundless nature. Thus the value of the benevolence of God is immeasurably enhanced, from the fact that it is to his creatures a mere gratuity. The creature basks under the sunshine of the divine benignity, while every ray is free and undeserved. Be the favors of God great or small, no creature can demand them as a right. If they come to him, they come as a gratuity that God may give or withhold.

But the goodness of God is also seen from the wide diffusion of happiness among creatures. This happiness is proportioned to their natures. If we take the scale of animal life, and, commencing with the bottom we ascend to the top, we find that existence is with the lowest up to the highest of creatures one uniform indication of the divine goodness. Who that observes the play of life in the humblest of creatures that doubts the enjoyment of existence? In the sportive movements of the young of animals, is there not high evidence of pleasure? When we see the eagle soaring far up in the air, or listen to the warbling of the little songster upon the bush, have we no proof of the goodness of God? Why so universal the appearance of enjoyment? Why do we find that—search through the varied orders of animal existence, investigate every species of fish, or insect, or bird, or quadruped—their condition is one of pleasure rather than pain? Why is pain the rare exception, and enjoyment the rule of life? Why, from the ephemeral life of the insect of an hour to the protracted existence of a century of time, do we see every page of being written all over with the language of enjoyment? Does not this show that God loves the happiness of his creatures, and seeks to promote it? Happiness may be divided into three kinds: that which is physical, mental, and moral. The body is the seat of the appetites and the involuntary action of the blood, the nerves, muscles, lungs, and heart. In our physical nature lie the senses, such as sight, hearing, taste, smell, and feeling. But the action of the appetites, the involuntary movement of blood, nerves, muscles, lungs, and heart might be painful rather than pleasurable, and yet we live in the world. A constant uneasiness might attend the movement of the body and the gratification of our senses, and yet not so great as the love of life. Our physical existence might be barely endurable, without being altogether unendurable. We may have a constant experience of pain, and yet not so extreme as to supplant the fear of death. Such a state of existence is supposable, why not actual? The reply is, the goodness of God. God loves the happiness of his creatures too well to make their life only

endurable. So far from our physical state being only the negation of pain, it is a positive source of enjoyment. It is a physical pleasure to gratify suitably the appetites. All animals love to see, and hear, and taste, and touch, and smell. All the senses are avenues of pleasure; but more than this, the involuntary action of the blood, nerves, muscles, and lungs have in their way happiness; their disorder is always attended with pain, their healthy action with comfort. But why, unless God loves our happiness, should for the most part the physical state of creatures reveal the involuntary part of the body a condition of pleasant rather than painful action? Why does the process of physical life show the harmonious action of a thousand springs never, as a rule, coming in collision with each other? Why our physical mechanism so seldom meeting a jar? Could we dissect our own bodies, and look at those vital cords that tie our bones together; could we watch the opening and shutting of millions of valves, the blood pouring through countless channels, the nerves permeating all over the system; could the laboratory within be unveiled where the secret chemistry of nature works its miracles of assimilation; could we study the mystery of animal growth, the process of nervous and muscular action, the separation of the oxygen from the air, the throwing off of the carbon, and the intricacies of countless movements,—should not our wonder of the wisdom of God be even surpassed by the feeling of his unlimited goodness? It is not the diversity of instruments in the body that is only to be admired, but the happy harmony of their action. It is not that they subserve the end of life alone, but that they secure so happy a life,—a life, upon the whole, of great enjoyment; a life closed indeed by death and made less desirable by the infirmities of age, but yet a life where the balance of pleasure far outweighs the evil of pain. Is it conceivable that a being not good would adopt that course peculiar only to a benevolent God? Would we not expect that misery would preponderate in our system with a God who rejoiced in evil, and made evil the end of his action? Consider, that if benevolence in man shows itself by seeking the happiness rather than misery of

society, infinitely more does all nature show that benevolence is the reigning principle in the heart of God. In a twofold way is this seen : first, by the conscience, whose earliest lesson, when unperverted, teaches us to hate wrong and love the good ; and then by the constant manifestation in the works of creation that happiness is loved more than misery. Thus, the benevolence of God is seen combining the two elements of justice and love—justice to regulate the love, love to inspire the justice ; the one supreme in the mind of God, the other in the heart of God. By justice the benevolence of God is revealed in its majesty, by love in its amiableness,—the one commands our esteem, the other our affection. Through the varied ranks of animal being, happiness has been seen to be the prevailing rule, while pain is only the exception. But when we come to consider our mental and moral organization there is more clearly seen the goodness of God. Wonderful as may be the mechanism of the body, the mechanism of mind and heart is more so. Two facts in respect to the soul of man all admit : the soul is mental and it is moral. By mental is meant that the soul thinks and reasons ; by moral, that it feels and discriminates right from wrong. But the condition of the soul as mental and moral presents a most important subject of inquiry. What is the uniform rule of mental and moral action ? What is the fruit of the suitable action of mind, conscience, and affection ? Does enjoyment or pain arise from the proper exercise of the mental and moral faculties given to us by God ? Remember, mental and moral action is restricted to a right exercise. We take into consideration alone the faculties of the soul, in their mental and moral action harmonizing together. We speak not of an unhealthy action, or the separate instruments of the soul in collision, but in harmony, and confined in their exercise to their own legitimate sphere. We affirm that happiness is the invariable fruit of right mental and moral action : no pleasures so great as the pleasures of thought and duty ; no satisfaction so sweet as the approbation of conscience, the glow of moral worth, or the lofty joy of mental attainment. The highest happiness is

experienced when the will inspires the mind to noble effort, or the heart to deeds of love. The pleasures of sense are far inferior to the pleasures of thought, and of virtue. But great as may be the pleasures of thought, the pleasures of virtue are greater. As the moral part of man is the noblest of his faculties, so its right action secures the deepest happiness. If, when we contemplate the pleasures of mind and virtue, we find that their legitimate exercise results in happiness, then is there not in this fact a high argument for the goodness of God? If our physical nature is so constructed as to afford great pleasure, and the exercise of mind and practice also of virtue conduces to our happiness, then have we not a threefold reason, even that derived from our physical, intellectual, and moral nature, for believing in the goodness of God? Commencing with conscience, it will be seen that the great element of divine goodness is justice; that it is not only the love of happiness, but the love of right with happiness that marks the character of God; that virtue is a higher end than enjoyment,—but if, with the highest end we find another end aimed at of vast importance; if both right and happiness are made to go together as far as possible; if we see that the exercise of mind and virtue is attended with great pleasure, that even apart from external influences, and without those outward rewards that generally await the right efforts of the mind and heart, there is an internal satisfaction that more than repays the toil and self-denial experienced,—then have we not the noblest proof of the goodness of God? God would be good, if the right exercise of our mental and moral faculties were attended only with that low degree of comfort that results from the absence of pain or uneasiness; but when pleasures of the most exalted nature ensue from the suitable action of our higher faculties, then must we not believe that God, in thus bringing about the happiness of man, does indeed show that next to right he supremely loves the enjoyment of his creatures? When we consider the pleasures of thought, we find that they correspond to each development of thought. They are not the same with one kind of mental exercise as with another. The rapture of

the orator or poet in their movements of highest triumph is peculiar to that kind of mental effort; but the man of science or the naturalist, who studies the structure of vegetables, or makes himself familiar with the history of the fishy tribes, the insect race, the bird or the quadruped; the anatomist, who pries into the secrets of the physical structure; or the artist, who pictures forth in marble or upon canvas his ideal of beauty—all these have their own peculiar pleasures; pleasures that correspond to each sphere of mental labor. Not more diversified are the kinds of thought, than the enjoyments that spring from them. Every labor of mind brings with it its own reward. From the calm and tranquil pleasures that, like gentle streams pursue their noiseless course, to those more noble enjoyments that swell forth into mighty rivers, there is seen in the exercise of mind every degree and variety of enjoyment. The orator or poet may prefer his kind of happiness; but the man of science, the historian, or the artist will not exchange their pleasures for the former. Thus, not only is there the greatest diversity of mental gifts, but as wide a diversity of intellectual joys. But what language can do justice to the pleasures of virtue? Virtue, like thought, has its high and low sphere; like thought it has its endless diversity of exercise; its throne is in the conscience. Conscience is not virtue, but conscience tells what virtue is. Conscience shows its inherent right and worth; virtue is the action of a pure disposition and noble spirit; conscience the herald that proclaims its presence; virtue is the homage of the heart to God; conscience the faculty which esteems that homage; virtue is the love of goodness; conscience the approver of it. Virtue is obedience to law; conscience that which judges the equity of law; virtue is the heart's movement towards that which is morally beautiful; conscience the witness of that beauty; virtue is the reflection of the image of God; conscience the canvas upon which that image is portrayed. Thus, we see that the pleasures of virtue, springing directly from our moral nature, lead us at once to the recognition of the goodness of God. How good must be that being who thus makes the path of virtue so pleasant! How must God love

moral excellence when he strews along the way of life roses of immortal beauty! Is it not a high evidence of the love of God to us, that duty is made our highest happiness? Is there not in the heart itself a fountain of joy that needs but the call of duty to make it send forth its living waters? If the exercise of mind is noble, is not that of virtue far more so? Consider the variety of pleasures that spring from the pursuit of virtue. They accord with the peculiar virtue exercised. Is the virtue of patience called for? there is an internal composure whose satisfaction can be experienced, but not described. Is the virtue of courage practiced? it brings with it a feeling of great pleasure. Is compassion to the suffering, or the relief of the fatherless and poor exercised? then the purest joys are awakened in the soul. Whatever may be the class of virtues, each class has its own reward. Not only do we see the greatest diversity in the pleasures of virtue, but we see those pleasures spontaneous and unforced. The will cannot create them where there is no virtue; and the will cannot suppress them when they rise up in the heart. Man may counterfeit virtue, but he cannot the joy of virtue. Do men gather grapes of thorns, or figs of thistles? Even thus is it with virtue. Its sweet fruit can never grow from the thorns and thistles of sin. But the goodness of God is also seen from the fact that the most imperfect virtue is made to give some pleasure. Not great virtues alone, but all virtues have their joys,—joys not dependent upon outward circumstances, not like wealth or honor, uncertain and soon passing away, but pleasures that are permanent as virtue itself. The outward world may vanish away, but the soul carries about with it a world of its own. But the highest evidence of the goodness of God is seen from a consideration of our state, sinful by nature. Goodness from God to moral agents who have abused their freedom by sin, who have fallen from perfect rectitude, is more than goodness: it is goodness bearing the impress of mercy,—goodness revealing itself by countless favors to the undeserving and to the unthankful. Thus, all God's bounty to us is the bounty of his mercy; the pleasures he grants are the

fruits of his forbearance and compassion. The goodness of God to us is the goodness of mercy, infinite as his own heart of love, and boundless as the wants of his erring children,—mercy, deep-flowing as a sea over a world of sin, tender as a mother's love for her infant, free as the air and divinely rich.

“For so the light of the world in the morning of the creation,” says Jeremy Taylor, “was spread abroad like a curtain, and dwelt nowhere, but filled the ‘expansum’ with a dissemination great as the unfoldings of the air’s loose garment, or the wilder fringes of the fire, without knots, or order, or combination,—but God gathered the beams in his hands, and united them into a globe of fire, and all the light of the world became the body of the sun; and he lent some to his weaker sister that walks in the night and guides a traveler, and teaches him to distinguish a house from a river, or a rock from a plain field, so is the mercy of God, and it filled all that infinite distance and space that hath no measures but the will of God, until God, designing to communicate that excellency, and make it relative, created angels, that he might have persons capable of huge gifts, and men who he knew would need forgiveness, for so the angels, our elder brothers, dwelt forever in the house of their Father, and never broke his commandments; but we the younger, like prodigals, forsook our Father’s house, and went into a strange country, and followed stranger courses, and spent the portion of our nature, and forfeited all our title to the family, and came to need another portion. For, ever since the fall of Adam,—who, like an unfortunate man, spent all that a wretched man could need, or a happy man could have,—our life is repentance, and forgiveness is all our portion; and, though angels were objects of God’s bounty, yet man only is in proper speaking, the object of his mercy; and the mercy which dwelt in an infinite circle became confined to a little ring, and dwelt here below till it hath carried all God’s portion up to heaven, where it shall reign in glory upon our crowned heads forever and forever. But, for him that considers God’s mercies, and dwells awhile in that depth, it is

hard not to talk widely and without art, and order of discoursings. St. Peter talked, he knew not what, when he entered into a cloud with Jesus upon Mount Tabor, though it passed over him like the little curtains that ride upon the north wind and pass between the sun and us; and, when we converse with a light greater than the sun, and taste a sweetness more delicious than the dew of heaven, and in our thoughts entertain the ravishments and harmony of that atonement which reconciles God to man, and man to felicity, it will be the more easily pardoned if we should be like persons that admire much and say but little; and indeed we can but confess the glories of the Lord by dazzled eyes, and a stammering tongue, and a heart overcharged with the miracles of this infinity."

CHAPTER XV.

THE ÆSTHETIC NATURE OF MAN.

THE nature of man is not only intellectual and moral, it is also æsthetic. There is a principle of taste, of perception of the sublime and beautiful, even as of affection, thought, or moral discrimination. But in analyzing the principle of the beautiful and the sublime in our nature, or the faculty of taste, a great difficulty presents itself in the impossibility of definition, or giving logical forms to our perceptions. The fact is, the principle of taste in the mind by which so great a pleasure is secured from the perception of beauty or sublimity, is most intimately associated with the affections. The class of emotions that rise up in the mind when some object of great beauty or sublimity is presented, is so different from the intellectual apprehension of usefulness, that we at once decide in our minds that utility and beauty can never be confounded together. But what are the elements that enter into our idea of the beautiful and the sublime? In general language, for only general language can be appropriate to the description of a faculty whose exercise is so subtle as to elude the power of delineation in numberless instances, we say that order, harmony, proportion, fitness, are included in our perceptions of that beautiful or sublime; but the beautiful clearly differs from the sublime: greatness seems to belong to the sublime, while smallness is necessary to our idea of beauty. Thus, the language the ocean is sublime, but the rivulet gently winding its way through a meadow is beautiful. But the idea of the rugged or the precipitous also enters into our conception of the sublime, while the smooth and the gradual is with us essential to the perception of the beautiful. Thus, the deep ravine, the rushing of water over great rapids, the rugged sides of a high mountain, give to us

the emotion of the sublime; but a smooth lawn, a delicate flower, a small hill clothed in verdure, we call beautiful. Fitness and proportion enter peculiarly into our conception of that beautiful. Thus, we always believe the beauty of a body sensibly diminished, if a foot or hand or any member of it is missing. A house with everything in proportion we call beautiful, but variety and the unique is necessary to the idea of the sublime. Now nature, by presenting the greatest variety of objects, beautiful and sublime, directly reveals itself to the æsthetic part of our constitution. The taste of man has a boundless field for exercise in nature. In these the development of the æsthetic part of our nature, and the affording to it so vast a variety of objects for its exercise, in making the world without us so adapted to the world of taste within us, there is high proof of the goodness and wisdom of God. The world is full of the beautiful and the sublime. Wherever man goes he finds the principle of taste within him directly appealed to. How powerful is the influence of this principle in our nature, may be seen from the fact that a very large proportion of our enjoyments arise from its exercise. Thus, the perception of some object of sublimity or beauty awakens at once pleasure in the mind; the contemplation of the deformed or the ugly awakens in us feelings of pain. Observe how early the principle of taste reveals itself! The child will be frightened by a homely face long before he manifests the marks of reason. Although the faculty of taste develops itself by exercise, and becomes in proportion to its cultivation more refined, yet it never in man, however degraded, appears to be altogether lost. There is that in our nature that loves at all times the beautiful and the sublime. We at all times feel what it is to look upon some vast mountain scenery, the ocean lashed by the angry wind into a tempest, and the quiet meadow-land,—the smooth flowing of a stream, or the flower opening its leaves to the sun. Thus, we can never lose in our minds the deep impressions of the beautiful and the sublime of nature. We ever associate that which we know to be essentially different, with our ideas of that which constitutes beauty or

sublimity. Thus, we pass from natural objects to moral objects with rapid transition of mind,—we say virtues are beautiful or sublime; a daughter's attention to her aged mother is beautiful; a father's care for his child is beautiful; a deed of lofty heroism or of manly courage is sublime; virtue we paint always as beautiful; great self-sacrifices for the good of others, we consider sublime. We never borrow from nature our idea of the deformed or ugly, and attach it to virtue. But vice we uniformly paint as ugly; the features of crime we represent as hideous. Why do we find the external world so exactly adapted to the æsthetic part of our nature? Why a correspondence so fitting to our constitution? If God was not good, should we see so many evidences to awaken in us pleasure from the sublime and beautiful of nature? Action in the inorganic or organic kingdom, and especially *great action*, has in it peculiarly the sublime. Thus, the tempest in its energy, the lightning flash, the earthquake, all comprehend the sublime. The æsthetic part of our nature not only shows itself in the emotions of hope, joy, reverence, but also calls forth, at times, in the sublime the emotion of fear. Unknown power has always in itself more or less of fear; so also the dark and the obscure. But the beautiful combines more the element of the delicate and the feeble. Thus, fragility enters more into our conception of beauty, while strength into our perception of the sublime. We speak not of a flower as sublime, but beautiful. But the lion or war-horse we call sublime when putting forth their energies. Consider, also, the emotions of sublimity or beauty as awakened by music. Sublime music is very different from beautiful music. Each kind of music borrows in sound the elements that enter into the appearance of external objects. Thus, beautiful music has a soothing influence, but sublime music awakens us, and calls forth the strength of our feelings. The beautiful is smooth and gentle, the sublime impetuous and rugged. The one is like the gradual slope of some green hill, the other the steep declivity of a mountain. The sublime and the beautiful enter deeply into nature,—nature in form, in sound, in color. How

combined, yet complicated, are the avenues of pleasure that present themselves to the principle of taste! What a diversity of enjoyment is opened up to man! But there is something worthy of careful attention, as connected with the sublime and the beautiful: it is the sympathy that exists between the æsthetic part of our nature and the moral part of our nature. The one seems to love the company of the other. Other things being equal, a virtuous man has more pleasure, from the sublime and the beautiful, than a vicious man. Vice always appears to contract the sensibilities to that beautiful or sublime. Vice, while it hardens the affections, seems to throw a veil over the beauties of nature. As virtue makes more refined the moral feelings, so it peculiarly fits them for sympathy with the æsthetic part of our nature. But vice, by making gross and blunt the moral perceptions, incapacitates at the same time the taste for the appreciation of the beautiful and the sublime. As delineating the sympathy of the æsthetic with the moral nature of man, how appropriately has Milton represented the happy pair in Paradise uniting together in their hymn of praise to God!

“ These are thy glorious works, Parent of good,
Almighty! thine this universal frame,
Thus wondrous fair; thyself how wondrous then,
Unspeakable! who sitt'st above these heavens,
To us invisible, or dimly seen
In these thy lowest works; yet these declare
Thy goodness beyond thought, and power divine.
Speak, ye who best can tell, ye sons of light,
Angels; for ye behold him, and with songs
And choral symphonies, day without night,
Circle his throne rejoicing; ye in heaven,
On earth join all ye creatures, to extoll
Him first, him last, him midst, and without end.
Fairest of stars, lost in the train of night,
If better thou belong not to the dawn,
Sure pledge of day that crown'st the smiling morn
With thy bright circlet, praise him in thy sphere,
While day arises, that sweet hour of prime.
Thou sun, of this great world both eye and soul,
Acknowledge him thy greater, sound his praise
In thy eternal course, both when thou climb'st,

And when high noon hast gained, and when thou fall'st.
Moon, that now meet'st the orient sun, now flit'st,
With the fixed stars, fixed in their orb that flies;
And ye five other wandering fires that move
In mystic dance not without song, resound
His praise, who out of darkness called up light."

The charms of poetry all arise from a happy exhibition of the beautiful and the sublime; but the inspiration of the poet, the fire of genius that kindles in the eye of the painter or the sculptor, owe their exclusive origin to refinement of taste embodied in the execution. Nor is this different with the masters of music: music is the sublime and the beautiful embodied in sound. Observe, then, how diversified are the sources of happiness that arise from the development of the principle of taste! The inspiration of poetry, painting, sculpture, and music, all reveal the goodness of that being who has constituted us with a nature susceptible of so much pleasure from the exercise of the principles of taste. In these, the mysterious sympathy shown between the moral and æsthetic parts of our nature, have we not a peculiar illustration of the divine goodness? Would virtue appear to us so beautiful and sublime, and vice when seen so deformed and hateful, if God did not love the one and hate the other? Would nature thus be presented to the æsthetic part of man, did not its great author embody in himself the highest beauty and sublimity?

CHAPTER XVI.

THE IMAGINATION.

ONE of the noblest faculties of man is the imagination; but the imagination, by forming ideal pictures of the lovely and the grand, brings into constant exercise the principle of taste; it creates over and over again in the mind those images of beauty and sublimity which so powerfully influence the heart. Thus, its agency is seen in imparting to the æsthetic part of our nature both refinement and strength, delicacy and power, so that the mind has a far more vivid sense of the objects of nature. Thus, we find a highly cultivated taste more or less associated with the imagination. Why is the imagination given to us unless it be to add vastly to our happiness, as well as to promote virtue in man? Observe the external world as adapted to the exercise of the imagination. That which strikes us as most wonderful in nature is the exquisite fitness of the outward and visible, through the medium of the senses, to the internal and spiritual. All nature would be a source of the highest wretchedness was not this peculiar fitness of things observed. It is not only the adjustment of one faculty of the mind to another; not only the nice balancing of natural laws so that the noblest order is made known; but there is revealed the harmony of the world without us to the world within us,—a harmony that brings into exercise every faculty of the mind. Now the imagination finds in the external world an unlimited field for development. It can retire within its own castle, and bring before the mental vision those scenes of beauty and of grandeur that so delight the senses. It can recall the melody of music, whose sound long has passed from the ear, and create within itself new strains of vocal

harmony. It can call up the features of a departed friend, and throw over them a more enchanting loveliness than ever was presented to the eye. It can upon the canvas of the mind paint the masterpiece of the studio with richer colors than ever beamed upon the artist from the wall. It can give in thought a nobler beauty than ever glowed in the creations of the chiseled marble. Thus the imagination has in it a mysterious power of giving a vitality to the beautiful and the sublime of nature. Its loftiest exercise brings us into the deepest harmony with everything lovely and grand without us. It throws new charms over the dull routine of life, kindles high hope in the heart, and gives energy in all the pursuits of life. Does not the provision of such a faculty reveal the wisdom of an Infinite Being? Would we wish to be deprived of it? Then childhood would lose its highest glow of beauty,—then youth would, like a scorched flower, droop in its aspirations of hope,—then manhood would falter in its arduous toil,—the energies of life would be sapped of more than half their strength. But it is not the external world only that presents a sphere for the imagination. It can, from the dusty leaves of history, from the traditions of past ages, from associations of the most diverse nature, create images of beauty and sublimity. How impressive the language of Gray in his “Elegy written in a Country Church-yard!”

‘Can storied urn or animated bust
 Back to its mansion call the fleeting breath?
 Can Honor’s voice provoke the silent dust,
 Or Flattery soothe the dull, cold ear of death?
 Perhaps in this neglected spot is laid
 Some heart once pregnant with celestial fire;
 Hands that the rod of empire might have swayed,
 Or waked to ecstasy the living lyre.
 But knowledge to their eyes her humble page,
 Rich with the spoils of time, did ne’er unroll;
 Chill Penury repressed their noble rage,
 And froze the genial current of the soul.
 Full many a gem of purest ray serene
 The dark unfathomed caves of ocean bear;
 Full many a flower is born to blush unseen,
 And waste its sweetness on the desert air.”

The imagination is remarkable for its early development in the mind of genius. There seems to be in it something more purely etherial, more allied to the highest refinement of spirit than in the exercise of all the other faculties of the mind. Notice, in respect to the imagination, one marked peculiarity. Its earliest and purest development is often in the form of devotion to the supreme being. God, in his power, wisdom, and goodness, is a theme most congenial to its exercise. The imagination loves the boundless, the infinite. It readily ascends from nature to nature's God. It finds its noblest field for imagery in the unlimited and incomprehensible. Thus, as the painter throws upon the canvas a shade of darkness to augment the beauty of his conceptions, so the veil of mystery thrown over the Deity gives a far higher flight to the wings of fancy. Great as may be the mystery of nature, the mystery of God is immeasurably greater. Thus the imagination finds in its contemplation of God, a theme boundless in its range as the universe. The universe itself, with God recognized, seems to be the reflection of his character,—a mirror portraying his own image. Thus, the genius of Hebrew poetry is pervaded with the delineations of God. Thus, some of the earliest illustrations of poetic art have as their exclusive theme God. Thus, often the childhood of genius breaks forth in a hymn of praise to the Deity. Observe the language of the friendless boy, Chatterton, but eleven years old, who so early met with a melancholy grave.

“ Almighty framer of the skies,
O let our pure devotion rise
Like incense in thy sight!
Wrapt in unpenetrable shade,
The texture of our souls was made
Till thy command gave light.”

Thus, we see that imagination enters not only early, but universally into all the creations of genius. What is our idea of the highest development of mind and the noblest efforts of thought, if it be not the actual realization, the embodiment in statuary, painting, or words of the ideal concep-

tions of beauty and sublimity, as made known in the imagination? Here is the sphere of genius: its last effort is to give permanence and living reality to others of the lovely and the grand, as first conceived of in the mind. But why does the imagination, in its exercise, secure so great pleasure? Why does it create in the mind a living fountain of enjoyment, or find a field so vast for its range, subjects so fitted for its cultivation, unless God is good, and desires to be worshiped in a manner suitable to his character and perfections? The genius of Hebrew poetry is pervaded with the highest elements of imaginative power. David, Isaiah, and Ezekiel seem to have exhausted the storehouse of human thought in delineating the majestic, the awful, the sublime, the wonderful in God. Their minds, rising to the high themes of God's nature and manifestations, convey thoughts so peculiar that language itself staggers in utterance. Thus, poetic descriptions of nature and of God seem to differ, in that, while the former is more sensible and easy of delineation, the latter is vastly more profound, and enters more intimately into the deeps of the soul. The imagination revels in the beautiful and the sublime of nature, but it is overwhelmed in the consciousness of its littleness in the conception of God. The idea of nature comes with its own limitations into the soul, but the idea of God, the more clear in its vision the more it enlarges, yet humbles the spirit of man. Nature has its bounds to the imagination, even in its boundless variety,—but God is an ocean, not more fathomless in its deeps than inconceivably grand with that expansum where the horizon forever rises and sits upon its everlasting waters. Thus, we see why God would never permit an image of himself to be made even to please the objective mind of the Hebrew. The imagination was permitted to portray all the glories of nature, every semblance of imagery, and all moral duties; and the great facts of prophecy were shadowed forth by rites and ceremonial pictures, surpassing in gorgeousness of delineation the highest efforts of the heathen world. But the imagination that dared to make an image of God, or picture forth by any material emblem the awful mystery of his per-

sonality, was accursed. Sinai encircled itself in a chain of fire, warning every Israelite not to pass beyond the line that separates the finite from the infinite. Study the genius of Hebrew poetry, and the mind will be impressed with the submissiveness, the docility, the reverential homage of the imagination when contemplating God. It is altogether destitute of that sensual limitation, that vicious alliance of the divine and the human that characterizes the theology of paganism. Thus, while the poets of heathenism invariably debase the idea of God, and its philosophers refine him away, the result is that one class merges into idolatry, and the other passes into atheism. The pagan imagination, with a two-edged sword, destroyed either divine personality or existence; but Hebrew fancy, controlled by inspiration, embodied the element of the human in God enough only to enlist the affections, and the divine to sober the mind, so that the imagination escaped alike the evil of atheism and idolatry. In speaking of the noble end for which the imagination was made, it is fitting to allude to its fearful perversion, and that debasement which makes it often a source of the greatest evil to man. The curse of most works upon poetry, fiction, and philosophy is just a heathenish imagination. The fancy made to observe the restraints of reason and virtue often rushes wild over hill and dale like the horse of Mazeppa, with the body of his master tied to it. Is it not most mournful to see often such a defilement of a faculty that would, undepraved, subserve the highest pleasure and usefulness to man! When we see swine wallowing in the mire, our disgust is relieved by the thought that swine were made for the dirt, otherwise they would not have bristles; but how different our feelings in beholding the songster that warbles upon the bush, or man made in the image of God, lying down in the filth! So of the imagination degraded in its office, the spectacle is more than disagreeable: it is revolting and unnatural. We are pained to think that what can soar so high, and hold converse with the angels, will make its bed where only the lowest of the brute creation should find a congenial home.

CHAPTER XVII.

CONSIDERATION OF ANGER AND SHAME, THE LOVE OF AMITY, OF SOCIETY, AND THE POSSESSION OF PROPERTY.

THERE can be no doubt that the passion of anger may be divided into the instinctive and the deliberate. The one may be right in its exercise, while the other may be wrong. Thus, we find that the natural influence of anger is to remove fear from its possessor. It is seen through the whole animal creation. It rises up in the nature when injury is experienced or threatened. Thus, we see the weak when attacked by the more strong exhibit instinctively anger. How the eye of the boy flashes forth the emotion of anger when willfully struck by a large one! Injury awakens this feeling in the mind. Thus, not only do we experience this feeling when we suffer an unprovoked injury, but we feel resentment whenever we read or hear of atrocious injury in others. The principle of resentment at hurt or wrong done, is universally implanted in the mind of man. Thus, anger stands always a sentinel in the heart whenever power is abused. Why this passion so wide-spread in our nature? Why search through every grade of the animal kingdom,—do we see its developments where injury is threatened? Evidently because in the world it acts as a safeguard, as an indispensable protection under innumerable circumstances. It disarms the strong of their greatest power,—it keeps watch over the feebleness of the weak, giving upon emergencies an unwonted power of defense. Thus, while fear is most useful at times to enable us to escape from anger, anger is equally serviceable to us often to meet it. The one inspires caution, the other courage. Most appropriately has Brown shown the value of this principle of our nature.

“What should we think of the providence of nature, if

when aggression was threatened against the weak and unarmed, at a distance from the aid of others, there were instantly and uniformly by the intervention of some wonder-working power to rush into the hands of the defenseless a sword, or other weapon of defense? And yet this would be but a feeble assistance if compared with that which we receive from the simple emotions which Heaven has caused to rush, as it were, into our mind for repelling every attack."

Thus the principle of anger, in its instinctive exercise, is made by God to subserve the highest benefit. Nature reveals as truly the design of God to make it a weapon of defense, as if some immediate interposition of divine power was exhibited. The whole world declares its adaptation under suitable restraints for the purposes of life, and its indispensable use in the economy of nature.

But the emotion of shame also subserves a most useful end, as the defense of modesty and a restraining power in the mind of the impure. Thus, this principle acts as a great wall of defense to society. Commencing so early in our nature it suppresses innumerable outbreaks of depravity. Its influence being internal, it operates upon one side to check aggressions, and upon the other to defend from unlawful indulgence. Thus, within the mind it is an ever-present monitor of conduct, a vigilant sentinel upon the rights of moral purity. The ways in which the emotion of shame acts upon society are innumerable. Thus, often when other motives fail of making their influence effectual, shame comes in as a last resort, and saves from ruin where nobler sentiments fail. How frequently is this principle seen in the condition of the individual, as securing an end of the greatest value! How often are the multitude restrained from excesses by this principle, that otherwise it would fall into! The great power of shame is seen from the manner in which it touches upon the sensibility of pride, or the feeling of self-respect. Thus, when called into action it directly awakens emotions in the heart, that with silent yet resistless energy often controls the whole mind. History is full of the developments of this principle, influencing even millions when cir-

cumstances powerfully call it forth. Thus, the shame of defeat in war is often the sole protection of the soldier. Thus, honor and shame operate as powerful incentives to action,—the former a grateful, the latter a humiliating emotion of the heart. One feeling is the reverse of the other, and yet neither can be spared in the complex machinery of our nature.

There is a class of the affections indispensable in the economy of life, which reveal in a high degree divine skill and benevolence. We refer to the love of family, society, and the possession of property. Suppose, for a moment, the love of family, comprehending the affection of parents to their children, or children to their parents and each other, was unknown,—suppose this mighty principle obliterated, where would society be? Where would the world be? Society is made up of families, but what could keep families together with the absence of the principle of affection?

How could society stand the shock of the sundering of the million secret ties that bind parents to children, and children to parents? Where would be the means of support to those too weak or too helpless to secure support for themselves? Where would be the care of the strong for the weak, or those countless attentions that make up the everyday scenes of existence? Look upon society! the bond that keeps society together is a vastly stronger bond than civil government. It is the affection that reigns in the family circle, the principle that leads the individuals of a family to care for each other. Thus, within the family are seen the deepest sympathies. The circle of affection to be strong must be small: general philanthropy may do for the mass,—the impulse of mutual good will may subserve a most useful end to the multitude; but the family demands something stronger than all this. It demands *concentration* of affection, not a diffusion of it. It demands a singleness of good will, not general philanthropy. The family to exist must have something direct, positive, and immediate in the affections. Love must show itself as self-sacrificing. The tie that binds the family in the strongest way together, binds also the State the

stronger together, for the family calls into constant exercise the principle of subordination,—there are learnt those lessons of obedience that give security to the State. But the affection of the family calls into constant exercise the principle of industry, of foresight, of disinterestedness, of kind and generous sympathy. Thus, the mother forgets herself in her care for her infant, the father toils for his children, the children obey and become the support of their parents. Thus, the family is the nursery of the purest emotions of our nature. If its cares are great, its joys are greater. It brings into action the unselfish feelings of our nature. The smallness of the family circle only makes it the stronger. While affection by general philanthropy is dissipated, by particular philanthropy it is concentrated, so that the family is best adapted for the nursery of virtue. It preserves from ruin millions of the human race. It throws a shield of defense, the best the world knows of, over the infancy and childhood of humanity, leading it up step by step into the power of self-preservation, so that the family affection is not only the sentinel that stands at the door of general dissoluteness, but the highest safety of society, keeping it from moral earthquakes and volcanoes, from tempests of enraged elements that otherwise would rend it into pieces, shatter the body politic into a thousand fragments, and light up all over the world funeral piles of ruin. God never saves the State by overlooking the family,—he gives that principle of affection that creates the subordination of the little circle of home, and then widens that circle to comprise the State.

But the love of possession is also a strong principle implanted by God to cement society together. Thus, we see the first care of society is to protect the rights of property, for the rights of property are essential for industry, perseverance, and foresight. Take away all security to property, and industry and all the energies of a State are destroyed. Poverty, want, ruin, come rapidly on; consequently all government fences round the property of the individual with a strong wall. The love of possession may degenerate into avarice,—it may be abused like every other natural principle of our nature,—but

God gave it for the wisest end, even to be next to the family circle the strongest cement of society. As property is diffused among the masses it leads to the fear of novel changes, and imparts a dread of revolutions, so that the middle class becomes mighty and the extremes of society weak, so that permanence is given, and the love of mutual subordination strengthened. True liberty dies out with the great weakening or dissolution of the ties of property. General insecurity is fatal to liberty. When there is no respect for the rights of property, society rushes into anarchy, and anarchy, to avoid a worse evil, rushes into despotism. Despotism, then, for self-defense, invokes the power of the sword, and the violence of war buries up in its gory bed the dearest rights of man.

Thus, under whatever aspect we may regard the constitution of man, we see in the workmanship of God the eternal impress of his wisdom and goodness.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OMNISCIENCE, OMNIPRESENCE, AND SPIRITUALITY OF GOD.

IN respect to the omniscience and omnipresence of God, it need only be said that the mind can no more in the works of nature limit the presence or the observation of God, than the power or wisdom or beneficence of God. As the essence of God must be forever beyond the reach of our faculties, so must also the *mode* of the exercise of the attributes of God. Where there is the action of the power of God, there must be his presence, and where there is his presence there must be his observation. It is vain to speak of the attributes of God except in that popular language understood by all. We can know nothing of the attributes of God except from their manifestation, and from the exercise of reason and that light which comes to us from Nature and Revelation. From this we are led to the conviction that the action of the Deity includes his presence, and his presence his perception. But how amazing is the idea of that great Being who is present wherever there is the work of his hands! who sees all things in the wide universe; whose mind, unlimited in thought, takes into one view all the myriads of worlds that people the immensity of space! What boundless grandeur must belong to him who embraces within the ample range of his vision the countless revolutions of suns and planets; who, undistracted with the diversity of his cares, can give an equal notice to the smallest as to the greatest of his works! The mind of the creature is soon weary with thought, and the brightest genius feebly flutters in its upward flight; but the mind of God never tires, his eye never sleeps. There is no darkness with him. All is open as the day. The worm that crawls in the dust is not unobserved. The rustling of a forest leaf in the wind is heard as distinctly as the music of a

choir of angels. Imperfection marks the creature, perfection the Creator.

“The omnipresence of God,” says Dewar, “is necessarily implied in his infinite perfection. If there be no perfection wanting in a being who is infinitely perfect, and if it be a perfection to be present everywhere, and at the same time ; to be present everywhere, not successively by motion, but without motion, then it follows that the all-perfect God is omnipresent, infinite in himself, what power is there without him to bound his nature and essence to time or space ; or can we conceive that he would voluntarily place any restraint on himself? Immutable in his being and perfections, it cannot be said of him, that there is any place in heaven, or in earth, or in the boundless void of space from which he is absent ; or that he moves from one place to another. Almighty in his power, what is there to limit him in creating and in peopling many millions of worlds through an eternity to come? And must not he who forms be present in the formation of his works, which he makes, and continues to be present to direct and uphold them? This was the induction of the Apostle when persuading the Athenians of the omnipresence of God. He is not far from every one of us, ‘for in him we live, and move, and have our being.’ ‘If we have life, and breath, and all things, he from whom we receive them must be in us and around us.’ ‘We are placed on a theater on which we, and everything about us, are exhibiting the presence of God in all the power and benignity of his nature ; and if we are not yet admitted into the place of his peculiar glory, we are allowed constantly to witness the excellence of his working, and the wisdom of his councils.’ ”

The great idea that God is a spirit is the necessary deduction from his omnipresence and omniscience. His infinite power and wisdom could not admit of that limitation included in the very essence of matter. All that we can know of the nature of God must be from the developments of that nature. But nature presents her proofs of design ; power is seen in her countless changes. The revolutions of myriads of worlds reveal the amazing power of God. But how is the infinite to be

confined to matter? Matter is finite : it is and must be limited in space. Matter is unintelligent : it thinks not nor reasons. Spiritualize nature as much as we please we can never impart to it thought. Materialize mind as much as we please we cannot give to it divisibility, extension, form, weight, and color. Mind acts, matter is acted upon. To make God material, or compound him of mind and matter, is essentially to limit him in his very nature. It is to make him necessarily imperfect. If God be not in his nature spiritual, an infinite spirit, then he could not have unlimited power, he could not be present over his wide universe, nor could his knowledge extend to all events. Our most exalted idea of a substance is that it thinks and reasons. But when we look upon the substance of God as material, then we degrade God immeasurably. To ascribe matter to God, however we may modify its nature or existence, must be infinitely unworthy of God. But the very idea of power in its noblest exercise precludes ascribing matter to God. God being self-existent must be an infinitely self-active and powerful being. Could God's power be manifest over the whole universe if it was limited to any material substance? Could God be omnipresent if he was circumscribed to the sphere of matter? Can that which must be bounded by measurement and limited in space, be appropriate to the nature of God? God must be the author of matter, or matter the author of God. But matter cannot be the author of God, for then it would be eternal; then it would have a prior existence to God; then that which is acted upon would originate that which acts; then the limited and the finite would be superior to the unlimited and infinite; then that which has no thought would be superior to that which thinks; then the material would excel the spiritual; then matter would be God, and God matter; then the idea of finite spirits would be absurd. If God was material there would be nothing that was not material. The fundamental distinction of soul and body would be lost; there could be no such thing as soul and body, and all thoughts would be only refined materialism. Thus all lofty and good ideas of God, all ideas coexistent with the phenomena of nature, make out

God to be spiritual, and the infinite source of all knowledge, wisdom, and power. We can never conceive of God as in any sense restricted in time or space. We cannot limit him in any of his attributes; especially his nature must be infinitely superior to all matter: mystery the most unexplained rests upon the origin of matter, but no obscurity upon the fact itself that God made matter, and that it is not a part of his nature. The omnipresence and omniscience of God both preclude the materiality of God, for the moment we think of God in any other light than as a spirit, everywhere present and possessed of all knowledge and power, then we set limits to God. Our idea of the perfection of God forcibly confirms the fact of his spirituality. The attributes of God are in their nature so peculiar and so wonderful that it is impossible to think of God in his essence other than as an infinite spirit. Everything that carries with it the idea of inferiority must be carefully excluded from God. There is that in our deepest nature which teaches us there is something without us and above us; something self-caused and self-existent; something that cannot be circumscribed in space, or comprehended by finite thought; something that is independent of all other things, and upon whom all other things depend; something that is boundless in every direction, and unlimited in thought, feeling, purpose, and mind; something that made all creatures and all worlds, and of which no language is appropriate except that embodied in the words, the *Infinite* and the *Perfect*.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE EQUITY AND BENEVOLENCE OF GOD SHOWN FROM THE MORAL CONSTITUTION OF MAN.

WHAT may be the voluntary perversion of the moral workmanship of God is altogether distinct from the fact as to what was that workmanship as it came from God. We are to consider not the debasement of man's moral nature, but the actual condition of that nature bestowed by God. Suppose we are called to see the painting of some great artist: that painting may be old, or defaced by careless usage, and yet from the lineaments that remain, although greatly imperfect, we may come to the conclusion that it was the creation of genius. In man's moral nature, injured as it may be by sin, there is yet seen in conscience the workmanship of God.

Let us, then, examine the nature of conscience; let us see what is the work of our moral sensibilities, and then directly do we, from the character of the divine workmanship, come to the conclusion of his equity and benevolence. There are those who have confined the argument upon the benevolence of God alone, to the fact of the vast amount of happiness existing in the world. Having in one scale weighed the misery existing, and in the other scale the happiness prevailing among the different creatures made by God, and found that misery was the exception and happiness the rule, they have therefore with good reason inferred the benevolence of God.

But consider that *duty, right*, and not happiness is the great idea upon which we base the equity and benevolence of God. It is because what he has made is right, what he demands is duty, that chiefly we infer the divine goodness. When we enter upon the question of the amount of happiness existing, the adaptation of the works of creation to produce pleasure, we do indeed find in these things a high proof of

the benevolence of God. But yet misery exists, and the objection presents itself of moral evil. To meet that objection we must stand upon different ground than that presented in the happiness theory,—we must go to the fundamental idea of virtue, beyond which we cannot proceed farther, even to that wall of adamant spoken of by Mackintosh, “which bounds human inquiry (and which has scarcely) ever been discovered by any adventurer, until he was roused by the shock which drove him back.” What is that wall of adamant, where all discovery must stop, which is the foundation of all ethics, and even the immutable basis upon which divine law and authority rests? Is it not the idea of right, of duty? It is no adequate definition of virtue to say that it is useful, it produces happiness, it accords with the fitness of things, it is order, divine harmony, it is moral beauty. These are the fruits or the tendencies of virtue. The question presents itself, why is virtue useful? Why does it produce happiness, or accord with the fitness of things? Why does it engender order, divine harmony, or moral beauty? Why is virtue to be supremely loved and obeyed? Why is its opposite ever to be rejected and worthy of hate? It is in the solutions to such a question that conscience comes in with an answer alike infallible and immutable. It does not say that virtue is to be loved and vice hated, simply because the one is useful and the other the reverse,—that the one represents order, fitness, and moral beauty, and the other engenders disorder, contention, and deformity. There are reasons why it would be the part of wisdom in us to be virtuous and not vicious. But the fruits of a tree do not constitute the tree itself. Beyond these reasons, there is the ultimate reason, the wall of adamant that stops all farther inquiry, and makes known the last element of all ethics. *Virtue is virtue because it is right*; because conscience pronounces upon it the approving verdict of duty. *Vice is vice because it is wrong*, and conscience when it sees vice *as vice* declares it to be wrong. Farther than this we cannot go in our last analysis of virtue and vice; here we reach the essential element in the nature of virtue and vice which engenders the fruit of usefulness or

uselessness, happiness or misery, order or disorder, beauty or deformity. The question then that is peculiarly to test the fact of the equity and benevolence of God is simply, *what is the moral constitution of man?* not what is the moral constitution in its state as *perverted by man*, but what is his moral constitution as originally given by God? What are those moral sensibilities as created in us by the Deity? There is a wide distinction between power or faculty granted by God, and the abuse of that power or faculty. No one would infer that a steam-engine dashing itself upon the rocks was made for this end. The construction of the steam-engine shows that its true sphere was the railroad, and that it was designed for the purpose of rapidity, yet safely conveying in cars passengers and merchandise over the road. Even in its greatest power of mischief by abuse, there is made known wisdom and benevolence in its construction. The abuse of the engine is not the end, but the perversion of the end for which it was made. So of our moral constitution: it shows the wisdom and benevolence of its great author, even when most fearfully perverted. All can see the use of a compass in the ship upon the wide ocean, and although by carelessness that compass may prove a great source of mischief, yet the end for which it was made was beneficent. We rightfully then discriminate between a thing and its abuse, power and its perversion, faculty and its derangement. So in the consideration of the moral constitution of man: we must look away from its derangement by sin, to the thing itself; we must view it as it might be and should be, rather than as it appears in its ruin. Take the human body in the full tide of health and the same body prostrated by disease, and how mighty the contrast! But who, in viewing the body loathsome with the ravages of a mortal distemper, the limbs useless for service, the ear dull of hearing, the eye blind to the external world, and the clammy sweat of death gathering over the form of man, would say this was the end for which the senses were made; this the purpose which is made known in the limbs; this the use of the whole mechanism of the body? Not so. The derangement or dissolution of

the animal economy was not the design of that economy ; the cessation of its use was not the use itself. Death may be a necessary condition of animals in this world, and through sin in man it may and is wisely ordained by God to befall the human race ; but this is not the design or great end to be subserved in the animal economy. So also by sin we see the moral constitution in disorder and ruin ; but as made by God it reveals in the clearest light his equity and benevolence.

Here is the conscience, God's own workmanship, in the heart of man as much as the intellect or the body. Does that conscience when *it sees* a thing to be virtuous approve of it ? Does the conscience command us to do what we feel to be duty, and as authoritatively demand that we should not commit sin, *when sin is seen to be sin* ? The question is not what conscience actually does do when abused, but simply what is the nature of conscience unperverted,—what are its decisions in a healthy state ? We are to look upon conscience in its exercise just as we look upon a steam-engine or a compass ; we judge of the wisdom and beneficence of their workmanship simply by what the steam-engine or compass can or will do in their appropriate sphere. The disasters that will attend the wrong use of these instruments in no respect affect the utility or wisdom of their construction.

In the same way must we look to the conscience as revealing the equity and benevolence of God. Some confound conscience with virtue. As well may a man confound the axe that cuts the wood with the wood itself. Virtue is an effect, conscience an instrument ; virtue is good done, conscience that which urges to good and approves of it ; virtue is right action, conscience that which constitutes the faculty of right action. Thus, conscience and virtue stand related to each other as agent and action, instrument and effect. To see in conscience the evidence of the equity and benevolence of God, we must view it especially in what it is designed to do ; we must look upon it as an instrument made by God for the wisest end. Nothing is more mournful than to see the perversion of conscience, and yet the fact that in different persons its decisions are so diverse, is owing to the use of conscience

out of the appropriate conditions of its sphere. There is not one of the senses that will not deceive when abused in its exercise. The faculties of sight, hearing, taste, touch, and smelling will all be exercised under certain appropriate conditions. The senses as truly give to us wrong ideas of the external world out of their sphere, as they never mislead us when exercised in their sphere. But does this fact ever lead us to underrate the value of the senses? Are we ever disposed to think them useless, because of the mistakes we often fall into by their wrong use? Because the senses are limited in their range of operation, do we therefore infer that God is not wise and good in giving to us the senses? But the senses are only the instruments of the body, just as the conscience is the instrument of the soul. The difference is simply that the former is material while the latter is immaterial. Consequently we find that conscience is a faculty exclusively pertaining to a moral agent, and if the abuse of the senses is no argument against the wisdom and beneficence of God in their creation, equally true is it that the perversions of conscience do not infringe upon the equity and the goodness of God. As we look in physics upon the senses as instruments, so also in ethics we must look upon the conscience. As in the former we can show wisdom and beneficence in God by their legitimate use, so also we can in the latter. The natural world reveals no more clearly the character of God than the moral world. While nature throws light upon the natural attributes of God, so with truth it may be said that the moral constitution of man peculiarly displays the moral attributes of God.

The peculiar prerogative of the conscience is that it does not look to the consequences of a thing, so much as the *thing itself*. The conscience does not say, Do such a thing because it is useful, but because it is right. Its language is not, Avoid such a thing because it engenders misery, but because it is wrong. It is the intellect that weighs in the balances consequences. The sphere of the conscience is restricted to the right and wrong of conduct. The conscience alone takes cognizance of the internal state of a moral agent. It is not the

will of God that makes his own nature virtuous, but his nature that makes his will virtuous. Conscience in man, when unperverted, is an indication of what is the moral character of God. As God's workmanship, it tells not so much what is the Divine will, as what more comprehensively is his moral character, including his nature and will. Can then there be a doubt that if the conscience approves of the right, when seen as such, and condemns the wrong,—if, even amid the ruins of our moral nature it speaks of duty, of obligation, and enforces right by its own peculiar sanctions, that the great Author of conscience must himself approve of right and condemn wrong? What more conclusive evidence of the equity of God? Has God implanted a law within the heart imperatively demanding right action, and must not the maker of such a law himself supremely love moral excellence, and hate sin? It is not said that conscience and virtue are the same: the fundamental distinction between the two has been seen; but here is the question, Does not conscience in man that tells him to be virtuous, that unperverted leads to it, that guides as an instrument, when not abused, to virtue, that approves of the right wherever seen, and rebukes for wrong whenever felt,—is not such a faculty a clear mark of the equity and goodness of its author? Can we for a moment believe that the Deity gave man a moral nature that must condemn himself, and compel him to despise the author of his existence? Certainly there can be no supposition so absurd as that God would *belie* himself in his own work. Man's work and God's work are two things altogether different. Man's work may and does often cast reproach upon God, but God's work never. God never would give moral sensibilities that the more virtuous in man, the more they would lead to the contempt of their great author. As God can never hate himself, so never can he hate or be hated by his own work apart from the *abuse* of that work. The essential idea to be dwelt upon in considering conscience is, not what conscience actually does do in its abuse, but simply what conscience can do and would do when used as God meant it to be used. Unless this distinction in ethics is always kept in mind, the contem-

plation of conscience, as perverted in fallen nature, will be more likely to throw darkness than light upon the moral attributes of God. Great as may be the disorder in the natural world, as the consequence of sin, yet the impartial observer of human nature is compelled to admit a disorder vastly greater in the moral world, the effect of sin.

In contemplating conscience, a great allowance must be made for sin, even as in mechanics the calculator of physical forces always leaves a wide margin for the law of friction. The distinctive element of sin has entered the moral world, and its worst power is seen in perverting and blinding the conscience. We do not see conscience in man as it is unfolded in angels; nor is it now in man, as it will be in man perfectly redeemed from the curse of sin; but this fact has nothing to do with the question, Is not the equity and the benevolence of God shown from the moral constitution of man? Is not the conscience which makes known the moral constitution of man an instrument in itself, as given by God, wise, and good, and just? When we discriminate between a thing and the abuse of a thing, then are we prepared suitably to view the goodness of God in granting to man a conscience. The conscience, in its *proper exercise*, is the moral image of God. When the conscience tells us to do what is good and to avoid what is evil, when it approves of what is right and condemns the wrong, it reveals as truly the Divine disposition as if the Deity directly communicated his will by miracle. Let it be understood that conscience is simply spoken of as a natural faculty of the soul in its unperverted exercise. It is given by God for a specific end, as much as the eye, the hand, or the foot. The eye can see only right under the appropriate conditions of its exercise; the ear can hear only correctly when used in its true sphere; the hand or the foot have their suitable range of exercise. So of the conscience as a moral faculty of the soul; it is to be looked upon exclusively in its decisions, under its own peculiar and appropriate conditions as constituted by God. Viewed in this light, it is no argument whatever against the equity of God and his goodness, that the conscience is often so wrong, and

its exercise so fearfully perverted. The simple question in relation to the conscience is, what will it do when rightly used? What are its decisions under appropriate and suitable conditions?

Let us, then, consider conscience in its nature,—let us examine it as a law, a feeling, and a judge,—let us view it in its supremacy over our nature, and then may we read from its character and right exercise the clear proof of the moral excellence of that Being who gave it to man.

“The truth seems to be,” says Sir James Mackintosh, “that the moral sentiments, in their mature state, are *a class of feelings*, which have no other object but the mental dispositions leading to voluntary action, and the voluntary actions which flow from these dispositions. We are pleased with some dispositions and actions and displeased with others, in ourselves and our fellows. We desire to cultivate the dispositions, and to perform the actions, which we contemplate with satisfaction. These objects, like all those of human appetite or desire, are sought for their own sake. The peculiarity of these desires is, that their gratification *requires the use of no means*; nothing (unless it be a volition) is interposed between the desire and the voluntary act. It is impossible, therefore, that these passions should undergo any change by transfer from the end to the means, as is the case with other practical principles. On the other hand, as soon as they are fixed on these ends, they cannot regard any farther object. When another passion prevails over them, the end of the moral is converted into a means of gratification. But volitions and actions are not themselves the ends, or last object in view of any other desire or aversion. Nothing stands between the moral sentiments and their object. They are, as it were, in contact with the will. It is this sort of mental position, if the expression may be pardoned, that explains, or seems to explain, those characteristic properties which true philosophers ascribe to them, and which all reflecting men feel to belong to them. Being the only desires, aversions, sentiments, or emotions which regard dispositions and actions, they *necessarily extend to the whole character and conduct*,—

among motives to action they alone are justly considered as universal."

What, then, is that source of knowledge which tells us that man has a conscience, and for his conduct is worthy of approbation or disapprobation? The reply is, consciousness. Do we not, through another medium than the observation of the senses, have the idea of right and wrong, the feeling of joy or love, of esteem or aversion? Are we not perfectly persuaded of mental pleasure or pain, of the character of our motives and conduct as good or bad? If so, then the reality of conscience is as certain as consciousness: the existence of our moral sensibilities is as true as the reality of our affections and intellect. Here, then, is seen the peculiar office of conscience. It is the regulator in man's heart, that is given by God to control his conduct. It is the instrument made by God to exercise a universal supremacy over the voluntary states of the mind. Its sphere of action is exclusively internal. The decision of conscience is upon the state of man as a moral agent. It is simply upon the question of right and wrong that it decides.

"The supreme authority of conscience," says Dugald Stewart, "is felt and acknowledged by the worst, no less than by the best of men; for even they who have thrown off all hypocrisy with the world are at pains to conceal their real character from their own eyes. No man, even in soliloquy or private meditation, avowed to himself that he was a villain; nor do I believe that such a character as Joseph in the 'School for Scandal' (who is introduced as reflecting coolly on his own knavery and baseness without any uneasiness but what arises from the dread of detection) ever existed in the world. Such men probably impose upon themselves fully as much as they do upon others." Says Lord Shaftesbury, as quoted by Stewart, "We may defend villainy, and cry up folly before the world, but to appear fools, madmen, or varlets to *ourselves*, and prove to our faces that we are really such, is insupportable. For so true a reverence has every one for himself when he comes clearly to appear before his close companion, that he had rather profess the vilest

things of himself in open company than hear his character privately from his own mouth. So that we may readily from hence conclude that the chief interest of ambition, avarice, corruption, and every sly insinuating vice, is to prevent this interview and familiarity of discourse, which is consequent upon close retirement and inward recess."

In considering the nature of conscience one most important question presents itself. What is the relation of the intellect to the moral sense? We can all of us see a vast difference between the perception of an intellectual truth and the feeling of obligation. In respect to the sensibility of right and wrong, the distinction is fundamental between this and the perception of the properties of a triangle, the knowledge of the working of a machine, or a demonstration in anatomy, or fact of history. The sphere of the intellect is to tell us what is true; that of the conscience is to inform us what is right,—the one is confined to knowledge, the other to moral obligation. The intellect instructs us what to do, the conscience how to do. Truth is the end of the one, duty of the other; nor can any sophistry confound knowledge and duty. The reasoning is one thing, the feeling of obligation is another. While the intellect is so distinct from the conscience, it yet sustains to it a most intimate relation. If the reasoning power originates perceptions or new intellectual views, and the conscience moral emotions or feelings of obligation, yet it is greatly aided and supported by the various powers of perception and comparison; consequently the decisions of conscience must be according to the knowledge possessed or the light enjoyed. The same outward acts may have decisions altogether different from the different motives that may be known to influence the conduct. What the conscience looks at is the disposition of the mind,—the actual state of the heart that leads to overt action. Consequently its decisions must vary with the diverse degrees of knowledge, and be clear or obscure, weak or strong, just in proportion to the facilities possessed of attaining a correct knowledge.

"Probably every one," says Professor Upham, "can say

with confidence that he is conscious of a difference in the moral emotions of approval and disapproval, and the mere intellectual perceptions of agreement and disagreement which are characteristic of reasoning. In the view of consciousness there can be no doubt that they are regarded as entirely diverse in their nature, and as utterly incapable of being interchanged or identified with each other. The moral feeling is one thing, and the intellectual perception or suggestion involved, both in the processes and the result of reasoning, is another. Although the reasoning power and the conscience, or the moral being, are thus distinct from each other in their nature, they are clearly connected in their relations, as has been intimated already, inasmuch as the intellect, particularly the ratiocinative or deductive part of it, is the formation or basis of moral action. We must know a thing, it must first be an object of perception, before we can take any moral cognizance of it; and this is not all,—the moral cognizance, as we have already had occasion to explain, will conform itself with great precision to the intellectual cognizance—that is to say, it will take new ground in its decisions in conformity with new facts perceived. Consequently we cannot rely perfectly on a moral decision which is founded on a premature or imperfect knowledge. The more carefully and judiciously we reason upon a subject, the more thoroughly we understand it in itself and its relations, the more confidently may we receive the estimate which the voice of conscience makes of its moral character.”

Thus, in contemplating the relation the intellect sustains to the conscience, we find that conscience makes the intellect to assist it as an instrument in its decisions. The intellect acts the part of an indispensable servant that never can be spared in the performance of its functions. The supremacy of conscience is seen, in that it makes tributary to it the intellect and the will, and exercises a universal sway over all the voluntary states of the mind.

“There is a superior principle of reflection or conscience in every man,” says Butler, “which distinguishes between the internal principles of the heart, as well as his external ac-

tions, which passes judgment upon himself, and upon them pronounces determinately some actions to be in themselves just, right, good, others to be in themselves evil, wrong, unjust, which without being advised with, magisterially exists itself, and disapproves or condemns him the doer of them accordingly, and which, if not forcibly stopped, naturally and always of course goes on to anticipate a higher and more effectual sentence, which shall second and affirm its own."

Let us then consider conscience in its universality as a law, in its energy as a feeling, and in its greatness as a judge. In considering conscience as a law, we are to remember that, as a rule of divine origin, it is implanted as a first principle in the moral constitution by God himself. It is, therefore, that upon which the mind proceeds; that which directs the reason and the judgment; that by which all that is praiseworthy or is blamable is estimated. Consequently as a law it is universal, and from which proceed our first lessons of right and wrong. Thus, in the words of Adam Smith, we say, "upon whatever we suppose that our moral faculties are founded, whether upon a certain modification of reason, upon an original instinct called moral sense, or on some other principle of our nature, it cannot be doubted that they are given us for the direction of our conduct in this life." So impressed even were the ancients who had not the light of Revelation to guide, with conscience as a rule, that Cicero in a well-known passage says: "Right reason is itself a law congenial to the feelings of nature, uniform, eternal, calling imperiously to our duty, and peremptorily prohibiting every violation of it." "Nor does it speak one language at Rome and another at Athens, varying from place to place, or from time to time; but it addresses itself to all nations and to all ages, deriving its authority from the common sovereign of the universe, and carrying home its sanctions to every heart by the inevitable punishment which it inflicts on transgressors."

But we have a far higher authority for conscience as a law in the words of inspiration, for we read, "they who have no law (that is, no written law) are a law unto themselves, which shows the law written in their hearts." Thus, we see how

clearly defined is that faculty that makes us moral agents: our responsibility rests upon the fact, not only that God has given us a law revealed upon the pages of the Bible, but a law revealed upon the pages of the heart, enstamped with a Divine hand upon the very tablet of the soul. Thus we see that however defaced may be the impression of that law; however perverted may be our moral sense; however unsafe by our sins we may make the conscience as a sole guide; yet still that law remains, still in legible characters is it written upon the soul; still, whether by our sins we make our conscience unenlightened, or unfaithful, or troubled, or hardened, that law, written in the heart, bears witness, and, amid its greatest perversions, is alike universal in its sanctions, and condemning in its abuse. Consequently we see the excellence of the moral nature as given to us by God, we see how noble, originally, is that constitution not dependent for its principle of duty upon the ever-varying outward relations of life. Here, within, does every man have a conscience which, if he has no higher revelation, is a law to himself, a rule of duty in life bearing witness to his conduct, and which, however perverted, will not make those in the deepest darkness of heathenism excusable for their sins,—a law springing from no human source, but coming direct from our Maker.

Consider then conscience in its energy as a feeling. Conscience has to do not only with the reason, it is not only that which directs the mind, giving to it uniformity in its decisions, and making itself a rule of conduct universal as man. But conscience has also its seat in the emotional part of our nature. It is enthroned in the sensibilities, and thus has to do with every class of our affections. It is this sphere of conscience that gives to it an energy so great. Observe how soon conscience shows itself as supreme over the feelings. The words, “You ought to do so!” “I cannot bear to think of it!” or “I am pleased that I obey my father or mother!” “I am glad I did not hurt my brother, or sister, or school-mate!” are the first exclamations of childhood and youth: they come unbidden from the heart; they are the earliest

words of our youngest years. But with the increase of age conscience displays also a mighty energy. By our perversions of duty we may have smothered its voice, or silenced the alarm-bell in our hearts, and yet we cannot, by our wills alone, control it; we cannot say, Thus far shall conscience go in its reproaches and no farther. No human wisdom or might is able to extinguish in the heart its reproaches. It comes often to the mind like a thief in the night. It comes after the drunken scene of midnight revelry to the miserable sufferer, and adds a hundred reproaches to every pain that lacerates the body. It comes at times to the gay pleasure-seeker, and spoils all the merriment of the hour by its inward stings. It comes to the oppressor of the poor and helpless, and makes the heart to ache with its stern rebukes. Upon the palace walls of godless wealth it writes, with an invisible hand, the dread epitaph of its ruin.

But the energy of conscience upon the sensibilities is seen peculiarly in cases of great crime. What but conscience in its reproaches is present to the murderer when he seeks to drown the remembrance of his sin in the intoxicating cup! What but conscience is present to him whom remorse for some deep wrong drives to the madness of suicide! Sometimes the sea is troubled with angry waves, and the waters dash their white spray upon the rocks; sometimes the sky is dark with clouds, and the tempest-wind utters its dismal cry; sometimes the rumbling thunder is heard, and the lightning flashes its lurid light across the darkness. But these indications of the strife of nature but faintly represent the higher strife that rages in the heart when conscience moves over the sea of human sensibility. There are times when conscience awakes to a more terrific energy, and flashes upon the soul with a more scorching light. There are times when the roar of the troubled waters is more fearful, and there gathers upon the sky a deeper darkness. The emotional part of our nature possesses in itself innumerable diversities of feeling. There is joy and sorrow and fear and hate and love; and yet each one of these master passions comes with an endless retinue of attendant sensibilities. We may as well attempt to count the

number of the stars as that throng of emotions that pervade the soul. Now over these feelings conscience exercises an unlimited sway: her very throne is in the heart of human sensibility. Here is it that she acknowledges no superior.

Having contemplated conscience in the painful emotions engendered by wrong conduct, let us look to conscience in the feelings of pleasure created by right conduct. Consider that God has implanted in man a conscience to be independent of all outward circumstances, a rewarder of virtue. He has given a conscience for the purpose of bringing man into a state of peace and joy far superior to every external condition of happiness. Thus, if conscience by its influence over the sensibilities possesses in itself the elements of the highest wretchedness, it also has the secret of the noblest happiness. Who can describe the charm of its approval of some virtuous deed? Who delineate the peace that it creates when its intimations of right are obeyed? Thus have we looked upon nature when the setting sun threw its light upon some landscape of surpassing beauty,—with tints of a thousand colors sky and water were reflected: the summer breeze wafted the sweet perfume of flowers, and gently did the warbling of the bird die upon the ear. Here was nature's harmony, and her mighty energies for evil controlled by a law that subserved the richest pleasure and the noblest peace. Thus with conscience when at peace with itself, over man's nature in right conduct she exercises a nobler harmony than is seen in the external world. In the influence of the conscience upon the sensibilities in right conduct, we see the great reason of the happiness that virtue brings with it. The conscience in our nature is like a mirror: it reflects everything that passes over it. Let the conduct be wrong, and it reflects the moral deformity of the person himself. Let the conduct be right, and the moral beauty of that virtue is with equal faithfulness reflected. Thus the heart has within itself a mirror upon which, in vivid distinctness, is delineated every feature of our moral nature.

But there is another element in conscience having its seat in the affections. That element consists in the mysterious

power possessed by conscience to throw all the sensibilities by sin into confusion, or unite them by virtue into harmony. The sweeter the music of a harp, the more painful the discord when broken. The conscience of a good man is like sweet music, and every sensibility of the nature is made to give out a note of harmony; while the sensibilities of a bad man by conscience are rudely jostled together, and every movement is that of discord. Thus is it that in wrong conduct conscience creates so great uneasiness in the sensibilities. Conscience rudely throws them into collision,—the passions are moved out of their appropriate sphere, and made to conflict with each other. Thus we see the meaning of the language, “The wicked are like the troubled sea that cannot rest.” Conscience will not let the sensibilities rest, it makes its sharp note of discord to vibrate with rude violence through the emotions, stirring them all up like a hive of bees broken in upon,—making war in every member, and bringing into hot pursuit every fiend of mischief. It is in the sensibilities that its energy is peculiarly displayed.

But conscience exerts over the sensibilities its highest influence through the law of association. We must understand that law in order to see, in the strongest light, the energy of conscience upon the emotions. Consider then the thoughts that are made to rise up in the mind through the influence of association. By this law past thoughts and deeds, through the medium of some striking incident or resemblance, are presented to the mind. Thus, let a person, after years of absence, revisit the scenes of his childhood, and the familiar events of his early years will be brought to mind by the house in which he once lived, by the fields where once he roamed, by the running stream where once he played. Should his eye light upon the portrait of a brother, or sister, or mother, or father, or some aged relative long ago dead, the principle of association within will recall to mind things that had been before buried in forgetfulness. The actions of his past life will come up before him in vivid distinctness. Now conscience makes use of the principle of association to impress its lessons most effectually upon the mind. It throws

a clear light upon the characters of our past history. Thus we see how the man of atrocious crime shuns the spot that once witnessed his sin. Thus we see how deeds of benevolence, and great self-sacrifice for the good of others, throw a spell of beauty over the local habitation that bore testimony to our virtue.

It would seem as if conscience had in it the highest elements of our happiness or our misery. If this were not so, why the effort to harden it, or make it turn traitor to our welfare? The wicked man never works so hard as when he seeks to drown the reproaches of conscience, or make it give an erroneous decision. Before we commit a great sin, we seek by our sophistry to silence conscience, or compel it to give a perverted acquiescence.

The most horrid tragedies of the French Revolution were dignified under the abused name of law and equal rights. The worst excesses of despotism are justified by appealing to the necessity of preserving order. "Whom we hate we defame," is an adage as old as the world. It would appear as if the commission of wrong was more than half disrobed of its hatefulness to the mind, when the mantle of a perverted conscience had been thrown over it. How expressive the words, "But even their mind and conscience is defiled!" Thus do we see the heathen casting her infant into the Ganges, or throwing herself into the flame that consumes her dead husband. Thus do we read of Ravallac glorying in his crime, while a nation mourns over a murdered king. Thus do we hear of the stoic firmness of a Guy Fawkes, who was arrested before he had succeeded in blowing up with powder the Parliament and royal family of England. Nor is it only in great sins that we see the effort made, and often with success, in compelling conscience to a false decision. The everyday events of life show how careful men are to silence its reproaches, or justify by it their sins.

Let us then consider conscience as a judge. We do but half realize the power of conscience, unless we consider that in a good degree it possesses the attributes of a judge. We have viewed conscience in its universality as a law, and in

its energy as a feeling, but when we come to view it in its judicial decisions we see most clearly what is comprehended in the word *judgment*. The fact that now by our sins we have made our conscience blind, or hard, or in any way perverted it, in no respect authorizes the conclusion that always it will slumber, or never be in a different state. It is a faculty of the mind restricted in its exercise by the present knowledge possessed, and dependent in its decisions upon the amount of light enjoyed, and the circumstances under which it is called upon to utter its voice. Thus we see why the consciences of different persons are so varied, and why different decisions are made even upon the same acts. There are two states that give diversity to the decisions of conscience: the circumstances without us, and those within us,—our external and internal condition. Everything to the eye looks differently upon a mountain to what it does in a valley, and yet the perception to the eye may be in its sphere as true in one condition as in another. The inference then that change of circumstances, internal or external, or both, will have a mighty influence in the decisions of conscience, is most clear. Who knows not the fact that there are hours when long-buried sins come, through the law of association, before the mind like an army of giants! It was conscience that spoiled all the pleasures of Belshazzar's feast, and made the knees of the guilty monarch shake at the handwriting upon the wall. It was conscience that made Felix tremble as Paul reasoned to him of righteousness, temperance, and a judgment to come.

But the greatness of conscience as a judge will be manifest in its highest power when there comes a revolution in the circumstances of our existence. It is especially when there passes over our being that mighty change that transfers us from this world to another; then conscience will, in its new state of being, possess in its judicial decisions a far greater energy of action. Think for a moment of the ten thousand circumstances of this world that combine to silence or pervert the decisions of conscience. As Delilah bound round the sleeping Samson new ropes, she dreamed not that when awake, the strong man, at the cry of the Philistines,

would break them as flax before the fire. So also we reason of our conscience, that sleeping Samson in this world. But when the great trump of the last day is heard,—when resounding through the heavens there enters the cold grave the voice of God, “Awake ye dead, and come to judgment!” conscience then no longer will be bound with the ropes of Delilah. Coming forth from the closed chambers where feebly her voice was heard amid the confused clamor of human passion in this life, conscience then will assume the prerogatives of a judge that will not be silenced in the discharge of duty. The verdict of Christ our judge will meet with a response in every heart. To the conscience itself will the appeal of equity be made, and true to its high source, true to its nature, true to the noblest privilege of its being, will conscience utter forth a decision that shall be as irreversible as the soul in its nature is immortal.

When we are asked why is virtue virtue, it may be very well to say because virtue is useful, because it accords with the fitness of things, it is in harmony with all moral law, is spiritual beauty and divine order. But all these things are the fruits of virtue, the necessary attendants upon virtue, not the tree itself. It is only when we say virtue is virtue, *because it is right*, that we may be said to reach that wall of adamant beyond which all inquiry must stop. When the interrogation is put, why is virtue useful, or why does it accord with the fitness of things, or harmonize with divine law and order, or promote our noblest happiness?—what other solution to this question can be given than that virtue is something in itself intrinsically right, and *is thus right, because* conscience, our moral nature, ever commands us when seen to love it; because the *feeling of obligation*, universal as man, at once springs up in the heart; because conscience, long before the intellect can weigh the fruits of virtue, or calculate its consequences, instinctively tells us to love it and hate its opposite; because imperatively as the voice of God conscience demands that we should esteem, cherish, and follow virtue, be the consequences what they may; because conscience accuses us of wrong, where virtue is hated, and

selfishness loved, be the advantages believed in ever so great?

But are we conscious how directly we attain unto the evidence of the equity and benevolence of God, when, in our examination of conscience, we find that it accords as a divine rule of action implanted in man with the essential element of all virtue? Do we suitably apprehend how much is included in the simple fact that conscience tells us to do what is right, approves of it when seen, and uniformly, when used as God meant it should be used, condemns us for wrong-doing? Is it not evident that such a faculty shows the essential virtue of God and tells us that the great author of the conscience loves that which is right, and hates that which is wrong; that he does so from his very nature before he made man, before he revealed his law, and from eternity when man or angel had no existence? Can any absurdity be so great as that which supposes that God's moral law should not be the transcript of his own equity and benevolence? Is it possible that the universal law of God, based upon the immutable distinction of right and wrong, should belie his *own nature*? It is one thing to consider conscience in its willful perversion, or in that abuse created by a depraved will and heart, but quite a different matter to view it simply *as an original faculty in its legitimate exercise*.

We believe that conscience in the fall of man, and in the subsequent development of depravity in the human race, suffered with the rest of our nature; but conscience, even in its greatest ruin, shows as conclusively its origin from God as the intellect or the body. And the reason why especially the conscience is deserving of careful study, is that while the natural attributes of God are shown in the creation of this world and its inhabitants, there is a peculiar light thrown upon the moral attributes of God in everything relating to the moral nature of man. We distinguish between the moral image of God as reflected from an unperverted conscience, and conscience abused; but we must not shut our eyes to the great fact that God's equity, benevolence, and wisdom are seen even in the conscience, however debased. By a wrong con-

dition of circumstances the needle of the compass may point wrong; but who is disposed to question the wisdom and benevolence of the compass in itself considered? Just so of the conscience; we must view it as given to man for the noblest and most benevolent end.

Looking at it simply as an original faculty, we are irresistibly driven to the inference that as the appropriate office of conscience is to approve of right and condemn for wrong, as duty is its exclusive sphere, and the very end for which it was given, so also duty, eternal right, constitutes the essential glory of the nature of God. No supposition can be more foolish and wicked than that God's work, as it comes from his hands, will throw falsehood upon his own nature, and repudiate in its right action the very author of its being.

When we consider the happiness that arises from the exercise of the bodily organs, the useful end secured by the muscles of the human frame, the benevolence evinced in the animal creation, and the adaptation of nature to the varied offices of all creatures, we are indeed impressed with the goodness of God. But it is especially when man is viewed as having a conscience which is the great instrument by which all moral obligation is seen and felt, whose sphere of action is internal and limited to the merit and demerit of moral character, that we must arrive to the conclusion that such an instrument must come from a being who supremely loves the right and hates the wrong, and is himself essentially and eternally good.

"Duty," says Francis Bowen, "is not caused, for it never began to be; it has existed from eternity. We cannot even conceive of a period when justice was not, or will not be obligatory upon every being capable of understanding what justice requires: upon the idea or feeling expressed by the word *ought*, the whole science of morals depends. It differs not in degree, but in kind, from desire and appetite, so that these can never really come into competition with it. In truth it does not admit of degrees, for there are no half-way obligations. Conscience either speaks absolutely, or not at all."

Having thus considered the great element of virtue as consisting in the idea of right or duty, and that this alone is the exclusive sphere of conscience as the noblest faculty of man, is it not evident that conscience in its nature reveals the essential justice and benevolence of God? Does it not as a rule of conduct manifest the actual disposition of the Deity himself? Must we not infer that the great idea of right, of moral obligation, or the feeling comprehended in the word *ought*, had its origin from God? Is it not evident, from the consideration of the moral constitution of man, that God loves that which is in its nature good and hates that which is evil; that he always approves of the right, and condemns for the wrong? God thus acts, not so much because he has made a law, as because his own infinite nature leads him to love the right and hate the wrong.

It is a great step that we take to prove the equity and benevolence of God, when we show that there is something in virtue intrinsically good, and in its opposite inherently evil, and that conscience, as an original faculty, enjoins in its proper use the same love of virtue or right that reigns in the heart of God. Thus far the consideration of virtue as it comes before the intellect has been overlooked, and the attention confined to the relation that virtue sustains to the conscience; but we must not confound the conscience with the intellect or the affections. It is essentially different from both, however intimately the conscience may be associated with the intellect and affections; it is evidently designed by God to be an absolute rule, and exercise a supreme control over the whole moral nature. It calls upon the will to obey its voice, upon the intellect to give to it information, and upon the affections to love its beauty and urge to moral action. It imperatively enjoins submission upon all the faculties of our nature.

But the conscience is vastly strengthened in its exercise by a written law: whatever may be its action in an unperverted state, it is essentially dependent, in the present fallen condition of man, for its best exercise, upon the revealed will of God. In considering the chief element of all virtue, it has

been seen that it must comprehend that which is addressed to the highest part of our nature. If, by a careful analysis, we distinguish between virtue as presented to the intellect and affections, and virtue as presented to the conscience, we shall find that the intellect tells us what is true, the affections what is morally fit or beautiful, while the conscience gives the feeling of ought, and the idea of *right*. Can we then discriminate between the common quality of virtue and its first element, when we reach that wall of adamant that bounds all further inquiry? Certainly we can, by simply considering virtue as it presents itself to the intellect and affections, and as it presents itself to the conscience.

The intellect, as a perceiving power, tells us that virtue upon the whole is useful, that it promotes the highest happiness, conforms to order, and harmonizes with all moral law. The affections assure us that virtue is something in itself beautiful, good, lovely, and most desirable; but the conscience imperatively tells us that *virtue is right* in its very essence, and awakens the feeling of moral obligation. Our moral constitution, with the threefold power of the intellect, affections, and conscience, calls for the exercise of virtue. There is then a twofold quality in all benevolence or goodness common to all virtue: first—justice, and then love. The justice in benevolence or goodness regulates it, the love inspires it. God's justice makes his conduct always right, his love always urges him to right conduct. By justice the divine benevolence is forever upon the side of equity, of moral order and law, and by love always upon the side of that most useful, most happy and good. The one reigns supreme in the mind, the other in the heart of God.

With great appropriateness McCosh remarks, "All deep and earnest inquirers into the nature of virtue have got at least a partial view of the complex truth, each has seen it under one aspect, and has gone away so ravished with the sight that he never thought of going round the object and inquiring if it had another aspect equally lovely. Hutcheson is right in saying that in all virtue there is benevolence, and Edwards has given his theory a wider expansion in affirming

that love to being is of the very essence of virtuous action. Clarke too enunciated a profound truth when he said that there is an eternal fitness in virtue, for there is such a fitness in that righteousness which regulates benevolence. Reid and Stewart and Cousin have developed the mental process by which this eternal fitness is discovered, and have shown, too, that virtue must reside in the will. Each has seen so much of the truth, to use an image of Jouffroy, each has seen one side of the pyramid, and has written *beneath* it, not as he ought, this is one side of the pyramid, but this is the pyramid. One party has seen the love, and another has seen the righteousness. Hutcheson observed that affection and feeling were essential parts of all virtue, but took no cognizance of the fixed principles by which they must be regulated. Edwards, in a profound investigation, discovered that love must be according to a rule, but did not follow out his investigations so far as to discover the fundamental nature of that rule, as being no less essential a part of that morality than love itself. Clarke and Cudworth, with clear intellectual intuition, saw the presence of eternal and unresolvable principles. Reid and his followers have patiently investigated the powers of the human mind by which these principles are discovered; but none of these latter philosophers seem to give its proper place to the no less important element of benevolence. The true theory is to be found, not in the indiscriminate, not in the mere mechanical combination of the two, but in their chemical combination, in the melting and fusing them into one."

Thus it will be seen how the ablest writers upon the nature of virtue have differently presented the subject. But virtue certainly has an aspect of peculiar value when contemplated in its relation to the conscience. It is not affirmed that the whole of virtue, in the widest import of the word, is included in the idea of *right*. We would not, to use the significant image of Jouffroy, make out the pyramid of virtue all over to be only that which is presented in its relation to the conscience. But there must be something upon which the great fabric of virtue should stand; and what is that

foundation unless it be the immutable principle of right? Where its eternal basis unless it be in righteousness? Where that wall of adamant, unless it be in the feeling of *ought*, the sentiment of *right*, the first idea that lies at the root of all moral obligation? If the conscience is higher in its office than the intellect or the affections, why should we not go to the noblest part of our nature for our most worthy idea of virtue? Why, in viewing the separate beauties of the pyramid of virtue, should we overlook the everlasting foundation of rock upon which it stands?

In considering the moral constitution of man we must not overlook two elements that are essential to the existence of that constitution, and universally admitted by it: those two elements are personality and *freedom*. It is personality that distinguishes man from a thing; it is freedom that gives responsibility. Remove personality, and man is no more a moral agent than a stone; remove freedom, and man can no more be praised or blamed for his conduct than the wheel of a cotton-mill, or the boiler of a steamboat.

But where, as the great source of evidence, do we look for personality and freedom? Is it not to the consciousness? does this not give the absolute certainty of man a person, and man free? Who can doubt the fact that he thinks, or feels; and yet do thought and feeling and a sense of moral obligation find their foundation in the perfect certainty that the agent thus thinking, feeling, and having a sense of right and wrong, is a person and free? Can any process of reason ever destroy this consciousness universal in man? Many a philosopher has attempted to destroy it, and have thought to merge finite personality into the personality of God, and finite freedom into a law, or mode of divine existence, and thus have landed into pantheism; but pantheism, in doing away with human personality and freedom, must in consistency do away with all right or wrong in man, and with this all true accountability either to God or to man. But it is the peculiarity of consciousness that no perversion of mind can do away with its first principles. Some may reason themselves into the idea that there is no such thing as pleasure or pain,

just as Berkeley imagined there was no external world; but consciousness will not belie itself: experience is a school-master too stubborn to be fooled with senseless argument.

There is another class of philosophers who are found in the opposite extreme; they ignore altogether the existence of God. There is nothing with them but man; man is God and God is man. Divine personality is but another name for human personality, and the freedom of the Creator is all merged into the liberty of the creature. But here man's consciousness shows the atheist, even as the pantheist, in error. Man's consciousness is intimately associated with the idea of dependence, and this feeling of dependence shows itself in human history in a thousand ways. It is the basis of all systems of sacrifices to propitiate the favor of a *higher* power, and it speaks out in all the prayers, all the worship, and all the religion of man. Why so? Simply because human consciousness tells of human guilt, and groans in pain with the burden of sin. But what is sin? What is guilt? Do stones pray? Is there sorrow in trees? Is the warbling of the bird, or the roar of the lion, a confession of guilt? Do we get our idea of churches or temples of worship, Protestant or Catholic, Mohammedan or Pagan, from the beasts of the field? No indeed!

What does this show? Does it not declare the great fact of moral dependence with moral responsibility,—freedom with personality? Is not human consciousness as hostile to the atheist as to the pantheist? Is not the history of atheism and pantheism that of extremes meeting, and both belying each other? Both start from one common point, even that of denying the facts of consciousness: but the facts of consciousness are the first principles, the axioms of all reasoning, and both atheist and pantheist show their senseless folly by repudiating that upon which all reasoning is based. But would not the mathematician show himself an idiot who should formally announce that he should demonstrate the high problems of geometry without admitting as first steps the axioms of geometry? But consciousness has its axioms as much as mathematics. First truths do not admit of any

process of reason ; they would not be first principles or truths if they were reasoned out ; they are the foundation of reason, and reason cannot go higher than its source. The stream does not make the fountain, but the fountain the stream. The axiom that the whole is greater than its part cannot admit a process of demonstration. No reason can make an intuitive certainty any plainer. The facts of consciousness are as certain and universal as the axioms of mathematics, but they are equally beyond the process of reason : reason, like the senses, has its bounds ; within its sphere it can lead to certain truth, but no sooner does it get out of its sphere than it shows its folly, first by confusing plain truth, and then by making confusion worse confounded. This is peculiarly so when reason attempts to do away with the facts of consciousness. It is the insane attempt of the head, and hands, and feet, in the fable, to do away with the body ; but the body destroyed, and the head, hands, and feet must perish too. All that reason gets by denying the facts of consciousness is self-destruction. If the foundation of all reason is taken away, reason itself must fall to the ground. The facts of consciousness, like the rock-bound coast of England, have for ages withstood the impetuous waves of pantheism, atheism, and materialism, and for ages have these angry billows been beaten back, and yet while human depravity lasts will they be denied or explained away ; but no infidelity can conceal these facts : they will project out like this rocky coast, against which in vain dash the waves of the sea.

“Merely literary men,” says Wilson, taking the thought from Verplanck, “are slow to admit that vulgar minds can have any rational perception of truths involving great and high contemplation. They overlook the distinction between the nice analysis of principles, the accurate statement of definitions, logical inferences, and the solution of difficulties, and the *structure of our own thoughts*, and the *play of the affections*. They discern not between the theory of metaphysical science and the first truths and rational instincts which are implanted in the hearts of all, and which prepare them to see the glory of the Gospel, to feel its influence, and to argue from both for both the divinity of Christianity.”

The instinctive feelings of our nature, and those intuitive truths upon which the whole science of reasoning is built, are often very little considered. It has been the great mistake of most arguments upon the existence and attributes of God, that the subtlety of metaphysics has been resorted to, rather than those self-evident truths recognized by man in all ages. The evidence for a God of infinite goodness and justice is addressed to us through two mediums,—that of the senses and the consciousness. Important as may be the former, and necessary to satisfy the reason, yet the latter, in the universality of its power and influence, far surpasses it. There is none the less reality in the truth of the evidence of consciousness because it cannot be clothed in the precise language of logic. The feeling that I exist, or that my idea of an external world has an objective reality, are truths as certain as any axiom in mathematics. No demonstration to a man can be higher than self-demonstration. Our nature is so constructed that we instinctively believe that every effect must have a cause,—that if man cannot create himself, or the world create itself, or the laws of nature adjust themselves, then we must look for a cause above and without these things, by the double evidence of the senses and the consciousness. We are forced to believe in an infinite cause, self-existing, underived and eternal,—the author of man, of nature, and its laws.

When we study the conscience we find it to be a great law of duty. Within the heart do we carry about a witness for the goodness of God that no sophistry can obliterate. We must believe in accordance with the first principles of belief; we must think as we are constituted; our nature is outraged if we do not thus think. We are upon a sea of endless uncertainty if we refuse thus to believe. We are forced to admit, that even if conscience, an external world, ourselves were chimeras, if by any possibility they could be mere fictions of imagination; yet we must act and think and have as deep a conviction of the reality of things as if things were real; and however far we might venture upon the sea of skepticism, yet we would be compelled by our inherent convic-

tions of reality to return back, for first principles cannot be tortured into error as the deductions of reason. The skeptic can gain nothing by disavowing the intuitive convictions of his nature; he does not better himself by his efforts of self-annihilation.

“There is a spiritual sun,” says Fenelon, “that enlightens the soul more fully than the material sun does the body. This sun of truth leaves no shadow, and it shines upon both hemispheres. It is as brilliant in the night as in the daytime; it is not without that it sheds its rays, it dwells within each one of us,—one man cannot hide its rays from another; whatever corner of the earth we may go to there it is. We never need say to another, Stand back that I may see it; you hide its rays from me, you deprive me of that which is my due. This glorious sun never sets; no clouds intercept its rays but those formed by our passions. It is one bright day. It sheds light upon the savage in the darkest caverns. There are no eyes so weak that they cannot bear its light; and there is no man so blind and miserable that does not walk by the feeble light from this source that he still retains in his conscience.”

But this spiritual sun that Fenelon calls the conscience, carries with it the highest evidence of the goodness of God. By teaching us that duty is our highest end,—the acting right the noblest exercise of man,—it reveals as truly the will of God to us as if that will was written upon the sky. Why, if God was not good, would he implant a principle in our nature that would lead us to despise wrong and injustice whenever felt and seen? Why thus instinctive the feelings that rise up in the heart of approbation of right, of approval of virtue, of esteem for the lovely and excellent, unless the author of our nature himself loved the right and the good! Let it be observed, skepticism cannot so confound the essential nature of things as to lead us to deny that there is reality to the internal ideas of right and wrong. It cannot say virtue and vice are only the deceptive creations of the imagination, as all the reasoning in the world will not convince a man that there is no ocean that he gazes upon, no ground

upon which he walks, no sound that he hears, no flower that he smells; so no sophistry can blind the mind to the inherent reality of right and wrong, virtue and vice. Our knowledge of these distinctions is none the less certain because it is intuitive or self-evident. First truths are always intuitions: no explanation can make clearer to us the idea that the whole is greater than a part, or that two is more than one; no reasoning can make clearer to us the idea of our self-existence, or more convincing the feeling that we ought to do what is right, and avoid what is wrong. Who but a Being who loves the good and hates the bad would so constitute the heart? Would God give in the soul of man a spiritual sun to reveal the deformity of sin and the beauty of virtue, if that sun only unveiled that which would awaken contempt of the Deity himself? What an absurdity, what wickedness in the idea that the author of our moral constitution would *not have it* in its proper exercise the reflection of his own justice and goodness!

“The great Creator,” says Dr. Alexander, “has not left himself without a witness in the heart of every man. It is possible that a man may be so abandoned as to believe in lies, and that he may come to disbelieve the God that made and supports him. But he cannot obliterate the law written in his heart; he cannot divest himself of the conviction that certain actions are morally wrong; nor can he prevent the stings of remorse when he commits sins of an enormous kind. Men may indeed spin out refined metaphysical theories, and come to the conclusion that there is no difference between virtue and vice, and that these distinctions are the result of education. But let some one commit a flagrant act of injustice towards themselves, and their practical judgment will soon give the lie to their theoretical opinions. As those speculatists, who argue that there is no external world, will avoid running against a post, or into the fire, as carefully as other men, so they who endeavor to reason themselves into the belief that virtue and vice are mere notions generated by education, cannot nevertheless avoid perceiving that some actions are base, unjust, or ungrateful, and consequently

to be disapproved of, whether committed by themselves or others."

Thus it will be seen that conscience is that spiritual sun within us whose voice proclaims an ever-present God. This arises not so much from the deductions of reason as from the instructive feeling of our nature; assuring us that the great law within, universal as man, must have an author, and that the Being who made us must, with the conscience, love the good and hate the bad. Other evidences of the goodness of God fall immeasurably short of this in conclusiveness and power. This is the evidence every man carries about with him in his own bosom,—immediate in its decision and instructive in its agency. Thus, we find the existence of conscience has far more to do with the idea of God and his righteousness than is often imagined. Man feels more than he reasons. The former is spontaneous, while the latter creeps with slow pace over the ground. With undisciplined minds this is peculiarly true. Thus, we see the fact of God's existence; and his goodness, even when first announced, finds a response of acquiescence so universal in the conscience. Thus, we see the multitude of all ages, corrupt as they may be, and ignorant as they may be, yet never in theory disputing the evidence of a Supreme Being, and his goodness. Confused as may be their idea of God, erroneous as may be the conceptions of his moral character, misguided as may be the homage paid to false idols, yet conscience, however perverted, cannot easily be made to give up the idea of one infinite Being of justice and goodness. When false philosophy and the superstition of centuries have thrown their black foliage over the foundation of the greatest of truths, and enveloped thick in their embrace of death the noblest part of man, yet conscience, *the wall of adamant*, is still seen by the observer through the chinks and openings of that fatal drapery that surrounds it.

Most convincingly has Pascal said, "We know the truth not only by the reason but also by the heart; it is by the heart that we know first principles, and it is in vain that reasoning, which has no part in it, tries to combat them. The

Pyrrhonists, whose only object this is, strive for it in vain. We know that we do not dream, however impotent we may be to prove it by reason; this impotence proves nothing more than the feebleness of our reason, but not the uncertainty of all our knowledge as they pretend. For the knowledge of first principles, as of *space, time, movement, numbers*, is as certain as any of those that our reasonings give us. And it is on this knowledge of the heart and instinct that reason must support herself, and on this she founds her whole procedure. The heart feels that there are three dimensions in space, and that numbers are infinite; and the reason demonstrates its course, that there are no two square numbers of which one is double the other. Principles are felt, propositions are proved; and all with certainty, although in different ways; and it is as ridiculous for the reason to demand of the heart proofs of its first principles, in order to be willing to consent to them, as it would be for the heart to demand of the reason a feeling of all the propositions that it demonstrates in order to be willing to receive them."

The great author of the moral constitution of man has so made it that it shall plainly testify to two things: First, that he himself, as the absolute, the infinite, the eternal, loves supremely duty; secondly, that he loves supremely truth. If we keep in mind the ever needful distinction between God's work and man's perversion, we shall find that truth is the natural end for which the mind is made, even as duty is that for which the moral sensibilities are given. The melancholy history of man shows that God's purpose in his creation is frustrated by his natural love of error, even as by his inclination to fly from the restraints of duty. But, because we see the painful evidence that man is wrong in his head and his heart, it does not imply that man is made for error and guilt. It does not imply that God loves either. The whole moral constitution of man speaks out against this inference. What is the actual fact in relation to the intellect and the heart? We certainly can tell the use of an axe, and for what it is intended, even if by abuse the edge of it may be as blunt as a fence rail. Now the intellect was made

for truth. First, because through the senses in their appropriate sphere the facts of the outward world exactly correspond to the internal impressions of the mind. The mind, using the senses as instruments, is not deceived in relation to external things. The idea mentally of a tree, a brook, a hill, a house, corresponds with the things themselves. This is always the case with the senses legitimately used. And secondly, the professed object of the intellect in all investigations is truth. Error as error is not professed to be the end of human reason: error is often imbibed instead of the truth; but the very fact that men are so ashamed to confess that they are seeking error rather than truth, speaks volumes in favor of God's making the mind for truth, and to be satisfied only with it. What are all the fair pretenses of error and its crooked by-paths but the unwilling concession of the mind to the worth of truth! Truth does not hide its face as error does. Truth stands upon its own merits, while error is ever aiming to clothe its loathsome body with the garb of truth. It will steal its semblance if it cannot glory in its reality. Truth is constantly counterfeited, because error seen in its naked hideousness revolts the mind. But why should the mind revolt at error undisguised if it was made for it? If truth is a matter of indifference with God, why does he speak out so loudly in its favor in man's moral constitution? If the false currency of error is all the same with the Deity as the genuine gold of truth, why has he made the human mind so ashamed of error when exposed, and so confident and joyful even when truth is established? The moral constitution is made not only for the actual realities of life, but the love of error and habitual self-deception will put it all out of tune, and, like a sweet instrument of music with the strings out of place, the very discords given will show the perversion of that purpose for which it was intended. All the professions of men boasting that they are in search of the truth, reveal the great fact that error is not a normal condition of the mind, but an abnormal condition. God designed the mind to find out truth, and not to be cheated every hour with delusions. As a melancholy fact,

men do constantly and perseveringly practice self-deception. Reason is ever getting out of its sphere, and pretending to decide things, where there is a perfect incompetence of knowledge. Back of the reason there is the will and affections; and if error is followed after more than truth, does not Revelation give the solution to the difficulty in the words: "And this is the condemnation, that light is come into the world; and men loved darkness rather than light because their deeds were evil."

Equally evident is it that God made the heart for duty. All our moral sensibilities speak out the momentous truth that their great Author is good and loves good in his creatures, that truth and duty should be the aim of every moral agent. Nothing more strikingly illustrates God's end in man's creation than the universal principle upon which all civil law, all criminal law, and all courts of justice are based. Two words sum up the professed end of all human government, *truth* and *duty*. However philosophers may reason, mankind can assume no other end in human law; human law may be oppressive, but it does not label oppression upon its face; civil enactments may be unjust, but they never profess to seek injustice rather than justice; human decisions may be erroneous, but they never acknowledge that error rather than truth is aimed at. It is not thus that error and injustice walk the earth; their danger lies in their concealment, not their exposure. Here, then, is the stubborn fact that always arrays itself against the atheist, the pantheist, and the materialist. Mankind do act upon the principle, whatever may be its misapplication, of treating vice as vice, virtue as virtue, truth as truth, and error as error. Law does profess and seek to carry out the great end of punishing vice, protecting virtue, exposing error, and vindicating truth. Law professing a different end would not be tolerated; humanity, corrupt as it is, rises up in wrath against legalized injustice when exposed and judicial error unmasked. Observe how crime when punished is approved of; how innocence tortured is condemned. Observe how the universal voice of humanity calls for law, simply because the end pro-

fessed of law is truth and duty. Now this end, universally professed by human law, shows clearly that the common judgment of mankind in relation to truth and error, virtue and vice, has its foundation in the consciousness or heart; it is all based upon those first principles which no ingenuity or reasoning can ignore. Indeed, those very philosophers who loudly declaim against human personality and freedom and responsibility; who confound moral agency with the fatalism of mere law, and convert the great element of personality into a thing; those who disregard the essential distinction between mind and matter, or who so deify cause and effect as to exclude the First Great Cause, all are compelled to go upon the common principle of human law, that never questions the fact of the fundamental distinction between virtue and vice, truth and error. Those philosophers who build in their minds such fine castles of speculation, have as a plain fact to confess their folly and repudiate their conclusions whenever they are brought into collision with the actual verities of life. Whatever may be the theories of philosophers who seek to transcend the natural limits of reason and deny the facts of consciousness, their practice in the everyday concerns of life shows that they believe quite as firmly, when their own interests are at stake, in personality, freedom, truth, error, virtue, vice, and moral responsibility, as the great multitude who never have had the presumption to deny these things. All punishment and reward have their reason in the first truths of consciousness. The very oaths taken in a court of law involve the idea of divine authority and human dependence and responsibility to it, confirmed by that universal consciousness that teaches man that he is a *person*, and an *accountable person*. Now the certainty that the earth turns round upon its axis, or makes an annual revolution around the sun, is not more firmly established than the facts of consciousness. It is a great truth, that deny them as we may, we all of us have to act upon them; all law is built upon them; all correct reason must use them as axioms. When a certain slave, punished for theft, exclaimed to his master, "I am fated (that is, *necessitated*) to steal," that mas-

ter was glad to repudiate in practice his fine-spun philosophy by replying to him, "And you are also *fated to be whipped.*"

Looking, then, to the universally admitted facts of consciousness, and considering the intuitive conviction of the certainty of these facts, can we come to any other conclusion than this,—that God, who made the human consciousness and heart even as the intellect and faculty of reasoning, intended that man's moral constitution should recognize the personality and benevolence of God himself? Judging of the maker by his workmanship, do we not find in the all-pervading conviction of human personality, of freedom, of moral responsibility, of cause and effect, of the necessity and excellence of virtue and truth, of the folly and injury of error and vice, and the professed end of all law to arrive at truth and establish justice, the certain evidence that if such is God's work, such the established order of the world without us and within us, then, notwithstanding the perversity of the mind of man, his sinfulness and his guilt, notwithstanding the prevalence of error and crime, the character of God is vindicated, and his being shown forth in his personality and freedom as infinitely wise, benevolent, and just?

CHAPTER XX.

“THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICAL AND MORAL EVIL.”

It will be our object to show that there have been ideas attached to the import of the words omnipotence and infinite benevolence altogether erroneous, and speculations upon what the Deity might do or ought to do, in every respect unbecoming the limited range of the human mind.

“We have explained enough,” says Leibnitz, “when we have shown that there are cases where some disorder in a part is necessary to the production of the greatest order in the whole. But M. Boyle, it appears, demands a little too much. He wishes that we should show him in detail how evil is linked with the best possible plan of a universe. This would be a perfect explanation of the phenomena. But we undertake not to give it, and what is more, we are not obliged to give it, a thing impossible in the present state. It is enough for us to make the observation, that nothing hinders, but that a certain particular evil may be linked with that which, viewed in its totality, is the best. This imperfect explanation, and which leaves something to be discovered in another life, is sufficient for a solution of objections, but not for a comprehension of the thing.”

This opinion of Leibnitz is deserving of careful consideration. His hypothesis in respect to the introduction of evil presents a serious obstacle in the way of those who would imagine that its existence implied a deficiency in the benevolence of God. Whether correct or incorrect, it answers a most useful purpose in throwing the burden of proof against the divine benevolence upon the hands of skeptics. The skeptic at least cannot say the present system may not on the whole be the best possible to God; that his present

universe, in its totality, with the disorder of sin, may not be better than any other possible universe to God. Reasoning alone upon the ground that the greatest amount of happiness is the greatest good, the skeptic, upon that assumption, cannot say that for aught he knows there may not in its totality be a greater amount of happiness in the present universe with the incidental permission of evil, than would be in another universe with no sin in it. If the greatest good is to be measured by the greatest happiness in the aggregate, how does the skeptic know but that the present universe embodies more happiness than any other possible universe? How does he know but that a more permanent and larger increase of good may result from the present order of things than from any other? Is the skeptic capable of prescribing to God what should be his best kind of universe? Does he know that anything better, upon the whole, can be done than has been done? Admitting that among all those possible universes present to the mind of the Deity there was the weighing in scales the aggregate happiness of each separate universe, can the skeptic say that among them all the present universe, called into existence by God, was not the best? Can his own limited mind pronounce that God might do better than he has done? Can he say that there is a defect in divine power or goodness?

But the difficulty of the skeptic is greatly augmented when he carefully ponders the real value of free moral agency. One thing is certain: if sin is not possible, neither is virtue; if wrong cannot be committed, neither can right; if there is no power to do evil, neither is their power to do good; if freedom of choice cannot exist in wickedness, neither can it in holiness. The power of choice implies something to choose between, viz.: the existence of two things, and one different from the other.

Free moral agency presupposes in its nature the possibility of sin: for freedom in a creature to exist, there must be the liberty of choice between the good and the evil. The question is not then, whether a free moral agent cannot sin, but whether he *may* not sin, and yet God do all things

for the best. It is whether sin and misery may not exist, and yet the present universe be the best possible to God.

We think the hypothesis of Leibnitz, upon the supposition that the greatest good is the greatest amount of happiness, impossible to be refuted. As such, the burden of proof is all upon the side of the skeptic; and, until he can show the contrary, he has no business to point to the existence of evil as in any respect implying a defect in the goodness or in the benevolence of God. It is not for the skeptic to call upon the Christian believer to unravel the profound intricacies of the problem of moral evil. The Christian but poorly understands the real strength of his available ground when he thinks it necessary to explain everything before he can call upon his opponent to believe. Most happily has Leibnitz thrown into the face of his learned adversary the unanswerable words: "But M. Boyle, it appears, demands a little too much. He thinks that we should show him in detail how evil is linked with the best possible plan of a universe. *This would be a perfect explanation of the phenomena.*"

Not only is it self-evident that this would be a perfect explanation of the phenomena, but it is equally certain that such an explanation is impossible to a finite mind. We stand not at the commencement of the great chain of Divine Providence, but more truly in the middle of that chain. Behind us is a boundless eternity, before us lie ages everlasting. How then, in the nature of things, can we take into detail the universe of God? How are we capable of sounding the deeps of God's providence? When we measure with our short line and plummet, are we conscious how vast is that distance down which we think to go? What arrogance then to call upon the believer in God's infinite goodness to explain in detail the permission of evil? With the innumerable positive proofs of the Divine goodness before him, is the skeptic at liberty to question the fact of God's benevolence, because he may not be able to see into the mystery of the moral disorder that reigns in the world?

Says Lactantius, who professes to have taken his views from Epicurus: "The Deity is either willing to take away

all evil, but is not able to do so, in which case he is not omnipotent, or he is able to remove the evil, but is not willing, in which case he is not benevolent; or he is neither willing nor able, which is a denial of the perfections of God; or he is both able and willing to do away with the evil, and yet it exists."

This dilemma, that at first sight appears so plausible, vanishes upon a nearer investigation. What does this dilemma involve? Simply an assertion that cannot be proved,—even the competence of a finite mind to prescribe what omnipotence can do, and what infinite benevolence should do. But can any scale be constructed by which we may measure infinite power and benevolence? Are we not aware that when we separately contemplate the two attributes of infinite power and goodness, we must look not to the outward development, but the principle itself of Divine power and goodness? If we supposed omnipotence exhausted itself in the works of creation, if there was no other world or being that God could make, then would not such an idea limit the infinity of God's power? Suppose the full compliment of worlds and beings made up in the universe, if God could add nothing more, would his power be unlimited? If all possible exercise of power is restricted to the present universe, then something more would be impossible. Suppose that universe had in it a thousand degrees of happiness, one more degree added would not be in the power of God. Equally vague is the idea of the word infinite as applied to Divine benevolence.

In the very nature of things that which is infinite cannot be restricted to *actual development*, otherwise the *infinite would be finite*. The measure of the infinity of God is to be estimated from what he can do,—from the boundless resources within his nature,—not the outward manifestation of that nature. There is a necessary limit to a finite being of power even as of goodness; but the infinite being cannot exhaust his power or benevolence in outward development, or he would cease to be infinite and become finite. All works must have an end; that which has a beginning in number

must have a termination in number. There is a limit to the universe or there could be no commencement; as the universe is the aggregate of parts, so one part taken away or something added that did not exist before, diminishes or increases the number that goes to make up the whole. Consequently, if the amount could not be increased, would not the universe be the measure of the divine power rather than the manifestation of it? It should never be forgotten, that it is wholly beyond the finite mind to prescribe bounds either to the power or to the goodness of God.

What constitutes the essential idea of the infinity of the attributes of God is the fact that the measure of it exists in the nature of God, not in the outward developments of God in the universe. The world we live in reveals the boundless power and goodness of God, but it does not prescribe that power or goodness, neither does the universe do it. God, as infinite, must have in himself resources transcendently greater than any outward development of these resources.

“The greatest possible effort of infinite power,” says President Appleton, “is a solecism in language. Infinite power is a power without limits, but every effect is, and must be, finite. It is absurd to speak of an effect equal to infinite power; and it is impossible to imagine any effect so great that God cannot produce a greater; for if all the creatures now existing were elevated to the nature and dignity of angels, still, as there is no *ne plus ultra* of Almighty power, they might be raised still higher. Besides, their number might be increased. But number implies limits; let it be doubled, trebled, or multiplied by a million, still the product has limits; and a limited effect bears no proportion to an unlimited cause. All the objections to the goodness of God on account of his not having produced happiness to the utmost of his power, do therefore rest on absurdity. But suppose it were otherwise, and the greatest possible effort of infinite power did not imply a contradiction, it would still be perfectly beyond such limited capacities as ours to ascertain whether Deity had proceeded to the utmost extent of such power in the production of happiness. Consequently, if the objection were well-

founded, it would be impossible for Deity himself to enable human creatures to ascertain his goodness."

One object in this valuable quotation is to make clear the great truth, that no finite mind can prescribe bounds to the power or the goodness of God. The actual development can bear no comparison to the infinite cause. We have alluded to the theory of Leibnitz, upon the best possible system of the universe, not because we are partial to his optimism, which we believe is open to objection, but because we think his theory at least impossible to be refuted by that class of minds who are so fond of weighing in the scales the necessary quantity of the divine power and goodness; who reason as if virtue and happiness were ponderable things, and as susceptible of measurement and weight as sugar and corn; but the fact is, virtue and happiness are not capable of being weighed by any analogy with material things. They refer to qualities of moral agents, acts of responsible beings. Virtue and happiness are abstract ideas, that apply not to the aggregate, but to the individuals that make it up. It is not the universe that is to be looked at, but each responsible agent in it. We are to determine the quantity of virtue and happiness not by a general abstraction that hems in the whole universe, but by the merit of each individual in that universe. The divine equity is vindicated if full justice is done to the individual, no matter where in the scale of being he commenced, or where he ended. It is the separate sphere where each act that God looks at, not the whole with all compounded together.

Let us examine what should be the chief end, and what is the highest interest of man,—what, in truth, is the greatest good. Is it happiness or virtue? Is it right or pleasure? Is it to be virtuous we should chiefly live for, or is it to be happy? When we contrast the two together, is not virtue the highest of the two? The problem of the existence of physical and moral evil is relieved of its greatest difficulty when virtue is considered a greater good than happiness. God's chief end in creation is not then to produce so much the greatest happiness, as the greatest virtue; not to propose, as the highest

end to a moral agent, pleasure as duty. Happiness indeed is connected with virtue, but it is the fruit, not the nature itself of virtue,—the servant but not the master.

But if virtue is the highest interest of man, is not the liberty to do wrong essential to its very existence? Would there be any virtue if there was nothing to test it? If we took away freedom, where would be the development of right conduct? If we removed harm and suffering, where would be the virtues of patience, of courage, of endurance, of compassion, and of mercy? Suppose the present universe did not secure, in the aggregate, the greatest possible happiness, who can say that it does not the greatest possible virtue? Suppose the ultimate stock of pleasure by the existence of physical and moral evil diminished, who can say the development of right may not be immeasurably increased? Suppose our finite minds might weigh the ultimate amount of pleasure, and we should find it less than in some other possible universe, would not a vastly nobler manifestation of right, a more brilliant development of virtue, more than compensate for the loss?

But divine goodness is relieved of all objection if it can be shown that any suffering, any moral evil, is consistent with infinite benevolence. It is unnecessary for us to discuss the full amount, the extent, of moral or physical evil; all that we have to do is to show that any is consistent with the goodness of God. No matter how large the amount of evil, yet if some can be shown to be consistent with divine benevolence, then the question at once is settled as to the consistency of the permission of physical and moral evil with infinite benevolence. For if some evil is necessary, or consistent with the goodness of God, why not the existence of all the present physical and moral evil? Can any person be competent to prescribe to Omnipotence what he should do, where he should stop, or how much evil it is proper for him to permit in his universe? If the greatest good is virtue and not the highest pleasure, right and not the greatest happiness; if duty is man's noblest interest, and not joy,—

then who can say that the present system is not on the whole the best for God to make?

Let us then carefully examine whether any evil, physical or moral, is consistent with the benevolence of God. Let us commence with the lower order of creation. Pain and death to the brutes are evils; but would animal existence be possible, constituted as the world is, without death? Is not the aggregate amount of happiness vastly increased by the number of the inferior animals who come into existence? Would myriads of creatures enjoy existence unless death had granted to them a sphere of enjoyment by the removal of a surplus number? Estimating, where virtue and vice are impossible, the goodness of God by the greatest amount of happiness, can it be shown that as much enjoyment would exist in the animal kingdom without death as with it? Consider, also, that death renders certain an inconceivably greater number to enjoy life. Consider again, that if it is a gratuitous blessing to give life; if the creature brought into being had, previous to existence, no claim upon God for the enjoyments granted in life, then certainly a creature has no claim upon God for endless existence. If no favor was due the creature before existence, certainly there can be no demand upon God for a deathless being.

But the question at once is settled of the goodness of inflicting death, when the momentary evil is contrasted with the vast amount of enjoyment afforded. Consider how great is that enjoyment even among the lowest orders of creation! If we could imagine them endowed with foresight, would they not prefer their joyous life to having no life, and with it no death? If the cup of existence with its few pains was offered in one hand, and *non-existence* with no pain in the other, would it be difficult to determine which would be chosen? Contemplate the few pains that happen to the brute creation. Now pain can be shown in the present constitution of things to be a positive blessing. In the vast majority of cases, to every individual of the brute creation, it comes only at extremely long intervals of their existence. The whole life is passed in enjoyment, in most cases, with

only the momentary uneasiness of death. Animals not having human reason do not anticipate with dread their death. Nor are the pains upon the whole much greater than what are absolutely needful for their preservation. Bodily pain is the sentinel that keeps watch over the system. Had animals no pain, no dread instinctive of suffering, it is inconceivable how they could exist. No efforts would be made to avert danger—no exertion to avoid destruction. The brute creation have just enough of uneasiness to urge to active effort to avoid physical evil. Animals are placed under just enough of restraint to secure them from perpetual ruin.

Nor is the degree of pain equal with all. The lower down we go in the animal scale the simpler the organization, the more limited the sphere of exercise or enjoyment, the more inferior the faculties, the less we have reason to believe is the sensation of pain. Thus, as a compensation for a relative degradation in the scale of animal life, we see a diminution of all sensibility to suffering. The head of a dragon-fly will eat after it is severed from the body. One remarkable peculiarity in respect to pain, and which reveals the benevolence of God, is, that the nerves that give the sensation of pain are mostly upon the surface of the body, and the deeper the incision of the knife the less the pain. Thus, where it is most needed we find pain, and where it is less needed less pain. Upon the surface of the body there exists most danger, and there is needed upon the surface of the body greater warning. The peculiarity of animal life is, that its existence every moment would be endangered were it not for the principle of fear engendered by pain. Can, then, the existence of physical evil to the lower orders of creation conflict in any degree with the benevolence of God? Do we not find it even a strong evidence of divine goodness? Could it be, under the present constitution of things, dispensed with without great detriment? Here, then, is one step taken to show that some evil is clearly consistent with infinite benevolence!

Let us, then, ascend up to a higher order of creatures: let us take *man*. Here we come to a free moral agent; here we

find conscience, a moral sense, the feeling of responsibility and obligation. If man is a free moral agent, then the possibility of his falling into sin is directly involved in it. Then there must be liberty of choice, the ability of choosing between the good and the bad, the inherent power of being virtuous or vicious. The freedom involved in man's moral nature must enable him to obey or disobey. Can the objector to the divine goodness—because man is a sinner, and therefore liable to suffering and punishment—say that it would be better that man's freedom should be taken away, that his liberty should cease to exist, than that he should be liable to evils so great?

Remove human freedom, and what is the result? Is it not the absence of that which is man's highest privilege and most exalted dignity? Is God to be blamed because man so perverts his highest prerogative? Because man's freedom can be made the instrument of his ruin, is that a reason why infinite benevolence should not bestow it? Must then there be, as the only alternative, the nature of brutes? Is the goodness of God to be impeached because there may be involved in the most costly gift a greater evil from its abuse? Would it be a blessing to have no conscience, no freedom of choice, no exalted powers of man made in the image of God, because that very moral agency involves in it the essential power of free choice? Is compulsory virtue, virtue? Is forced freedom, freedom? Do we want to be brutified, with no other power to guide than instinct? Do we ask for mechanical action, and the disrobing of our natures of reason, of conscience, and the angelic power of moral faculties? Is such the price we would be willing to pay for exemption from moral evil?

But the fact that virtue, not happiness, duty, not pleasure, right, not joy, is the greatest good and our highest interest, relieves the subject of moral and physical evil of its greatest difficulty. So long as we look upon happiness as the greatest good, and the greatest happiness as the greatest end, the mind will insensibly fall into the notion of happiness as if it was subject to weight and measure, and the chief thing

to be considered in relation to man. Consequently we shall imbibe the idea of the present system with Leibnitz, as the best possible with God, and by our peculiar theory of optimism directly, if not knowingly, limit divine power or goodness. What other inference but this, while happiness, not virtue, pleasure, not duty, is made the greatest good? But exalt the idea of right, the principle of virtue, above happiness, and then at once the inference is conclusive that happiness and pleasure, as subordinate, may before the higher principle of virtue and duty be sacrificed. The only question we ever need ask is, What will make us virtuous? not, What will make us happy? Then shall we judge not only that happiness is inferior to virtue, but must always make way for it: so far then, under certain circumstances, have we any reason to doubt of the goodness of God because of the denial of happiness, that we are compelled to admit that a much higher blessing would be lost unless there was the sacrifice of happiness.

The idea that suffering and pain, physical and mental, throw doubt upon the goodness of God is at once shown fallacious, when we consider that such suffering may be essential for the trial of virtue,—that the noblest development of virtue may be in a state of probation,—that the world, as a scene of discipline, may be the best possible for man a sinner,—that with wrong committed and liberty perverted, there must be suffering and pain. Such an idea makes every objection to the goodness of God from the existence of evil altogether without foundation. The great law of our finite condition is progress, not attainment. Happiness, however great, is not the great end: virtue is the grand end. But virtue is *action*, not a state; it implies effort, increase, constant progress. Happiness is being, virtue is doing; consequently the cultivation of virtue—the giving to moral agents the noblest sphere for its exercise—is a higher end in creation than happiness.

Temptation, evil, pain, trial, danger, may be necessary to secure the noblest end of virtue. None can say it is not so. None can affirm that God has not chosen the best system for

such an object. None can offer the existence of evil as any objection to infinite goodness. Our moral constitution, the light of nature and revelation, teach us the contrary; both assure us that God is good. The divine benevolence is as boundless as the divine wisdom and power. The problem of moral and physical evil need not trouble a single mind; it has nothing in it to infringe upon the goodness of God. Our ignorance is the sole ground of our mistakes. We are constantly liable to overlook the greatest good in an inferior one. God, as infinite in his perfections, cannot be fully comprehended by our finite minds,—finite in their progress. This only we know, we can place no limit to the power or to the goodness of God. How ungrateful are we to complain at God's works,—to imagine the fish should be elevated to the scale of quadrupeds, quadrupeds to men, and men to angels,—to be envious because some are more learned, or rich, or higher in the scale of being than ourselves,—to find fault, not with our want of virtue, but happiness,—to think we might improve upon the order of the universe! How ungrateful to be spying out always the evils, and never to think of the blessings! Is there to be no end to our captious questions?

But these questions force us to pass beyond the limit of human agency and human power, and lead us directly into the infinite sphere of divine power and benevolence. But let us abstain from language as thankless as it is useless. Let us bow before the infinite mind. Let us trust in the boundless goodness of God. Let virtue and eternal right be the end of our being, and then happiness, such as God only can give, shall be our portion.

Most appropriately, upon the permission of evil, does Horace Bushnell remark: "So far, the possibility of evil appears to be necessarily involved in the existence of a realm of powers; whether it shall also be a fact, depends on other considerations yet to be named. One of the most valued and most triumphantly asserted arguments of our new school of sophists is dismissed in this manner at the outset. God, they say, is omnipotent, and being omnipotent, he can, of

course, do all things. If, therefore, he chooses to have no sin, or disobedience, there will be no sin or disobedience; and if we fall on what is sin to us, it will only be a form of good to him, and would be also to us, if we could see far enough to comprehend the good. The argument is well enough, in case men are things only and not powers; they are, by the supposition, to act as being uncaused in their action, which excludes any control of them by God's omnipotent force, and then what becomes of the argument?

“But it will be peremptorily required of us, at this point, to answer another question; viz., Why God should have created a realm of powers, or free agents, if they must needs be capable, in this manner, of wrong and misery? Without acknowledging for one moment that I am responsible for the answer of any such question, and denying explicitly the right of any mortal to disallow or discredit any act of God, because he cannot comprehend the reasons of it, I will simply say in reply, that it is enough for me to be allowed the simple hypothesis that God preferred to have powers and not things only; because he loves character; and apart from this, cares not for all the mere things that can be piled in the infinitude of space itself, even though they be diamonds; because, in bestowing on a creature the perilous capacity of character, he bestows the highest possibility of wrath and glory,—a capacity to know, to love, to enjoy, to be consciously great and blessed in the participation of his own divinity and character. For if all the orbs of heaven were so many solid Kohinoors, glittering eternally in the sun, what were they either to themselves or to him; or if they should roll eternally, undisturbed in the balance of their attractions, what were they to each other? Is it any impeachment of God that he did not care to reign over an empire of stones? If he has deliberately chosen a kind of empire not to be ruled by force; if he has deliberately set his children beyond that kind of control, that they may be governed by truth, reason, love, want, fear, and the like, acting through their consent; if we find them able to act against the will of God, as stones and vegetables cannot, what more is necessary to

vindicate his goodness than to suggest that he has given them, possibly, a capacity to break allegiance, in order that there may be a meaning and a glory in allegiance, when they choose it? There is, then, such a thing inherent in the system of powers as a possibility of wrong; for, given the possibility of right, we have the possibility of wrong."

CHAPTER XXI.

THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

“THE physical or immediate *cause* of any event,” says Prof. Nichol on the solar system, “is merely that event without which as a precedent the other never occurs. We say that one event causes or brings about another, not because aught is visible—any peculiar virtue in the first event which *necessitates* the second—but because it is so arranged in the economy of the known universe that when the first happens the second always follows it; and if we find events so ordered, that in a long *series* of changes they succeed each other in a certain recognizable plan, we term that observed plan the *law* of these events. The name, or word law, does not thus involve the idea or any controlling power: it is the mere result of an observed succession,—the mode by which we thread together in our minds the different events which befall; and if the slightest element involving control is properly connected with it, it can only be in reference to the relation of such succession to spiritual or mental phenomena, and ultimately as it represents that IDEA in the Almighty mind according to which the order in question was arranged.

“Regarding LAW, not as causative, but expressive,—as the simple indication of mighty arrangements, a gleam into the finite mind from that of the Creator,—surely the farthest stretch of vision which man can ever achieve is only a further disclosure of Almighty glory and excellency.”

The natural is peculiarly the sphere of the development of law as related to second causes, or causes dependent for their original power upon the First Cause. Now, whether this divine power is every instant of time felt energizing all second causes, and producing effects through an immediate

interposition of force in all cases, or whether a constitution is given under the name of nature that has in itself a power of causality distinct from the First Cause, that in certain subordinate relations may be said as restricted to this constitution to be developed from itself alone, yet one thing is certain, the nature of everything as made by God is always developed under its own laws; and this constitution, be it that of a stone, a tree, a fish, a bird, or quadruped, shows itself under natural laws specific to each thing or creature, and unfolding itself under a uniform principle of order and adjustment.

It is easy to see how this regularity in all natural law is the foundation of all the security and happiness of creatures, and why all human reasoning is based upon it. That God should give a constitution to everything appropriate for the end for which it was made, might easily be inferred from the fact that he has himself a nature, and that nature is the embodiment of all his infinite perfections. A correct idea of nature and its laws, as related to creatures or anything created, would dissipate the common illusion that regularity was always inconsistent with change, and uniformity with suspension. Nature never would be worshiped as the cause of all things, or natural law deified at the expense of its maker.

But the great idea to consider is not so much what is the constitution of nature, or what are its laws, as what is the end for which this constitution was made,—what lies at the foundation of all these processes of nature, and for which they were instituted. In reply, we must consider that all natural law, and all the varieties of inanimate or animate existence, have a relation to one grand whole, so that nothing exclusively is made for itself. Thus, nature is not only a process of development, each part aiding another, and all interwoven together, but nature has for its end the shadowing forth of the perfections of God and the display of his glory, be it in inanimate or animate creation. No other end on the admission of a God is possible or even conceivable. God must be in himself the infinite center and circumference of all existence,—all thought, all wisdom, power, and goodness,—

or we must deny the fundamental distinction between mind and matter, and make nature and its laws the only God that has a being, which would involve pantheism or materialism. To undertake to define with clearness what is the constitution of nature, what are its laws and their relations one to another, has been the hopeless effort of philosophers in all ages. We can only say in popular language, what are the obvious phenomena of nature; we can only classify its operations under certain general laws; we can only point the inquirer into its secrets to a few of the outside properties of nature, and give specific names to each uniform diversity of action; but beyond this, the highest, even as the feeblest, intelligence must ever be in the dark.

Evidence most overwhelming is given to us to show that nature is not God, or God nature; and when we have arrived at the most obvious of all truths, that there is a God independent of nature, its author and preserver, then the most sensible of all inquiries must be, for what is nature made? What are the phenomena of its existence? How are they developed, and what that individual and universal process which limit its operations? It is not difficult to reply to such questions. Nature, as the workmanship of God, must have a certain constitution, must develop itself under certain laws; those laws must have enstamped the impress of uniformity, of a regular process, of like effects following like causes, of invariability of action under similar circumstances, of constant manifestation under its appropriate conditions. But when the question is asked, must there never be any deviation? must God never act above his natural laws, or give a new power, or impose new relations, or institute new conditions of development, or supersede these laws, or act in direct opposition to them? This can only be answered by saying, that if there was a time when nature was not, if a period did exist when its laws had no being, if evidence conclusive does show that nature itself is but a process of development, and, following the law of the separate parts that go to make it up, has revealed a birth, a maturity, and decline, then in the process of ages the grand whole may and will

reach that stage where a total change shall pass over its existence, and new laws and a new nature shall take the place of the old.

In confirmation of this, science and revelation both agree ; they both point to the preadamite ages of the world, to the evening and morning of those six days of creation, enstamping on all material things the great law of *process*, and disabusing the mind of an endless perpetuity to any existing manifestation of nature. The supernatural is peculiarly consistent with the past history of this earth ; it is absolutely essential whenever a new epoch of development comes into existence. It is impossible to argue from the existing regularity of nature's laws, that always this has been so, or that never it will cease to be as it is. We have the records of science and revelation to show that there was a time when the great fabric of nature, including our earth and its inhabitants, was first put up ; when new laws came in to carry out new adjustments and conditions ; when a new process was evolved from a pre-existent state, and nature put on a new raiment ; when life sprang from death, order from confusion, and beauty from deformity.

The question then presents itself, is there anything more than the natural ? is the supernatural inconsistent with just ideas of God or nature ? Not if past history teaches the contrary ; not if the great end of creation must be to manifest the perfections of God ; not if the light we can gather from an investigation of nature, and the declarations of revelation show that there are times when either nature must be created or made anew, or there be interposed laws other and higher than any now existing.

Most appropriately does Professor George Fisher remark : " There can be no doubt that a powerful tendency to pantheistic modes of thought is rife at the present day. The popular literature, even in our country, is far more widely infected in this way than unobservant readers are aware. The laws of nature are hypostasized,—spoken of as if they were a self-active being ; and not unfrequently the same tendency leads to the virtual, if not explicit, denial of the free and responsi-

ble nature of man. History is resolved by a class of writers into the movement of a great machine,—into the revolution of events with which the free will neither of God nor of man has any connection.

“We are thus brought back in our analysis of the controversy with the existing unbelief to the postulates of natural religion. On these the Christian apologist forms the presumption or anterior probability that a revelation will be given. It is more and more apparent that the cause of natural religion and that of revealed religion are bound up together. But the native convictions of the human mind concerning God and duty cannot be permanently destroyed. Atheism is an affront alike to the inquiring reason and the uplooking soul of man. Pantheism mocks his religious nature. It is inconsistent with religion, with prayer, with worship,—with that communion with a higher Being, which is religion. It is inconsistent also with morality in any earnest meaning of the term: for it empties free will and responsibility, holiness and sin, of their meaning. Every one who acknowledges the feeling of guilt to be a reality and to represent the truth, and every one who blames the conduct of another in the very act, denies the pantheistic theory. Conscience must prove in the long run stronger than any speculation, no matter how plausible. In the soul itself, then, in its aspiration after the living God, and its conviction of freedom and of sin, there is erected an everlasting barrier against the inroads of false philosophy, and one that will be found to embrace within the shelter of its walls the cause of Christianity itself.”

Thus it will be seen that nature and its laws do not conflict with the development of the supernatural, for nature is the result of the divine workmanship, and natural law originates from the constitution God imparts to nature. Pantheism and materialism both are based upon the deification of nature and shutting out God from his works. Natural law, if either is true, must resolve itself into an unyielding fatality, and the utter denial of the supernatural. But admit the personality of God, the fact that nature is only the work of his

hands, and then the inference is inevitable that the constitution that he has given to it must be such that nature in its totality will as certainly pass through a change involving the necessity of the supernatural, as that any of its parts have a birth, maturity, and decline. If the end for which nature was made is to show forth the perfections of God, it must appear to the last degree improbable that an eternity would be given to it of the undeviating operation of natural law, and that no principle of change should be enstamped upon the works of God. It is the very fact that this uniformity is broken in upon, that undeviating regularity has its prescribed bounds, that natural law has its limits, that gives the highest proof of a power above nature, which makes nature the servant and not the master; because God does interpose at times, and gives a new nature, and new development of law, and new relations and conditions of life; because he does show that there is a birth, maturity, and decline, and that when the time comes nature itself must die without supernatural intervention, that God shows that the throne of dominion is restricted to himself alone. But suppose this was not so, suppose nature had its eternal circuit of uniformity, suppose natural law never was broken in upon, and all this visible earth, and sun, and moon, all this universal nature existed under an inflexible and eternal type of development, going round its endless circle of causality with no forces emerging but those evolved in the ages of the past, how certain the inference that nature must be God, or above God!

Here we see the necessity of the supernatural. It is the great principle manifested in Providence, showing the dependence of the creature upon the Creator, and that the world is not a machine, having in itself wheels of perpetual movement. Take the idea of the supernatural away, and nature is reduced to a clock which, once wound up, runs forever. Thus, as we study the constitution of nature, we are impressed with the fact, ever growing in importance, that over and above the first setting in motion the machinery of the universe, there must be an ever-present power, above all

second causes, that superintends every instant the complicated forces of universal nature, adjusting, regulating, directing and restraining, giving to each part its respective limit, and combining the whole in one universal harmony. It is in this way that alone we can solve the great problem of the preservation of the universe, or account for the harmonious adjustment of those laws that in other respects would involve inextricable confusion.

Without entering into the investigation of the scriptural meaning of the six days of creation,—as this more properly comes under the department of revealed theology,—it is only needful to say that all history and science confirm this wonderful record of the preadamite ages. The evening and the morning distinctly teach us of two different states of existence, and foreshadow in each of the six great epochs of creation the intervention of the supernatural to give a higher type of being to our earth.

Most appropriately does Professor Tayler Lewis, in his work on the six days of creation, remark: “As surely as there is written on the rocks the long working of regular, uninterrupted laws or methods, in which each step or stage *seems* to come out of what went before, and to have given birth to what comes after (for this is the only consistent meaning we can attach to the word natural,) so surely is there found another record as strangely, and we may even say more unmistakably, engraved. From a higher world than the natural there must have been from time to time a sudden flashing in of the *extraordinary*, of the supernatural, of a new morning after the long night of nature; or, in other words, the divine power introducing, or *bringing out*, if any prefer the term, a new element, a new force, a new law, a new idea, call it what you will, accompanied with new methods, or laws for its subsequent *growth* or development, and then leaving it to their undisturbed operation.”

This is precisely the idea we have of the great distinction existing between the supernatural and the natural, which is found enstamped on the records of all history and all science. To conceive that an infinitely wise, powerful, and benevolent

God would give up to nature all that which would peculiarly mark his own existence as independent and above nature, even as controlling it, is impossible. To believe this, a man must shut his eyes to every good argument addressed to the understanding, and be willfully blind to the clearest facts of history. The great reason for the supernatural lies in the necessity of revealing to all moral agents that God has nature under his perfect control, that he acts according to his own will, and cannot be confined in his movements to the sphere of any natural law. To limit himself to this would be to hide the most sensible evidence of his personality and infinite superiority to nature, for nature is not, and cannot be, a self-perpetuating machine with no end. There is enstamped on all natures an inherent law of birth, maturity, and decline. It is seen in all vegetation, all animal existence; and if we carry the analogy into the history of nations as individuals, we see there also a process of infancy, growth, manhood, and decline; and could we measure the ages of inanimate existence, of the solid earth and planets, as we do the days of our sun-measured lives, through the whole physical universe there would be seen a mighty cyclical law pervading, and making out as distinctly a limit to movement in time as there is enstamped a limit in extension. Space would no more certainly have its boundary in the creation of worlds than time its limit in their existence. As the natural was never made to boast of an infinity of creations, so also it cannot an eternity of duration. An inherent necessity must be in nature to die out, or the supernatural never could reveal itself in its glory. Nature must have its constitution from God, and that constitution must teach the great lesson of its infinite inferiority to its author. But how teach this lesson, except by a vivid contrast with him; how teach it unless it bears the impress of subordination and dependence? God is unchangeable, infinite, and eternal. Nature must be changeable, finite, and limited. It must spring from the supernatural, be controlled by it, and find its limit in it. Consequently, natural law, while it must be a rule to the creature, can be no rule to the Creator. God holds it in his hands as the charioteer

the reins of his fleet steeds, and while he permits them to run in their appointed course, he yet controls those instruments which otherwise would bring ruin upon all. If, then, as far as our experience and observation go, as far as the teachings of science and history extend, we find no exception to that cyclical law that limits with equal certainty the age of the forest leaf as the monarch that roams the desert, the flower of the field as the life of man, the insect of a day as the oak of centuries, why should we hesitate to believe that the world may die out as certainly as the creatures that inhabit it? Why should we refuse to credit the old age of the future, as we are compelled to confess that of the past? All this may be true, and yet a higher stage of existence be superinduced upon that which has ceased to be. A nobler life may be evolved from that life which is quenched in death. The naturalist alone must find everything to discourage him; he never looks upon nature, however fair, but that he reads in every lineament the revolving wheel of birth and death. Not one of the vegetable or animal creation is an exception: he rushes for consolation to the solid earth; he welcomes inanimate nature; he says, here is the changeless, the immutable, the eternal; here are laws whose uniformity is never broken in upon; here are the ages that roll on in an undying regularity; but, as he explores the buried-up archives of land and sea and rock, as he climbs the mountains or goes down into the deep caverns, he finds the extinct remains of species of animals that speak of a condition totally unlike the present; he finds proof of a pre-existing condition where even the denizens of the land could not live; beyond this he goes where air and water could have no inhabitants, and ages beyond he sees a condition where all must be chaos and night. Why, then, should he infer that the present is more permanent than the past; that the supernatural, so essential in ages that have gone by, may not be equally as desirable in the ages to come?

This is peculiarly evident when we consider that natural law only expresses the law of a part of nature,—that nature is made up of an endless variety of things, and that each of

the numberless parts of nature has its own law, and can only exist by a proper adjustment to the whole. So when natural law is spoken of, the question must always arise, What law? Is it the law of the atmosphere, of heat, of gravitation, of chemical combination, of vegetation, of animal growth, or of any thing else? Now, the word nature simply means the present constitution of things with all its variety of laws; and to speak of this constitution as eternal and its laws as changeless, is to belie all history and science as a fact, without any attempt at explanation. We know that supernatural intervention has always marked the ages of the world. The very end for which the world was made, for which its varied inhabitants were created, reveals the great fact that nature has enstamped upon it a higher impress than that which secures its present action. The whole follows the same law that is the condition of the individual parts. The circle of existence is no more endless than the process of development,—the finite is as true in duration as the limit of worlds in space. A higher power must intervene to give a new impulse to the worn-out machinery of natural law; must impart to the old nature a new power; must bring it under new conditions, and place it upon a nobler scale of development. When the time-piece of the old world runs down, then another supernatural intervention must wind it up, and from the ruin of the past evolve a better creation.

“The position we have reached,” says Professor Tayler Lewis, “is that all natures—lesser natures, greater natures, specific natures, general natures, the one universal nature—have all one law of growth, maximum, decline, *ortus, transitus, interitus*; and that if one outlives one or more revolutions, it is only to go round in a similar cycle, with a corresponding law of decrease at each repetition. In other words, the cyclical law is the law of all natures, or, as we might say, the *nature of all natures*. If we are not satisfied with any attempted *a priori* proof, there is the inductive, or *a posteriori* argument derived from experience. This may be very limited, but it knows of no exceptions. It is decidedly against the doctrine of any eternal progress severed from the idea of the super-

natural, as far as we can judge, from 'the things that are seen;' this is the process of all natures. They all repeat themselves, they all have a tendency to run out. We see it everywhere in the natural world. We discover it, moreover, in existences of a higher character, which, although not strictly belonging to the physical in their essence, have their manifestation in connection with it. We trace it to some extent in the moral world, in social and political systems, in psychological developments, in intellectual and literary periods. These, too, have their growth, maximum, decline. A nation has its birth, youth, manhood, and old age. What we call the 'age,' too, presents often the same manifestation. But in nature, strictly, as far as our observation can extend, there are no exceptions,—none that are such, even in appearance. Some of the periods are but for moments,—that is, moments in our modes of estimation,—some are for hours, some for days, for seasons, for years, for ages; but in all the same cyclical law reigns predominant. Each has its birth, its youth, its age, its perfection, and its imperfection, its growth, its decay, its reviviscence, its winter, its spring, its evening of torpor and repose, its new morning, when, like the sun in its circuit, it again sets out to run its appointed round as one of the lesser wheels in the Gilgal Toledeth, or the great wheel of the universal nature.

“Unless, therefore, the Scripture expressly contradicts, we cannot resist the conviction that would convey this analogy from the lowest to the highest manifestation in the physical universe. As we go back from solar days to seasons, from seasons to years, from years to lesser times of plants and animals, from these to ages that witness the growth and decline of species and genera, we cannot reject the thought that there are still higher *days*, and seasons, and years. God and nature cannot be supposed to stop short with our sense, and our history, and our inductions. The ever-widening spiral carries us upward to the ages of ages—the *αἰῶνας των αἰῶνων*—possessed of the same cyclical character, and during which God employed the same cyclical law in the production of worlds, and Scripture does not forbid it. To one who will read it

aright, the whole aspect of the sublime account in Genesis is consistent alone with such a view, while it is greatly aided by those remarkable expressions in other parts of the Bible, where the utmost power of language seems taxed to convey one, the idea of the vast duration of God's kingdom (his visible outward dynamical kingdom) in the ages that preceded the growth of our world as well as in those that are to come. From all this we infer not only the *fact*, but the absolute *necessity*, of repeated creative or supernatural acts; and this not only to raise nature from time to time to a higher degree, but to arouse and rescue her from that apparent death into which, when left to herself, she must ever fall. The supernatural becomes the originator of a new nature, or the restorer and vivifier of an old; but this, too, in time runs out, or tends to run out. There comes again the evening, the winter, the period of growing torpor, from which a new creative word alone can recall the dying cycle; and hence the necessity of such word, not only to the higher progress, but to the very existence, of the universe. So also in the moral world. Here, too, we trace a similar analogy, if not the same law. In the moral as well as the physical kingdom, there is *extraordinary* manifestation, the new life, the powerful growth, the apparent decay, and then the long reign of ordinary *moral causes*, until, when the spiritual seems almost sunk in the natural, God comes forth from the 'hiding-place of his power,' and there is a new exhibition of the supernatural word and supernatural grace, reviving everything from its night of torpor and decay. It is something more than a metaphor when such reviviscences are styled *a morning*, and the period they usher in, *a day*,—a day of light, a day of life, a day of power, a day of the right hand of the Most High. Such days as, we may yet expect, are coming upon the Church and the world."

So full of importance is this forcible presentation of a subject that must ever involve the deepest mystery, that the mind naturally lingers long in the contemplation of those ages that have called forth, and always will call forth, the highest interposition of the supernatural; and the question arises, Why,

when a line is so distinctly drawn between God and his works, nature and its author, the law of the natural and the supernatural, is there room in the human mind at all for the vagaries of pantheism and materialism, or the degrading systems of heathen superstition? Why does human philosophy carry with it so much the impress of ungodliness, and tend so universally to the denial of God, or the removing him from his works? If humanity was sinless, would not the tendency be as natural to view God in his works as that of the law of heat to expand? But considering the universal friction of sin, are we not compelled to admit that the moral disease that blinds the mind and hardens the heart is the real solution to those difficulties that are presented in human belief and practice?

Arnold has well remarked, in one of his sermons, "The clearest notion which can be given of rationalism would, I think, be this, that it is the abuse of the understanding in subjects where the divine and human, so to speak, are intermingled. Of human things the understanding can judge, of divine things it cannot; and thus, where the two are mixed together, its inability to judge of the one part makes it derange the proportions of both, and the judgment of the whole is vitiated. For example, the understanding examines a miraculous history: it judges truly what I may call the human part of the case,—that is to say, of the rarity of miracles, of the fallibility of human testimony, of the proneness of most minds to exaggeration, and of the critical arguments affecting the genuineness or date of the narrative itself. But it forgets the divine part, namely, the power and providence of God, that he is really ever present among us, and that the spiritual world which exists invisibly all around us, may conceivably and by no means impossibly exist at some times, and to some persons, even visibly."

Thus it will be seen that the admission of a personal God brings with it the admission of nature dependent upon him, brings with it the reasonableness of the supernatural, and involves its development in accordance with no other law than simply the will of the Creator, a power put forth that can be

shown only by the simple fact, and which will ever in its philosophy elude the highest researches of the human mind.

Revealed theology comes to us presupposing the great truths of natural theology. It enters into no proof of the existence of God, of creation, of conscience, of the fall, of human sinfulness. These are the very foundations upon which it builds; they are the axioms, self-evident, universally acknowledged, of all divine theology; they form the admitted propositions, felt and seen, and known to be never denied with the shadow of reason; and yet while denied they can only be through an agency and cause that has its very seat in the perversion, the prostitution, and, if possible, the abnegation of an element in human nature that God has placed as the first and last witness of himself, even the conscience.

If the question is asked, Why is revealed theology denied? the answer must be found in the fact that some, if not all of the axioms of natural theology are forgotten, ignored, or positively rejected. It has been our object to show that the natural, which is the sphere especially of second causes, must involve the supernatural in some way. God must be the First Cause of nature, and the parts which go to make it up must intimately depend upon him. "Man uses machinery," says G. Cummings, "a lever to move a weight—but we do not consider the power as in the machinery or the lever; as in this instance the machinery does not render unnecessary the agency of man, so do not secondary causes exclude the agency of God."

Our idea, then, of all secondary causes, is simply that in the world of matter the action is *ab extra*, while in the spiritual world it is *ab intra*. Matter has its principle of movement from without, mind from within. The constitution of nature, in relation to both mind and matter, will, therefore, be in accordance with the law of each, except in those cases where all natural law is suspended, or superseded, or made to give way to another and totally different law. What that law will be can only be decided in the mind of God himself. There are innumerable cases where the supernatural is simply above all natural law, where it means only a new force that is in-

fused into the old law, a new energy that gives higher efficiency to the natural, and enables it to accomplish what otherwise it would not.

Then, again, the supernatural may assume the type of originating matter, introducing substances and their laws that never before existed, as when the first matter was made, or the first man. These all comprehend a distinct and perfectly different application of power from that which subsequently is manifested. Then, again, the supernatural may be seen acting in direct opposition to existing laws, and producing effects not only above all natural laws, but setting them altogether aside, as in raising the dead to life. The type of the supernatural in relation to mind and matter, may have as varied an application as that manifested in natural laws. It may be concealed in its operation, with difficulty discriminated from the known operation of nature, or it may be as obvious as the lightning flash, and compelling conviction of the direct agency of God in the dullest intellect. Especially in relation to mind the supernatural may be, and often is, more concealed, for mind presents a profounder depth of mystery even than matter, and therefore where most unknown there may be most frequent the direct agency of God. And yet the view we entertain of the supernatural, and its frequent occurrence when concealed, does not conflict with the exercise of man's free moral agency, or make impossible the freedom of human volition with the existence of second causes. The law of the mind and that of matter are totally distinct in this respect,—that matter is passive and must be acted upon, the force applied must be from without, while mind acts from within, is self-caused, and therefore can, in perfect consistency with the supernatural, have connected with it the element of individuality, of voluntariness, and freedom. It therefore exists under limitations, but not the limitations of matter. As originating from the First Cause, it must be dependent upon it, and yet that dependence be such as to exalt it to the highest stage of moral responsibility, and bring reward or its opposite.

Here, then, we see nature under innumerable modes of man-

ifestation, and expressive of substances totally distinct, each having their own laws, and each in their existence and duration bounded by the law that exists in the divine mind. We follow on the great chain of causation, and we reach finally the last link that is upheld by the hand of God. The supernatural is above, below, within, and around the natural. As we resolve the forces of nature into their simplest elements, we find behind them all more recondite forces that have eluded our investigation; we go deeper and deeper still into our analysis of the causes that keep the wheels of life in motion, or in the inanimate creation we submit to chemical law the different substances of nature; and yet the most subtle processes of the chemist teach us the great lesson that there are causes at work, bound up in elements, that can never be analyzed or understood. One thing, however, we do know, that no inconsistency would be so great, no absurdity so manifest, as to confound the natural and the supernatural in the same thing.

Most appropriately does Professor Tayler Lewis remark, "If any one ask, Why does God work in this way? What need has he of natures? we can only say, 'So it seemeth good in his sight.' He could doubtless have made all things differently, but then we know it would not have been the best way, because he has not adopted it. He works through nature, or a succession of natures, no one developing another, yet each preparing the way for the one that is to succeed. We see enough of the universe to know that this is the method, and, thus considered, the general view is unaffected by the measures of duration. It is of no importance to the argument whether the flow seems more or less rapid as viewed from our stand-point, or as measured by the shorter periods of that exactly divided physical system to which our thinking, that is, our flow of ideas, has become confirmed. It is still the great principle, whether it appears in the growth of the fungus, the 'son of a night,' in the growth of the plant that lives for years, in the growth of a tree that endures for centuries, in the growth of worlds whose cyclical law extends through æons of ages, embracing a duration equal perhaps to

millennial or millions of millennial recurrences of such cycles as are made by our exact sun-measured years. It is the great principle for which we contend; and, this established, it certainly ought to guide us in our interpretations of a record which professes to reveal the creative acts of God. If we thus view nature as a stream of causation governed by a certain law, which not only regulates, but limits, its movements, then the *supernatural*, as its name imparts, would be *all above nature*,—in other words, that power of God which is employed ‘according to the counsel of his own will,’ in originating, controlling, limiting, increasing, opposing, or terminating nature, whether it be the universal, or any particular or partial, nature. Thus regarded, the supernatural would assume various aspects, to which we may give distinctive names. As originating nature, we may call it the *ante-natural*: as adding a new force to a previously existing nature, it may be styled *præternatural*, although there are some uses of the word that might vary from this idea. If such new power, though higher than the previous nature, is in harmony with and works through it, thus producing a higher order of results, though still through it and by it, then it may be named the *con-natural*, since in this manner, in connection with the old, it truly becomes itself a new nature. When the divine power is in immediate and direct opposition to nature, breaking through its laws, and producing events the opposite of what would have come out of its unobstructed sequences, then may we rightly call it the *contra-natural*,—such as those interpositions that are generally termed miraculous.”

From this contemplation of the supernatural, it will be seen that it must be totally opposed to those great errors that for ages have been developed in the history of man. Consider that type of error that goes under the general name of superstition. The tendency of the human mind perverted is like a pendulum, to swing between the two extremes of superstition and infidelity. By a logical necessity, the mind not Christian must trust to one of these two extremes of false belief or no belief. It must confide in a system that degrades reason or deifies it, or trust

in the true God, and the supernatural as shown in natural or revealed theology.

Under the aspect of superstition will come all the varied forms of polytheism that have existed and do now exist in the world. But polytheism, as its name imports, is the religion of many gods. It consists in the degrading of God to a human level, and giving supernatural qualities to creatures. It is the deification of nature under its endless forms. Polytheism has been the prevailing sin of heathendom in all ages. It is especially attractive to the ignorant masses of society. It saves the trial of thought, investigation, or the discipline of reason and virtue. It gratifies in some sense the religious craving of man, while it obliterates the most needful distinctions to guide in the way of truth. The great error of all superstition lies in attaching divine qualities and the supernatural to creatures, or the objects of inanimate nature. It will easily be seen that the polytheistic element must always, with the multitude, ignorant and depraved, be more powerful than that of any other form of delusion. It appeals immediately to the senses. There is much in it to gratify the æsthetic nature and take captive the imagination. It professes to quiet the conscience under its load of guilt. It does not limit itself to one form alone of worship. Its gods are as varied as the caprice or passions of the nature. Its objects of adoration are as numerous as the heart could desire. The supernatural is not restricted to one god alone. Thus ancient as well as modern polytheism has its uniform type of the degradation of the true God. It worships in the creature those qualities that are but the deification of human selfishness, lust, and passion. The human, with all its infirmities and all its passions, is exalted to the divine, and consequently the people, too ignorant to understand, or too willful to learn, have been made the victims of priestcraft and the most revolting superstitions. The chains of spiritual slavery have been forged and riveted upon millions of the human family, simply by lowering the supernatural to the natural, and substituting false idols in the place of the true God.

Nature-worship, commencing first with the sun and moon

and stars, soon degenerated into that of the earth, air, water, fire; and then, assuming a higher degree of grossness, there came the adoration of dead heroes, elevated to demigods; and then the persons of living emperors were made divine, and worshiped as more than human; and from this the descent was rapid to the beasts of the field, to lizards, crocodiles, snakes, and even the insects. Now, all this degradation of the human mind arose from the false ideas entertained of the supernatural, and the confounding it with the natural; it sprang from giving to nature and its objects those powers that alone belonged to God. The polytheistic element has even assumed the garb of Christianity, and, while it has spurned the more revolting forms of superstition, yet has borrowed from the heathen world precisely the same element that makes it so opposed to true religion.

In Romanism, while the unity and the personality of God are admitted, yet divine honors are paid to saints, to angels, to the Virgin Mary, and the supernatural is ascribed where only the natural belongs. The great peculiarity of Christianity is, that it draws wide the line of distinction between the natural and the supernatural: it makes out God infinitely different from and above his workmanship. But polytheism, by removing this distinction, and ascribing the supernatural to the objects of nature, animate or inanimate, and especially to beings having human infirmities, passions, and sins, ends in inverting all moral traits. Virtues by it have been made vices, and vices virtues. The worship of the heart being directed into a wrong channel, adoration itself has been made an insult to God; and the more superstition has secured the control of human nature, the more it has deteriorated alike in true knowledge and virtue. But if polytheism has been the religion of the ignorant, pantheism has been that of the educated. The polytheist has gods many, the pantheist makes all things God. The one turns into a wrong channel the whole religious nature, the other blocks up that channel with the rubbish of a false philanthropy. The former blunts all the moral sensibilities, the other refines them away. Both, as they take captive the mind and heart, are idolatrous; but the idolatry of

the polytheist is specific and sensible, while that of the pantheist is general and vague. The supernatural, with the former, is the common quality of all his idols ; with the latter, the general condition of everything or nothing. God, in the one, is degraded to nature ; in the other, nature is elevated to God. In both the true God is denied or forgotten, because all the qualities that distinguish God from nature are obliterated. The injury done to the moral nature is most marked. If in pantheism ideal or materialistic human responsibility is ignored, in polytheism it is misdirected. The pantheist, merging himself into the one universal substance, becomes simply a passive recipient of influences that absolve him from all accountability. The polytheist has his responsibility divided or destroyed by the conflicting divinities that usurp the worship of the heart. By the one class God is degraded to the low level of sinful humanity, by the other his attributes of personality, freedom, and holiness are refined away : and thus man floats on the sea of destiny as the straws of mere caprice, his own existence an enigma, to be swallowed up at last in the infinite ocean of universal being. Truly, the belief of the pantheist is as mournful as that of the polytheist ; for to be dashed by an insane pride upon the rock of inexorable necessity is quite as sad as to be drowned by the love of idols in the turbid waters of sensuality.

The evil of pantheism is not restricted to modern times. It entered deeply into all the literature and philosophy of the ancient world. Under different forms it flourished. In Greece and Rome it was the common infirmity of all the educated classes. Disgusted with the imposture and priestcraft of the state religions, the natural revulsion was infidelity, and this became plausible only as it took the form of pantheism. Unable to live without worshiping something, the educated mind of the heathen lapsed into pantheism ; for pantheism allowed the deification of nature ; and, discarding the supernatural altogether, it permitted just that exaltation of humanity that flattered the pride of the more cultivated portion of society. Consequently, it entered largely into the teachings of the Stoics and the philosophers ; it taught the

doctrine of a relentless necessity, and gave to nature the type of an unalterable fatality. By obliterating the chief distinction between vice and virtue, it relieved the mind of the dread of responsibility, and became the more attractive as it gratified the pride that took away the fear of punishment.

Pantheism was the natural revulsion of the mind from the grossness of superstition; simple atheism was too negative, and not so congenial to the religious sensibilities. It was easier to imagine everything God than nothing; to suppose nature an external emanation from the Deity, uncreated like himself and a part of his being, than to deny the existence of any God whatever. Modern pantheism is only the ancient dressed up in a new garb; it involves essentially the same process of thought, and leads to the same results. The same conclusions are reached by Spinoza and Hegel, that the devotees of the old pantheistic philosophy arrived at; both begin by making no distinction between God and nature, denying the divine personality, and end by removing from man that freedom which involves accountability. Thus it will be seen how false ideas of the supernatural have so much to do with the development of polytheism and pantheism: they must lead to some form or other of superstition or infidelity.

The existence of the supernatural is also opposed to the postulates of deism, and every system of modern philosophy which holds to the sufficiency alone of reason to guide man.

Modern infidelity assumes two forms: one, that which holds to the sufficiency of reason alone in religion; the other, that which trusts implicitly to the intuitions and the feelings. The former declares that the reason is enough to lead into all essential truth and guide in the way of virtue; the latter insists upon the sensibilities as a source alone to be depended upon; both declare that the supernatural is unnecessary, and cannot be proved. It is said that the mind can learn enough to guide from the works of nature, and, as this shows an infinite God, why seek for more evidence or knowledge of his perfections?

The supernatural is discarded simply upon the ground of

the uniformity of natural law. But history and science, as has been seen, conclusively establish the position that this uniformity is neither uninterrupted nor eternal, and that miracles, if impossible with man, are possible to God, and have actually taken place. If, then, the mind turns to the present or past condition of humanity, there is certainly nothing to encourage the belief that man does not need the supernatural to help in his difficulties, or more truth than nature gives to guide in his ignorance. The infidel, who looks alone to his reason, or his intuitions and feelings, cannot find in the unspeakable degradation of heathen nations anything to convince him of their sufficiency. The question may well be asked, If the light of nature is all that man wants to guide to the knowledge of God, why has it not done this? If natural theology is amply sufficient to make mankind truthful, useful, and virtuous, then what means the mass of human ignorance and vice existing?

Deism rests for its main support upon the idea of the impossibility of miracle, and the undeviating uniformity of natural law; but it must throw aside science and history, ignore all the evidence of testimony, and trust itself to an assertion that is at war with all just ideas of God. The supernatural is not contrary to reason, or impossible; it is not contrary, for that which is above the reason is not therefore *opposed to it*; nor is it *impossible*, for that which God has done he may do again. Thus deism, which calls the reason alone sufficient for the discovery of truth and the practice of virtue, discards the supernatural; because to admit it would be to confess that human necessities demand something more positive and reliable than the reason.

The infidel, who holds to the supreme authority of the intuitions and the feelings, comes to the same conclusion, while the road walked in may be altogether different. The sensibilities may be as wrong as the reason, and equally as unsafe as the only guide to truth or virtue. It is just as proper for a man to say that his reason is God's only revelation to him, as his feelings or his intuitions, and equally as pernicious in practice, if either assumption leads to the denying of the

supernatural. The real question of the present day, is that involved in *a true idea of the supernatural*.

Reason discards superstition, but it finds no better home in the baseless fabrics of those schools of philosophers who resort to materialism or idealism for support. The infidelity that ends in denying human responsibility cannot get rid at least of the conscience and the great fact of human government; and while both make man accountable for his conduct to man, with irresistible logic they point to a higher source even of authority and law, that will not release any person from obedience upon the fatalistic idea of man being simply a machine. All correct ideas of theism, then, must lead to the supernatural, as the only remedy against the deification of natural law or the delusion of pantheism. The pendulum of human belief may swing now in the direction of superstition, and now in that of the opposite error of pantheism; but one thing is certain, the human mind will never find its point of rest, never reach the line of an exact equilibrium, where faith may repose itself in the absolute certainty of truth, and human reason reach the rock where safely it may build for eternity, until it confidently trusts in the interposition of the supernatural wherever infinite wisdom and benevolence may dictate, independent of advice or help from any creature or thing.

How necessary, then, that we should welcome all the light that comes from history and science, to show the actual development of the supernatural! Why is it that infidelity, that trusts to the sufficiency of reason and the light of nature, should be so anxious to deny the supernatural? Is it not because, if *admitted*, it would compel to the reception of revealed theology, and with this the whole system of doctrines upon which it is based? So long as the uniformity of natural law is regarded as perpetual, and nature the sole cause of all existence, it will always be true that revealed religion will be denied. But the distinction has been shown between the absolute and the finite, the uncreated and the created, and that all nature must have its limit in those cyclical ages that make indispensable the interposition of miracle. However

second or final causes may be manifested in nature, yet all have an appointed circle of duration, and when that is completed, the supernatural must intervene to restore, resuscitate, or create a new nature. Consequently, nature is not a machine of unending movement, but something dependent on the supernatural for its life as its first origin.

The professed aim of Christianity is to distinguish between the supernatural and the natural, and deliver from the fatal errors of superstition. Unlike infidelity, it places nature in its true relations to God ; to the reason it is a guide, and to the sensibilities a restraining and regulating power. The first end of infidelity is to discredit the supernatural. It denies its reality altogether, or confounds it with the delusions of superstition. The reason and the sensibilities being made out the only guide, and nature the sole cause of all things an emanation from God, or simply a part of that substance which is infinite and eternal, absolute and uncreated, the natural tendency is to a belief that sin is a misfortune rather than a crime, and that what is called the supernatural is only a more recondite process of nature or subtle development. It is said that nature's laws are not fully understood, and that a person must wait patiently until a higher stage of science and knowledge will account for that which seems to be supernatural. The whole argument is based upon the assertion that reason, the intuitions, or the sensibilities, are alone sufficient to guide mankind, and that nature is the only volume open for instruction ; but to read that volume as it should be read, is not the aim of the infidel. By making nature divine, and her laws immutable and eternal, God is as effectually shut out from the mind and the heart as if no God existed. Superstition, with all its errors, admits human responsibility and guilt, although it directs in a wrong channel the religious nature ; but infidelity seeks to extinguish it, or to smother in delusive abstractions the deepest convictions of the heart. Consequently, when infidelity finds a lodgment in the mind, it first begins by denying the supernatural, and then by deifying the natural. But there are truths in natural theology that confront the infidel at the very door of his

speculations, and which he must meet before he can show that his nature-worship is sensible or right.

The great fact of the supernatural, under the imposing aspect of the miraculous, is constantly meeting him in science and history; and when it is viewed under its more concealed aspects, it shows itself as the essential law that supports nature and preserves the universe from ruin. The power of God can never be shown to be delegated absolutely or exclusively to second causes. Give to nature as much as possible the mechanical aspect, and yet underlying all its movements there is a divine energy that imparts the real force that makes all the wheels move. Because miracles so seldom are seen, and only at those great epochs of time when nature must have a new nature, or when the old nature must be re-suscitated, or when some crisis of momentous interest in the moral world necessitates it, this yet is no argument against the existence of the supernatural. The reason why the miraculous should be of seldom occurrence is apparent; but this does not prove that other forms of the supernatural are ever wanting. Could we see the intimate dependence of nature upon God, could we observe how all the diversities of sensitive existence and all the complicated mechanism of the physical universe do really hang upon his will, are directed by his purpose, and made to act through his sustaining power, we should then look upon the supernatural as the normal condition of all nature, and the natural as related to it as intimately as cause and effect. God would be seen in his works, worshiped as the author of all blessings, recognized in all existences, and believed upon as infinite in all perfection. Man, to achieve the highest moral elevation, must avoid equally superstition and infidelity; for, while the former confounds the natural with the supernatural, the latter makes out only the natural existing, and this is his god.

But the ways in which the supernatural may exist and yet not be recognized are innumerable. It may act with nature, giving it only another direction, concealed, indeed, but not the less real. Then it may be a new energy imparted in the spiritual world; and from this mental acts and feelings may

originate impossible before. Then it may act through second causes, in the way of new thoughts, new motives, new impulses, and this may be done in such a way as most effectually to secure the object desired. It may give in prayer a more than mortal wisdom and directness, or it may answer it through countless varieties of adjustment of means to an end higher than the natural, and yet in alliance with it. Through the whole department of the physical and spiritual universe it may be present, now helping, now changing, now suppressing, and now adjusting the forces of nature, so that without ever acting as in miracle against nature, it may yet secure an end with a certainty as great as that of the highest exertion of creative energy. How near the natural may be to the supernatural is only faintly shadowed forth in the words, "In him we live, and move, and have our being." This is not mere metaphor: in a sense most vital and true, God is spoken of as near to man, and near to all the natures he has given, be they physical or moral.

The great element that distinguishes Christianity above all superstition and all infidelity, is the revelation of the coexistence of the human and the divine: the cworking of the natural and the supernatural, each in their distinct sphere, and yet each as truly as if only the human or the divine had any action whatever.

The supernatural, then, is made known to us as existing in many ways concealed, and then in the open method of miracle. It may be often a power above nature, and altogether distinct from it, and yet be an energy bringing about the most important effects, undistinguished in the mind from the common operations of nature. But the great cyclical law holds all natures with a grasp that none can elude; there does come a time when the longest, even as the most ephemeral of created things, must have an end. The undying youth of anything made by God is possible only by the interposition of miracle. God never confers immortality as the necessary condition of any nature,—no nature is thus independent of him. The inspired word declares the immortality of soul

and body in the resurrection state, but it is only through the interposition of the supernatural.

An inherent power of endless life apart from this can never be predicated of any creature, however exalted in virtue or intelligence. God reserves to himself alone the power of an endless life; and when he bestows it on any nature it must come under the law of the supernatural, and not the natural. Now, all infidelity overlooks this essential condition common to all natures, general or specific. Looking only to the regularity of natural law, it forgets that this does not constitute the efficient cause, and that the endless perpetuity of any nature can no more be shown to be its normal condition than can the origin of any nature be proved to be without miracle. If creation involves the necessity of the supernatural, equally true does endless existence.

Infidelity, then, is just as unreasonable as superstition, and, in some aspects, more pernicious. While boasting of freedom from its bondage, it yet leads to the very region and shadow of death; it forces man to the experience of a desolation, where, upon the altar of an insane pride, there is sacrificed all that can truly bless in time or save in eternity. It calls itself free, but it is that freedom that grasps at the shadow and loses the substance. Having none of the elevating truths of Christianity to guide or console, and nothing to trust in but the poor light of human philosophy, it makes more truly hopeless the condition than the gross delusions of superstition. It rejoices in the idea that there is nothing supernatural, that nature itself is eternal, and her laws alone that deserve obedience or esteem; but the idea of God, however unwelcome, can never be altogether excluded from the mind. If the infidel makes out, in his own mind, conscience, responsibility, and divine law a dream, yet he will find it impossible to shake it off; it will follow the nature more persistently than the waking hours of the day, and plunge it, though ever so reluctant, in one long night of gloom.

What is there, then, that infidelity can stand upon, whether it takes the form of rationalism, deism, materialistic, or ideal

pantheism, or atheism? What can be made out of nature with the supernatural denied? Does it prove no God and no miracle? Is its voice that of chance or fatalism? Does it call itself eternal, or an emanation from the infinite? Does it show law never changed or interrupted? Is not its whole history that of birth, life, and death, of ages measured by great or lesser epochs of time, all under that mighty cyclical law that extends over the whole universe? Does it not teach the lesson of highest interest that there is no creature or thing, no existence animate or inanimate, that is not as dependent on the Almighty for its being as its creation? And whether that being shall survive in any instance the universal law of all natures, *must depend alone upon the interposition of God*, imparting that which nature is powerless to perform.

Most truly has Horace Bushnell, in his work on Nature and the Supernatural, remarked: "God is expressed but not measured by his works; least of all, by the substances and laws included under the general term nature. And yet how liable are we, overpowered, as we often are, and oppressed by the magnitudes of nature, to suffer the impression that there can be nothing separate and superior beyond nature. The eager mind of science, for example, sallying forth on excursions of thought into the vast abysses of worlds, discovering tracts of light that must have been shooting downward and away from their sources, even for millions of ages, to have now arrived at their mark, and then, discovering also that, by such a reach of computation, it has not penetrated to the center, but only reached the margin or outmost shore of the vast fire-ocean, whose particles are astronomic worlds, falls back spent; and having, as it were, no spring left for another trial, or the endeavor of a stronger flight, surrenders, overmastered and helpless, crushed into silence. At such an hour it is anything but a wonder that nature is taken for the all, the veritable system of God; beyond which, or collateral with which, there is nothing. For so long a time is science improved upon by nature, not instructed by it; as if there could be nothing greater than distance, measure, quantity,

and show nothing higher than the formal platitude of things. But the healthy, living mind will, sooner or later, recover itself. It will spring up out of this prostration before nature to imagine other things, which eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor science computed. It will discover fires, even in itself, that flame above the stars. It will break over and through the narrow confines of stellar organization to conceive a spiritual kosmos, or divine system, which contains and uses, and is only shadowed in the faintest manner by, the prodigious trivialities of external substance. Indeed, I think all minds unsophisticated by science, or not disempowered by external magnitudes, will conceive God as a being whose fundamental plan, whose purpose, end, and system, are nowise measured by that which lies in dimension, even though the dimensions be measureless. They will say, with Zophar, still,—‘the measure thereof is longer than the earth, and broader than the sea;’ and the real, proper universe of God, that which is to God the final cause of all things, will be to them a realm so far transcending the outward immensity, both in quantity and kind, that this latter will be scarcely more than some outer gate of approach, or eyelet of observation.”

CHAPTER XXII.

THE HUMAN, THE SUPERHUMAN, AND THE DIVINE.

THE human must comprehend all that which is in accordance with its constitution. The constitution must be that which is in accordance with its nature. Human, constitution, and nature, all mean the same thing as related to man. But what is man's nature, unless it be that which embraces both his body and mind? Is not his nature comprehensively the physical, mental, and moral parts of his constitution? If this is so, is it not a contradiction to speak of any part of man's nature as supernatural? The great idea all attach to the human is simply that which pertains to the nature of the human, and, therefore, that which is manifested in accordance with the laws of the human. All that is human is therefore natural, so far as man's constitution is concerned; and all that is natural must therefore mean all that acts in accordance with the laws of the natural.

But it is said human volitions act outside of the line of cause and effect, and therefore are supernatural. But cause and effect cannot be restricted alone to the inorganic, organic, or animal kingdom. It cannot be said that man in his volition is an exception to this law, because man is free in his volitions. Those who hold this theory overlook the brute creation, and do not consider that, in some respects, if true, it must also hold real with brutes, so far as they have anything corresponding to the human mind. The great mistake many make in reasoning upon cause and effect, is that they imagine it to be the same in mind as in matter, and because in the physical world matter is passive, and must be acted upon; and the result invariably follows the same, from like causes, with no possibility to the contrary, that this must be equally true in the spiritual world.

But human volitions are *self-caused*, they are *ab intra*, and with full power to the contrary, and therefore must be voluntary, free, and unforced. Cause and effect in the world of mind are essentially different from cause and effect in the world of matter. Necessity rules in the one, freedom in the other. Consequently, to illustrate mental and moral effects by any analogy taken from matter, is unphilosophical, even as it is opposed to the intuitive convictions of the understanding. And yet, in a real sense, all conduct proceeds from motives; and there is always an influence as certain, in the moral world, to be followed by effects, as exists through the great law of cause and effect in the world of matter. Does any conduct lead to the idea that motives have had nothing to do with that conduct? Is it not the peculiar prerogative of the mind that it is susceptible to motives, and is influenced always one way or another by motives?

In that department of nature where cause and effect are *ab extra*, we see the manifestation of a law of force irresistible? we can always say that such effects will follow invariably such causes; and therefore the idea of freedom is altogether wanting, and it is wanting because there is no power to the contrary existing. But in the world of mind and human volition it is essentially different. Because a man acts from motives he is free, for there is always, *ab intra*, a power to the contrary. Thus the true idea of moral freedom is invariably power to act differently from that which is acted, and always power to act free in the very volition that leads to vicious or right conduct. There is first a self-conscious power in the very act of choice, and then a perfect conviction of the mind that a different course might be pursued. But if men act from motives, then motives are a cause in conduct just as truly as force is a cause in making a ball fly through the air. But here consists the great difference, the ball is passive, and has no power to resist the force applied, and must always act the same with the same force applied,—like results will invariably follow from like causes; but the mind has not only the power to choose in all motives, to be influenced by one and not by another, but it has a twofold freedom:—freedom

in the very act of choice, and freedom before this act to the contrary. It has the highest evidence of this in consciousness, and in all its feelings and thoughts in relation to the conduct of others.

But still we know that conduct is as much the result of motives presented as it is free in the act of choice. Now, many have drawn the inference that because men act from the strongest motives, that men *must* act from them, and that conduct is as much the result of necessity as the rolling of a stone is the result of force, and consequently human volitions are not free. Here a double mistake is made: first, by confounding action *ab intra* with action *ab extra*, that self-caused with that acted upon, a development under the condition of inherent activity with that of essential passivity; and secondly, by asserting that all choice proceeds from the strongest motive; but the only plausible argument for this is simply asserting that whatever brings about a certain result or effect is for the time being the strongest motive, and inferring this because the law of the strongest force always holds good in things; but persons are not things because there is absolute freedom to choose from the weaker motive as truly as from the strongest motive, and in the case of sin because the weaker motive does really exist to bring about choice. The greatest motive to a man is himself; and endless confusion has followed this vain effort to weigh motives in the same scales in which sugar and salt are weighed. The fact is, that conduct must be the result of motives, for it is an absurdity to predicate choice with no influence, and therefore such influence must be in a true sense a cause of action.

All human volitions are absolutely free to take up with any motive whatever. This being so, it is doing the cause of moral freedom the greatest possible injustice to fasten on to it the old theory of the *strongest motive*. In the sense in which the term very often is used it leads to fatalism, and creates a doctrine of necessity that is peculiarly pernicious to that responsibility to which God and man hold us for our conduct. It is begging the question to say that the strongest motive to a man is that which secures his choice. This

is the very thing in dispute. It is simply saying, because a man acts from such a motive, therefore it is the strongest, and it is the strongest because he thus acts. Now, all this is assuming the very thing to be proved. Why may not God make the human mind free to act from any motive, strong or weak? Why may not the very idea of guilt be involved in taking the unworthy, the weak motive, in preference to the noble and the strong? Why may not self-consciousness declare that its great sin consists in disregarding the rational, the good motive, and taking up with the irrational and the foolish motive? The fact is, the man determines the motive vastly more than the motive the man.

And this leads us to consider that what passes under the phrase, *the strongest motive*, is the most general, vague, and loose of all expressions, and is used to mean much or little as a man may please. The ideas comprehended in the word motive are the most complex imaginable. It comprehends everything that influences the mind; and what is it that influences the mind? Who can tell? It may be that without us or that within us; the internal or the external; other persons or ourselves; it may have reference to things animate or inanimate; feelings or perceptions, and a thousand and one things which cannot be described.

Is it not then irrational to talk about the strongest motive as if it was as susceptible of weight as a pound of coffee? Is it reasonable to believe a necessity exists in it to act from it as irresistible as that which brings a stone to the ground? Upon a certain class of minds this method of reasoning is peculiarly unhappy; it drives them to the repudiation in volitions of the law of cause and effect, or the making out all human volitions as supernatural. But we shall show that the strict meaning of the supernatural is that which is above nature, that which nature cannot do.

But is human volition not in accordance with the very nature God has given to man, his very constitution? Is not this humanity, with its complex powers, really natural, as distinguished from the supernatural? The fallacy of those who call human volitions supernatural, is found in the fact that

they overlook the truth that the mind was made to act naturally as much as the body; to act according to its nature, and as certainly as the action of the brute creation or the inorganic kingdom: but, says the objector, mind is a power. Very true, and so also the lioness fighting to save her young is a power. The human power may be a very different power, but it is not for that a supernatural power. Mental activity never can go further than its nature permits, no more than physical power. The supernatural should only be used as restricted to the divine. What is supernatural is that which God does. The sphere of its activity is the divine, while the natural is the sphere of the human. The error in making all human volitions supernatural is quite as great as that of denying altogether the supernatural. If the one leads to infidelity, the other verges far into pantheism. Nature is simply the constitution God has given to things and persons—to his kingdom, be it inorganic, organic, animal, human, or angelic. It is a comprehensive term, embodying everything made in distinction from the maker. And the supernatural is that which is above nature, or any power in it, be it physical or mental. It is of great importance that this distinction should be clearly defined and resolutely held to. Give it up, and the whole doctrine of inspiration as a divine influence is thrown into confusion, and no line really, with truth, can be drawn between the supernatural in that which man does and the supernatural in that which God does. It is quite as important that the mind should be disabused of the sophistry conveyed in the phrase, *the strongest motive*. Man is not a machine because it acts *ab intra*, is self-caused, and can choose any motive whatever. The great sin in man lies in the fact that it is abnormal, irrational, contrary to the strongest motives of right, happiness, affection, and goodness. It is a war of the lower nature against the higher, passion against reason, pride against humility, lust against purity, violence against order, intemperance against temperance, avarice against prudence, and hatred against love. The reason why the language, the strongest motive, is held by us as always applicable to the action of the mind, is because we insensibly fall into the idea

that what is true of things is also so of persons. Cause and effect in things is always as the strongest force, and there is no power to the contrary. In things all is necessary, uniform, and inevitable. Thus, like causes produce like effects under all circumstances and occasions. But in mind the law of causality is altogether distinct. There is no possible analogy between the two. The difference is as radical as the nature is distinct.

In all language we indeed speak of motives as the cause of volition, because the mind is made to be influenced by them, yet its freedom of action is the essential condition of its existence. The mental constitution is made for freedom, as much as the air for breathing, and this freedom has a two-fold character—power to act differently from what is done, and then power to choose any motive whatever, strong or weak. Why, then, is the language, the mind always acts from the strongest motive, so common? First, because we fall insensibly into the idea that the mental constitution is a sort of machine; secondly, because we confound the *successful motive* with the strongest motive. The mind always does act from the successful motive, for this always is chosen in preference to any other. But does this mean that what influences is in itself always the strongest motive? Have motives weight, as stone? Does not conscience declare that in sin the weakest motive is chosen? Does not folly peculiarly consist in taking up with the most insignificant considerations, and overlooking the greatest? Is not the very guilt of wickedness, that it is so irrational, so senseless, so destitute of all worthy motive? We cannot get round this by saying that such motives to the wicked are the strongest; they are the successful motives, because they secure the result. But strength and success are not convertible terms. The true idea of freedom is, that while it is the law of the mind to act from motives, it is equally the law of the mind to take up with any motive, and free always to do differently from that which it does do. The ambiguous phraseology of the strongest motive leads into materialism, or into the fatal error of necessity. In this sense we hold to the self-deter-

mining power of the will; not that motive has nothing to do with the will, but that the will can act from any motive, and always with power to the contrary. We contend that all this action of the mind is natural, because it is in accordance with the constitution God gave it. Volitions are as natural in the spiritual world as gravitation in the material: the one is a mental power, the other a physical power; one is free, the other necessitated; one self-active, the other acted upon. Force in the material world is always blind, in the spiritual world intelligent; in one it has the essential characteristic of necessity; in the other, of liberty.

Holding, as we do, to the most unrestricted idea of freedom in human volitions, and in no respect disposed to encumber it with the ill-defined and unfortunate phraseology of the strongest motive, believing that it is the man that determines the motive vastly more than the motive the man, and that motive is the most complex of all ideas, and cannot in any true sense be defined in many cases of volition, and feeling that no language should be used to impair in the least human accountability and freedom, yet we cannot for a moment hold to the opinion, full of danger to all correct ideas of inspiration and the divine action upon men, that volitions are supernatural. The supernatural is the divine, as distinguished from both the human and the superhuman. What is the superhuman? It is simply that which is above the power, or transcends the strength of man. We read that other beings exist besides the human: now, the exercise of their power must be superhuman. Angels have a nature as truly as men, but not the same nature: all their actions must therefore be superhuman; and if we could conceive of an order of beings higher than the angelic, it would be true that the action of such beings would be superangelic, as their action is superhuman; but in no true sense could their action be called supernatural, for it is not above their nature, it is *as their nature*, and therefore must be natural. To do away with this distinction is to throw the greatest obscurity upon the whole subject of the divine influences and power. We believe God takes exclusively to himself the preroga-

tive of the supernatural, for nature must, in innumerable ways, be under his influence and control. All human or angelic volition is in accordance with the constitution God gives, and whenever action in either is above that constitution, then it is through the influence of the supernatural, and the glory alone belongs to God. The idea of inspiration is simply the influence of the Almighty on human thought above the plane of the natural, and transcending all creature power. The miraculous always includes the supernatural, but the supernatural does not usually the miraculous. If it is said that either, or both, act in accordance with law, it is only true in the sense that this law is the will of God himself. The whole subject of law, as applied to the Deity, is simply the method he proposes to himself, and what that method is can only be known to God.

The divine, then, as distinguished from the human or the superhuman, is simply the supernatural as the method of God in relation to all his action in the world of matter or mind. It embraces all degrees of the divine action, in controlling, directing, or creating things or persons. It is the divine power, as distinguished from all creature power. Consequently this action of God must possess in its nature something essentially distinct from all creature action, and all developments of mind or matter. The supernatural is the sphere of God alone, while nature, or the natural, is the sphere of all creature activity, be it human or angelic. It then should be always remembered, that when the human mind acts above the natural, or transcends the limits of the natural, then the reason is simply it is under the control of the supernatural. This is always divine, the energy of God himself coming in contact with human activity and thought, and bringing about those results that would be impossible if the natural only was relied upon. This view of the supernatural is peculiarly consistent with all correct ideas of second causes. Second causes, in matter or mind, are the powers that are manifested in both, and which grow out of the constitution of both. A cause is force, force is power, and power is simply producing results. Now, the doctrine of second causes, material or im-

material, is based upon the fact that God has given to every nature its own peculiar constitution,—that this constitution has its own laws, and these laws are revealed by the activities of all natures in every department of God's kingdom.

To contend that there is only one cause, and deny second causes, is simply the essence of pantheism, and all fatality as applied to human conduct. It means that human action is but a mode of the divine action, and consequently no such thing as human responsibility. But we contend that God can make second causes either necessary or free. He can give to creation a nature with *no liberty*, as well as a nature *with liberty*. This is what in human and angelic creatures he has done. But the great First Cause must reserve for himself the sovereignty of creation; and while he gives all the freedom that the creature can have, he certainly will not disrobe himself of the supernatural, in directing and controlling all things in subserviency to the highest good of the universe. It is for this reason we object so strongly to the use of the supernatural, as applied to human or angelic volitions. Neither man nor angel can act above his own nature, or by any inherent energy get beyond the sphere of second causes. All causality must be absolute or dependent: absolute in God, for no restriction is admissible in it; dependent in creatures, because it is God's gift, and confined to the nature he has given: that nature may be necessary or free; its energy may be *ab extra* or *ab intra*, and show either the irresponsibility of things, or the accountability of persons.

Consider then how the divine acts upon things and persons. Things are influenced by those forces that, corresponding with their nature, invariably bring forth the same results from the same causes. The law of causality in things is in accordance with the principle of necessity, that admits of no deviation, no change, no development outside of that influence that uniformly brings about like results from like causes. Things always demand, in all action, two or more conditions: one the external force applied, the other the object which receives this force. There must not only be two or more conditions, but a corresponding relation between

them. Thus oil and water do not mingle or combine, but sugar and water do. But when we come to persons we see the law of causality within.

There is an inherent power to choose between motives, to act freely from any motive, to resist or yield to any influence brought to bear upon the mind by motive. A person is self-caused, he is made a rational being, and this means the ability to take up with right or wrong motives. But a person could not be a person and not be susceptible to motives from the world within him or without him; he could not be a person and yet a passive being, with a constitution where motives could have no power. Things are not the objects of motives. We do not reason with them, we cannot converse with them, or teach them, or persuade them. There is an impassable gulf between things and persons, for blind force is at an infinite remove from intelligent force. But a creature could not be a creature and yet exempt from the law of cause and effect. A man must choose something, he must act from some kind of influence, good or bad, or he would be neither a thing nor a person, and this would be an absurdity. The divine, then, when it comes in contact with the human, when a supernatural influence is made to bear upon the mind, is, unless a direct miracle is worked, always in accordance with the laws of the mind, giving a higher energy, or a new direction, to those laws acting with the natural, while above it, and ordinarily undistinguished from it; but in no true sense can such action of the human be appropriated as its own exclusively. The divine influence that secures the effect within the sphere of the natural, while truly above it, must be considered the procuring cause of this effect, and to God alone the glory belongs.

It will be seen how this view of the divine, as distinguished from the human or the superhuman, gives to it the noblest aspect when made the object of human desire or effort. If the human never acts above the natural, then the supernatural is the reason, and this will throw the greatest light upon the whole subject of inspiration, and teach us that what distinguishes the Bible above all other books is,

that it carries about with it the ineffaceable impress of the supernatural, the stamp of the divine, while all other books are the offspring of the natural.

If now a person should ask, What is a miracle? we reply, First, it is not a natural effect; second, it does not lie within the sphere of the human or the superhuman to accomplish. An angel may work wonders, and do that which, done by a man, would lead immediately to the inference that it was supernatural; but this action of the angel was simply superhuman, above that which a man could do, but not that which an angel was made to do. As human beings, we might not be able to distinguish between supernatural agency and superhuman, but as angels we should, for then we would be conscious of acting only in accordance with the nature God has given us. When, then, we get beyond the domain of things, or that of the irresponsible brute creation, we come to that lofty sphere where God speaks of man as made in his own image, and a being into whose nostrils he breathed the breath of life. Here we reach the condition of moral accountability, and that of persons that, however varied in the scale of creation, do yet all owe allegiance to God, and by him are held responsible for their conduct.

Thus we have contemplated the human, the superhuman, and the divine, for the great object of showing that the supernatural is to be restricted to the working of God alone, outside and above the realm of nature, and then to show that the law of cause and effect can hold as true in the spiritual world as in the material, and yet be perfectly consistent with moral freedom, and not only consistent with it, but the foundation upon which it must rest, and the only principle by which character can be formed in harmony with true liberty and responsibility. Under the action of the human we then classify everything that comes under the power of the human and its laws. Under the superhuman we mean effects produced by powers above the human, and yet in perfect consistency with their nature, and according to natural laws imposed upon superhuman beings by God. While under the divine we mean always the supernatural, and that which God only

can do. We hold this distinction of the greatest value in having any intelligent idea of inspiration, and in its application to the great themes of revelation. We believe God made both men and angels to act according to the nature he gave them, and in harmony with the laws of their being, and therefore all such action must be natural, always excepting those cases where the supernatural is interposed to help, or control, or secure, a higher end than the inherent powers of their own natures could secure. The divine coming thus in contact with the human or the angelic, is God's own method of securing in nature those results which give the highest permanency and glory to his kingdom. Miracle is the highest method of the supernatural, and will only appear when needful to secure effects of the highest value in the mind of God.

What, then, is sin? It is, in the moral world, a condition of *unnature*, a perversion of moral power, a spiritual deformity, an abhorrent estrangement from those laws that, obeyed, would secure everything blessed and happy. Sin is acting against God, against his system of nature, against his will, against his order of creation, an insult to the supreme authority of Jehovah, and an abortive effort in the creature to thwart the end of his kingdom.

What is sin toward self? It is moral suicide, the nourishing of a cancer in the constitution, that, uncounteracted, unrepented of and unforgiven, will bring with it death to the soul. Sin is something that works ruin to the nature as certain as any derangement of the physical system: rather, sin is a derangement affecting both soul and body, and must be arrested in its course, or irretrievable ruin is the result. If this is sin, we see why the interposition of the divine, in human affairs, is so indispensable; and why miracle, to secure certain ends in the moral recovery of man, is so much to be desired.

The interposition of the divine in human affairs, is so much the necessity of man a sinner, that were it dispensed with, we should see no hope for the salvation of man.

We see, then, from the derangement sin has introduced

into the world, from the disorder engendered by it in the material and immaterial creation of God, how essential it is for reversing this fatal tendency of evil that the supernatural, under all its varied forms, should exist, and even miracle be sometimes revealed to counteract the mischief that sin would bring upon the individual or society. But miracle is the manifestation of the divine power, on such occasions and under such circumstances as most impressively to convince the mind that God does what, in no sense, natural law could do; that even there is a suspension or setting aside of the laws of nature, and the clearly-defined impress of the working of a Being who holds all laws under his perfect control, and can, with infinite ease, bring about results that transcend all creature activity or wisdom. Thus, miracle may be defined as the highest order of the divine power, securing effects that do not come under the ordinary sphere of the supernatural, and only worked upon occasions of the greatest importance to God. Miracle, then, may well be described as something more, and far different from the common providence of God,—the putting forth of his almightiness, according to the method of his own wisdom, and which is concealed in his own mind.

Considering the supernatural and the divine as synonymous, and miracle as the especial revelation of the divine, we are compelled, whenever we consider the terrible disorder of sin universal over the earth, to admit, under a personal God, the necessity of just that kind of interposition to relieve the wants of the human family, that is made known to us in the Old and New Testaments, and to confess that miracle, under the circumstances of its manifestation as recorded in the Bible, is peculiarly suitable and appropriate for the great end of human redemption.

Believing in miracle, as so essential in the restoration of man under that divine system disclosed in revelation, we would, for this very reason, look with the greatest suspicion upon all miracles that do not carry upon their face the evidences of the Bible, and cannot claim for their working those divine proofs that give to *real miracles* their credibility.

But especially would we make heaven-wide the distinction that separates the divine power from the human or the superhuman, and recognize always in the supernatural that which is only divine, which not only is above all creature power, but is as far removed from the power of the created as the nature itself of the infinite is removed from that of finite.

CHAPTER XXIII.

LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN THOUGHT.

THE proper object of inquiry for the human mind is not so much what is the subject-matter of nature and revelation, not how the facts presented in both are made to harmonize one with another, as what is the character of the human mind and the essential limitations of thought. It is idle to speculate upon worlds beyond the range of the telescope: within the sphere alone of its power can the astronomer make his calculations. Facts and theories are widely different.

Consider, then, the natural limitations of the mind of man, and how differently individuals are affected by the same facts.

The consciousness and the senses are the two great instruments of human thought,—one internal, the other external. Take away any of the senses, and the mind is unable to comprehend the facts that properly come under the sense that is removed. The blind man can have no idea of color, or the deaf man of sound. So of the consciousness: while unable to define it, we yet know that the different degrees of reflection, reason, judgment, imagination, as well as the different states of the emotional part of our nature, all have a most intimate connection with it, and give to its action clearness or ambiguity, strength or weakness. The first thing that marks the human mind is its variety of development in different persons. No two persons are alike in their minds or bodies. Some have minds extremely weak and some strong; some excel in memory and some in judgment; some possess great natural powers of reflection and others of observation; some show great inventive faculties, others seem only able to imitate. The texture of some minds is coarse, that of others refined. Undoubtedly, there is an original and essential

difference in the minds of different persons. Just as no two trees of the forest are alike, and no two blades of grass are exactly equal in shape, or color, or texture, so one of the clearest marks of the individuality of the human race will be found in the variety that exists among all who people this world. This being so, must mould the ideas of every person. The same facts may be admitted, but there cannot be in all the same ideas connected with those facts. The same truth may be confessed by two persons, and yet this truth impress the consciousness of the one very unlike what it does the other. It is, then, evident that this difference in the minds of persons arises not only from circumstances in which they are placed from education and the force of habit, but from an original and essential variety in the minds of all. The natural faculties do differ in strength, energy, comprehension, and acuteness in all persons. There is as much a gradation in the scale of mind as in that of the development of the body. The essential distinctions existing in the material world only shadow forth distinctions as wide and great in the intellectual and moral world, and these distinctions all are consistent with personal freedom and accountability. The mind sympathizes intimately with the body; they mutually act and react upon each other. This being so, the inference is unavoidable, that different persons have a limitation in their ideas respecting material and immaterial things, corresponding with the original and essential varieties of mind existing in the world. What some may comprehend most clearly, others may not; what may be intuitively observed by some, may be altogether unseen by others. Not the mind only, but the emotional part of the nature, is widely affected by the same things in different persons.

Thus, take the original differences in the human faculties, and then those differences as modified or increased by education and habit, and we see the widest gradation in human thought with a corresponding limitation. But in addition to this limitation of thought, so different in persons of the same age, there is, with every one, a peculiar development of mind from early infancy to old age. That the human race came

into the world with anything that may be called innate ideas it is impossible to prove; so far from this, there is very clear evidence to the contrary. Faculty and idea are not the same; faculties of thought, perception, and feeling, undeveloped in a restricted sense, must exist in infancy. The senses and the consciousness, as the mere instruments of thought and feeling, must have lying back a nature, with faculties capable of thought and emotion under appropriate circumstances; but infancy commences with no ideas, but simply with faculties that, under certain conditions in action, will develop thought and feeling. Now, the process of human life is a process with a commencement with no ideas, but simply original faculties of emotion and thought, gradually developing into specific and expanding ideas and feelings.

Thus, we see not only in different persons an original limitation of mind, as diverse as individual existence, but this limitation diminishing with the progress of infancy into youth, manhood, and maturity of life. The powers of the human mind strengthen, and the mind expands with the increase of years. All this must be taken into consideration in the speculations of the reason. The reasoning power in one man is very different from that in another, and then it is also a thing of gradual development, commencing in every person with only faculties in a crude and undeveloped state: the mind shows itself absolute, with no ideas in the first dawning of its existence, for faculty and ideas are not the same, no more than the flint and the spark that is struck by concussion from it; and then there is, under appropriate conditions, a growth of mind as striking and varied as the growth of the body.

Consider, then, the limitations of the mind out of itself,—limitations in relation to God, to his creation, material and immaterial. Consider the simplest ideas with the individual. The primary idea is that of *I, a person*, as distinct from other persons and the outward world. But what is the source of this idea? Evidently the consciousness. Suppose the reason attempts to prove this first truth of our existence. Can anything more conclusive be said than *I think, therefore I am*?

And yet the whole force of this argument is found only in the individual consciousness. The idea of distinct personality is traced alone to the same source: from our idea of finite personality we ascend to the idea of the infinite personality of God. The great axioms of all truth, or rather the highest truth, are found in the consciousness. But the limitation of our minds is such that not only we cannot go back of the consciousness for higher proof, we must take its decisions just as they are, without imagining that any effort of reasoning can make them clearer. The great facts of consciousness by no process of argument can be improved upon: rather, elaborate speculations only tend to obscure the mind respecting these facts. All human action is based upon the admitted facts of consciousness, teaching the great truths of free agency, of accountability, of right and wrong. And yet, what limitation of mind in respect to the most clearly admitted facts of self-existence! Not to go beyond the individual, what an impenetrable veil presents itself to human reason in that which constitutes the essence of soul and body! This is just as evident when we consider the union of the soul and body; how body acts upon mind, or mind upon body; how the spiritual combines with the material, or how life enters into the organism of the human frame,—all is as unexplained to the mind of the adult as to that of the infant. The one knows just as much of their mystery as the other. Let a finite mind expand ever so much, let it grow to the capacity of a Milton, a Newton, or a Bacon, and it will be found that there are limitations of thought in every person never to be done away with.

But this is more evident when the world is contemplated. How we come into this world, live in it, or leave it, beyond the apparent outward phenomena of life and death, are subjects of the profoundest mystery. We see nothing of this great earth beyond the contracted horizon of our own individual consciousness and observation. Our own limited thoughts give to us all we do know of self and the outward world; and yet think how extreme is our limitation of thought in respect to the most familiar objects of sense.

Take the bird : we know something of its shape, color, action, and music. We open its body, and find out something of the mystery wrapped up in it ; and yet in this bird there are wonders of mechanism beyond the reach of the microscope. Such is the limitation of our minds that only a few of the most obvious properties in the outward world, a few only of the most sensible exhibitions of brute action, ever come under our inspection. Men have neither the time nor the capacity to know much of the world in which they live. Secrets innumerable in earth, air, and water, and of animate and inanimate creation, exist never to be disclosed to human thought. So far from the highest researches of science exhausting nature, they only open up regions inconceivably grander of wonder.

Here, then, does the human mind show its limitation as extreme, not only in the world comprehended in self, but in all the objects of the external world. Nothing but the mere surface of things is ever known. What is known of any one thing is not the ten-thousandth part of that which is to be known. As when a child takes a watch and plays with the case and crystal, and admires the hands, and counts the little figures, from one to twelve, marked upon the dial-plate, and then thinks he knows all about the watch, so often does the vanity of the human mind fancy itself posted up in the knowledge of self or the world, when only there has been but the infant playing of the reason with a few of the outside properties of things.

We come now to consider objects of thought inconceivably grander than self, or the world, or the universe of worlds. We enter upon the contemplation of God ; but how great is the limitation of the mind here ! Evidently what we do know of God must be what he pleases to make known to us. As the distance between the creature and the Creator is infinite, so also the limitation of mind necessarily implied in the finite must be as great. God reveals himself to man as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, but how can God, as such, be comprehended by the finite ? Certainly only in accordance with those modes of manifestation under which

he chooses to reveal himself. Now, there are but two conceivable ways of the manifestation of God to man. Either man must ascend up to God, or God must condescend to man. Either the finite mind must rise up to the infinite and merge itself into the infinite, or the infinite must bring himself, so far as he can be known, within the sphere of the finite, and come under human limitation so far as is consistent with his nature. Now the finite cannot ascend up to the infinite, there can be no merging of the creature into the Creator.

If man is so limited in thought respecting himself and the world, infinitely more limited is he in relation to God. If his knowledge of self and nature is so contracted, then what must not it be of the unlimited God? There can be but one way in which God in any sense can be known to the reason of man: that way must be the descent of God to man, coming to man as far as suitable under human limitations within the sphere of human thought, and accommodated to the infant capacities of his creatures. This is the development of God in revelation; but what does this lead to? Is it not that the first study of man should be what is the actual condition of the human mind as related to the great facts made known in nature and in revelation? The first study of the astronomer, before he reasons upon the stars, is the character of the instrument he is to make use of for the purpose of observation; he can know only that which comes within the range of the telescope. Should the finite then presume to reason upon the infinite without first deciding upon its own essential limitation of thought? Is it not the wildest dream of human pride to think of merging self into the infinite, or ascending up into God? Can a creature, unable even to tell what is comprehended in a second cause, be competent to conceive of the great First Cause?

If self-existence, under its own limitations, is a mystery so profound, much more must be the existence of the Absolute, in itself infinitely independent of all creatures and all worlds. But if the only way in which God in any true sense can be known to the human mind, is by accommodating himself to the essential limitations of the mind, then the in-

ference is unavoidable, that whenever the human reason attempts to go beyond its own true sphere of thought it will show its folly by its absurdity and contradiction. In other words, the true province of the reason in relation to God is simply *belief in great facts made known*. The proper business of the reason is to ascertain what God has said respecting himself and man, what facts has he communicated to man, and what are the evidences of a divine revelation to the human family. The reason is invited to make the most of all the truth made known in nature or the Bible respecting God. Whenever it attempts to erect itself into a self-constituted tribunal, and say what God should do or not do, what he should reveal or not reveal, what facts made known are consistent with his attributes and what are not, then does human reason transcend the boundary line of its limitation. What is the consequence? Is it not contradiction in theory, and absurdity in practice?

Certainly, if God does make himself known to us in any way, he will not previously ask the advice of his creatures. God will show as much of himself, his character, and perfections, as he chooses to do, and no more. But suppose in this world he permits the existence of sin, of disease, of death, and of innumerable evils affecting man in his physical and moral condition. Suppose directly or indirectly, as the consequence of sin, all nature suffers, and disorder and pain more or less abounds, what should be the natural inference? Is it not that all these evils, external and internal, have a natural tendency to bias the mind, and that, in addition to the limitation of human thought, we must add also the friction of sin, and view man not only in the essential littleness of his capacity, but even in the derangement of that capacity by physical and moral evil? This being so, there is a great argument for caution and modesty in all reasonings upon God, his attributes, and the relation he sustains to man. Every theory of the mind in moral reasoning that does not take into account the friction of sin will be essentially defective.

What is the actual condition of the mind in every effort

of reason to understand God as he has revealed himself to man? This is the first inquiry to make, for just as we have a false estimate of the human mind, must be the erroneous conception of God. Is it possible to think of God beyond the range of human thought? If God in any sense is known, can he be known except as he passes within the sphere of human thought? But suppose the individual consciousness and mind has altogether a false estimate of itself; suppose it vainly thinks its own vagaries realities, and confounds or overlooks the great distinctions of right and wrong, truth and error; suppose the mind grovels in sensuality, or is intoxicated with the dreams of pride,—must not all this be taken into account in its decisions respecting God? If the lens of a telescope is defaced, will it not affect all the observations of the astronomer? But when the calculations are found wrong, are the stars at fault, or the instrument used to observe them?

There is a twofold limitation of thought in all reasoning upon God—that which is the result of original contraction, and that vitiation of mind the natural consequence of sin. The difficulty lies not so much in the former as the latter. The finite is the essential condition of all creatures, and it has a scale of gradation from the archangel to the worm, from moral agents, responsible and free, to the minutest insect. But God makes himself known in a way corresponding to the nature he has given to his creatures. To a large part of his creation he does not choose to make himself known in any manner. God gives to brute animals just those kind of faculties that enable them to carry out the limited end of their existence. In their own sphere, so diverse, they live and die with a nature corresponding alone to the wants of their contracted existence.

But whatever may be the limitations of human thought, they do not exclude conscience and responsibility in the human family, since their existence is not only for time but eternity. And yet the saddest thing connected with mankind is the vitiation of their nature by sin. God does indeed condescend to man, and accommodates himself to his

nature ; but man, by the abuse of his free agency, has made himself sinful, otherwise there would be no error respecting God as he reveals himself to human limitation. What could be made known would never be mistaken, but clearly believed in and acted upon ; while that which should transcend the range of that limitation would be simply let alone as wrong to intrude into. But the tendency of sin in the mind is to make it bold where it should be timid, and timid where it should be bold. It reverses all the natural order of things. Instead of contenting itself with that which it may know, it seeks to find out that which it cannot know. The world is teeming with great facts, and God, by the direct manifestation of his mind to man, is making known things of transcendent importance to understand ; and yet the folly of the human mind in no respect is more manifest than in passing over the sensible, the near, and the everyday facts of existence, and rashly speculating upon the Divine Being, as if the finite, the fallible, the weak, and the sinful was able to grasp in thought the infinite, the absolute, the omnipresent and omnipotent First Cause.

Thus, the curse of sin is seen either in man groveling in the mire of sensuality, and not caring to think of God at all, or it makes itself known in an insane pride that imagines it can raise itself to God. But God only reveals himself in a way corresponding to the nature he gives to his creatures. What is more clear than, if this is so, that the essential limitation of the human mind would make it necessary to believe much that could not be understood, and submit to much that must ever be unavoidable. For the very reason that the finite cannot comprehend the infinite, or that the absolute and self-existent could not be known by the limited mind of man ; for the very reason that all creatures who are but second causes, are peculiarly dependent upon the First Cause, is it not certain that all the speculations of philosophy must be wrecked whenever they venture beyond the legitimate limits of human thought ?

But consider some of those characteristics of the human mind that give the note of warning whenever it attempts to

transgress its prescribed limits. First, whatever the mind does know it knows almost exclusively in the way of *simple facts*. This is true of all the familiar objects of sense that daily come under the observation of man, and even this knowledge is confined alone to the surface of facts. Thus, the mind knows the existence of the ocean, its vastness, its color, its saltness, and motion; and yet what mysteries unknown in the ocean! Thus, the mind knows that there is such a thing as the human body; to reason a man out of this belief is impossible. But what do we know of the bodies we every moment carry about with us, except a few of the most sensible properties of the human system? So of the earth and air. Ages have passed over the human race, and slowly accessions of knowledge have been made respecting earth and air; but what proportion does the known bear to the unknown? So also of rain, snow, sky, lightning, and heat, there is vastly more to be known than is known.

But if this is so of the most apparent things in nature, what must we not infer respecting the mind of man, and especially God! Is it not evident that God in his infinite perfections can be known only as he reveals himself within the sphere of human thought? But what must be the inference respecting such knowledge? Is it not that it must not only be accommodated to our mental limitation, but that it will be given to us more for the regulation of our conduct in this world than to gratify the curiosity, more as a matter of belief than mere reason, more for good living than for speculation? Remember that for practice a right belief subserves all the purpose, and far better than elaborate research of thought or profound reasoning. Belief is a short process, available at every emergency of life; but a man may die before he gets through with his reasoning: nor can human action wait long upon the lagging and uncertain footsteps of speculation. All right conduct need ask for is a right belief. And yet an axiom of life, universally practiced about things of this world, is discarded where God is concerned. In no respect is the insanity of human pride more seen than in presuming to dictate to God how he should make himself known to the reason.

But suppose he only discloses to man great facts in his government; suppose he chooses to present his truth to us more in the way of assertion than argument, more under the aspect of simple declaration than by any attempt to gratify the reason; suppose God tells us *what he is, rather than how he is*; suppose he consults no one method of human reason, either in the time, the way, or the character of his great remedy for the moral disease of man; suppose his revelation is exclusively confined to the specific end of securing right conduct,—will the human mind dare assert that God should not do so? As the human race consists of men, women, and children, with only a brief span of life, and vast issues hanging upon the improvement of their time; as all ought to believe right, does not the very course God takes to make himself known to man, show infinite wisdom as accommodated not only to the limited sphere of human thought, but also the sinfulness existing in that sphere? There is no difficulty in revelation that does not find its counterpart in nature. There are no peculiar obscurities in the facts of the Bible that are not equally evident in the facts of the physical world. Nothing lies so far beyond the range of human thought as the great law of cause and effect. The process of all right reason is from the known to the unknown, from the evidence of the seen and the felt to the belief of that unseen, and, as yet, unfelt. But it is reversing all right reason to go out of the sphere of human thought to explain that within its sphere. The human mind, with a capacity extremely limited, must content itself with simple facts and great axioms of moral truth declared by God. Nothing is so fatal to all true belief, even as all right reason, as to pretend to decide upon that which it cannot know, or to reject that which bears the stamp of the inspiration of God. Thus, take the divine purposes and the free agency of man, viewed alone as great facts made known in nature and revelation, and no difficulty need present itself in relation to these facts more perplexing than in other facts. But suppose the philosopher attempts to reason them out, and show how they both harmonize with each other: what is the result? In the very process of

human reason there is a limit passed, where, to proceed one step farther, is plainly impossible. The difficulty lies not so much in the separate facts as in the attempt to blend them together.

But why, at a certain point, must all reasoning stop, or involve itself in absurdity and contradiction? Why does the imperative mandate of the individual consciousness say, Thus far shalt thou go, and no farther? Evidently because the finite cannot comprehend the infinite; because there is an essential limitation of thought, beyond which all thought falters. Suppose there may be an apparent contradiction in the effort to blend together God's purposes and free moral agency: are either of these great facts to be denied? The contradiction that appears to the mind arises alone from its limitation. What appears to infringe upon these facts only confirms them. For why this failure of the mind to show how both, by God, are made to coalesce together, while the action of each is separate and independent? Why are we compelled to admit the facts, and yet find the reason unable to reconcile them in their joint existence? Is it that God has given to us a reason only to confound it? Is it that there is any real contradiction in the action of the divine purposes and free moral agency? Is one naturally opposed to the other? Not in the least! there is no real antagonism in the blending together of the two. They act in perfect harmony with each other; both are essential, both true, and while there is a dependence of one upon the other, it is not a dependence that in the least infringes upon the sphere of either. Why, then, the more we reason upon the *mode* of the joint existence of both, is there an apparent contradiction, so that the full admission of one seems to preclude the existence of the other? All this arises from the inherent limitation of the mind, and the impossibility beyond a certain line of having the least idea or knowledge of the infinite God. When the bird flies too high in the air, its motion becomes weak and unsteady, and it must soon descend to a region adapted to its nature. So of the reason: when it attempts to fly too high into the

mystery of the divine action and being, its very weakness shows itself in absurdity and contradiction.

As facts made known, man's free moral agency and God's purposes are most evident; but they are evident as facts to be credited and acted upon, not as theories to be reasoned out and demonstrated. Where is it that the difficulty shows itself when the mind of man attempts by any process of reason to blend together in one harmonious theory the union of God's purposes and man's free moral agency? Precisely where the finite passes the line of its limitation and intrudes into the infinite. It is evident there is the finite, and equally evident there is the infinite; but who can explain their joint existence or reconcile it to the reason? Denying the finite, we merge into pantheism; denying the infinite, we plunge into atheism; and either error destroys free moral agency. Suppose we admit the finite and the infinite, but deny the divine purposes: what kind of God do we make that has a mind without a purpose, an intelligence without a will, thought without intention, existence without wish, and perception without choice? If a man cannot be deprived of purpose and yet be a man, could God lose his purposes and yet be God?

But, says an objector, I cannot reconcile the joint action of man's free agency with God's purposes. The existence of one seems to conflict with that of the other. But is it not evident that what we are unable to comprehend should seem contradictory? Is there greater difficulty of comprehension in this than in the joint action of thought and matter, spirit and body? But the joint existence of thought and matter, spirit and body, cannot be denied because of their apparent contradiction. Neither free agency nor the divine purposes can be invalidated because of the seeming inconsistency of their joint existence. Apparent contradictions are not real ones. The Infinite can only be known as he condescends to the limitation of human thought.

The whole doctrine of the incarnation of Christ is eminently consistent with this view. The incarnation is revealed as a simple fact to be believed, not a speculation to be rea-

soned upon. What has reason to do with that which, like the infinite, is impossible to be conceived of? Says an objector, The incarnation is incomprehensible, and therefore impossible. Yes! the incarnation is impossible to be conceived of by men, because it is as high above man as the infinite is above the finite; but is it therefore impossible to God? Cannot God bring this about, even if the comprehension of this truth is impossible to man? The incarnation of Christ, the Son of God, is the manifestation of the wisdom of God to man in its highest and noblest aspect.

It is this great doctrine that tells us in the clearest manner that when God makes himself known to man, when especially he has some great purpose of mercy in view, he does it in that way which corresponds with the nature of man and his wants. It is the descent of God, so far as is suitable, into the sphere of man and into the region of his limitation; and, therefore, it is the assumption of that very limitation necessary for the welfare of the human race. But are any to imagine that God is finite or limited, because he takes upon himself those limitations absolutely necessary for accommodating himself to the contracted sphere of human comprehension and human action? Will any take advantage of this to attribute infirmity to God, because he condescends to the infirmity of man? When Christ said, "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father," is it not obvious that Christ speaks only under the restriction of human limitation? Is not the same great truth announced in other words, when Christ declares to Thomas, "If ye had known me, ye should have known my Father also"? This is all consistent with those other assertions in the Bible, where God speaks of himself as impossible to be seen, as the infinitely unknown. In the one case, God speaks of himself as beyond the sphere of human thought; in the other case, as condescending to come within the range of the limitation of man. The great truth of the incarnation of Christ, is God revealing himself under human limitations, the infinite entering the sphere of the finite; but this very condescension adds inconceivably to the glory of God, rather it is that glory, unlimited and eternal,

coming under the restrictions essential in the finite, not diminished, but, under the loveliest aspect of mercy, conforming to that limitation inherent in the contracted sphere of human thought and action. Yet this very condescension of God is made the occasion of innumerable objections to the plain facts of the Bible. But has it come to this, that either God in no sense shall be known, or, if known as far as human limitation will permit, this very knowledge is to be made the excuse for denying his infinite perfections and purposes of wisdom and grace, or man's free moral agency?

In no sense is the limitation of the human mind more seen than in the errors fallen into in the theories advocated of the first cause and second causes, existence uncreated and existence created, the duration of mind and matter, time and eternity. Yet it is certain that God existed from eternity, and as certain that matter and mind created is finite. But either matter and mind are derived from God, or they are not. If we say they are parts of God, originating from his substance, then we fall into pantheism, and pantheism is fatal to all human responsibility. If we say the finite does not originate from the infinite, then something comes from nothing, that which *is* proceeds from that which is not. Here creation, which is exclusively the work of God, plunges the reason into difficulties from which faith only can extricate the mind. If God is the Absolute, the First Cause, the Infinite, then in any way to make the finite, the derived, or any begun existence of mind or matter originating from God, does conflict with the fact of creation in the production of something from nothing. Creation is as much beyond the reason of man as the existence of the infinite. Man must believe it as a fact without explanation, or in the very effort to explain it the mind rushes into pantheism or atheism. Say that the world is a part of God, derived from him; say that the human mind is an emanation of the divine mind, and pantheism, with its denial of second causes and responsibility, follows; say that the universe is God, in the sense that nothing exists but this, and atheism is the result, and with it, as with pantheism, there is the denial of free agency and human responsibility.

Thus, many a noble mind has been wrecked in fruitless speculations to solve the difficulties involved in the existence of the absolute and the created, the underived and the finite, the self-existent and existence begun; but, other than as facts made known, there can be no knowledge of these things. To know the great things involved in the existence of God and in creation, the finite capacity of man must enlarge itself to an infinite capacity, or man must become God. But what absurdity in the idea! Yet this very contradiction of mind,—arising from abortive attempts to convert nature into God, or God into nature; to construct a theory that shall tell *how* mind or matter exists; how the infinite exists without the finite, or the finite without the infinite; how creation is possible or impossible; how the derived comes from the underived, or how only one exists,—this confounding second causes with the First Cause, all show that some fatal perversity of unbelief has taken hold of the mind.

In all reasoning from the personality of man to the personality of God, the limitation of the human mind is peculiarly seen. From finite personality we ascend to the idea of infinite personality. But the personality of man involves not only individuality, a person distinct from all other persons, but a local habitation for the soul, a sphere of existence restricted and an essential limitation in the mode of human life. Finite personality has a finite sphere of existence and development; in that sphere it is self-conscious; in its relations to the world it is altogether dependent; its very life and happiness must flow from its connection with that which is out of it and above it. But the personality of God is infinite, unlimited, self-existent, and independent; its action and happiness are in itself; perfect independence and absolute freedom are its peculiar character. The personality of God makes him in every respect essentially distinct from the universe. This personality of God, with his infinite attributes of wisdom, power, goodness, and knowledge, is underived, and therefore is the peculiar feature of the Absolute and the First Cause. Because from the known we infer the unknown, or because we believe from our own conscious personality in

the personality of God, is it not the extreme of folly to assert that God's personality in all respects resembles our own? Yet this great mistake is the source of all the controversy that arises in disputing the revealed fact of the triune existence of God, comprehending his essential unity of being with three persons,—the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

But evidently what constitutes the whole of the personality of God is not within the sphere of the human mind to comprehend; if, as a fact, it is made known that God is one being and yet three persons, that fact is to be believed in from the testimony of the sacred Scriptures. But, says an objector, the word *person*, when used in relation to man, always means one distinct being, and therefore three persons in the Godhead must mean three distinct beings. This does not follow. If the objector could comprehend the infinite, he might then be competent to say whether there is a real contradiction in the doctrine of Trinitarians; he might then be prepared to question the consistency of this threefold personality with the unity of the Godhead. But as the objector is finite in mind and existence, how can he insist upon his own theory as true if it conflicts with the plain assertions of the Bible? Does the same thing of necessity follow in the infinite being of God that does follow in the limited existence of man? Suppose one person means in a finite sphere one being, and three persons three beings, must the same logic be applied to the infinite God? Until the mode of the divine existence is known in its height and length and breadth and depth, is it not presumption to assert that what happens to be true in a finite relation is alone true in the infinite, the absolute, and the First Cause? Is the limited capacity of man competent to bring the charge of tritheism against those who hold to the doctrine that there is but one God and yet three persons in the Godhead? What if, in reasoning from human personality to the divine personality, there is an apparent contradiction? Does not this follow from the essential limitation of the human faculties?

The whole subject is one altogether beyond the grasp of

the comprehension of man, and it is to be credited as a fact revealed, with no attempt to explain it. For, until all that enters into divine personality is comprehended, there is an obvious impossibility in asserting that the threefold personality of God is inconsistent with his divine unity. Tritheism does not follow because the doctrine is held of three persons in the Godhead, and it does not follow simply because a process of reasoning that would be correct in relation to man in his finite capacity is not of necessity so when applied to the infinite, the absolute, and the First Cause. In the nature of things, the union of the human and the divine natures, and the doctrine of three persons in one God, must, to be conceived of in any sense, come under the limitations of human thought; but we are not to attach our own limitations to God, because in the way of accommodation to the infirmities of our faculties God reveals himself. If to be known at all, God must be known within the sphere of the finite; then let us be thankful for such knowledge, let us humbly submit our reason and hearts to it, and not pervert the divine condescension into an arrogant denial of revealed facts. These facts are not changed by any imperfection in our own minds, nor do they infringe upon the infinite perfection of God, but they are given to us for right conduct, for more than curious speculation,—for the trial of faith rather than reason.

There are many difficulties that are presented in the consideration of facts made known respecting the divine government, probation, heaven and hell; but these difficulties also grow from the limitations of human thought, they are shown as much in contemplating that which God declares *he will do* as in that which pertains to the mode of his existence. Consider how we come into this world, and what we are while we live in it. How does the mind develop itself from infancy? Is not its growth slow, vitiated, and, through wrong habit or association, subject to great perversion? Here then is the finite, emerging under the thousand perverting influences of sin, contemplating God as made known.

But is not the inference correct that God can only be most inadequately apprehended, either in his character or in his

government? Is it not certain that many difficulties will present themselves from the position of man in his relation to God? Does it therefore follow that facts made known respecting what God does or will do, are inconsistent or contradictory because they may appear so under the perverting influences of sin? Is it not certain that the limitations of human thought will experience also a kind of deception that arises from a person ignorant of those limits beyond which the mind cannot go? Facts are stubborn things that do not bend to our theories. We may think them very contradictory: we may say that if one kind of facts is true, another is not true; we may say we cannot reconcile this fact with a different fact made known,—but all will be of no use. It is quite probable that as much contradiction will arise in the mind respecting what God says *he will do* as in relation to what God says *he is*. It is quite probable that the human mind in its limitations will be often severely perplexed in all reasoning about the facts of the divine government and the issues of this short probation. There is a cause for this in that finite capacity that cannot take in all the reasons for God's conduct.

God must in himself have many reasons for what he does that he will not see fit to communicate,—reasons that exonerate him from the charge of partiality or injustice, and which are concealed in his own infinite being. But more than this, it is certain that God may have reasons for what he does that could not be comprehended if made known,—reasons that lie altogether beyond the finite capacity, and that are a rule to him, while they may be no rule to us. The natural presumption respecting a revelation of God's will to man is, that it will be regulative rather than speculative; more to secure right action than to favor the reason. While God will not treat the reason with contempt, he certainly will teach it its true place before him,—he will encourage its development but not its presumption.

Thus we find it. The whole import of the gospel to man is to teach man how to live well and how to be saved, but beyond this very little is said for the mere gratification of the

mind. Yet objections in relation to God's government, and especially the punishment denounced against the wicked, have often been made. Either the truth of God's threatenings against sin has been denied, or the mind has rebelled against God as acting unworthy of himself. Now it is obviously impossible for a finite capacity to say what God should do in the punishment of sin. The mind cannot, from any theory of God, decide as to the character of his government or dealings toward his creatures. True, we can say God will do nothing unjust, unworthy of himself, or opposed to the great law of equity; but this is the very difficulty to encounter, to decide what in all cases is just, equitable, or worthy of God. Such a question, in its full import, can be decided only by God himself.

It cannot come under the limited capacity of man to say under all circumstances what God should do. Why so? Because, first, man does not know what all circumstances are, and then man does not know all that God is. Here are two mighty objections to any theory of the human mind respecting what should be, in all cases, the mode of the divine conduct respecting his creatures. Man neither knows all that God is, nor all the circumstances that are connected with his conduct. Before, then, the mind presumes to dispute any revealed fact, let it ask itself how far it is competent to sit in judgment upon that fact. Is it not obvious that if the instrument of thought is distorted we shall have an erroneous impression of the object of thought? Is it not certain that if the mind is perverted it will pervert that which it professes to contemplate? Should not man, finite in all his faculties and weak in all his powers, remember that here it sees in part and knows in part; here the known bears no comparison to the unknown; here life is too short for idle dreams or useless speculations; here probation, with its issues for eternity, admonishes all to seek first the kingdom of God and the friendship of the Almighty, so that, in another and better world, we may see as we are seen, and know as we are known?

CHAPTER XXIV.

ATHEISM.

“The living God, which made heaven, and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein.”—ACTS, xiv. 15.

“The fool hath said in his heart, There is no God.”—PSALM liii. 1.

CONSIDER the condition of the atheist upon the supposition that there is no God.

His condition upon the supposition that there is a God.

If atheism *is true*, then the whole system of natural and revealed theology is false,—both are founded upon the admission that there is a God. If there is no God, then nature is its own God. Chance is the deity that rules, or the law unintelligent of an irreversible fatality, or some unknown power self-existent, pervading all substances, blindly dependent upon nature, or itself a part of nature. The infinite diversities of mind and matter have then no other origin than chance, or some cause unknown and without intelligence, or they had an existence uncaused and from eternity. There is, then, no independent and Almighty Creator, self-existent and uncaused, unlimited in his agency and knowledge, and infinite in goodness, wisdom, and justice.

What does atheism gain by this? The atheist is no better off, in any respect, than those who believe in a God. By removing the highest incentive to virtue and the greatest restraint upon sin, the atheist gains nothing either in virtue or happiness. By holding to no higher tribunal for his conduct than a human one, he makes not himself more useful or happy, he adds nothing to his real pleasures or virtues. How is the atheist better off in this world than the believer in a God of infinite purity, justice, and benevolence? Suppose him to find out the fact of his inability to take care of him-

self, or others to take care of him; suppose him conscious that no human aid can soothe his pain, or relieve the sufferings of the present hour, or the misery that threatens him in the future,—is he better off than those who believe in a Being so wise and merciful that he can do that for them that no human agency can perform?

But the atheist is no better than the believer in a God in his relations to society and in the happiness enjoyed from the contemplation of the works of nature. Atheism does not help its advocates to more usefulness or more peace of mind in the family relation: it is a poor preparation for society. Certainly civil and parental government must lose one main prop to respect and efficiency with the fear of God removed, and the sanctions of a higher than human authority done away with. The atheist walks upon the earth, and yet believes in no Creator of it; he breathes the air, and confesses no Being who mingles in such nice proportions those ethereal elements that separated or united together in a different way would destroy all animal life; he beholds the sun, and wonders at the mysterious light that, coming from the distant orb, gives beauty and growth to all vegetation, and yet that sun has no intelligent author; he admires the ocean with its ever-moving waters, and yet believes in no infinite mind that combines the waters together and makes them fit for countless inhabitants; he looks with awe upon the mountain, raising its majestic head above the clouds, but whether there is a maker of that mountain does not convince his mind; he studies the anatomy of the human frame, but the skill that forms the eye, or constructs the bones, or sends the blood through the veins, has its cause in no God.

The condition of the atheist, so far as the works of nature are concerned, is far inferior in happiness to the believer in a God. If atheism is true,—yet it bears upon its face everything repulsive and gloomy,—if, in looking upon some masterpiece of human mechanism, it is a pleasure to us to know some intelligent cause, and recognize some mind that adjusted together the varied parts, is there no pleasure in looking upon the universe and surveying the miracles of a divine workman-

ship? When the atheist contemplates those worlds whose rapid flight through space no finite mind can comprehend, the endless diversities of bodies, each acting in accordance with their respective laws, he sees no God in their formation. Admitting that he is right, was there ever a truth more repulsive or destitute of pleasure?

The atheist is worse off than the believer in a God, from the fact that his highest rule of conduct must be human authority, or what appears to him his own interests. But human authority may be upon the side of vice, and the atheist's self-interests may be the worst selfishness. If impunity to sin can be secured with no earthly punishment, why be intimidated from transgression, since no punishment can be experienced from a higher tribunal? If vice is more profitable than virtue, why not be vicious, since there is no God to punish? If it is more pleasant to act as we please, however pernicious to the welfare of others, why not do so, if human justice can be averted and divine justice not experienced? If wealth, honor, or pleasure can be secured by oppression or fraud, why not use these means to secure the heart's desire, if there is no God to judge or condemn?

Consider, also, that atheism, true or false, is revolting to the conscience and those sensibilities of our nature not wholly dead to all noble activity. If man has a lower nature that, with passionate inclinations, leads him to sin, he yet has conscience and reason, and the faculty of judgment, and natural perceptions of what is true and honorable and fitting to moral excellence. The idea of no God is opposed to the voice of conscience, that speaks of an authority higher for human conduct than the laws alone of man. The atheist, by suppressing the instinctive convictions of conscience and reason, is in no way to advance his internal peace or pure gratification. The atheist, by waging war with the better part of his nature, only helps on the worse,—he not only applies a burning torch to the magazine of his evil passions, but removes away the natural reservoir of waters that God, in mercy, has given to quench the flames of base desires. Such is our nature, and such is the existing relation of things,

that virtue and happiness are both sacrificed by rebelling against the conscience and permitting the lower part of our nature to lord it over the higher. But our noblest impulses are all favorable to the admission of a God, and our accountability to a source immeasurably superior to any human authority. Atheism, so far as it dares, throws the whole weight of its influence to help on the inferior part of our nature. By waging war with our best impulses, and not heeding the voice of conscience when it speaks of accountability to a divine being, it weakens beyond description the moral power to be virtuous. An atheistical heart is the hot-bed of all vice. Human law can only suppress the outward developments of those sins more immediately dangerous to society. What, then, is the mischief engendered in the community when no fear of God exists to stop the deep under-currents of sin?

But consider atheism in its relation to the future. Either all the enjoyments of the atheist are with the body, to be buried in the grave, or, if there is a future life in reserve for him, he has no reason to believe it will be any better or so good as the present life. He takes, as a celebrated infidel once expressed, *a leap in the dark*; and how does he know but that he may be as likely to jump into misery as into nothingness? What argument can he offer to show that, if eternal oblivion is not his portion after death, it may not be an existence combining worse elements of wretchedness than the present? If the atheist instinctively shrinks from the death of the brute, and, like Milton's fallen angels, would desire an existence even of pain to eternal nothingness, what kind of existence in the future has he to offer? With the denial of the first truth of natural and revealed theology, what are the hopes of the atheist after death? Shutting out from his mind Christ, the great medium of redemption, and absolving himself from the sacred restraints of Christianity, the atheist adds to the hopelessness of his state by extinguishing even the torch of nature. Thus, atheism, if true, is so gloomy and repulsive that its admission involves in a worse than Egyptian darkness the world. If atheism derides the restraints of

religion, it has none of its elevating tendencies or hopes. Atheism avoids the future, for the future is cheerless and uncertain. Beyond this world all is doubt. The present life is, then, the only sphere of action that the atheist loves to contemplate. Man's vision is contracted to the few short years of his mortal existence. But does the atheist imagine that, by shutting out from the mind every beam of immortality, he makes happier or better this world? Does he dream that, when he has enthroned in the heart the poor idols of time, he has retrieved the losses of eternity? If the atheist has made out religion a fiction, and a personal God a delusion, has he conferred any real favor upon man? Is it not true, the more contracted our hopes the less noble our conduct? Does the atheist imagine the good have any thanks for a system that makes the present hour alone valuable and extinguishes the bright hopes of the future?

But consider the condition of the atheist upon the supposition that there is a God. If atheism is *untrue*, then what follows? The existence of God reveals the great fact of his government, natural and moral. To learn what the government of God is, we have two books to consult,—nature and revelation. The first lesson we learn, as moral beings, is that the present life is one of trial under the government of God. Here upon this earth are we placed, with duties to perform and sins to resist. Here are we tempted, and yet not compelled into sin; allured to virtue, but not forced into it. There are certain actions that human and divine law combine to deter us from committing, while there are other deeds the performance of which secures the approval of the divine law and our conscience. Against the more atrocious developments of sin the laws of God and man are arrayed, while with every impure desire or wrong purpose there is made known the opposition of the will of God. Those sins that cannot be reached by human government are all condemned by divine law. Thus, even the atheist finds in his own experience that the sanctions of human and divine law are upon him.

In this world for some sins the divine government pecu-

liarily manifests its indignation. In the very constitution of man God writes the impress of his authority. Let a person give himself up to strong drink, or the control of impure passion, and even upon the body are inscribed the characters of divine indignation. Let a person habitually foster in himself anger, or malice, or envy, or fraud, and it will not be long before even the body will reveal the injury done to the soul. Here, then, we see sensuality and intemperance writing in lineaments of wrath their impress upon the form of man. Here we see the baser passions of our nature inscribing their fatal mark upon the soul and body of man.

Why, then, is the whole course of nature so hostile to sin and so friendly to virtue? Why does our constitution thus reveal the misery of sin? With the evidence of God, is there not made known his moral government? Consider that the government of God is uniformly upon the side of virtue: it is based upon those principles that, acted out, secure the highest welfare of every person. Thus, the laws of God disapprove of all sin and approve of all virtue,—they demand the performance of those duties that involve in them the noblest blessings. If justice is an essential feature of God's government, so is benevolence. Who but God instituted that system of things by which one kind of action promotes our welfare while another results in our wretchedness? Here, then, we see the truth revealed of a probationary state, and that the divine purposes are tending to some higher consummation, where there is to be the revelation more perfectly of God's dealings with mankind.

Another feature of God's government is, that it holds all mankind accountable for their conduct. Law implies subjects. All being under the government of God are bound to obey his will.

Revelation makes known the great fact that the government of God over man includes not only the present life, but also the future,—that this world is only a rude stage of existence, where are cultivated those plants that must have another sphere of being to reach their maturity of sin or virtue. The existence of God, with the clear intimations of his will in na-

ture and revelation, show us a boundless future beyond the grave, an illimitable expanse of time, where thought, feeling, and perception continue,—where the soul will look back upon the associations and scenes of time, even as the mariner upon the ocean observes upon the far-distant sea the dim outlines of the land no longer to be visited as his home or the nursery of his infant years. Thus, God's government in relation to man has in it progressive stages of development, so that what now is dark will in the future become clear, and what now is unknown will by creatures be understood, so that the apparent irregularities with the evils sin has introduced into the world will hereafter find an explanation such as shall remove all doubt of the goodness of God.

Another indication of the moral government of God is, that there actually does exist in harmony with that government a system of redemption by Christ. We live under the strange anomaly of grace and law, of a system comprehending the most perfect justice and at the same time the most unlimited mercy,—a system where divine law for a short time stands in abeyance, while infinite love, through the mediation of Christ, works its miracles of salvation for redeemed sinners. To deny the fact of God's existence, and consequently his government, under a system of law, would be far more excusable than to deny them under a system of grace. If atheism under the former would reveal neither reason nor wisdom, what shall be said of atheism under the latter? The real sin lies not so much in the mind that pretends to believe there is no good evidence of God's existence, as in the heart that wishes it to be so. It is an indication not so much of want of intellect as want of all good sensibility to the grandest of truths and the best of beings. How slender is the argument necessary to induce a man to embark his fortune in an enterprise where nothing can be lost by the venture, but everything may be gained! But the atheist reverses this rule of wisdom: he ventures his all where nothing is gained if there is no God, and everything is lost if there is. The atheist increases his condemnation by presuming upon such a course

under an economy of grace. While atheistical in heart, grace can be no grace to him,—the golden hours of probation in respect to salvation are nothing to him,—angels of love inviting to a fairer world can be no angels to him,—ministers of affection standing by his sleeping couch, or present in the sweet retirement of home, can avail nothing for him; with the denial of God he cuts himself aloof from all those influences that would otherwise lead him to heaven. When he looks upon nature, with her endless diversities of form, he looks upon a blank, a causeless something with no intelligent author; when he surveys the heavens, he recognizes only an unmeaning law, or a blind chance; all creation is open for inspection, but its great Author is denied. The Being who paints the flower of the field or the rainbow that arches the sky, or gives music to the bird that warbles, or strength and intelligence to man, is forgotten.

To see more clearly the real nature of atheism, let us contrast it in its influence with Christianity. It is not our object to speak of the truth of Christianity, or discuss the evidences of its divine origin. We only purpose to portray it in its influence upon mankind. Atheism comes professedly to deliver the mind from the shackles of Christianity. To believe in the God of revelation would be to deny itself. To admit a God would be to admit the duties we owe to him, and all the sanctions of his moral government; but if there is no God, then Christianity is a fable, and the sanctions of religion are unfounded. In what respect, then, is atheism better than Christianity? Here are the ills of life, with their inevitable attendants. Here come death and sickness, and poverty and hunger and want, all the wretchedness of crime and the pains of dissipation and folly: these things do exist in the world. Two different schemes are presented to remedy the evils of the present life—atheism and Christianity; each as diverse as light and darkness. In what respect does atheism remedy the ills of life, or give the assurance of a better state beyond the grave? No rule of judgment more correct than that based upon the influence exerted. Atheism says there is no God, consequently there is no Saviour for sinners, no

immortality of blessedness as made known is revelation for the believing in Christ; atheism at the best can offer nothing beyond the grave but a condition like that of the present life, and that even it cannot make certain by a single argument. It must of necessity, therefore, limit its promises and hopes to the present world. What does it offer? By removing all the restraints of the future it shuts up the mind only to the enjoyments of the present hour. What does it offer for that hour? What the paradise it makes out of this life?

Atheism has indeed its conventional rules, but all those rules it discards when opportunity gives impunity and license gratification. It forms for itself a code of laws, and the chief one upon the list is, your own pleasure is your highest law, and your only restraint should be the impossibility of gratification. Thus it embodies in itself, as its essential element, that which discards all moral obligation, or any rule of duty that depends upon the will of God and the best welfare of mankind. Examine, then, atheism in its influence upon the individual and upon society. One of the first things we learn in coming into the world is, that our own pleasure, to be innocent, must not be at the expense of the pleasure of others, and our own gratification, to be right, must never infringe upon the best interests of society. Christianity makes around each individual a circle, and says, beyond that circle you must not go, or you trespass upon the rights of your neighbor. To go without your circle is to exclude yourself from all the real pleasures of your circle, as well as do injury to others. Thus the chief element of Christianity is that of good restraint, because by it the individual and the community move in harmony, and by respecting the rights of each the interests of the whole are mutually promoted. What does atheism do? It breaks down that wall of self-protection that binds all society together with the cord of friendship and of love. By giving a license to the passions and appetites of our nature that Christianity condemns, by absolving the individual from holy restraints that the gospel approves of, it turns the individual loose upon the community, to be to society, wherever his own selfish interests may lead, its greatest

enemy. How then does atheism benefit the world? As far as it can go or it dares to go, it mocks at the wholesome restraints of religion, and makes no higher law to the individual than his private inclination. What of the sweets of life does it offer to society more than the religion of Christ? It is the glory of atheism to absolve the individual and society from those restraints that religion most earnestly seeks to impose. Its creed consists in no religion. Christ and God are names that atheism would obliterate from the memory of all, or only rehearse them to show its triumph over religion. After throwing the Bible into the fire, and stifling with its profane scoffs every aspiration of holiness,—after it makes itself an undisputed master of the cottage and the palace, and is the public guest of the nation and the idol of its warmest love, what are the rewards it bestows, what the substitute it offers for the hopes of the gospel?

When atheism had one triumph in France, what did it do? It secured the national divorcement of the people from the restraints of the Bible. It placed upon the throne the Goddess of Reason, and made all Paris ring with its hymn of triumph over the death of Christianity. But anarchy and ruin followed in the rear of its track,—the guillotine drank up the best blood of the nation,—personal property and life every day were endangered, and the sword of atheism, in a few short years, devoured three millions of the people. Equality, fraternity, and liberty were the only trinity adored; but no heathen temple could reveal three gods more vile or more cruel. The equality of atheism aimed to obliterate the just distinctions of society that alone preserved it from stagnation,—its fraternity attempted to bind, by the coercion of physical force, those diverse orders of mankind in unison whose hearts alone could be reached by moral renovation,—its liberty was but another name for passion uncontrolled by those good influences that give to freedom its only value. Thus did atheism show itself when it had a fair opportunity; and who would wish to see repeated like scenes of its victory?

But atheism, in doing away with the laws of God, tends di-

rectly to do away with parental and civil law; its code of morality is so corrupt that it does not offer to society a single support. By removing the highest restraint upon vice it suffers it to roam at large, until it becomes so formidable that it even welcomes as a self-protection the greatest absurdities of superstition. Atheism, having nothing to recommend it, seeks to pass itself off under the guise of something that is better, and is never more ill at ease than when it finds itself stripped of the garment of false religion, that it assumes to enable it more effectually to make its thrusts at that religion which is true. Atheism destroys those generous emotions that lead to self-sacrifice for the general good. It freezes up the purest sensibilities and the noblest sympathies of our nature. By introducing as the only standard of conduct its mercenary code of selfishness, it effectually suppresses all the promptings of virtue and of disinterested affection. Having converted the belief of God into a fable, and the atoning love of Christ into a device of superstition, it destroys, with the highest check upon vice, the loftiest hopes of man. Possessing in itself no intrinsic merit, giving no good support to society or security to domestic purity, it wanders over the earth with the mark of Cain upon its forehead, and all the wretchedness of the first murderer in its heart.

No thanks to atheism for those checks that God, in mercy, has placed upon its progress,—no thanks to it for that law of self-preservation that makes even the most corrupt to shudder with the good at the contemplation of its prospective triumphs. Well may mothers weep, and children, abandoned, cry, and the aged and oppressed groan in despair, when atheism walks with bold and merciless visage in their midst! Well may nature clothe herself in a robe of darkness, and throw over all her scenes of loveliness and beauty a drapery of mourning, when atheism sits upon the world's throne, and sings his bloody hymn of victory over the death and burial of Christianity!



REVEALED THEOLOGY.

(259)

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CHAPTER I.

NECESSITY OF A REVELATION FROM GOD.

THE foundation of all our reasoning upon the evidences of Christianity rests upon the admission of three truths, established by the light of nature,—God, Conscience, and Man a sinner, responsible and free.

We enter now upon the discussion of the great questions :

Is the Bible a revelation, in *any sense*, of the mind and will of God ?

Were the writers of the Bible inspired by God, and *how* inspired ?

Have we, in the Old and New Testaments, a clear exhibition of the mind, character, purposes, and feelings of God toward man ?

Is not the Bible, in the *highest sense*, a supreme authority for human conduct ?

What is the proof of the *Divine Mission* of Christ, and what its necessity ?

If, in reply to these questions, it is shown that the Bible is from God, then it must be infinitely superior to any human production, as making known God's will, and it must have the sanctions of its great Author, demanding our faith and obedience. But if the Bible has only a human origin, then it must have only a human authority, and consequently our obligation to believe and obey it must be measured by a human standard. As the words of God are infinitely superior in dignity to the words of man, so also, if the Bible contains only the words of man, is *not inspired*, then must it be as in-

ferior in worth to an inspired production as man himself is inferior to God.

A revelation from God is necessary for us, not only because we are sinners, and need every favorable influence to lead us in the right way, but especially because the light of nature has failed to guide men aright. Now, God has a right to speak to us in the way he thinks best. The question for us to consider is simply one of fact: Has God spoken to us? We cannot prescribe to God the mode of the divine communications. It is not for us to say how God shall speak to us, or when he shall thus do. God may not choose to reveal to us all the reasons of his conduct. The infidel objects to the Christian scheme because it is a revelation given to us, not at once, but at different periods of the world; but, unless this was most pleasing to God, he would not have resorted to it. He objects that an obscure nation of Jews was the chosen depository of the divine messages to man, but God has a right to select whom he pleases for such a work. He objects to the difficulties of revelation, but he might as well object to the difficulties of nature. He objects to the mysteries of the gospel, but there are other mysteries in the world besides those of revelation. He objects to many things incomprehensible in the Bible, but his objection is equally valid against the incomprehensible of his own body. We might go on to speak of many other objections, but it is not necessary here. Our object is only to establish the proposition that whoever admits the existence of God must also admit his right to give a revelation of his will in the way and time most pleasing to him. The question for us to settle is simply a question of fact.

The Scriptures come to us as the word of God; they profess to be divinely inspired and a revelation of his will. Are they what they profess? In deciding upon this question, there is one uniform law of belief that is never to be forgotten. This law is, that we are authorized to believe in anything when the reasons for belief are greater than the reasons for unbelief. Thus, we credit testimony just in proportion to the evidence existing. By a law of our minds we

are authorized to believe whenever the evidence for a thing is greater than the evidence against it. The question is not so much the degree of evidence that the Bible is the word of God, as is there any evidence at all that it is such? Before we are authorized to reject it as a divine revelation, we must show that there is greater evidence that it is not such, than that it does come from God. It is not for us to prescribe to God how much evidence he must give us to show the Bible divine. Our only course is to take the revelation, as it comes to us, and examine its credentials. It may have great or small credentials, few or many, but if the word of God has any credentials, we are to receive it, so long as no evidence exists to the contrary. Here is the stumbling-block with many in receiving the Bible as the word of God. They prescribe to God just the evidence he must give, and if their standard is not reached they reject the Bible; they say we must have evidence as demonstrative as mathematical evidence; they say such objections in respect to style or historic narrations of Jewish customs, battles, manners, or language, must be fully cleared up to their satisfaction before they receive the Bible as the word of God. All such reasoning is alike irreverent and out of place. We have no more right to prescribe to God the exact mode or degree of revelation than we have the matter of it. This is the business alone of the author of revelation and does not concern those who receive it.

Whether God's revelation comes to us with a high or low degree of evidence, whether its mode suits our feelings or not, are questions that are not to influence us to the rejection of the word of God. Our simple business is, to see if we can offset with our evidences, the evidences of Christianity. If the evidences of Christianity excel ever so little the evidences against it, it is reasonable in us to believe in the Bible. Thus, taking a position the most favorable for the unbeliever, it can be shown that thousands receive the Bible, and yet they may give vastly less proof of it than what really exists. Here consists the great error of infidelity. It imagines that, by raising difficulties in the Bible and apparent inconsistencies, the Bible can be disproved. But the real question is,

Does *any evidence* exist that the Bible is the word of God? If so, that evidence must be disproved before it can be denied that the Bible comes from God. If the Bible had but a thousandth part of its present evidence, yet that evidence existing would sanction belief. If we can clear up the difficulties of the infidel, it is well; but if we cannot, his infidelity does not disprove the Bible. Are there not, however, multitudes, because of some specious objection, or some verbal inaccuracy, who throw away the Bible? They wait not for infidelity to prove miracles and prophecy false and the thousand internal evidences of the Bible,—they willingly suffer the whole to be condemned because of those few difficulties which they cannot master. Suppose, for argument, the objector to prove out one chapter or book uninspired, he has yet, step by step, to prove out every chapter and book of revelation uninspired; suppose him to prove that the evidence of the Bible as the word of God is small, he has yet to prove, before with reason it can be rejected, that there is no evidence whatever, great or small, that the Bible is the word of God. All this he must do before he can be entitled to confidence. Should God choose to give us little evidence of a divine revelation, then we ought to receive that evidence and make the most of it. Evidence is evidence, be it small or great, and with no higher evidence to offset it the part of reason and good judgment is to receive it.

Having established the proposition that we are bound to believe in all evidence whatever, in proportion to its value and truth, and that no evidence, if good, is to be rejected, even if small, we will consider the great question of the necessity of a revelation from God. If the Bible is not necessary for us,—if it is useless as it concerns our best interests, there is a high presumption against its being the word of God. If we do not need a revelation from God it is reasonable to believe that God, who does nothing uselessly, will not give us a revelation. On the other hand, if we do need a revelation from God to make us better and happier,—if it would advance our best interests for this life and the life to come to have a divine communication from God, then it is

probable that God will give us a revelation to guide, enlighten, and save. To determine the probability of a revelation from God, from its necessity, we are to consider three subjects: God, conscience, and the history of the human race. First, let us consider God. His existence is admitted: then, in power, he must be infinite; consequently he can give a revelation with its credentials, when and as he pleases. But God is also admitted to be just: then, if there is any way by which that justice can be sustained and sinners saved, it is highly probable he will make it known. But God is admitted to be good: then, if benevolent, it is probable he will reveal that which may bless mankind. Here, then, is God, powerful, just, and good. Is this truth admitted? Where, then, the improbability that he would give, if needed, a revelation?

Thus, so far as God is concerned, we cannot say a revelation from him is impossible or improbable. Look to the conscience and man's history to see if it is not necessary. Consider the conscience, can it be hardened, or blinded, or made treacherous, or unfaithful? Can the moral nature be so perverted as to call evil good, and good evil? To answer this question we point to facts. The world is full of blind, hard, and unfaithful consciences. What one thinks is duty, another thinks is a crime. The Hindoo believes in self-immolation; the Chinese think infanticide meritorious. The heathen moralist glories in suicide, and the worst excesses of impure passion by the pagan are justified as most honorable to the Deity. A wrong conscience is the parent of the worst deeds of fanaticism, and the constant annoyance of all civil legislation. A perverted conscience is the source of all religious delusion, even as it is of cruel bigotry. Before the assassin plunges the dagger into the heart of his victim he will offer a prayer to the Virgin Mary, if not unto God, and the darkest atrocities of superstition must first be made justifiable by the verdict of an unfaithful conscience. Thus do we find the strangest inconsistencies approved of by the conscience, and the very thing one person believes true or virtuous, another condemns as false and vicious. If thus the conscience, which

God has given to us, is so perverted, does it not need a divine revelation to guide it? Is there not necessary, in order to correct this ever-changing needle, some infallible standard of right conduct? If conscience is all we want to guide us right, why does it not thus do? Is it possible, or probable, admitting the goodness of God and his desire to save sinners, that he would leave the human family alone to so treacherous a pilot? No matter if we exclusively are to blame for the abuse of conscience, the fact, wide as the world, exists of its perverted movements. What more probable than that at some time a better guide might be given?

But there are other reasons why a revelation from God is most needful. Consider human experience in past history. If the deists think they can get along very well without a revelation from God, the greatest geniuses and most gifted minds of antiquity did not think so. They deplored the wretched state of things, and most fervently prayed for a purer light, and better guide. They did not consider nature's light enough, rather they felt like blind men groping their way over mountains of danger. Plato tells us, "We know not of ourselves what worship to pay to God, or what petitions to offer. We must expect a lawgiver from heaven to instruct us; and oh, how I long to see that man, and who he is! he must be of a nature superior to man's (*i.e.* divine), because of the unwillingness of men to be guided except by superiors. He must be a mediator."

Socrates, as revealing the prevailing darkness in respect to a future state, said a short time before his death, "I hope I go to good men, but this I do not affirm. I am going out of the world, you remain; which is better is known to God."

In the well-known dialogue between Socrates and Alcibiades, on the duties of religious worship, Alcibiades is going to the temple to pray; Socrates meets him and dissuades him from prayer on account of his inability to manage the duty aright. "To me," he says, "it seems best to be quiet; it is necessary to wait till you learn how you ought to behave towards the gods and towards man." "And when,

O Socrates! shall that time be, and who will instruct me?" says the wondering disciple, "for gladly would I see this man who he is." "He is one," replied Socrates, "who cares for you; but, as Homer represents Minerva taking away the darkness from the eyes of Diomedes that he may distinguish a god from a man, so it is necessary that he should first take away the darkness from your mind, and then bring near those things by which you shall know good and evil." "Let him take away," rejoins Alcibiades, "if he will, the darkness or any other thing, for I am prepared to decline none of those things which are commanded by him, whoever this man is, if I shall be made better."

Plato, speaking of human nature, says, "I have heard from the wise men that we are now dead and the body is our sepulcher."* Again he says, "The prime evil is inborn in souls; it is implanted in men to sin."† Again, "The nature of mankind is greatly degenerated and depraved; all manner of disorders infest human nature, and men, being impotent, are torn in pieces by their lusts as by so many wild horses."‡ He also speaks of an "evil nature," "an evil in nature," "a disease in nature," "a destruction of harmony in the soul." Tracing the origin of this diseased state, he says, "That in times past the divine nature flourished in men; but, at length, being mixed with mortal custom, it fell into ruin; hence an inundation of evils in the race."§ Again, "The cause of corruption is from our parents, so that we never relinquish their evil way, or escape the blemish of their evil habit."|| Also, "That after the golden age the universe, by reason of that confusion that came upon it, would have been quite dissolved had not God again taken it upon him to sit at the helm and govern the world, and restore its disordered and almost disjointed parts to their primeval order."¶

Seneca speaks quite despairingly of our possible recovery by any means. He says, "Our corrupt nature has drunk in

* Gorgias, fol. 493.

‡ Critias, p. 400.

† Leg. p. 731.

|| Timæus, 103.

‡ Politicus, p. 274.

¶ Politicus, 251.

such deep draughts of iniquity, which are so far incorporated in its very bowels that you cannot remove it save by tearing them out." And yet he conceives, in the faintest manner, some possibility of supernatural aid. "No man is able to clear himself; let some one give him a hand; let some one lead him out."* He also says, as if he were writing out another VIIth chapter of the Romans, "What is it, Lucilius, that, when we set ourselves in one way, draws us another, and when we desire to avoid any course, drives us into it? What is it that so wrestles with our mind, allowing us never to settle any good resolution once for all?"†

Ovid also joins in the same confession. "If I could I would be more sane. But some unknown force drags me against my will. Desire draws me one way, conviction another. I see the better and approve, the worse I follow."‡

Thus also Xenophanes closes off his work on nature in these words: "No man has discovered any certainty, nor will discover it, concerning the gods, and what I say of the universe. For if he uttered what is even more perfect, still he does not know it, but conjecture hangs over all."

Pliny, confessing the wretched hunger of his soul, saw no relief to it better than suicide. "It is difficult," he writes, "to say whether it might not be better for men to be wholly without religion than to have one of this kind [viz. that of his country], which is a reproach to its object. The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him also to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions, he is the most wretched of creatures, since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature; man is full of desires and wants that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. Among these so great evils, the best thing God has bestowed on man is the power to take his own life."§

Clement, the Roman, tells us how he was harassed from childhood by questions which paganism could not help him

* Ep. 52. † Ep. 52. ‡ Metam. vii. 18. § Hist. Nat., lib. vii.

to answer: such as relate to his being and immortality, the origin of the world and its continuance, when it began, when it will end, and whither his present life is to carry him. "Incessantly haunted," he says, "by such thoughts as these, which came I knew not whence, I was sorely troubled, so that I grew pale and emaciated. . . . I resorted to the schools of the philosophers, hoping to find some certain foundation. I saw nothing but the piling up and tearing down of theories. Thus was I driven to and fro by the different representations, and forced to conclude that things appear not as they are in themselves, but as they happen to be presented on this or that side. I was made dizzy than ever, and from the bottom of my heart sighed for deliverance."*

Such is nature's longing for something greater than nature's light. To see the necessity of a divine revelation, we have only to look to ancient and modern paganism. The question is not what natural religion can do, but what it has done. Has it made clear the unity of God? Look to the innumerable idols adored of heathen lands! Has it made manifest the moral perfections of God? Look to the idol gods where Christianity does not exist! What their character! Who knows not, that has made himself acquainted with their history, that they personified every vice most degrading to humanity? Has natural religion given any consistent ideas of a future state? Look to the sensual paradise of Mohammed, the elysium for heroes of the Greek and Roman mythologist? Look to the Druids' home for warriors, and the bloody hall of Odin! Has natural religion established a good code of morals? Consult the heathen bible for the virtues of humility, of disinterested benevolence, of supreme love to God! Has it defined the nature of virtue? Look to the innumerable speculations of pagan writers! Amid uncertainty so great, how needful a divine revelation!

The world has had a fair experiment of what it could and would do without it. As age after age rolled on, every form

* Neander's Hist., vol. i. pp. 32, 33.

of superstition was tried, and every device of man had an opportunity for development. But how melancholy the record of history! The great empires of the earth rose and fell, and nation and individual evinced no self-restoring power. In the deepest darkness of mind millions went to the grave; but the grave itself was not so gloomy as those living waves of spiritual death that rolled their dark waters over the hopeless fabrics of human science and learning. Philosophy tried her utmost; and there arose in the academy giants in intellect, but they resembled only the lurid flashes of the thunder-storm that but revealed more vividly the surrounding darkness. Legislation and civil power tried their utmost to stem the tide of human corruption. Dreading the mischief of atheism, and the passions unrestrained, the lovers of humanity, appealing to the religious principle of our natures, enthroned superstition in marble palaces, and gave to idol worship the great seal of state; but religion itself became corrupt as the grave, and virtue expired upon the sacrificial altar. Then came the appeal to the love of the beautiful, and humanity was tried to see if beauty and goodness would coalesce. Painting and statuary, such as man never had seen, adorned the temples of Athens, and Corinth and Rome became majestic with those famed structures of art that every succeeding age has only imitated to fail in. But the beautiful neither explained virtue nor enforced it, it gave no better idea of God, and the golden age of beauty and art did but reveal a deeper abyss of human corruption and helplessness. The temple to the unknown God was the only temple destitute of a worshiper, and the highest age of civilization, even as the darkest abode of savage existence, all proclaimed the necessity of a revelation from God.

But to see in the clearest light the absolute need for man's highest welfare that God should give a revelation, let us interrogate the oracles of natural religion to see if there is a satisfactory explanation to the question, the most important that man can ask, How can man be just with God?

It is the peculiar glory of the Gospel of Christ to answer

this question, and enforce, by every variety of illustration, the divinely instituted remedy for sinners. The question before us to consider is, Does natural religion explain and make intelligent an effectual remedy for sin? Does the light of nature show how man can be just with God? To show most clearly the necessity of a revelation from God, we are not compelled to prove that the light of nature in no sense can make known an atonement for sin. Even admitting that there could be some intimations of the mode by which God may be just and yet save sinners, yet the great difficulty to be met is,—has, as a matter of fact, natural religion in any true sense made intelligent and satisfactory to the mind a mode by which a just God in consistency with his law can pardon and save sinners? *If so*, then we believe one great design of a revelation from God is useless; *but if not so*, then we have the highest possible evidence of our need of a divine revelation. It is not necessary to enter into the intricacies of the question, what, on this subject, natural religion may reveal. We intend to wander into no speculations upon this point, but to confine our remarks to fact, and fact alone. But in reasoning upon facts, two important ways are needful to arrive at a right decision. First, arguments adduced from admitted principles, which, in themselves, are facts,—then a consultation of history of what has actually taken place. By this course, we have two chains to strengthen our argument,—right theory, and the results of that theory. A physician, in prescribing for his patient, must have a correct theory in his mind of the nature and cause of the supposed disease, and then he must know, to a good extent, what is actually the disease. His correct theory will tell him what medicine to give, and his knowledge of the actual state of the disease, when to give the medicine. In the same manner are we to investigate the question, How can we from the light of nature learn? How can man be just with God? The necessity of a revelation from God is evident in other important respects. Great and many are the reasons why we should welcome it, apart from its wonderful disclosure of the only way a sinner can be saved; but here peculiarly we would rest

our argument for the absolute need of the Bible that brings life and immortality to light.

God, conscience, and man a sinner, are admitted : natural religion shows as much as this. How are we from these truths to arrive at the result that God can pardon the sinner, and will do it? Let it be remembered we now are to shut our Bibles, and go to work without the light that comes to us from the sacred page, to show how God can or will pardon and save a rebel against his law. It is confessed that God is just, but the first principle of justice is to punish sin ; but if God is just, he must have a just law. What, then, is the voice of divine law? Does it not pronounce punishment to the sinner? Does it not give a reward to the obedient? What is our first idea of human law? Is it not a command with a penalty attached for disobedience? But is that penalty repentance? Is repentance the punishment threatened the violator of human law? Is contrition for sin and amendment for life the penalty denounced by human tribunals against those who transgress the law of the state? Certainly not. For no human government could stand a day with law sustained by such terms. But is advice the penalty of human law? When a thief steals our property, or an assassin murders a citizen of a state, and before the legal tribunal is convicted of the same, is the penalty for his transgression advice? Are they told to do better for the future, not again to transgress the law, and then dismissed to their former state of freedom? But what law upon such a condition could command respect or have any existence? Our idea of law is evil or punishment inflicted upon its violation. Repentance and advice have nothing to do with law. Law does not recognize such language as appropriate penalties. As repentance or advice cannot wipe away sin, so are they equally ineffectual to sustain the sanctions of human authority. But what is true of the law of man, must, for the same reason, be true of divine law. It is no more sensible to disrobe the law of God of its penalty, than human law. If the law of man could not exist with no penalty, equally true divine law could not. If we would consider human government as a mockery,

with no penalty for disobedience than repentance and advice, even so must we look upon divine government. There must be, with the one as with the other, punishment for disobedience. But if that government, be it human or divine, is just, then the lawgiver, for the same reason he rewards the obedient, must inflict punishment on the disobedient. But there is a higher argument for this in conscience. What does conscience say? Is not the first lesson she teaches us the lesson that sin deserves punishment? Does she not condemn us for sin? Does she say to the sinner, You may defraud, or commit perjury, or violence upon the person of your neighbor, if you but repent of it? Are good advice and repentance the penalties she attaches to sin? Certainly not. Conscience shows us our sins and their desert of punishment, and there she stops. She can go no farther than denounce sin, and with the verdict she pronounces, if guilty, give to it a present punishment, even as a gloomy foreboding of future evil.

Look, then, to the sinner as self-condemned by his own conscience. What does the light of nature teach him as a remedy for his sin? Is it repentance? But still the sinner asks the question, How can this save me under a just God? Still the sinner instinctively interrogates his conscience, How would it do for a human law to have such a penalty for transgression? Still he asks the question, Provided God did save from punishment upon such a condition, what is to become of his law? what of respect for his authority? We ask nature, and seek for all the light she can bring us from natural religion, to extricate us from this difficulty. We demand something to satisfy our minds, to appease the reproaches of conscience, sensible of sin and a violation of God's law, that must demand a perfect obedience. As we have no divine revelation to go to, showing to us a crucified Saviour offered to the acceptance and salvation of all upon faith and love, we wish, shut up alone to the Book of Nature, to have natural religion teach us the great truth of an atonement for sin. We have already come to the conclusion that repentance, or

good resolutions, or any effort for future obedience, cannot save us guilty.

We have decided that if human law cannot be sustained by such sanctions, certainly divine law cannot. If God is just, then the more just the more certain the penalty of punishment. We wish now to know from nature's light our remedy. We wish to solve the greatest of difficulties,—a just God and a sinner saved. No such mysterious anomaly as this can we find in human government. She utters no other voice than, *Obey or be punished*. No light does conscience throw upon this question. With tenfold energy she reiterates the voice of law, *Obey or be punished*. Again do we interrogate nature. We ask, How may we be saved from sin? The response comes back to us, cheerless as the grave, *Obey or be punished*. Here we are in a worse than Egyptian darkness; but the instinct of preservation will catch at every straw that floats upon the troubled sea of human existence. Our theory gives us no hope; its conclusions, from admitted principles, irresistible, reveal no remedy: as a last resort we turn to the history of man as actually revealed. The question now is, Is there, throwing theory away, any clearly revealed remedy for sin in nature's works or in the facts of human history? Remember, we are not to bring in revelation to help us out of our difficulty. The question is, Can we get out of it without revelation?

By one process of argument I have shown we cannot; I am now to resort to another kind of argument, drawn from existing facts in the works of nature and man's history. The doctrine of revelation is, that Christ, being a *divine and perfect substitute* for sin, has sustained the claims of justice violated, and made it consistent with God to save the sinner in harmony with a perfect moral law. In other words, it points out a way by which the law can be honored and yet the sinner saved. The question is, Can we find out from nature's works and the history of man a remedy for sin? Is there an intelligible and clear mode made known, except in revelation, of the way in which a sinner, in consistency with a just law, can be saved? We will give the widest latitude of

range, the most liberal concession to the inquirer after the solution of this great problem of human destiny without revelation. We will say, You may go wherever your reason or imagination may lead you to find out how a sinner, under a perfect moral government, can be saved in consistency with divine law. Where can a divine substitute for sin be found? Search the records of nature. Let the inquirer have, as far as possible, the benefit of the argument derived from the principle of substitution seen in the violation of natural law, by which we see where a bone is broken, or the flesh cut, or the human system prostrated by disease, that nature, by a mysterious power, exerts herself to repair the mischief occasioned. Let the most be made out of the principle of substitution seen in human life, where a mother saves by her own pains the life of her son, or a father wears himself with toil to provide for his family. Let us give due credit to the thousand instances of suffering for the benefit of others, and that mighty principle that runs through all society, of averting by others those evils that otherwise would fall upon ourselves. Here, indeed, is substitution of a certain nature seen. As a greater illustration of the principle of substitution, let the inquirer of nature point us to the sacrifices innumerable of mankind in all ages of bloody victims upon the altar to propitiate the favor or avert the anger of heathen divinities. And yet where do we find any satisfactory evidence of a substitute for sin of such a character as to avert from the sinner the punishment of sin? We see sin followed by punishment in this world; why may it not be in the future? When we have given the most favorable construction to a remedial system, existing to a limited extent, to avoid natural evil, what assurance have we from nature of a system of redemption for the lost sinner? After gleaning up all the favorable evidences we can to throw light upon the problem, How can God be just and the sinner saved? how much is the darkness removed? Search the world over with no Bible, and to what is the sinner directed as a ground of hope that he may be saved? We have already seen that we cannot look to repentance as a valid foundation to rest upon.

We must look to some principle of substitution, some person who can bear our sins and sustain himself a broken law. But we wish to find out where that substitution is in nature, and the remedy for our wants that is presented. We certainly cannot delude ourselves with the idea that brute animals can save us from the punishment of sin. What value in their blood to avert the sword of divine justice? We cannot look to a mortal man like ourselves for a remedy; he cannot, as a sinner, save himself, much less save us. We cannot look for an atonement to the collective purity or goodness of any number of men, in any age or every age. No human goodness can cancel the sin of a single day, much less the sins of a whole life. Let us, then, search the world over to see if we can find a perfect being, one who never has sinned. I will suppose that such a spotless illustration of humanity has actually been found: I will suppose that one man, escaping every taint of corruption and as pure as Adam unfallen, has been discovered. Let us make him an atonement for our sins. But can we do it? He can save himself only when perfect in obeying divine law; as a subject of law, all he can do is to obey law. What works of supererogation has he to offset the sins of mankind? What can he do to avert from a single sinner the penalty of law? He can do nothing. We must go to a source higher even than law itself; we must mount to a height of dignity so lofty, that law, even like the clouds that encircle the earth, is transcended by the majestic summit that towers above in the heavens. Where does the light of nature show us such a substitute? Where, except in revelation, do we find the anomaly of God and man united,—of humanity to suffer for our sins, and divinity to honor the law? Where in nature do we find one person possessing traits so diverse and so peculiar, that every claim of the Godhead and yet every interest of man are blended together in harmony?

Here is conscience, in the heart of man, condemning for sin, but we ask in vain of her for a remedy. She shows us our ruin, but no way of escaping from it. Here is divine law speaking the same language that human law does,—that

repentance or future obedience is no atonement for sin. Here is man in his history, in every age, experiencing the evils of sin, and yet in vain striving to satisfy the claims of justice by the sacrifice of animals or the bodily tortures of self-immolation. Where, with no revelation to guide us, is the remedy for sin? We will consult the nations of antiquity. Upon the fertile plain of Dura, where the ancient Assyrian worshiped, is the temple of Babel,—long is that procession that ascends the steps of Babylon's great tower. Here are worshiped the sun, and moon, and stars; but in these heathen rites do we find a remedy for sin? Again, we visit the land of the ancient Canaanite, and see a ferocious multitude shouting at the infant cry that ascends from the bloody arms of Moloch. Is it here we find consolation for a troubled conscience? Now, in famed Ephesus, we view the great temple of Diana, the wonder of the world; but in the profane scenes there witnessed do we find a relief to the mind? Disgusted with the impure and cruel homage paid to idols, we turn to the schools of the philosophers and visit the quiet scenes of the Academy and the Porch. Here is the collected wisdom of the world; here the learned few come to speculate upon the mysterious problem of human destiny. We listen, with eager interest, to the sages of the old world,—but the first of all truths—of an Infinite God, the Creator of the universe from nothing—is not settled; all the boasted philosophy of centuries of learning commences in a fundamental error,—the denial of a Creator of matter and spirit. From nothing nothing can come, is that axiom of delusion that alike subverted the immortality of the soul and the infinite wisdom and power of one Supreme God.

We wish to find out the nature of virtue, but of the three hundred definitions given, not one includes humility or disinterested benevolence. We inquire, What is the chief end of man? The Epicurean places it in pleasure,—the Stoic, in the suppression of our natural sympathies. We ask for the evidence of a future state. The disciples of Pythagoras speak to us of the transmigration of souls into different animals, and those of Plato of the existence of souls

before the world. We ask, Who are the favored residents of heaven? and we are pointed to warriors whose fatal violence has desolated the earth, and made by revenge and craft unnumbered beings most miserable and degraded.

Bewildered amid contradictions so great, and errors so many, upon the plainest truths of Christianity, we try once more to see what light the famed seats of human learning and art could throw upon the most practical and most interesting of all questions, How can man be just with God? But, instead of one God of infinite, natural, and moral perfection, we are pointed to a thousand subordinate divinities, and we must first balance our accounts with them before even we may presume to think of the presiding deity of the pagan Pantheon; and then, when we have reached the last of the gods, what do we find? A being having no interest in his creatures, and so absorbed in himself as to leave to others the management of human affairs. But, worse than this, the very vices that conscience upbraids us for are deified in gods, not to worship which is a state offense. Need it be said that we may try in vain to find out anything upon the greatest of truths, when even the alphabet of a divine revelation is unknown?

Let us then interrogate every other religion but that of the Bible for an answer to the question, How shall man be just with God? We will leave the pagan rites of the South Sea Islander, and the dark atrocities of those cannibal superstitions that degrade the Malay and the Patagonian to the level of the brute; we will not rehearse the story of those Mexican priests whose temples, dedicated to the god of war and the hosts of heaven, struck terror in the heart of the stern Spaniard when he viewed the skulls of thousands of victims offered in bloody sacrifices to their sanguinary deities; we will go to those better religions, venerable for their existence through long centuries, and holding in their iron grasp millions of worshipers. But we appeal in vain for any light to show how, as sinners, we may be saved, to the devotees of the Grand Lama, or that vast empire of China whose only Bible consists in the principles of Confucius. We then turn to

Mohammedanism, stretching its gloomy sway over the fairest regions of Africa and the great continent of Asia; but the Koran gives to us a morality without love, and a religion without faith; propagated by the sword, it is no less cruel in its practice than corrupt in its rewards; offering no true atonement for sin, it gives no other pardon than a home for sensualists.

Finally, as a last resort, we will go to the evangelists of infidelity and read over the acts of the apostles of Deism. Perhaps these new lights can tell us something better than the Bible, and prove how useless to us is a revelation from God. But who of this Ishmael army of infidels shall be our authoritative standard of belief and practice? Shall we take Spinoza, or Strauss? But the one proves out the universe God, the other God is the universe. Shall we, flying from this German abyss of speculative nonsense, resort to the more intelligent epistles of Voltaire or Rousseau? But the former, fighting all his lifetime against religion, died in the arms of the Roman Catholic Church; and the other, a notorious debauchee, died, saying, "O God, I give thee my soul, pure and untainted as it came from thy hands!"

Shall we go to the English school of infidels? Lord Herbert declares lust and passion no more blameworthy than thirst and hunger. Hobbes denied any real distinction between right and wrong. Lord Bolingbroke placed the chief happiness of man in the gratification of the sensual nature. Hume declared self-denial and humility positive vices. If the first principles of morality are denied, who among these Ishmaelites of absurd confusion, can tell us how a just God can pardon a sinner?

We are driven to revelation alone for an answer to this question. There and there only is the great problem of human destiny solved; and if we find it not there we find it in no other place.

Here do we take our stand, and show, by an argument that must be irresistible to every reasoning, upright mind, the infinite necessity of a revelation from God,—a necessity based upon the deepest wants of our nature,—a necessity so

great that, if revelation is not true, there is not one ray of light to cheer the wretched family of man,—a necessity such as our nature, spiritual and immortal, must, if it ever does awake to its destitution, feel too mighty for language to describe,—a necessity so commanding, that it would be high treason to God to disavow, and an act of perjury to conscience to deny.

What, then, is the gospel remedy for sin? How does it teach justification with God? All is summed up in the words, “Where sin hath abounded, grace doth much more abound.” The advent, life, death, and resurrection of Christ have introduced us into an economy of grace. Law is sustained by the great Mediator; justice is satisfied. The sinner is saved not because he comes up to that which the law demands, but simply that he fulfills the conditions of grace. The language of law is, *Do and live*; of grace, *Live and do*. Law says, *Obey perfectly, and you shall be saved*; grace says, *Believe in Christ, and you shall be saved*. The obedience of the one is legal; of the other, evangelical. The obedience of the law is alike impossible and hopeless. Try ever so hard, and you come short of it. Go through with self-inflicted tortures, but these do not save. Make the most of your merits and good works, but they cannot come up to the standard of divine law. But salvation by grace honors the law, because it secures what the law does not,—the obedience of love. Our sins had dug for us a gulf fathomless in wretchedness; they had erected a wall of separation between us and God, high as heaven and deep as perdition; but the vicarious sacrifice of Christ bridges over that gulf, surmounts that wall, gives to us an open communication with heaven. The mystery of the cross angels desire to look into, for the cross averts from our heads the sword of justice, bids the trembling sinner hope even unto the end, banishes from the soul despair, assures him that justification, impossible by law, is possible by Christ, and bids him seize the outstretched hand of the angel of hope, and, from the deepest hell of his own corruptions, to ascend up to the highest heaven of God’s love.

CHAPTER II.

CHRIST.

THE birth, life, death, and resurrection of Christ are the foundation of all revelation ; consequently the all-important question at once presents itself to the mind, Is Christ that which he professes himself to be? Is he the Son of God? Does he truly establish his claims to be heard and obeyed by works that prove him to be all that the Bible asserts?

First, consider, is Christ merely a fiction of the imagination, a brilliant idea of an unreal personage got up by enthusiasts or intentional deceivers? There have been those who have thought thus,—some, who have contrived to force themselves into the belief that Christ was not an actual person as delineated, but one invented by the mind for a certain end. Suppose, then, to prove a real Christ appearing in the world at the commencement of the Christian era, we follow the stream of time back, so that we may have as near a view as possible of the divine author of Christianity. We will go to the most reliable sources, and from them find out the solution to a question of vast interest, Was Christ a fiction or a reality, a person or a painting?

Nero's persecution of the Christians took place in the sixty-fourth and sixty-fifth years of our era. The execution of Christ by Pilate occurred about thirty-five years previously. As Bayne, in his work on the testimony of Christ to Christianity, has well said: "This Christ, who was honored in Rome in a manner so transcendent, in a manner which, on the showing of Tacitus, resembled the honor paid to a God, had lived only so long before. Whatever time is required to account for the phenomenon of Christ's worship on such a scale and with such an intensity, is rigidly confined within thirty-five years. If legend was accumulated; if incident

was exaggerated; if fable was invented; if a real individual was invested with a garment of myth; if the popular imagination surrounded him with a halo, and magnified him into a divinity; if enthusiasm contributed its colored fancies, fanaticism its distempered heat, and superstition its darker imagery,—the whole work had to be done in little more than the number of years which now, in 1862, have elapsed since the death of Walter Scott.”

Let us now turn to Tacitus, the Roman historian, and carefully read over those words, the truth of which is undisputed. “The most skeptical criticism,” says Gibbon, whose authority in such a case is absolutely conclusive, “is obliged to respect the integrity of this celebrated passage of Tacitus.” The circumstances are thus detailed by Tacitus:

“Nero judicially accused of the offense and punished with the most studied torments a set of men, hated for their wickedness, who were commonly called Christians. The author of that sect was Christ, who, in the reign of Tiberius, suffered death by sentence of the procurator Pontius Pilate. The vile superstition, repressed for a time, again broke out, not only in Judea, the nest of mischief, but in the city also, whither all atrocious and scandalous things flow, and where all flourish. At first those only were apprehended who confessed themselves of that sect; afterward a vast multitude discovered by them, all of whom were condemned, not so much for the crime of burning the city as for their enmity to mankind. Their executions were so contrived as to expose them to derision and contempt. Some were covered with the skins of wild beasts, that they might be torn to pieces; some crucified; while others, having been daubed over with combustible materials, were set up as lights in the night-time, and thus burned to death. For these spectacles Nero gave his own gardens, and at the same time exhibited there the diversions of the circus, sometimes standing in the crowd as a spectator, in the habit of a charioteer, and at other times driving a chariot himself; until at length these men, though really criminal and deserving exemplary punishment, began to be commiserated as people who were destroyed not

out of regard to the public welfare, but only to gratify the cruelty of one man."

Observe this great fact. Christ, the author of Christianity, came into a sin-loving and persecuting world; he distinctly told his disciples that as their Master was treated so would they be; as he was hated, so also would be their condition. The disciples, then, of Christ were not deceived as to the real character of his mission. They knew that the opposition of the world must be encountered,—its contempt, its wrath, its malice, its misapprehension and fiercest attacks upon their persons, property, and reputation. Now, this passage of Tacitus described a notorious fact within thirty-five years from Christ's death.

The question now is, Are men so fond of fiction as to suffer so much for it, knowing it to be such? Who can say that at a period of the world where the mind was peculiarly retentive of great events and personages, especially if of recent existence, where the scarcity of all parchments and their costliness made it of the first importance to tell of facts as they really took place, any motive could exist for taking up with a fictitious Christ, or any story whatever not founded on fact? Remember, thirty-five years was a very short time indeed to fabricate a lie; and then, when that lie exposed to persecution and death, is it possible that it could be successful? Now, men do not naturally love persecution, ignominy, or death: if these evils are encountered, some powerful motive must exist to induce submission to them. Tacitus distinctly asserts that thousands were persecuted and put to death for Christ, because they believed in him, and openly professed his name. Is it possible that, if there was no Christ, any could be found voluntarily taking up with that which they knew was false, and suffering persecution for such an end? Is it possible Christ's disciples would give up all earthly comfort, peace, or reward, for only the fiction of a Christ? The supposition that they were sincere, but deluded with the idea of a Christ when there was no Christ, is equally absurd. They had too much at stake to be easily deceived: deceit was their ruin, truth their salvation. Did

only thirty-five years elapse and yet they not know a real person from a fictitious one, especially when mistake subjected them to all manner of tribulations, with nothing whatever to be gained by it?

But let us consult Jewish accounts of Christ. The Talmudical literature of the second century gives great importance to Christ's miracles. "The later Jews," says Mr. Baden Powell, in "Essays and Reviews," "adopted the strange legend of the *Sepher Toldeth Jeshu* (book of the generation of Jesus), which describes his miracles substantially as in the Gospels, but says that he obtained his power by hiding himself in the temple, and possessing himself of the secret ineffable name by virtue of which such wonders could be wrought."

Mr. Powell quotes also, from Limborch, this statement of Orobio, a Jewish writer:—"The Jews disbelieved, not because they denied that the works which are related in the Gospels were done by Jesus, but because they did not suffer themselves to be persuaded by them that Jesus was the Messiah." Here, then, we have Jewish as well as Roman testimony to the fact that such a person as Christ actually existed, and then we have the highest proof from the sufferings of the early Christians that they did not die for a fiction, but were persuaded on the best of evidence that Jesus of Nazareth lived, taught, and died to save men. Such a person, then, as Christ, suffered and died under Pontius Pilate, the Roman governor. For more than eighteen centuries the Christian Church has commemorated his death. The two sacraments of Baptism and the Lord's Supper, observed by millions through all these centuries, testify to the most undeniable of facts, that Christ did live and die as narrated by the four Evangelists.

The question of the greatest interest now presents itself. What was the personal character of Christ, both intellectual and moral? We will look simply in a human relation, and for argument's sake consider him as we would any man, to testify to important facts. Certain things were declared by Christ himself. Was Christ competent to testify to these things of himself, and was he truthful? If *incompetent*, he

might be mistaken ; if *untruthful*, he *certainly deceived* ; and in either case we cannot credit the works alleged of him. Notice, then, the intellectual and the moral character of Christ, because upon a correct idea of both will depend the solution of all the difficulties that are presented in his professed works. Volumes innumerable have been written upon Christ's character. He has engrossed the thoughts of the purest and the noblest intellects of every age, and yet it may be said with the greatest truth that new beauties and new wonders are presented under whatever aspect Christ is viewed. The theme is utterly inexhaustible. We may view this or that development of the Saviour's character, and yet it rises up before the mind with such a mysterious grandeur, such a sacred majesty, so unapproachable in its purity, so profound in its wisdom, so transparent in its simplicity, so unique in its manifestation, so perfectly consistent and true and right, that infidels, even while denying his supernatural nature or works, have confessed with amazement his transcendent excellence.

In a single chapter but very little can be said of the character of our Saviour, and yet enough to show that of all men Christ had an intellect of the clearest, sharpest, and most wonderful strength. Not one cloud of error passed over it. Sagacity of the rarest nature distinguished him. Always self-possessed, he never for a moment was at a loss to say the right word at the right time. Christ ever manifested the highest wisdom. He outwitted his foes, while he confounded their malice. But what adds peculiar force to the mind of Christ was his perfect knowledge of that which he should be called to go through with. He was prepared for every exigency, because he knew just what was the trial of his patience.

It is impossible to look to the intellect of Christ without noticing the sharp outline of those features that gave absolute distinctness to the ideas advanced, and appropriateness to all his words. The four Evangelists dwell mostly upon the three last years of his life ; they give us only a few hints of the period of his infancy and youth. Doubtless Christ, as a

man, grew in stature and knowledge; with perfect humanity, he always conformed to its essential conditions; nothing out of place, but everything is in place both in his words and conduct. Christ's intellect came in contact with all conditions of men, the high and the low, the weak and the powerful, the learned and the unlearned, and yet not in the slightest degree was it ever injured by this contact so intimate. Nor did Christ in his youth enjoy the advantages of the schools; he lived in Nazareth, a by-word even with the Jews for its dissoluteness of manners, its ignorance and wickedness; his parents were poor, himself brought up to the trade of a carpenter. We have no evidence that he had any advantages whatever for learning; his occupation precluded him from the leisure essential for success in acquiring much knowledge. Surrounded by influences the most unfriendly, the child of poverty, toiling from day to day to obtain subsistence for his body, encouraged by no persons in power, he yet suddenly emerges from his obscurity and draws upon himself the eager gaze of all classes in society, not only because of his wisdom, but those mighty works that challenged the severest scrutiny, while they carried with them the clearest evidence of his Messiahship.

Observe how Christ unfolded truth to his disciples, how wisely he conformed his instructions to their situation, while all the plots of his enemies were unmasked by the inimitable excellence and point of his language toward them. Could the profoundest, clearest, strongest intellect the world has ever seen be mistaken as to whether miracles were worked or not?—whether works were performed accrediting his mission or not? Remember, Christ declared, over and over again, that his works showed him from God, and challenged the most embittered of his foes to examine them. Remember that, however we may view Christ, one thing is certain, he knew what he was about. Jesus did know whether he worked miracles or not. He was no enthusiast, no visionary mortal, capable, by the excess of his imagination or the undue development of any other faculty of the mind, of being deceived. His perfect self-possession and intuitive sagacity, that

singular discernment that never for an instant forsook him, the character of his instructions, his answers to the Scribes and Pharisees, and all his actions, evinced one thing,—Christ knew what he was about; others might be deceived, but he was not; others might attach an exaggerated importance to unessentials, but Christ did not. The knowledge he displayed, his lofty serenity, his amber-like clearness of intellect, that saw ever absolute truth without imperfection, that robust strength of thought that grasped in a moment the most perplexing subjects and unraveled difficulties that for centuries had perplexed the wisest thinkers, all testify to one self-evident truth,—*Christ knew what he was about.* This is especially evident when we consider that there is not one instance on record of his ever being mistaken, ever being outwitted by his enemies. They tried often to ensnare him, but he uniformly confounded them. Thus, in the question of the tribute-money, in that of the woman who had married seven husbands, or the one taken in adultery, or the reply to the Scribes and Pharisees who would have him tell by what authority he acted, and in many other instances, Christ never spoke unadvisedly, or in any way placed himself in a false position.

Have we not, then, the most conclusive evidence that Christ *knew* what he was about, and could not be wanting in intelligence? The next question to be considered is, Was Christ honest? was he true? was he what he professed himself to be? Here notice a most remarkable fact: very *few* indeed even of those who have rejected the Bible as the word of God, and denied the reality of miracles, have ever been so presumptuous as to assert that Christ was *dishonest*. The greatest skeptics have recoiled instinctively from such an idea, so fearful and so repulsive. We can safely say that the worst of infidels would shudder to assert that Christ was an impostor. Whatever may be said against Christianity, the last and the most unfounded of all assertions is that which impeaches the moral character of Christ. Remember how monstrous the thought, that one whose instructions were so full of wisdom, tenderness, love, and compassion, whose life

was so marked by self-denial and voluntary suffering for others' good, whose whole history, from the cradle to the grave, was that of the highest illustration of innocence, should be capable of dishonesty!

Observe Christ as he revealed himself in his conduct and instructions, and say where can an instance be found of the least swerving from the rule of the most absolute rectitude. As the mind thinks of those varied and extraordinary conditions of his life, where our Saviour came in contact with sin in its most malignant shape, can it be shown that his spotless raiment of righteousness was defiled by the least stain? Observe that occasions were presented of severest trial; and yet did all this trial produce any other effect than to reveal with a brighter luster his wonderful virtue? Follow Christ from the commencement of his ministry of three years to its consummation upon the cross, and say whether the exquisite sensitiveness of his nature yielded ever so little before the force of temptation?

Now, one thing is certain, either Christ worked the miracles he professed, either he was all he taught of himself, or he was dishonest. There is really no other alternative. We have seen his amazing sagacity and intelligence, and this fact establishes the proposition,—*Christ knew what he was about*; if so, then we are shut up to the alternative,—Christ was what he professed himself to be, or he was dishonest. We hold the skeptic to this stern, this irresistible fact. In our other chapters we give proofs from many sources to show the Bible from God; but this only goes to show that Christ also was from God; and if so, then what he said was true, and what he worked confirms his words as perfectly reliable and deserving of confidence.

In the remarkable work of "Ecce Homo," where the author contemplates mostly the human of Christ, it will be seen that he has portrayed with marked ability this aspect of our Saviour. Let us look closely to the humanity of Christ alone, and it will be found that, considered simply as a man, the sun at noonday is not more visible in the heavens than is displayed the honesty of Christ in all that he said or

did; and yet that honesty in a human relation involves Christ's honesty in a divine relation, and the truth he spoke as a man irresistibly forces us to confess his truthfulness as the Son of God. No person can confess his veracity as the Son of man, without crossing that line that tells of his truthfulness as the Son of God. For certain purposes it may be well to contemplate Christ in simply a human relation, but the mind, as it gazes at the fairest picture of humanity that ever the world has seen, must, if true to itself, pass into the awfully mysterious domain of his divine attributes. Not the prismatic colors of the sunbeam are so blended together as the supernatural and the human in Christ. Not a drop of water so holds in its composition the elements of hydrogen and oxygen as does the person of Jesus the twofold excellence of a human and divine nature. All this must be admitted if we confess his miracles; and his miracles must be admitted if we hold to his honesty. If it is impossible to conceive of Christ as imposed upon, equally difficult is it to imagine him to deceive.

Which horn of the dilemma does the skeptic take? Does he say Christ was imposed upon? Then he must admit his destitution of intelligence, his incompetence, his extraordinary want of all discernment and wisdom; but, worse than this, he must also declare that the apostles were deceived as to Christ's miracles, and that his enemies who confessed them true while they attributed them to Beelzebub, and also the Christians of the first century, were deluded, and suffered only in the cause of deception. Take the other horn of the dilemma; Was Christ an impostor? Did he act untruthfully or deceitfully? But this supposition, that should blister the tongue of any mortal who would make it, is at war with the first dictate of conscience, and equally at war with every principle of correct reasoning or good sensibility.

That man may well tremble who throws upon the character of Christ the imputation of dishonesty. No, not the worst infidels will do this. They will shut their eyes to the proofs of Christ's divine mission, while they praise his virtues; they will extol his goodness, his love, his mercy, his

tender sympathy with the suffering, his wisdom, his moral beauty, and yet they will turn round and deny the supernatural of his character, and refuse to credit his miracles. They will call his incarnation a fiction, and his resurrection a delusion. Monstrous inconsistency! Admit a God, and deny that he cannot become incarnated in his Son! Admit sin, and yet refuse to see its only remedy! Admit Christ's virtue, and deny his works! Admit that Jesus was all sympathy, love, sincerity, and truth, and yet refuse to see or hear what he says of himself! Admit everything human, and yet impeach that humanity really of deception! All this the skeptic must do unless he is willing to take the New Testament and interpret it simply according to the plain meaning of the language.

The question is, Did Christ do what he said he would do? Was he what he professed to be? Did Christ work miracles as conclusive evidence, with the end for which he came, and the nature of his instructions, that he came from God and was heaven-descended? If *he was thus*, then he was honest; *if not*, then could he be honest?

Let us, then, contemplate Christ in what he said of himself and that which he professed to do. Three things we have attempted to show: First, Christ was no *fiction*; secondly, *not deceived*; thirdly, *no deceiver*. Let us now consider what Christ said of himself and what was said of him by the apostles. The argument is cumulative. If inspired men confirm all that Christ declared himself to be, and testify to the reality of his works, then the evidence comes with augmented force to show that the character of Christ involved his works, and his works his character; his veracity proves his miracles, and his miracles his veracity; his disciples show the truthfulness of their Master, and that truthfulness proves the reality of their discipleship. In our other chapters the evidence of prophecy and miracles is given, with many other proofs. All that now is needed, is to quote the words of Jesus himself and the apostles of Jesus, showing clearly that unless we impeach Christ's character we must admit his works and the reality of his divine mission. When John

the Baptist was thrown into prison, he sent messengers to ask directly of Christ whether he was the Messiah or not. Jesus answered, "Go and show John again those things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk: the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear: the dead are raised up, and the poor have the gospel preached to them; and blessed is he whosoever shall not be offended in me." Two things here are directly asserted: miraculous power, and to the *poor* proclamation of good tidings. Observe that miracles are never divorced from their end; they are always worked for a worthy object. The four evangelists represent Christ as working miracles; they are interwoven in the whole web of his ministry. Christ referred to his mighty works as aggravating the guilt immeasurably of the cities that rejected him. He speaks thus of his works: "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me." Now, Christ never had a low idea of his miracles. In the circumstances of his advent, life, and mission, they were of incalculable value. The method of proof he proposed was of the most direct and positive character. Christ plainly pointed to his works. These works, says Christ, are my credentials, the royal seal of God himself; and, thus addressing those who heard him and saw his miracles, he challenged them to show those miracles false, or to prove that they were worked by any other than God's own Son. Christ challenged the Jews in any respect to show him a sinner, or in the least thing to prove him recreant to his duty to man or God. They could not do it; his enemies were dumb before him,—absolutely confounded by the demonstrations he gave of his authority as the true prophet of God and his own well-beloved Son. Miracles by Christ had always an evidential character, simply worked as an unanswerable argument to show that he was just what he professed himself to be. Christ did not say that his life or his teachings alone proved him from God; but, taken in connection with his miracles, none could refuse to reject him without the deepest guilt and exposure to the severest punishment of God. Think for a moment how eagerly the enemies of

our Saviour would have seized upon one false miracle and made mountains out of a single mistake, if Christ gave them really this opportunity. But Christ did not give his crafty foes an inch of land to stand upon,—he left them all suspended in the air by the cord of their own malice. Thus, observe, no charge was brought against Christ before Pilate of working false miracles. Christ was fully in the power of his enemies; but they could not point to a single instance of deception on his part, either in his actions or his words. They cloaked their hatred indeed under the charge of blasphemy, and yet they perversely shut their eyes to the only thing that was able to prove it, and that was to show that Christ worked *no miracles*. Observe the ocular and tactual demonstration of his resurrection given to Thomas. Christ did not repel him, but invited him to the fullest proof of his miraculous victory over the grave. What more appropriate exclamation after such a proof than those words of amazement that broke from his lips, “My Lord and my God!”

Read over the declarations of the evangelists and of Paul respecting Christ’s miracles, and can anything be more plain than that Christ professed to raise the dead, and did thus actually do? To add tenfold weight to his proof of oneness with God, and his divine commission as the Saviour of the world, he confidently predicts his own death, and lays down his life in confirmation of this truth. Thus there is the highest possible evidence given that he was what he professed himself to be, in that he made his death and resurrection credentials that he was sent from God. Observe especially how Christ spoke of those who would not believe upon him. Did Christ work no miracles, he could not thus speak without bringing into absolute contempt his mission, even in the minds of his disciples. Who ever made assertions of such startling importance, or assumed a position of such amazing significance? What words of awful grandeur fell from his lips, all directly assuming equality with God, and leaving the impression upon the mind that while in one sense he was man, in another sense he was infinitely above man, and distinct from him! It is self-evident that assumptions of such

startling significance must rest upon the solid basis of miracles, or they would be indignantly repelled by even his sincerest friends.

Christ had to do with three classes of persons—open enemies, curious spectators, weak but true disciples. Certainly his bitter foes, and his prying and indifferent spectators, would not for a moment regard him, or be silenced by him, unless he did work miracles; and his disciples without them could not be persuaded to follow him. Now, the foes of Christ could do nothing against him except under false pretenses, while the curious confessed his mighty works, while they would not deny themselves for him, and his disciples had their faith every day confirmed, until it became a conviction of the mind so strong as to lead them to forsake all worldly good to secure the approbation of their Master, enduring all evils for that cause that enlisted the highest love of their hearts.

Observe also the oneness of all Christ's purposes for the benefit of the world. Jesus was singularly elevated above the age in which he lived. With Jewish bigotry he had no sympathy; he favored neither the exclusiveness of Judaism nor the vices of Gentileism. There was a unity in all his conduct, a oneness of aim that never deviated from the most perfect rectitude. If Christ had not been what he professed himself to be, he could not uniformly have persevered in the course he did. When we read the historians of Christ, we find all the four evangelists agreeing in recording, without collusion, the everyday acts of his life, and his instructions to his disciples. They all agree in confirming the miracles he worked, and reveal Christ as always having the same great end in view, even the salvation of the world. Not a single valid discrepancy can be found; not one conflicting statement. Look to the grandeur of the end Christ ever had in his mind. How infinitely insignificant the temporal glory of a nation to the salvation of the world! How mean the benefit of an earthly state in comparison to the salvation of the soul! In contrast, how contracted all the glory of the earth!

It is in the nobleness of all Christ's instructions and life

that we see also the impossibility of deception. From the manger to the cross, all had an intimate relation to this great end. As the great author of redemption, Christ never for a moment permitted himself to lose sight of it. Appearing in an age singularly bigoted, among a people attached to idolatry, to the Mosaic ritual and the ceremonial law, he yet borrowed in his life and instructions not one trait of the age he lived in, or had in himself a single element that was in unison with the popular spirit. Equally opposed was Christ to the philosophy and practices of the Gentile world. His kingdom was not of this earth. He neither asked its favors nor feared its frowns. He neither succumbed to the prejudices nor trembled beneath the power of the mighty; was neither seduced by the riches nor dazzled by the honors of the world. Solitary, in his own glory did he reveal himself, in his divinity the most unapproachable, and in his humanity the most accessible. Possessing in himself the most diverse qualities, he combined the most opposite virtues; meek and gentle beyond conception, yet calm, resolute, and energetic; weeping at the grave of Lazarus, and rebuking the pride of the Pharisees in language never to be surpassed in severity; familiar to little children, and yet making the Jewish Sanhedrim amazed before the awfulness of his reserve. To him the most helpless, the most ignorant and destitute of this world's goods, could approach without fear; and yet the elements of nature were all subservient to his word. The wisdom of Christ clearly shows him from God. One unguarded expression of veneration to his mother would have laid deep in human nature a valid foundation for an idolatry the most insidious and powerful,—an idolatry that supports the whole system of Romanism, and which needed but a word to make it as universal as the Bible itself. But no language can portray the inimitable caution of Christ: with a divine foresight, he looked through all coming ages, and provided an antidote for every spiritual disease of man.

CHAPTER III.

CHRIST AS MORALIST, LEGISLATOR, REDEEMER, AND KING.

WE will consider Christ in those most extraordinary features that make him, in distinction from all human beings, the moralist, legislator, redeemer, and king of mankind, and which prove him, in connection with miracles and prophecy, to be not only the Son of man, but the Son of man in a sense essentially different and infinitely superior to that which can be predicated of any of Adam's posterity.

The chapters on miracles and prophecy, with that upon the success of Christianity in the first century, enter in as conclusive proof of that which Christ says of himself, and should be read not only as connecting links of the great chain of evidence showing the Bible from God, but as revealing with the utmost clearness that Christ is the Alpha and Omega of all revelation, the First and Last of all that which constitutes redemption for man.

Never was there an age of the world where morality was based upon principles more fundamentally wrong than that age in which Christ came. The antediluvian age might in the grossness of sin be worse, but certainly the age that witnessed the advent of Christ to this world excelled in everything hypocritical and false. The Roman conquests had introduced outward unity in the political world, and established a centralized power that broke down the separating walls that in past ages had divided one nation from another; but those conquests were based upon force: fear in the conquered nations brought about an external obedience, while at heart there was no sympathy or real union. So far as the Roman world was concerned, all morality centered in the state and

all virtue was summed up in obedience to Cæsar. Political idolatry had taken the place of the homage paid in former ages to the gods, and heathenism itself had changed its old garb for a more liberal superstition, which included in the divinities adored, successful generals and emperors. But things, if possible, were worse in Judea; for there all the exclusiveness of Judaism existed, while there was a total departure from the heroic virtues of the age of Joshua or David, or even the later times of the Maccabees. The fire of pure devotion had almost gone out upon the sacrificial altar, and but a few feeble sparks were seen in those worshipers who impatiently looked for the coming of the Messiah. So far as morality was concerned, Judea exhibited the spectacle of a whitewashed sepulcher, an empty shell, with all that once constituted the value of the nut extracted. Society was divided into two great classes—gross sinners and plausible moralists. The former class knew themselves to be sinners, but cared little about leaving off sinning, while the latter class felt themselves to be righteous, while practically they were profoundly ignorant of the first principles of all virtue, or at heart hostile to them. The open sinners and the legalists all agreed in one thing, that God in some way should be worshiped, and all were pleased with that kind of worship which dispensed with the self-sacrificing homage of the soul, while they submitted to the outward form of religion. How radically corrupt was that state of society when one class practiced that which they would not learn, and the other taught that which they would not practice! where conscience was alike defiled and unfaithful, and the only religion that prevailed was a painted caricature of the true! What was Judea, morally considered, but a monstrous and grotesque exhibition of whatever was bigoted, supercilious, and formal? The legalists were looked upon by the multitude as very pious. There was the exact washing of cups and platters, the precise payment of mint and anise, the most punctual observance of fast-days and feast-days; there were religious processions without number, holy banners, sacred badges, ecclesiastical intonations, fragrant incense, long faces, and

sackcloth garments. Never, probably, did the temple or the streets witness prayers so long, or manners more exact, or religion more vociferous.

The Scribes and Pharisees were never more pleased than when they heard the respectful salutation of Rabbi! Rabbi! And these were the authorized teachers of the people. As the author of "*Ecce Homo*" has well said, "The legalist believes that the old method by which their ancestors had arrived at a knowledge of the requirements of duty, namely, divine inspiration, was no longer available, and that nothing more remained but carefully to collect the results at which their ancestors had arrived by this method, to adopt their results as rules, and to observe them punctiliously. Devoutly believing that in the most trifling matter, where action was involved, there was a right course and a wrong one, and at the same time entirely deserted by the instinct or inspiration which distinguishes the one from the other, they invented the most frivolous casuistry that has ever been known; they overburdened men's memories and perplexed their lives with an endless multitude of rules, which sometimes were simply trivial; *e.g.* an egg laid on a festival day may be eaten, according to the school of Shammai; but the school of Hillel says it must not be eaten; and at other times were immoral, as in the case of the Corban, which Christ selected for censure." "But it is evident that Christ was not better pleased with their good deeds than with their bad ones. Their good deeds had the nature of imposture; that is, they did not proceed from the motives from which such deeds naturally spring, and from which the public supposed them to spring. When these men tithed their property for the service of religion, did they do so from the ardent feelings which had suggested the oblations of David in old times? No doubt the people thought so; but in truth they paid tithes from a motive which might just as well have prompted them to take tithes—respect for a traditional rule. When they searched and sifted the Scriptures, fancying, as Christ said, that in them they had eternal life, did they do so because they felt deeply the wisdom of the old prophets and

legislators? The people no doubt thought that these diligent students were possessed with the spirit of what they read; but the truth was that they only pored over the ancient scrolls because they understood that it was proper to read them; therefore the more they read the less they understood. And they paid the same reverence to the languid futilities of some purblind commentator as to the inspirations of Isaiah. When they lauded the ancient prophets, and built their sepulchers, was it because they were congenial spirits, formed in their school, and bent upon following in their steps? The people thought so; but Christ pronounced, with memorable point and truth, what is true of many other worshipers of antiquity besides the Pharisees, that they were the legitimate representatives of *those who killed the prophets*, and that they betrayed this by the very worship which they paid to their memory."

Here, then, were two classes Christ had to deal with: the people, ignorant, deluded, and vicious; the teachers, proud, hypocritical, and false, having just enough of the appearance of virtue to escape the consequences of vice, but not enough to deliver from its secret power. In both classes morality was misunderstood in its great principles, and therefore all duty was misdirected or unperformed. But the mischief was incalculably greater upon the side of duty, submitted to only in its form, than where neither its form nor spirit was carried out; for the people were in a condition where they might be reached, while the Pharisees were in a state where all reason or proof was useless. The mists that hung over the ignorant multitude, openly sinning and experiencing the penalties of a cost confessed to be alike unclean and undone, might be cleared away by the divine teachings of that Saviour who healed men in their bodies as in their souls; but that delusion that enchained the privileged order had other and more fatal elements of evil than those which characterized the people. Pride, with its triple coat of mail, bigotry, ever jealous of its prerogatives, and a fanatical regard for those forms that brought consideration and wealth, ever stood in the way; consequently, of all classes the legalists were

most hostile to Christ; and the reason lay in the fact that Christ not only proved their morality baseless, but took away the cloak of hypocrisy by which they deceived the people. Now, in all duty, Christ enforced, as never before, the value of a right state of heart. All his instructions were directed to the great point of personal holiness. There must be some principle at the root of all obedience, which makes all action right, and without which no word or deed has in it that which could commend itself to God. What especially was the idea of this principle and its sphere of activity? It was the affections under the law of right—not a theory of right, but an impulse of right, a condition where all the sensibilities are awakened, and all directed in the pure channel of holy love. The first principle of morality taught by Christ was, that no duty toward God or man could be rightly performed without the heart. In other words, Christ dwelt upon the spirit of obedience rather than form—its internal development rather than its external. But the essence of all duty consisted in holy love—its impelling principle must be this, because this alone is the only effectual antidote against temptation and sin; but the right action of the sensibilities was the last thing thought of by the legalists, and the least understood by all classes. Religion had degenerated into mere form, and all worship had ceased to have that principle that alone could make it pleasing in the sight of God, or that spirit without which he could not be approached. Thus all duty had become simply an affair of outward action, leaving the source itself of morality untouched.

Judaism differed in that age from paganism only in that it was more intellectually right. It had lost that element of obedience that inspired Abraham, and David, and Isaiah, and simply became an affair of punctilious observance, an empty routine of tiresome ceremonies. But Christ not only pre-eminently taught the right source of all morality, but also its right method. This method was singularly comprehensive and original. It was peculiarly adapted to the New Dispensation which he introduced into the world. The nature of morality in Judaism was exclusive. It had its animus in the

stereotyped forms of a Dispensation that was to be superseded by a better. Consequently, Christ taught that our neighbor was not the Jew alone, but the Gentile, and that mercy and kindness to all men were as imperative as to the children of Abraham. Both Jews and Gentiles had no true idea of morality toward enemies or aliens. How to act under injuries was the most perplexing of all problems to solve. But Christ enforced a line of conduct under injury absolutely original, if we look to the leading authorities among both Jews and Gentiles. Thus, among the Romans, forgiveness toward enemies, the suppressing of a revengeful spirit toward conquered foes, hardly entered at all into the idea of morality. This was looked upon rather as a vice than a virtue, or, if a virtue, something beyond human attainment. Among the Jews, if positive enmity did not exist toward strangers or Gentiles, positive indifference did, and the principle of forgiveness as enforced by Christ toward all mankind was absolutely unknown. This, in practice, was a version of the moral law neither felt nor understood. But morality, as inculcated by Christ, not only broke down the separating wall between Judaism and Gentileism, and made all mankind children of one common Father, but, in relation to God, the soul, and a future state, principles were taught far in advance of anything inculcated in the Old Testament. Christ came not only to establish the law and the prophets, but to give something vastly superior. Thus the Fatherhood of God was brought out with wonderful distinctness, and also his personal interest in every son and daughter of Adam; not only God under the aspect of reconciliation, but God under the aspect of Providence. So, also, of the soul. How vivid the light that is flashed upon it by the instructions of Christ! How prominently is it brought out in its value and amazing interests! Thus Christ places the seal of royalty upon every soul, be the outward condition ever so poor, obscure, and afflicted: he not only asserts the fact, next to that of God's existence, of the utmost importance for man to know and feel, but he throws around this fact circumstances of worth that never before entered the mind of any person.

So, also, of a future state. Here we see how great the value of that kind of morality taught by Christ: happiness or misery in the future, the resurrection to life or condemnation, all have an intimate bearing upon the character of our lives and the actual condition of the heart of every person. The great thing demanded for heaven was the possession of some principle that should be of universal application, and yet so simple, so true, so elemental in its nature as to make it suitable for every condition of mankind, and perfectly adapted to the object of his mission to save the soul. What was that principle, lying at the root of all true morality, and which, as an indispensable step, secured ultimately a right state of heart? One word is enough to express it: faith, or confidence. Christ rested everything upon that simple test, which alone was possible or practicable for all mankind. How was this test enforced? Simply by saying, If you have confidence in me, you will regard my possession worthy of all necessary sacrifice. You will take up your cross for me. Thus, morality was based upon the double foundation of right faith and right love, faith that should bring this love, love that should bring this faith; both in their very nature must lie not upon the surface of humanity, but at the center, the heart, and both must exist wherever there was true obedience. Now, the difference between the legalists and Christ was this: legalists insisted upon forms and rules to bring about right morality; Christ, upon faith and love. The one was satisfied with the shell of religion, the other only with the meat of it.

Here observe the reason why the legalists were so severely censured by Christ, and so openly and frequently rebuked in the sternest language. Not because they were worse than all other classes,—this does not follow necessarily,—but because they were vastly more dangerous. With pagans, publicans, and open sinners, with the confessedly immoral and dissolute, with all that class excommunicated from the select order of pietists or consecrated religionists, and especially such as came under the ban of civil law and suffered the penalties of the outraged sentiments of society, there was an access

by Christ immensely more easy, and they could be approached far more successfully. But between the legalists and Christ an irreconcilable hostility, and a barrier immeasurably more difficult, existed. The legalists had borrowed enough of the garb of true religion to make it plausible with the multitude, but were utterly destitute of its spirit; they assumed to be the teachers of morality, while they were the slaves of conventional rules, forms, and ceremonies: moreover, they existed as the strongest defenders of an exclusive Judaism. But the nature of Christ's mission had superseded this, and the end of his advent to this world was to do away with all the distinctions of Jew and Gentile and upon the wants of a common humanity introduce a religion that should be essentially universal. Consequently, before Christ could proceed one step toward establishing Christianity, he must destroy the whole system of legalism in the estimation of the people, and bring into deserved contempt the hypocritical teachers of it.

A new era had dawned upon the world, but the Scribes and Pharisees had shut their eyes to the miracles of our Saviour, or had willfully perverted them into the workings of Beelzebub, and, while they borrowed all that was burdensome and formal in the religion of the prophets, they were utterly destitute of their spirit. They had simply floated like chips upon the sea of humanity, and like chips they had been thrown upon the beach, useless for all purposes conducive to human welfare. Contenting themselves with being mere surface-teachers, they grew worse and worse, until they had arrived at just that point where in honest morality they were worse than the people, while in pretension they assumed to be immeasurably better. Christ could not tolerate them without sacrificing that cause for which he was willing to suffer and to die.

Consider Christ as a legislator. Moses was the legislator of a nation, Christ of the world. The genius of the one was exclusive, that of the other universal. Moses' legislation was restricted to the ceremonial law and the ten commandments, Christ's legislation embodied the spirit of all right law, while

he did away with all burdensome forms and all ceremonies that could not assume a world-wide adaptation. Of outward observances Christ restricted himself to three—open profession with his visible church, baptism, and the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; but, strictly speaking, the last two were only enjoined, for they included the first. Now, the legislation of Christ differed essentially from that of Moses in that it not only had a world-wide adaptation, but it had a vastly more positive character. Its spirit was essentially aggressive and comprehensive. The morality of the former consisted more in not doing evil—*Thou shalt not*, was the animus of it,—while the morality of Christ consisted in doing good, and its watch-word was, *Thou shalt*.

For motives Moses relied more on temporal rewards and punishments, but Christ on eternal. The one appealed to the present, the other to the future. The legislation of Moses was adapted to a specific end, that of Christ to a general end. Thus, while the legislation of Moses may be compared to a river flowing on in a prescribed channel, that of Christ could only be likened to the ocean washing great continents and fit for the commerce of the world. Notice the address of Christ to the Samaritan woman at the well of water: "But the hour cometh, and now is, when the true worshipers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth; for the Father seeketh such to worship him. God is a Spirit, and they that worship him must worship him in spirit and in truth."

Now the legislation of Christ was exactly of that character that made him a law to all his true disciples. The principle simply consisted in holding up an idea of excellence in his own person and instructions so perfect that nothing could be added to it, and nothing, without loss, taken from it. This ideal, if not attainable in this world, was ever to be reached after, and in itself was the most effectual antidote for sin. The legislation of Moses threw a man more upon his own resources, while that of Christ aimed constantly to throw a person upon the resources of God. By proposing a perfect standard, it taught most clearly human dependence

and divine strength, and thus, while it developed humility, it at the same time inspired the noblest courage. The legislation of Christ carried with it far more effectual power to restrain from sin than that of Moses, because, while that of Moses had more reference to the outward act, Christ's legislation had peculiar relation to the disposition. As sin has its source in the disposition, so, to cure man of sin, Christ taught that the root of it existing in the heart must be extracted. All then of Christ's legislation went directly to the source of all mischief, either in the individual or the community, and taught the one great lesson that the same principle that made a man right with God would lead him to be right with his neighbor, and that wherever there was the true love of the one, there also would be the true love of the other.

Equally different in the legislation of Moses and of Christ were the motives to obedience presented by each. The present world, with the one, was the great motive power, with its rewards and punishments, while the future world was that most constantly appealed unto by Christ. It therefore followed that where faith existed there also a motive power must exist, as superior in reality as the future life is more important than the present. Besides, the very mission of Christ demanded a more vivid presentation of the future world; and thus, when the time came for a higher revelation, we see that it was given under just those circumstances that made it a wonderful power in making progressive the religion of Christ. Thus the whole condition of humanity was changed, or vitally affected, by the greater truths communicated of the life beyond the grave. These truths had in them that which had an especial bearing upon the soul. Christ, as a legislator, brought to bear upon obedience all the motive power of three worlds. It was, then, not only as a moralist that he spoke, but as a legislator he enacted; and while he borrowed all that was useful of that old dispensation, he engrafted principles and motives into the new that made it peculiarly his own. In all the civil and social relations of life, Christ's legislation was just that which made it adapted to all ages and countries. It studiously

avoided having anything to do with the civil power, or with the merely outward relations of society, or with any mere social organization. The supreme wisdom of this will be seen when we reflect that society was immeasurably more corrupt in its spirit than in its forms, and, in the nature of things, must go through with endless outward changes to be made essentially better. Christ therefore shunned, in his legislation to his disciples, the least approximation to any one form or organization of society. He recognized most clearly the divine authority in the abstract of all civil government, but he would not be a partisan of any. Thus all of Christ's legislation was to effect a change in the outward relations of society, by going directly to the heart of it and creating a right spirit in the individual, and, through the individual, in the community. The spirit right, and, by an irresistible law of moral gravitation, the forms in time would be right; while the spirit wrong, and all forms would be perverted, and degenerate into some kind or other of civil or social despotism. And the course of Christ's legislation was pre-eminently adapted to the age in which he lived. No age excelled it in forms and ceremonies, and none came up to it in a radically corrupt and bad spirit. Society was rotten at its very core, and the first thing to be done was to apply a remedy to the inmost seat of the disease. Now, the legalists were content with painting over this sepulcher of humanity; Christ only with raising the dead bodies in it. Consequently, in the memorable instance of the tribute-money, the woman taken in adultery, and the course taken by Jesus at Pilate's Hall, we see how careful Christ was to abstain from any appearance of interfering with the civil relations of society. So in the ecclesiastical and social relations of society, Christ freely mingled with all classes, and indorsed by his presence all those outward forms by which the machinery of society moved on; and yet his legislation was peculiarly adapted, by introducing a new spirit, to work ultimately a change in the form itself. Remember, our Saviour made laws for his church and the world, and not for a sect or a nation; he inculcated those principles of love to God and man that, in their secret

and powerful movement in the heart of society, would in time bring about the highest moral, civil, and social elevation of man, and ultimately create those right forms and rules that would secure the noblest welfare of man; but Christ commenced with the root of society, and not its branches, knowing full well that unless the spirit was made right, all its outward developments must be wrong.

Let us now consider Christ as the Redeemer of man. Here we see, as has been shown in the chapter upon the gospel solution to the question of the sinner saved and the law sustained, that Christ alone met the conditions of this most perplexing of all problems. But there is an aspect to the subject of Christ the Redeemer of man worthy of careful consideration; that is, the great necessity of man was twofold,—a vicarious sacrifice, and a perfect example. This involved the incarnation of Christ, and a sensible and perfect illustration of all virtue; virtue not alone in the abstract, but the concrete; virtue under all those conditions made essential for redemption. Now, however unnecessary skeptics of the present day may deem the incarnation and death of Christ, yet we cannot study the systems of religion in the ancient world without being impressed with the idea that there ran through all pagan idolatry that which told of an earnest longing for some sensible manifestation of God, and especially that which should show a way of deliverance from sin.

In our chapter upon the necessity of a revelation from God, it will be seen how earnest the longing for some manifestation of God that had been for ages withheld from the world. Nor does it change the fact of this longing that the imagination had invented innumerable methods of divine manifestation that were opposed to all true reason and good judgment. Awfully depraved as were those inventions by which God was brought into communication with man, yet those incarnations that embodied the idea of present divinities, however monstrous in their conception, truly told of a want that had showed itself from the earliest ages of the world. Now we say that the incarnation of Christ precisely met this want, while it eliminated from it everything that was im-

pure and unreasonable. The fact that Christ in a vicarious sense was the Redeemer of man, as well as his Redeemer by his holy example, and that both his sacrifice and his life were divine, is the one great miracle of miracles, the central fact of all facts, and the only thing that promised to solve the difficulties of man's existence in the world. It is impossible to hold converse with the philosophy of paganism, and study the writings of Homer, Plato, Socrates, Cicero, or Virgil, without finding that which told of the evil of sin, and that which manifested an earnest desire to know some way by which man might be delivered from the bondage that enthralled him.

Thus, Young, in his work upon the "Christ of History," has well remarked: "We cannot hope to discover, in the religions of mankind, the method of solving the deepest problem of Christianity, but it is quite possible that they may illustrate, perhaps confirm, the only satisfactory solution which has yet been suggested. In these religions, almost without exception, the idea of incarnation will be found under one form or another. It is related, that Paul and Barnabas, in the city of Lystra, were about to receive divine honors; Barnabas was to be worshiped as an incarnation of Jupiter, and Paul as an incarnation of Mercury. The people of Laconia cried, 'The gods have come down to us in the likeness of men.' The noticeable fact is, that this was not a new and strange thought to them, but an opportunity familiar and generally received, and which, therefore, at once occurred to them as affording an easy interpretation of what they had seen and heard in connection with the two foreigners. The numberless metamorphoses of the gods of ancient Greece and Rome, and in the Eastern world the incarnations of Brahm, the avatars of Vishnu, and the human form of Kreeshna, and its reappearance in successive ages, are significant and demonstrative on this subject. Among almost all nations, and from the earliest period of which any authentic record has been preserved down to our own times, the idea of God incarnating himself is found. But mankind do not *universally* and for successive ages adopt that which is *wholly*

false. On the most philosophical grounds it may be argued that the continued and wide acceptance of the notion of incarnation in the world, is decisive proof that it must have *some* basis of truth. The idea, indeed, if admitted by men at all, was manifestly for conscience and reason in their most reverent and subdued exercise, and not for imagination. It was too awfully sacred for imagination, even in its most chastened movements, to have approached. But imagination, unchastened, irreverent, impure, coarse, and wild, dared to violate this sanctity. The result we behold in the contradictions, absurdities, blasphemies, and offenses against all faith and religious feeling and taste of which the world is full."

"But, in spite of the humiliations and revolting facts of this kind which abound, it may be argued incontrovertibly that the idea itself of incarnation must, from its universality, have *some* basis of truth. One of two things, or both, may be legitimately presumed: either this idea is the traditionary vestige of some primitive revelation, or there must be some grand necessity of universal human nature which it is felt can be met only by the doctrine of incarnation in one form or other. The deep sense of such a necessity all nations and all times have proclaimed; and does not Christianity reveal the only actual provision which has been made to meet this universal want? It was a promise in the beginning, it was a hope and a faith in successive ages, and in the *fullness of the times* the promise was fulfilled, the faith and the hope were realized. Once for all a response worthy of God was given to the cry of humanity; once for all, to meet a grand necessity, to achieve what no otherwise could have been achieved for the redemption of man, God incarnated himself. The union of divinity with humanity is the only principle which harmonizes the outward facts and the moral aspects of the life of Jesus Christ. Disgusted with the absurdities and shocked by the impurities and impieties of mythological incarnations, conscience and reason find rest in *one incarnation for all time*."

"In the personal character of Christ, then, we have the

evidence not only of a higher *office*, but of a higher *nature*, than ever belonged to man; the evidence of an essential constitutional separation from all men, in him who was holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners; in Jesus, the Son of Mary, the words of the ancient oracle received their beautiful fulfillment: 'Unto us a child is born, unto us a son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulders; and his name shall be called Wonderful, Counselor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace.'"—ISAIAH, ix. 6.

The great central fact of all revelation is, that Christ is the Redeemer. In its comprehensive import it embodies, as has been seen, two essential ideas—first, Christ a perfect example; secondly, Christ a perfect sacrifice. Consequently, while the incarnation of the Son of God is in itself the profoundest of mysteries, it yet offers the only solution to the question involved in the reconciliation of man to God, and presents the only valid foundation for reason to build upon or faith to inspire to virtue. But the incarnation of Christ was the necessary condition of his expiation for sin, just as his perfect sacrifice is the only foundation for redemption.

Let us now view Christ under the aspect of a king. Here observe, kingship may or does have two spheres of existence—one exclusively of this world, the other of the next; one temporal, the other spiritual; one limited only to time, the other bounded only by eternity. Observe, then, that at the very commencement of Christ's ministry our Saviour studiously avoided the former kingship, and this resolution on many occasions flashed out with peculiar power. Not only did Christ not seek temporal power, wealth, fame, or influence, he upon every occasion avoided it. The precise difficulty with the Jews was simply that Christ would not assume worldly kingship. It mortified their pride, repelled their hopes, irritated beyond measure all their national vanity, to see Christ performing the works of a prophet of God, and yet avoiding and contemning that earthly position which the Jews reasonably thought he should take. Thus, we read, the

multitude sought to make Christ a king, but he would not be induced thus to be made their earthly master.

Christ disclaimed all pretensions of a worldly nature; he forbade his disciples to harbor the thought even that his kingdom was of this world, and to the Jews this was peculiarly vexatious. With ample credentials to place him in the highest earthly position, he yet promised his disciples only the contempt and persecution of the world. Now this attitude upon the part of Christ was the real cause of his rejection by the Jews. What they looked for was an earthly king; what they desired was one who would lead them on to victory and make the Roman nation let go its grasp upon their national life. A king was the very thing they dreamed of and most earnestly prayed for; it formed the absorbing subject of their thoughts, and was that which they expected the Messiah to be. And Christ boldly told the Jews he was a king; he asserted this before the judgment-seat of Pilate; he proclaimed it wherever he went; he died with his kingship prominent in his words and actions. But Christ, to be consistently a Redeemer, must be only a spiritual king; and no other kingship was in harmony with the great end of an atonement; and this spiritual kingship carried with it the two greatest of all attributes,—universality and eternity. It was a kingship for all ages, and a kingship for all conditions and races of men. It was world-wide and unending.

Such a kingship was of necessity spiritual, and demanded of all its subjects faith and love. Consequently, it was more far-reaching in its claims and ends as the obedience of the spirit, its affection and confidence, are infinitely superior to outward obedience, or submission to visible and worldly power. The kingship of Christ was of just that character that made it singularly appropriate to the object of his mission and the benefit of man. Christ did not seek any other influence over his disciples than that which proceeded from the voluntary homage of the heart and was the free expression of affection and confidence. Consequently, the kingdom of Christ differed altogether in the nature of the power em-

ployed from that of earthly kingdoms, which was simply the *law of force*, or the authority of the sword. This was the glory of Rome, of her Cæsars and her Herods and Pilates ; but the law of love was the propelling influence of Christ's kingdom. Its throne was in the spiritual nature of man, that comprehended the conscience, reason, and affection ; consequently, in all the civil relations of life, Christ uniformly abstained from any acts or words that would make him a party to any civil authority. He inculcated submission and obedience, while he would not be made a judge to indorse any party whatever in authority.

Thus, in the tribute-money, Christ laid down a rule of universal application, while with infinite wisdom he confined himself alone to that kingship which was spiritual. Nor was it possible, for the end in view, that Christ should combine temporal and spiritual power, an earthly and a heavenly kingship ; both must be kept distinct, for any alliance with the kingdoms of the world would be fatal to his great end of redemption from sin. This was chief in all the thoughts of Christ, and therefore his kingship must have enstamped upon it universality and eternity, and that only was consistent with its spirituality. But there was a sense where the condition of redemption was changed, when the cure of sin working inwardly had extended to that which was outward and bodily, where with the highest truth it may be said that the kingdom of Christ was sensible, visible, and of the world to come. Christ uniformly taught that he was not only a spiritual king, claiming the deepest homage of the heart, demanding obedience in all relations of life, and imposing sanctions that embraced three worlds, but that when the set time should come, that kingship would assume an outward and visible form, as in this life it was strictly spiritual and had its sway over only the mind and heart. Repeatedly did Christ take upon himself that which most significantly told of his royal authority ; but he also declared that the time would come when his kingship should be as sensible and visible as it had been spiritual, and that as truly would he be outwardly a king as then he was spiritually

unknown and unrecognized, except by those who in their hearts submitted to his divine authority; and the reason lay in the fact, that as the cure of sin was to commence inwardly and work outwardly, so also should Christ's reign correspond with the exact progress of redemption from its imperfect to its perfected condition.

Thus it will be seen that a true idea of the kingship of Christ is the very key-note to the understanding of his instructions to his disciples and his mission to save sinners. It has been seen that Christ had one great end in view, that absorbed all his thoughts and inspired to all his sacrifices. That end was redemption,—first of the soul, then of the body. Now, the assumption of an outward and earthly kingship would have defeated this end when our Saviour came into the world. It would, indeed, have exactly corresponded with the views and feelings of the Jews, but it would also have extinguished all those hopes built upon the universality and spirituality of his kingdom. Christ aimed in every way to disappoint and thwart the contracted and selfish views held of his kingship by the Jews. To gratify them was to sacrifice his mission. Consequently, our Redeemer studiously avoided all that favored the expectations of his countrymen. His mission was not for a nation, but for the world; and, therefore, the spirituality rather than the visible or outward manifestation of his kingdom was chiefly aimed at. What Christ sought after was, to convince all that an atonement for sin was inconsistent with worldly kingship; for redemption not only involved a cross upon the part of Christ, but also self-sacrifice upon that of his disciples. How incongruous with this, any other position than that which Christ actually took!

It will, therefore, be seen that the mission of Christ was peculiarly spiritual, even as sacrificial, and aimed at nothing less than making practicable and universal a way of reconciliation with God, and the very reason that led the Jews to reject Christ was the highest reason, rightly considered, for receiving him. The difficulty with the Jew was, that in interpreting the prophets no true distinction was made

between the first and the second coming of Christ ; but the Old, even as the New Testament, made a world-wide difference in these two great and most momentous events. The first coming of Christ must, of necessity, be that of humiliation, while his second coming had only the marks of regal triumph and supremacy. Christ's first coming was more to secure the great end of a perfect priesthood, while his second coming involved especially the idea of a perfect kingship ; and yet the kingdom of Christ was as real in his first as it will be in his second coming, only it will then be both spiritual and visible and possess all those characteristics that will adapt it for a sphere of existence altogether different. Consequently, we see the consummate wisdom Christ always displayed when the subject of his kingship was alluded to.

In this world everything earthly and sensual was eliminated from it, because it was not of this earth ; it coveted neither its favors nor trembled beneath its frowns ; it borrowed not one feature in common with the kingdoms of this life ; it presented a marked contrast to everything that attracted the admiration and love of worldly characters, and sought only to reveal itself as spiritual and universal. The very comprehensiveness of the spirit embodied in it was fatal to the hopes of the Jews ; and, while they aimed only to secure that which was national, Christ thought only of that which was designed for all men and all ages. And here notice a most singular and extraordinary evidence of the divine character of our Saviour's mission : it was not only absolutely original in its conception, but in its execution. It borrowed nothing of the age he lived in, it appealed to none of the hopes common to mankind, it resorted to none of those measures essential for securing the prizes of earth. We find nothing in the life or instructions of Christ that would give the least idea of being a copy from any human original. Christ was his own original. Nothing like him ever before appeared on this earth, and nothing in all subsequent ages has ever assumed the lineaments of his person. And the distinguishing peculiarity of the life of Christ consisted in his reserve both of power and knowledge. It was this that filled his disciples

with such admiration and awe. They saw Christ giving at times, for most beneficent ends, the most amazing evidence of power, and, yet while subject to the wants of humanity, taking nothing for himself; ever willing to do good to others, but never solicitous to appropriate even needful comforts for his own person. He walked the ground a living embodiment of all that was unselfish and generous. The Lamb of God was the appropriate designation of his character. In that form of divinest workmanship there were stores of inexhaustible knowledge, even as power. And yet the reticence of Christ was quite as extraordinary as his hours of instruction. Our Saviour never deviated from one great end, even that of the redemption of body and soul, and his kingship in the age of his first advent was just that which corresponded to the actual wants of the world. A kingdom of love, as distinguished from a kingdom of force, was the leading feature of Christ's spiritual reign, and in the very principles which marked its development and the moral triumphs which followed in its progress there was revealed an infinite superiority to all the kingdoms of this earth.

CHAPTER IV.

EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES.

WE define a miracle to be a *visible sign given directly and intelligently to man from God, to show the suspension of a law of nature*, or that God has interposed his power to control the established course of nature. We consider miracles that are real as strictly supernatural, or something above human or angelic power, but we do not mean to comprehend in miracles all signs, or wonders, or that even which is not human. We would not call the agency of good or bad angels miraculous, although superhuman. Nor do we mean to say that there may be no cases on record where God permits things to be done which may not have very much the appearance of miracles; but what we do mean to say is, that when God works miracles they are so clearly defined, they come under such circumstances and for such occasions, that show them distinctly to be from him, and not from any creature source.

We do not purpose so much to investigate what may be miraculous, or what is the extent of miracles, as to confine our remarks to that which all must admit to proceed from a visible interposition of God, of such a nature as to be impossible to be performed by any creature, or to take place according to the known course of nature.

The question now is, Is there any probability that God would work miracles to substantiate a revelation of his will? We reply, that it is in the highest degree probable that God would give such credentials to his will. Consider the end to be attained unto. The infinite Being who holds all natural law in his hands, can, whenever he sees fit, either break in upon their uniformity, or so control them, or introduce in connection with them other laws, as to secure the great re-

sult of miracle, so sensible as to strike conviction of their divine origin in the dullest minds. The simple question to consider is, Does not the Bible, revealing Christ the Saviour of sinners, a future state of rewards and punishments, the judgment and the resurrection, need miracles as suitable credentials with mankind? The question is not whether there is evidence enough without miracles to authorize us to believe and obey the Bible, but whether, constituted as men are, without miracles the Bible would be believed in, or be received as from God. What men should do, and what they will do, are two questions altogether different. How could Christ prove, without miracles, to the Jews his divine mission? How, without miracles, in the early days of Christianity, could it have made way against the opposition and unbelief of the world? How could Moses have delivered from Egypt the Israelites, without the miraculous interposition of God? But more than this, the Bible comes to us denouncing the severest punishment to those who reject it and do not in their hearts receive the great author of Christianity. Why such severity of punishment, if so important and conclusive credentials as miracles are not given?

Christ even rested also his claims as the Son of God upon miracles. He openly said that he was not to be believed in unless he did the works that no other man could do, *works* above all human or angelic power, works that God only could perform, who alone controls nature's laws, and can break in upon their undeviating uniformity. Considering the greatness of the end to be accomplished, considering that the very existence of Christianity depended upon miracles, is it not highly probable that God would work them? Consider the adaptation of the Bible to our wants: why then should we not have the royal seal of its divine origin? Here is a watch: it is well made, every wheel is in its place, every part is adjusted to its separate office, nothing is absent but the hands to point out the minutes and the hours: why should not those hands be given to the watch? They go to complete one great design: why not given?

Now, here is a revelation of a great system of redemption

perfectly adapted to all our wants, but it needs credentials that it has come from God, credentials of such a nature that if *wanting*, millions who receive the Bible as divine would reject to their ruin. Admitting the existence of an infinitely powerful, wise, and good God, is it not in the highest degree probable they would be given? God is able to work miracles; there is then no want of power thus to do. God is infinitely wise to secure the great end of redemption; there is, then, every probability upon the side of wisdom that miracles would be worked. God is as good as he is powerful and wise; there is, then, in his mercy, the strongest presumption that there will be miracles.

But Christ, professing himself to be from God, and God manifest in the flesh, repeatedly declaring his mission divine, proposing to himself the amazing end of the redemption of the soul forever and the salvation of the world, of necessity based the great evidence of his supernatural advent to this earth upon miracles; he boldly asserted that if he did not the works that no man could do, then he was not entitled to belief, while he denounced the severest condemnation upon those who would not believe upon him, simply because they refused to credit that which could not with reason be denied. Now, the whole mission of Christ, the age in which he appeared, the violent enemies encountered, and all the obstacles so formidable to be mastered, made miracles of the utmost importance to the success of Christianity: is it not most reasonable to suppose that such credentials would be granted by an all-powerful, wise, and merciful God?

The great reason why many reject miracles arises from two errors: first, overlooking the fact of a personal God of infinite freedom and power, holding all laws in complete subjection to his will, the absolute originator of all existence, and its laws, material and immaterial; and then in believing in no other laws but the laws of nature, and the eternity of their duration, even as undeviating uniformity. Consequently, when miracle is spoken of, they say, Will God violate his own laws, will he act against nature, will he ordain a method of operation in nature, and yet counteract it?

But all this reasoning springs from a false view of nature. Nature is made for a certain end; but suppose a higher end is to be secured, will nature, by its uniformity of laws *uninterrupted*, be permitted by God to defeat this end? Will God be so dependent upon his own workmanship as not to show to his creatures his superiority to it?

As theists, we cannot limit God to the exclusive sphere of his natural laws. God must have a sphere of action above those laws, and able, whenever some great and wise end is to be secured, to take away the veil of nature, remove the thick folds of its garment, and show visibly and nakedly, without any obstructing medium, the glittering sign of his awful presence. But more than this: we contend that if miracles are not in accordance with the existing laws of nature, they may be in perfect harmony with other laws. If God suspends one kind of law, it may be to introduce another and superior kind of law; and if creating power has existed in the past ages of the world, and does now, and will ever, exist with God, then certainly it is most absurd to say that the Almighty has not controlling, suspending, regulating, or counteracting power. If God can make a world, he can make it move as he pleases.

Did the Bible contain idle fables, absurd contradictions, immoral instructions; did it approve of theft, profanity, avarice, pride, deceit, impurity, murder; was its general scope in favor of selfishness, or parental or civil disobedience, a disposition lawless of human or divine restraints, such a Bible would have an internal evidence that it was not from God, that would, in the highest degree, make miracles in its confirmation improbable, and even impossible. But from an examination of the general scope of the Bible, and its adaptation to elevate and bless man, we find directly the reverse. Such being the case, with a revelation worthy of miracles, and needing miracles to make it to be received, where the slightest improbability of miracles? Where is there the least evidence, from the uniformity of nature's laws, that miracles would not be given, considering the end to be attained?

Let it be remembered we are arguing as theists, not

atheists. We believe in a personal God infinitely higher than natural law, in his power able to work miracles, and from his wisdom and goodness disposed thus to do, provided there is an end to be attained unto worthy of the breaking in upon the uniformity of natural law. Christianity presents itself as such an end. Everything depends, in its reception, upon miracles. There are the mightiest obstacles to be overcome, the most formidable corruption of human nature and the world. Where, then, the improbability that God's ambassador to this earth should bring the royal seal of his divine commission? Is there not, then, the highest moral certainty that if such an ambassador does come to man, he will have the seal of heaven to make evident his divine origin?

There can, then, be no presumptive evidence against the miracles of Christianity simply from the uniformity of natural law? This uniformity is the very thing that constitutes the idea of a miracle. Were this uniformity broken in upon every day miracles would become common events, and lose all their value; but worse than this, all certainty, and all the plain rules of living and thinking, would be deranged, natural law would lose all its importance, and confusion reign triumphant. God, who does nothing without a wise end, has made, therefore, miracles of rare occurrence, and only at great epochs of time and emergency of events. Miracles are the reverse movement of the great engine of God's providence. They constitute an indispensable check to natural law. They mark the signal sovereignty of God over law, and reveal a far grander power behind the mighty machinery of the universe, by which God, at fit times, interposes to accomplish his vast purposes of wisdom.

While, therefore, under common circumstances and on ordinary occasions miracles are the most improbable of events, and ought not to be believed in, yet, in extraordinary emergencies, when certain occasions of vast moment transpire, they are of all things the most probable. Thus, we find, with the great multitude of Christians, the strongest proof of the validity of miracles consists in the adaptation of the Bible to

their wants; and because of their absolute necessity to substantiate the divine mission of Christ a supernatural revelation must have a supernatural proof. Christ, if true in his words, must be true in his works. If his veracity is to be believed in, then the miraculous evidence of that veracity must be credited. Miracles are to be believed, not only upon the ground that a most wise and beneficent end was secured by them, but because the truthfulness of Christianity hangs upon them.

The ethics of the Bible all depend upon its proofs, and its proofs upon its ethics. The supernatural is the foundation upon which the whole system of redemption rests.

How certain, then, that God will work miracles when some great end is to be attained by them; some end honorable to God, and in harmony with the noblest interests of man. This is not only theologically true, but true also to science. We assert that whatever science does say upon miraculous interpositions at great epochs of time is all upon the side of revelation, and corresponds altogether with the view, that whenever some mighty end was to be attained unto that natural law could not reach, that end was consummated by miracles, by the setting aside of natural law, or by the direct interposition of God. Thus, in the solid stratas of the earth are piled, with the regularity of shelves in a book-case, immense masses of different orders of animals, commencing with the inferior type of animal organization and going up to the highest rank of creatures below man, reptiles, fishes, birds, and quadrupeds. This earth shows unmistakable evidence of the uniformity of natural law being broken in upon, that there were epochs of time when changes took place that can be accounted for by no system of gradual development according to law, but only by a sudden, direct, and violent interruption of law and miraculous interposition of God.

But we have an additional evidence from reason to believe that natural law may be suspended and miracle intervene. Suppose natural law either could not, or would not, in its uniformity, at any time be suspended; suppose its course was so undeviating that no end to be accomplished, however

worthy, would avail to have it suspended,—where the visible evidence to man of the sovereignty of God over matter? But worse than this; would not law be deified at the expense of God? Would not God be forever forgotten by sinners when they never saw nature's uniformity broken in upon? Here it is that miracles, under some circumstances, are so necessary and so probable. Here it is that we find God teaching man lessons alike of his omnipotence and his wisdom. We come, then, to the conclusion, that so exalted is the end Christianity is designed to subserve, so worthy the object that it aims to secure, that *miracles* are not only in the highest degree probable, but necessary.

Upon what ground are we then to believe that miracles by God have been worked to give credit to the claims of revelation? There are but two possible grounds,—that of sight, of actual observation ourselves, and that of the testimony of others. But it is more than eighteen hundred years since Christ died: more than three thousand years since the wonders of Egypt and the giving the law upon Sinai: more than four thousand years since the flood. Upon what ground, but that of testimony, can we believe in these miracles? Personal observation of these miracles, to us, is out of the question. In what way can we believe in them, if not by testimony? There are those who have said, "We will not believe a miracle unless we can see it." A French infidel once said, "Why does not God show an evidence of miracles by writing his name upon the sky?" Suppose God should do just what the folly of some would have him do, work miracles every day and before all mankind for their convenience: what would be the result? First, there being only the unworthy end to accomplish of gratifying an idle curiosity, the highest evidence of the genuineness of Bible miracles would be taken away; and secondly, these events so common would interrupt all the harmony of natural laws and break up the whole system of nature's uniformity. Confusion would take the place of order, and uncertainty derange all human foresight. Who would travel, if the certainty was as great of going backward as forward? Who would eat, if

there was a probability as strong of starving on food as receiving benefit from it? Is it not most unreasonable, then, to demand of God miracles, when there is neither a worthy end to be reached, nor benefit secured?

When it can be shown that natural law is unable to secure the end that miracle does, that some great epoch in human history has come making necessary the interposition of God, when it can be shown that nature is utterly helpless to secure the noblest welfare of man, and that the highest moral considerations demand the manifestation of the supernatural, then the evidence of testimony is of the greatest value. A celebrated infidel, of more acuteness than wit, and more sophistry than wisdom, had the presumption in an essay upon miracles to say that "no amount of testimony could prove the miracles of the Bible,—that experience was greater against them than for them." Upon the atheist's ground, or that of the pantheist, that there is no God in distinction from his works, no independent Being infinitely above and separate from nature, or that nature itself is God, the opponents of Hume could not fairly reply to his arguments; he might well say that the experience of man in the uniformity of natural law should outweigh all evidence to the contrary. But there was another ground, where a child might contend with the greatest of skeptics and come off a victor,—it was that of theism,—the existence of a personal God superior to all law; one who had the power to interrupt his laws, or suspend them, or to introduce other and higher laws, and the wisdom thus to do whenever some worthy and glorious end was to be subserved by thus acting. All argument is thrown away with a man upon miracles who does not recognize and feel the reality of an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God. That admitted, and then we can take up all testimony for the miracles of revelation with as little embarrassment as the testimony that is given to us to prove the existence of Alexander, or Cæsar, or Napoleon, especially when we show the necessity of the Bible for the wants of man, and its adaptation for the human family in all ages, and the wise and benevolent end that the miracles of the Bible are designed to secure.

Our argument is then narrowed down to the simple point, Have we good testimony for the miracles of the Bible? To this we reply, more conclusive, more irresistible, more confirmed by friends and foes, than can be given of any facts of ancient history uninspired.

It is no small evidence of the genuineness of the Bible miracles that, after more than eighteen centuries of the most searching scrutiny, millions of the human race, all through this long interval of time, have believed in them. Who are those millions? Are they found among the ignorant or most enlightened, of mankind? Are they of the wisest and best, or are they seen among the dullest and worst, of men? Nothing can be more evident than that where Christianity prevails, and is most from the heart received, there exists the strongest faith in miracles as recorded in the Bible, and there is shown the highest type of whatever is noble, and pure, and intelligent.

One thing is certain; if Christianity is anything, it is that which is supernatural, and if its miracles are removed we take from it all that makes it a religion for sinners. Eliminate from the Bible its divine element, and we have nothing left but a residuum of rationalism, as empty of all power to benefit man as the teachings of any heathen moralist. It can be shown that no false religion could go through the ordeal of the Bible.

Mohammed never dared to base the reception of the Koran upon miracles. Coming in the darkest age of the world, and among a people the most credulous, yet even this most successful of impostors never presumed to work miracles, or his followers to believe that he did. But the Bible rests the evidence of its divinity, and its claim to be loved and received, upon miracles. Christ came with the words ever upon his lips, "Believe not unless I do the works no other man can do." Our Saviour rested his mission upon miracles. This was the test he offered to all. Is it possible that the Jews, in the most enlightened age, never would have found out the deception, if no miracles were worked? Is it possible that when Christ was arraigned for trial before the

Jewish Sanhedrim and the Roman governor, no charge would have been brought against him of attempting to deceive by false miracles, if indeed Christ worked no miracles?

Now, the great fact that is ever to be borne in mind respecting the miracles of the Bible, is simply this: they come under circumstances and upon occasions essentially different from all false miracles or wonders. It is the moral element connected with Scripture miracles that makes them so probable. It is because they are worked for no frivolous end; they come when the necessities of man really demand; they appear at those epochs of time when the impotence of natural law is self-evident; where God is needed to interpose with a visible demonstration of his power, to flash conviction upon the mind. Consequently, the marked feature of the Bible miracles is their *necessity*, and their peculiar adaptation for the end proposed of confirming the truth of the word of God. Observe, in contrast to real miracles, the false miracles professed at different periods of the world to be worked. If there were false Messiahs in the age immediately preceding the downfall of the Jewish race and their dispersion over the world, predicted by Christ himself, with equal truth there have been false miracles to impose upon the people; but there are tests always to discriminate between gold that is *gold* and gold that has *only the appearance of it*. The false miracles bore upon the face of them, as well as carried about in their very nature, the clearest proof of being but *counterfeits*. They were wanting altogether in the *moral element* that marks all the Bible miracles. Then the circumstances under which they took place were favorable for deception; then the character of the persons who professed to work them was such as would naturally awaken suspicion; and, to crown the whole, not a solitary case in all history can be shown, outside of the Bible, of the *raising of the dead*, the walking upon the waves of the sea, the feeding of five thousand people upon a few loaves and fishes, or making the winds and elements of nature instantly obedient to a word. Remember, it is not so much the miracles of the Bible in their number as in their *significant nature* that shows their infinite distance

from all other miracles. Magicians, like the priests of Egypt, with their enchantments may turn their rods into serpents, or what appear to be serpents; but *remember*, Aaron's rod, that swallowed them all up, is the genuine miracle.

Now the Vespasianic wonders Hume speaks of as "among the best attested miracles in all profane history," or that related by the Cardinal de Retz, of a man recovering his leg by *the rubbing of holy oil upon the stump*, or that of the cures effected at the tomb of Abbé Paris, all carry with them the marks of base coin. No miracles except those of the Bible can for a moment stand the test of a sound and searching criticism. Utterly deficient in the moral element, they come in a way so unnatural, are witnessed, too, where deception is so easy, and profess an end so unworthy of God, that the true miracles appear in contrast like the sun at noonday, making infinitely insignificant the poor rush-lights of human pride and presumption.

Our first idea of a *true miracle* is, that while it comes under the supernatural, yet it is the most marked and peculiar action of the supernatural. It is just that agency of God that he makes use of only on those few and most momentous occasions where a necessity exists for something altogether different from any other mode of the supernatural. Can any person say that in the government of God he may not see exigencies where the interposition of miracle would be most wise and benevolent? Take creation: what law of nature, we ask, where there is no law of nature? What natural acting, where the natural does not exist? We talk of laws, and laws of nature, often without understanding anything that is meant by laws. In ninety-nine cases in a hundred, it is only convenient phraseology to cover up our ignorance of the whole subject. To make that to exist which never existed before, is the highest exercise of the supernatural, and such as most appropriately we call miraculous. It is miraculous in two important senses: the giving of a new nature, and then new laws to that nature. It means simply acting differently from any previously existing laws of nature, and then, so far as any laws that do exist, in opposition to

those laws. When God makes something from nothing, or creates a new nature, he is not restricted to the dictionary of an old nature for the methods of his action. God is not so limited in his resources that he can only help himself to something that formerly existed, and act exclusively after those old processes that have once been in operation. Those old processes would not do in a new creation, and, if they might do, they would only be resorted to upon the ground simply of being the best that could be made use of.

Our second idea of miracle is, that God never wastes almightiness in it. Ability to work and working are two very different things. There is no waste with God. What may be fashioned out of the old he takes, and what cannot he supplies. The laws of nature in existence that may be used he does thus use, and to that which cannot be used he imparts new. Man may throw away the crumbs that fall from his table, but God has some use for everything. Accordingly, the miraculous will correspond in its development and frequency with the actual wants of the universe and the counsel of God after his own method of justice, benevolence, and wisdom.

Our third idea of miracle is, that it is introduced just where and when the laws of nature are wanting, and is especially that form of the supernatural, and that recuperative energy of God's action that exists when the old nature is run out, or when a *new* nature must be made. Thus, the law of birth and death never can introduce the resurrection state. The old nature has in it nothing to bring about a resurrection body; no existing law in nature can accomplish this. The resurrection is a new nature to the body, raised from the grave with new laws and new ends of existence. This great miracle, substantiated by the resurrection of Christ, is introduced to bring about that which never before existed, as well as to incorporate into the new body what has existed. The reason for this miracle lies in the fact that the old nature is utterly inadequate, by any process of law, to produce the resurrection body; it is not only above the sphere of the natural, but really in opposition to processes that exist

in the natural, so that miracle comes in, as in creation, to secure a result that is not only divine but in the highest degree transcends all creature power. Miracle is essential for two great ends: first, the creating of the substance of all things material and immaterial, bringing into being all the existences outside that of God; and secondly, acting as the infinite recuperative energy of the universe in securing that which nature herself is unable to secure. Much as we may admire that recuperative energy in nature acting in accordance with established laws, by which injuries are repaired to the body, and the human system recovers from the power of disease, yet there is a sense where nature itself dies out and must be not so much repaired as made over again under new laws and conditions of being. Now here is a recuperative energy, not imparted to the machinery of nature, not incorporated in any method of its own action, but above it and without it, where no second causes have sway and where alone God works. This energy is revealed in creative epochs of time, and when the cyclical ages have run out.

Our fourth idea of miracle is, that it takes place at those periods of time most suitable for securing the great end of divine wisdom and goodness, *and, therefore, can be known only to God himself.* Our human reason must be in accordance with the laws of the natural, and we can only infer the contrary when God speaks and points out the way. If it is said that miracle, as defined, implies that God has not made nature as it should be made, and that it throws a reflection upon his wisdom in not giving to nature and its laws power to secure what miracle does, the reply is, God never meant that nature, even as the principle of second causes, should do everything in the universe, God never intended that his own sovereignty should be thrown into the shade by any action of natural law.

Our fifth idea of miracle is, that while we may not be able to trace it to any natural law, yet it may, for aught we know, be as truly under laws above nature as those effects that take place through natural law in the plane of nature. No person can say that God may not have a law of working of exact in-

variability, under like circumstances, as truly as in any natural law ; and therefore, when miracle is spoken of as in violation of the laws of nature, or opposition to them, then the one who thus objects to miracles must show, to be consistent, that God has no other laws but those in the line of nature, and that nature itself is eternal ; he must show that nature needs no interposition of the supernatural, and that when God made any nature it was for an existence without end.

But we contend that immortality is the gift of God ; it is something outside of nature, and, in itself, exclusively within the sphere of the supernatural. There has never, apart from the word of God, been any valid reason for affirming immortality to mind or matter. This condition must be the result of those circumstances and effects brought about by a divine power, and not through the simple influence of natural law. We know that the soul is immortal, not because of its own inherent power of endless life, but through the supernatural energy of God in securing it to the soul ; and we know the body, under certain conditions, to be also immortal, because it is brought about by the miraculous energy of God. When, then, nature dies out, when all the powers of the natural fail to secure certain results intended by God, miracle comes in, not in violation of natural law, for natural law goes as far as it can and then stops, but in accordance with the higher law of the supernatural after the purpose of the Deity. God, then, has a place for miracles in the universe just as truly as a place for natural law, but that place is not to be found in nature, but in a sphere of activity immeasurably above it. It will be seen that, in nature, laws that are of invariable action to a certain extent are suspended, or other laws introduced, as the law of contraction by cold or expansion by heat, operating with invariable certainty through the whole realm of nature ; but in the case of the freezing of water at a certain point the reverse actually takes place, and expansion by cold follows, while in that of steam or vapor a like deviation from the law of contraction by cold, or expansion by heat, follows. Now, miracle, to secure a certain end, may be as truly in accordance with a law above nature, having its activity in the

direct working of God himself, as any deviation in nature from a general law. How can a person consistently object to miracle who admits creation? How can one say that miracles are impossible, or improbable, who sees prevailing through all nature the great principle of birth and death; who cannot show, by any deduction of reason or fact of science, an inherent immortality in anything connected with the inorganic or organic kingdom? How unphilosophical to speak of that as unreasonable, because it takes place after no natural law, but in a sphere immeasurably above it! Because we know some laws, is not the inference foolish that we know *all laws*? If nature, left to itself, must fail, is it not unwise to suppose that God has no other resources in reserve, and that, in a way best known to him, he cannot bring about effects such as miracles to show his own perfect sovereignty over nature, and the infinite ease with which he secures the vast ends of his wisdom and benevolence?

In all the miracles recorded in the Old and New Testament, how true the words of Paul: "God also bearing them witness, both with signs and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will."

CHAPTER V.

MIRACLES OF CHRIST.

WERE four separate witnesses to record facts seen by them, the highest evidence of truth to us would be, with variety of language and diversity in minute details, an exact agreement in every essential circumstance. Precisely the same have we in the four narratives of the life and miracles of Christ. Their agreement in every important particular shows their veracity, and their variety of style and unimportant discrepancies evince that they had no collusion between them, and that each narrative is an independent treatise.

Let us contemplate, in relation to the miracles of Christ, four things :

1. What were these miracles ?
2. The age in which they were worked.
3. How Christ's miracles differed from all other miracles.
4. The impossibility of deception either in the Author of these miracles or those who recorded them.

Our object is only to mention them in the order which Trench, in his valuable work on miracles, has given, while the student of miracles is directed to this work, and others on the same subject, in connection with a careful perusal of the four Evangelists, for a fuller knowledge of the details and the circumstances connected with their working.

1. The water made wine.
2. The healing of the nobleman's son.
3. The first miraculous draught of fishes.
4. The stilling of the tempest.
5. The demoniacs in the country of the Gadarenes.
6. The raising of Jairus's daughter.
7. The woman with the issue of blood.
8. The opening of the eyes of the blind in the house.

9. The healing of the paralytic.
10. The cleansing of the leper.
11. The healing of the centurion's servant.
12. The demoniacs in the synagogues of Capernaum.
13. The healing of Simon's wife's mother.
14. The raising of the widow's son.
15. The healing of the impotent man at Bethesda.
16. The miraculous feeding of five thousand.
17. The walking on the sea.
18. The opening of the eyes of one born blind.
19. The restoring of the man with a withered hand.
20. The woman with a spirit of infirmity.
21. The healing of a man with a dropsy.
22. The cleansing of the ten lepers.
23. The healing of the daughter of the Syrophenician woman.
24. The healing of one deaf and dumb.
25. The miraculous feeding of four thousand.
26. The opening of the eyes of two blind men at Bethsaida.
27. The healing of the lunatic child.
28. The stater in the fish's mouth.
29. The raising of Lazarus.
30. The opening of the eyes of two blind men near Jericho.
31. The withering of the fruitless fig-tree.
32. The healing of Malchus's ear.
33. The second miraculous draught of fishes

Observe, that while the circumstances under which these miracles were worked clearly show a supernatural power, there were yet some of more marked significance than others, and which could not possibly be mistaken for anything less than a most wonderful interposition of God, in showing a divine superiority to all natural law, and the counteraction of it in such a way as to prove the reality of the Messiahship of Christ. Remember, the miracles worked were not only for a most beneficent end, but absolutely necessary to substantiate the claims of Christ for the belief of all and the

obedience of all. The question before the Jews was simply, Is Christ the true Messiah? Is his assertion that he was the Son of God, even as the Son of man, in a peculiar and most extraordinary sense, founded on reality and deserving to be universally trusted in? Now, the credentials to prove this were miracles. If Moses needed miracles to show his mission from God and impose laws upon the Jews, much more did Christ need miracles to impose laws upon the world and prove his Sonship with the Father. The mission of Moses bore no comparison in importance to the mission of Christ. Moses introduced the legal dispensation, Christ the Christian dispensation. Moses was simply human, Christ was divine; the one was set apart for a nation only, the other for all nations. Consequently, the significancy of the mission of Christ constituted in itself the highest reason for miracles. Without them the claims of Christ could not be sustained. All the predictions concerning Christ were of the nature to demand miracles. The prophets foretold that the Messiah would work them; and, as the belief in this was universal among the Jews, miracles constituted in that age the strongest evidence of the truthfulness of his mission.

Some of the miracles of Christ were of such a character that we read the people were beyond measure astonished, saying, "He hath done all things well." Observe, especially, the miracle of feeding five thousand at one time, and four thousand at another, with a few loaves and fishes, and the baskets full of fragments taken up after this astonishing exhibition of supernatural power. Observe the walking of Christ upon the waves of the sea, the instant stilling of the tempest, the cleansing of the ten lepers, the opening of the eyes of one born blind, the raising of the widow's son, and the raising of Lazarus. Consider the end for which the miracles of Christ were worked, and the character of his instructions, and it will be found that they were indispensable for the proof of his divine mission. They were the most efficient instruments to prove the authority of his instructions, and to show to his disciples that they were under a teacher deserving of their most sincere attachment and obedience.

What, then, was the age in which they were worked? This age was the very period of the world most unfavorable for deception. The prevailing spirit was formalism and skepticism. The ruling class among the Jews was that of the Pharisees and the Sadducees. The former were the bigots of Judea, the latter the infidels. One buried up in senseless ceremonies and forms the true religion, the other were skeptical of all religion. One made void the law through the *vain traditions* of the elders, the other in practice repudiated the law. The religious convictions of both classes never penetrated beneath the mere shell of devotion, and, with but few exceptions, true piety was almost unknown in Judea. Never, perhaps, did infidelity, which denied the most fundamental truths of the Old Testament, or formalism, which covered them all up in the rubbish of superstition, abound more than when the Son of God came to his own and his own received him not.

The age when Christ came was peculiarly an enlightened age as contrasted with preceding ages. Thus, the Son of God came constantly in contact with the mind of the nation, fully awake, and disposed narrowly to examine into all claims for a homage and obedience that professed to derive their authority from God alone. It will also be remembered that the Jewish nation was then under Roman sway. The Jews desired nothing so much as a king to throw off this hateful bondage; and the Messiah that should assert a spiritual kingship, while he would disclaim all worldly power or intention of coming in conflict with a foreign power, would by this awaken most effectually the hostility of the ruling class among the Jews, and secure only the enmity or contempt of the nation. Now, the very fact that Christ declared that his kingdom was not of this world, and that he would have nothing to do in opposing the dominion of foreigners, made it a task a thousandfold more difficult to convince the Jews of his Messiahship and secure their confidence. Christ placed himself directly in opposition to all the prejudices and all the cherished hopes of the people. Is it possible that the miracles of Christ under a test so severe would not be at once ex-

posed, if indeed *not* real? It is natural to admit what falls in with our feelings and our aspirations; but is it not hard to confess to the truth of that which is opposed to the most loved idols of the heart? Now, Christ worked his miracles under such conditions that failure would in any instance have been eagerly seized upon by his enemies as an argument to prove the falsity of his claims. Enemies that ascribed his miracles to Beelzebub because they were compelled to confess their truth, would have infinitely preferred to have attributed them to imposture, if the charge could be sustained. Enemies that accused him of blasphemy, and constrained, by their malignant devices, the Roman governor to order his crucifixion, would have felt it a signal triumph to show that Christ had deceived the people by false miracles.

But it should be always borne in mind that they uniformly confessed to the truth of his miracles, while they attributed them to the wrong source. Christ silenced his deadly foes by saying that Satan would not fight against himself, or willingly encourage an enemy in his own house to destroy his kingdom. But the all-important fact, as proving with the Jews at that age of the world the truthfulness of Christ's miracles, is seen in that they were opposed to Jesus, not upon the ground that he worked no miracles, but that he claimed only a spiritual dominion and was not disposed to interfere with the Roman power. Rather than submit to such a Messiah, they would welcome any impostor that flattered their national vanity and professed himself willing to deliver them from a foreign yoke.

Observe, also, how Christ's miracles differed from all other miracles.

First. In their number. Our Saviour worked miracles far more numerous than Moses, or any other person mentioned in the Bible. His miracles were all crowded into a period of about three years; and yet how were those three years filled up with a brilliant succession of mighty works! Most truly with the public ministry of Christ did there appear the epoch of miracles. The end was worthy of this display of

almighty power. Miracles flashed before the people with a distinctness and genuineness that could not be denied. Friends and foes were alike forced to confess the mighty deeds of Jesus. Christ challenged investigation, he worked his miracles in a way so clear and so convincing that unbelief itself had to attribute them to Beelzebub, and the deepest enmity must torture them into the working of Satan. Now, the miracles of Christ were so numerous that finally the only alternative left the Jews was submission or crucifixion. Hatred itself could see no other way than believing in a spiritual Messiah or killing him; but even this last resort of wickedness could not succeed unless every form of justice was made a mockery, and the night rather than the day was made to witness their deeds of darkness and the treachery of Judas.

Second. All of Christ's miracles (remarks Trench) were worked with the utmost freedom and ease. "How different, in this respect, from the miracles of Moses and Elijah and Elisha and others! Christ speaks but the word, and it is done. Thus Moses must plead and struggle with God, 'Heal her now, O God, I beseech thee,' ere the plague of leprosy is removed from his sister, and not even so can he instantly win the blessing; but Christ heals a leper by his touch, and ten with even less than this,—merely by the power of his will and at a distance. Elijah must pray long, and his servant go up seven times, before tokens of the rain appear; he also stretches himself thrice on the child and cries unto the Lord, and painfully wins back his life. And Elisha with even more effort, and only after partial failure, restores the child of the Shunnamite to life. But Christ shows himself the Lord of the living and the dead, raising the dead with as much ease as he performed the commonest transactions of life. Moses shows impatience, but Christ reveals no imperfection in any miracle."

Third. "Where also," says Trench, "the miracles are similar in kind, his are larger and freer and more glorious. Elisha feeds a hundred men with twenty loaves, but he five thousand with five. They have continually their instrument

of power to which the wonder-working power is linked. Moses has his rod, his staff of wonder, to divide the Red Sea and to accomplish his other mighty acts, without which he is nothing; his tree to heal the bitter waters; Elijah divides the waters with his mantle; Elisha heals the spring with a cruse of salt. But Christ accomplishes his miracles simply by the agency of his word, or by a touch; or, if he takes anything as a channel of his healing power, it is from himself he takes it; or should he, as once he does, use any foreign medium (JOHN, ix. 6), yet by other miracles of like kind, in which he has recourse to no such extraneous helps, he declares plainly that this was a free choice, and not of any necessity."

Fourth. "While their miracles and those of the apostles are ever done in the name of, and with the attribution of the glory to, another, 'Stand still and see the salvation of the Lord, which he will show you;' 'In the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, rise up and walk;' 'Eneas, Jesus Christ maketh thee whole;' his are ever wrought in his own name and as in his own power. '*I will*, be thou clean.' 'Thou deaf and dumb spirit, I charge thee come out of him.' 'Young man, I say unto thee, Arise.' Even when he prays, being about to perform one of his mighty works, his disciples shall learn, even from his prayer itself, that herein he is asking for a power which he had not indwelling in him, but indeed is only testifying thus to the unbroken oneness of his life with his Father's, just as on another occasion he will not suffer his disciples to suppose that it is for any but for their sakes that the testimony from heaven is borne unto him. Thus needful was it for them, thus needful for all, that they should have great and exclusive thoughts of him, and should not class him with any other, even the greatest and the holiest of the children of men."

Trench, in comparing the evangelical with other cycles of miracles, with great truth remarks:

"We do not find miracles sown broadcast over the whole of the Old Testament history, but they all cluster round a very few eminent persons, and have reference to certain

great epochs and crises of the kingdom of God. Abraham, the father of the faithful, David, the great theocratic king, Daniel, the ‘man greatly beloved,’ are alike entirely without them, that is, they *do* no miracles; such may be accomplished in behalf of them, but they themselves accomplish none. In fact, there are but two great outbursts of these: the first, at the establishing of the kingdom under Moses and Joshua, on which occasion it is at once evident that they could not have been wanting; the second, in the time of Elijah and Elisha, and then also there was utmost need, when it was a question whether the court religion which the apostate kings of Israel had set up should not quite overbear the true worship of Jehovah, when the Levitical priesthood was established and the faithful were but a scattered few among the ten tribes. Then, in that decisive epoch of the kingdom’s history, the two great prophets—they, too, in a subordinate sense, the beginners of a new period—arose, equipped with powers that should witness that He whose servants *they* were was the God of Israel, however Israel might refuse to acknowledge *him*. There is here in all this an entire absence of prodigality in the use of miracles; they are ultimate resources, reserved for the great needs of God’s kingdom, not its daily incidents; they are not cheap off-hand expedients, which may always be appealed to, but come only into play when nothing else would have supplied their room. How unlike this moderation to the wasteful expenditure of miracles in the church history of the middle ages! There no perplexity can occur so trifling that a miracle will not be brought in to solve it; there is almost no saint, certainly no distinguished one, without his *nimbus* of *miracles* around his head: they are adorned with these in rivalry with one another, in rivalry with Christ himself; no acknowledgment like this, ‘John did no miracle,’ in any of the records of their lives, finding place.”

Trench also remarks: “The miracles of Scripture, and, among these, not so much the miracles of the Old Covenant as the miracles of Christ and his apostles, being the miracles of that highest and latest dispensation under which we live, we have a right to consider as normal, in their chief features

at least, for all future miracles, if such were to continue in the church. The details, the local coloring, may be different and there were no need to be perplexed at such a difference appearing; yet the later must not be in their inner spirit totally unlike the earlier, or they carry the sentence of condemnation on their front. They must not, for instance, lead us back under the bondage of the senses, while those others were ever framed to release from that bondage. They must not be aimless and objectless, fantastic freaks of power, while those had every one of them a meaning and distinct ethical aim, were bridges by which Christ found access from men's bodies to their souls,—manifestations of his glory that men might be drawn to the glory itself. They must not be ludicrous and grotesque, saintly jests, while those were evermore reserved and solemn and awful; and lastly, they must not be seals and witnesses to aught which the conscience, enlightened by the word and Spirit of God,—whereunto is the ultimate appeal, and which stands above the miracle, and not beneath it,—protests against as untrue (the innumerable Romish miracles which attest transubstantiation), or as error largely mingled with the truth (the miracles which go to uphold the whole Romish system), those other having set their seal only to the absolutely true. Miracles such as any of these we are bound by all which we hold most sacred, by all which the Word of God has taught us, to reject and to refuse."

Consider the impossibility of deception either in the author of those miracles, or those who recorded them.

How could Christ, who worked such miracles as are recorded by the four evangelists, be either deceived or deceive? Look to the chain of evidence to show the truth. They were in the Old Testament predicted to take place under the coming Messiah; they were worked for the noblest end; they took place under such circumstances as were most unfavorable for concealment; they were confessed to by enemies as true, even while they were attributed to satanic power. Christ based the truth of his mission upon them; he challenged investigation; he called for belief in these miracles simply upon the ground that they could not be denied.

At the trial of Jesus, could any doubt be thrown upon these miracles, the most would be made of it by his relentless foes: but Christ's enemies were silent, simply because the miracles could not be denied. At the crucifixion the chief priests and Pharisees dared not in a single instance to charge our Saviour with deception. His accusers said, reviling him, "He saved others, himself he cannot save."

Observe, also, the greatness of the condemnation Christ pronounced against those who would not believe upon him. Upon what was this based? Upon the ground that he performed *works* which no other man could do; and because his mission was fully attested to by these works shown to be divine, therefore all were inexcusable for unbelief and rejecting him. Could there be any meaning in this, did Christ work no miracles? Would there be any reality in the denunciations of Christ against unbelievers if there was nothing miraculous in his works to believe in? If Christ was deceived, could his disciples be willing to follow him, confess him before the world, or ever attempt to convince his enemies of the truth of our Saviour's mission, if nothing of miracle could be shown to prove his claims? Christ could not deceive, for then he would cease to be a holy example for all to imitate; neither could he be deceived, for then he could not present any inducement to follow him, or any disposition be shown upon the part of his disciples to suffer and die for him. Besides, Christ came to introduce the Christian dispensation, to be the Saviour of the world. Without miracles it would have been impossible to secure the confidence of friends, or silence the malicious charges of enemies.

To that generation, when it was all-important that miracles should be granted to prove the words of Christ, the absence of these miracles would be always an unanswerable argument against the mission itself. Equally obvious is it that those who recorded the miracles of Jesus could neither deceive nor be deceived. Men do not rush into torture, disgrace, death, without a motive. Human nature does not welcome poverty, persecution, contempt, and the loss of all

worldly considerations, without a reason. And the circumstances that attended Christ and his disciples, the hardships they voluntarily endured, the extreme privation they were subjected to, all show the utter impossibility of passing off any miracle as true that was false. Remember, Christ wished none to follow him who had no faith and love to him; he welcomed to his heart no disciple who was not willing to take up his cross and follow him. Over and over again did our Saviour disabuse the mind of his followers of any worldly advantage to be reaped from the acceptance of him. He had nothing of the earth to offer to his disciples, and, consequently, there could be no reason, no possible motive, to suffer and die for Christ, unless he had performed those mighty works which no man could do, and which, when performed, afforded evidence irresistible that all the miracles recorded were true and came from God.

CHAPTER VI.

BIRTH, RESURRECTION, AND ASCENSION OF CHRIST, AND THE MIRACLES OF HIS APOSTLES.

THREE great miracles are connected with the person of Christ,—his birth, his resurrection, and his ascension. The birth of our Saviour was in the highest sense supernatural; born of the Virgin Mary by the Holy Ghost, he had strictly our humanity, without any taint of original sin; he came into the world a perfect child, even as he showed himself afterward a perfect youth and man. The circumstances connected with the advent of Christ into the world were all most peculiar and most wonderful. Christ was preceded, as foretold, by John the Baptist, who proclaimed the mission of the Redeemer of man, and confessed his immeasurable inferiority to him. Angels heralded his coming with the song of the shepherds keeping their flocks by night, "Glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will toward men." Well might they by the angel be addressed in the words: "Behold, I bring you good tidings of great joy, which shall be to all people. For unto you is born this day in the city of David a Saviour, which is Christ the Lord." The birthplace of Christ, the Messiah, was foretold by Micah, who was nearly cotemporary with Isaiah: "Thou, Bethlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall He come forth unto me, who is to be ruler in Israel." Now, all profane history coincides with sacred history, in the accuracy of the fulfillment of all the predictions concerning the circumstances under which Christ came to the world. The flight of Joseph into Egypt was owing to the murder of the infants of Bethlehem by the cruel order of Herod, and the residence of Joseph and Mary in Nazareth resulted from the known cruelty and wickedness of

Archelaus, who succeeded his father in the rule of Judea. No fact in history, sacred or profane, is better established than the *supernatural* birth of Christ, and the wonderful events connected with it.

Consider the great miracle of the resurrection of Christ. This event was fully confirmed by the clearest evidence. Thomas had not only the evidence of sight, but of touch. Christ, not once, but often was seen by the disciples, and finally, before his ascension, he was seen of five hundred of the brethren. Every precaution had been used to secure death and prevent Christ's resurrection, foretold by himself. A Roman soldier had pierced his side with a spear, a guard was placed over his sepulcher, his disciples were few and despised, scattered and unbelieving. They could neither credit his testimony nor be consoled in view of his death. And yet, if Christ did not rise from the dead, how happened it that Jews and Romans, friends and enemies, were all deceived? How happened it that the sacred historians should fabricate a story that would only expose them to the contempt of the good and the persecution of the wicked; that they should invent a lie where no motive existed for it and no possibility appeared of making it believed? Why should the chief priests attempt to bribe the Roman guard to circulate the story that Christ's disciples stole him away, if indeed our Saviour did not rise from the grave? Why should the disciples proclaim Christ to all as arisen from the grave, unless the proof of this mighty miracle was of such a nature as to be impossible to be denied? The disciples of our Lord could not invent the story of Christ's resurrection, if untrue; for those who crucified our Saviour would have been glad of doing the same to his followers if they were convicted of falsehood and blasphemy; and certainly, if honest men, they were in no condition to be deceived. Their master had been subjected to an ignominious death; his grave was watched by jealous enemies; no human power could deliver even the dead body of their Lord from the possession of the Roman soldiers. Now, what motive could exist to practice a deception that offered no worldly advantages, and

exposed to certain calamity all who attempted it? How happened it that, in confirmation of a falsehood, Peter should have boldly charged home upon the Jews the crucifixion of Christ, and that three thousand at the day of Pentecost, deceived by an impostor, should sacrifice, with all the disciples of Christ, every earthly good in confirmation of an untruth?

Consider, as another evidence of the truth of the wonderful works of Christ, the substantial agreement of the four evangelists, who have recorded the miracles of Christ, and the united confirmation in their favor of the other disciples. Let it be borne in mind that while there does exist in the four evangelists a substantial agreement upon essential facts and the main scope of the subject-matter of thought, there yet is embodied in these narratives of the life and doctrines of Christ their own peculiar idiosyncrasies of mind and that marked individuality which conclusively show neither sameness nor servile imitation; and this very diversity of style, with unity of end and harmony in every important particular, carries with it the highest internal evidence of truth.

The ascension of our Lord took place forty days after his resurrection upon the Mount of Olives, about two miles from Jerusalem. Now, this great event is shown true by the testimony of witnesses who could not have been deceived. As an indisputable fact, it is recorded by the four evangelists; it accorded also with the predictions of Christ, and was made necessary by the supernatural character of his mission and the nature of all his instructions to his disciples. It was not only essential for the success of Christianity that Christ should rise from the dead, but that he should, after conferring the gift of the Holy Spirit upon his followers, return bodily to his Father in heaven. Christ having made an atonement for the sins of the world, it became him to show not only his triumph over the grave, but the glory of his spiritual reign, by returning unto that home of infinite blessedness from which he came to redeem lost man.

The miraculous character of the birth, resurrection, and

ascension of Christ was in perfect harmony not only with the predictions of the prophets of the Old Testament, but with the character of his instructions and the nature of his mission in this world. As the Son of God, coming for the specific end of the redemption of sinners, it would have been impossible to secure that end without the threefold miracle of his birth, resurrection, and ascension. The visible kingship of Christ, at his first advent, would have conflicted with his spiritual reign in the hearts of his followers; and therefore it was essential that Christ should, after attaining unto the end of his mission, return unto his Father. Remember, also, that so indispensable especially was the resurrection of our Lord, that he based upon it the whole success of his religion in the world, and the disciples made the fact of Christ rising from the dead the all-conclusive argument of Christianity, and boldly challenged the severest investigation to disprove it. This alone encouraged them and confirmed their faith upon an immovable foundation. With the certainty of this truth ever present in their minds, they did not hesitate to come into conflict with the enemies of the Redeemer, and convict them in their unbelief of a sin as unreasonable as it was pernicious to all their interests for time and eternity. Now, could the disciples of Christ have dared to attempt to palm off an imposition upon the world, when the whole world, spiritually, was in arms against Christianity, and would cheerfully crush it unless based upon truth that no sophistry could gainsay, nor ingenuity deny?

Consider the miracles worked by the apostles after the death and the ascension of Christ into the heavens. Those miracles took place under circumstances where deception was impossible. As one instance, take the case of the lame man from his birth instantly healed by Peter; he was known by all the Jews who resorted to the temple; he sat at the gate called Beautiful. There, before a great concourse of people, before enemies who would not be deceived, this lame man, at a word, immediately received strength in his feet and ankle-bones, and, leaping up, stood, and walked, praising God.

The priests of the temple and the Sadducees, grieved that Christ and his resurrection should be taught, laid hold upon Peter and John and put them in confinement. But mark the result of that miracle in confirmation of the divine mission of the Son of God. Five thousand believed upon the apostles, and those captious enemies who saw the boldness of Peter and John, and the man which was healed standing with them, could not say anything against it, and, in their confusion, exclaimed, "What shall we do to these men? for that indeed a notable miracle hath been done by them is manifest to all them that dwell in Jerusalem, and we cannot deny it." Can any have the credulity to believe that when Judaism was tottering on its throne, when a long-standing hierarchy was endangered, when temple and priest and the whole system of Mosaic ritualism, venerable for ages of growth, shook like an aspen-leaf before a few obscure, unlearned men, destitute alike of power, wealth, and honor, that imposture could have been palmed off? If the miracles professed to be worked were false, the disciples gained nothing but the contempt of all good persons and the certain triumph of their opponents. There was too much at stake to imagine even a chance for imposture.

Consider, also, that not two nor three great miracles were professed to be worked in confirmation of Christianity, but many, upon various occasions, and where the greatest publicity was courted; miracles, too, when the religion of Christ was in its infancy, when the wealth, power, learning, and influence of the state were arrayed against it; miracles so numerous, under such a combination of circumstances, that one failure clearly proved would discredit the whole; where the chance for deception was not as one to a million; where no occasional success would do, but uniform, uninterrupted triumph in all cases was essential to secure confidence and belief. Consider that converts from the ranks of enemies were secured in vast multitudes, of every rank and profession of life, among Jews and Gentiles; converts who sacrificed riches and honors, security, and all pleasures held dear by the world, for a conviction of the mind that no misfortune

could shake, and no enmity master. Now, this is a fact borne out by history, sacred and profane. Josephus, Tacitus, Julian, Celsus, and Porphyry, not friends only, but enemies, confirm this fact. And then, upon the side of friends, not the writers of the Bible only, but the apostolic fathers, Barnabas, Clement, Hermes, Ignatius, and Polycarp,—the leaders of the Christian Church, and historians after the age of the apostles,—Justin Martyr, Irenæus, Tertullian, the two Gregories, and Jerome, all confirm the indisputable fact of the greatness and the number of the miracles of the New Testament. The Jews, in every age, preserved with sedulous care the Old Testament; the miracles of that are not only universally acknowledged by the Jews themselves in every age, but are confessed true by Christ and the apostles. No such mass of testimony exists for other historic facts. The truth that Cæsar composed his Commentaries, or Alexander fought his battles, rests not upon a hundredth part of the testimony that the miracles of revelation do; and yet who doubts that Cæsar or Alexander once lived, or fought the battles recorded?

But, as an additional evidence of the miracles of Christ and his apostles, consider that no possible motive could exist for deception. A man must have a motive for lying; but what motive for lying could exist with the writers of the Bible?

Truth, when persecuted, when, like a hunted, forlorn outcast, it walks upon thorns, dwells in the caverns of the earth, lives where the world's honors, riches, and pleasures die out,—truth that is gibbeted, burnt at the stake, devoured by the lions of a Roman amphitheater,—truth crucified, hated, despised, and tormented in the family and the state, made ignominious and painful,—truth sitting in sackcloth and ashes, is not avowed, loved, believed in by thousands, unless *it be truth*. If the disciples of Christ did not work miracles, they neither could nor would *profess* them; and if their reality was not confirmed by testimony that could not be denied, then thousands would not have sacrificed everything for deception,—*deception* that conferred neither pleasure, honor, nor

wealth,—deception that subjected to every outward calamity and the upbraidings of an abused nature and perjured conscience. A story like this demands the greatest conceivable credulity, and involves itself a greater miracle than all the miracles of the Bible together. If, after a consideration of the circumstances connected with the miracles of Christ and the apostles, they are not to be credited, then it is impossible to imagine any fact of history worthy of belief.

CHAPTER VII.

MIRACLES OF MOSES.

WITH the patriarchal dispensation and the calling of Abraham, more than nineteen hundred years before the coming of Christ, there was made known the distinct separation of a nation, the lineal descendants of Abraham, who should be the chosen depositaries of the gospel, and of whom, as concerning the flesh, Christ should come. The promise that in Abraham, as the father of the faithful, the nations of the earth should be blessed, was more particularly manifested when Christ our Saviour appeared; but in another sense was the world benefited by the selection of a distinct race to be the especial objects of the divine protection and love. The world, at the calling of Abraham, had greatly relapsed into idolatry. To preserve the knowledge of the true God, it was necessary that one nation should be set apart for the express object of maintaining a knowledge of the unity of the true God. Consequently, we find the selection of the Jews, who were to be distinguished as the keepers of the sacred oracles, and for whom a succession of wonders were to be worked to preserve them from being altogether destroyed by the idolatrous nations by which they were surrounded. During the years that elapsed from the calling of Abraham to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, we have made known the increasing wickedness of the Canaanites, who were the original inhabitants of Palestine. It was when the cup of their iniquity was full, after an existence of more than four hundred years before the calling of Abraham, that we have made known to us the wonders in the land of Egypt. Let us, then, consider the miracles of Moses in the land of Egypt, and see if in any way they can be made to appear the

work alone of human power. Let us consider the circumstances of the Israelites and the peculiar relation they sustained to the Egyptians, and see if any other than a divine power, miraculously put forth, could account for the deliverance of the oppressed Israelites.

As soon as Pharaoh, who befriended Joseph and his brethren, was dead, there arose in Egypt a race of kings who looked with jealousy upon the strangers in their midst; they viewed with fear and envy their rapid increase, and began to devise ways by which they might be brought wholly under their power. To destroy them would be to lose their useful services as slaves; to let them continue in their natural increase would be making them too formidable for their interests. The only course that presented itself as adapted to their end was to keep them in abject bondage, and to slay their male children. Thus their hardships, with their growth as a nation, increased, and what slavery could not do, Pharaoh sought to accomplish by infanticide. But in the darkest day of their adversity God raised up for them in the house of Pharaoh a deliverer. Moses, so called because saved from the water, was appointed by God to secure the independence of his nation. At the age of eighty years he commenced that series of wonders that has made memorable to all succeeding time the land of Egypt. But consider the circumstances under which the ten plagues were sent upon Egypt, and the end for which they were sent.

The Egyptians were sunk into the deepest idolatry; they worshiped not only the sun, moon, and stars, but birds, reptiles, and brute animals. To suppose that the Israelites were not contaminated by the example of their masters is to contradict their subsequent history in the desert, and their known inclination to worship idols. In Egypt, with the vices of slaves they had all the fear of slaves. Every manly and noble impulse seemed to be crushed under that iron bondage which befell them. Doomed to the thankless task of brickmaking, unrewarded for the severest toil, their male offspring murdered, all national hope, all energy, seemed to have expired. They distrust their deliverer, Moses; they upbraid him when

doing the best service for them, and alike in their actions and their whole deportment they appear to be only degraded slaves. To effect simply a deliverance from bondage to the Israelites was but a small part of the task of Moses. It was to educate them to a better religion, to impress upon their minds the one true God, to deliver them from the idolatry even more than the slavery of the Egyptians,—this was the great task to be performed. On the other hand, the Egyptians were proud in their oppression; they were given up to the most cruel despotism even as the most debasing idolatry. Neither king nor nation would of their own accord emancipate the Jews. Here, then, we see a twofold end to be attained unto by miracle, even deliverance from bondage and the counteraction of idolatry, under circumstances that would clearly show the supremacy of the God of the Jews. Consequently, we see that the known instrumentality selected for the Jews was such as to preclude the idea that the work performed was of man and not of God. Not only was the end proposed for miracles most suitable, and worthy of God, but such as could not be attained unto by any human power. No human power could save the Israelites or conquer the Egyptians, in the peculiar circumstances in which they were placed. No human power was able to conduct through the desert the Israelites, and from the debasement of slaves to make them a free and powerful nation. If Moses could, unaided by the direct power of God, have guided the Jews to the promised land, with no miracles as the credentials of his authority, he yet could not without miracles have made the Jews acknowledge the unity of God and his infinite superiority to the gods of the Egyptians. It was not simply to deliver the Jews from civil bondage, but to educate them as the chosen people of God,—that was the end to be secured. Thus we see a double occasion for the Mosaic miracles. *First*, the necessity of the miraculous interposition of God, to secure for the Jews, in their low condition, political freedom, and then the necessity, equally great, to emancipate the Jews from Egyptian idolatry. Now, all the means adopted to deliver the Israelites were designed to impress upon their minds the infi-

nite superiority of the one God to the polytheism of the heathen. The Jews were to be set apart from all nations as the peculiar people of God, and to be made a standing monument to the nations of the earth of the superiority of God to all idols. Does not the whole history of the wonderful preservation of the Israelites in Egypt, and their more wonderful deliverance, show that this was the end to be secured? So far from the improbability of miracles professed to be worked by Moses, it is impossible to account for the preservation of the Jews, and their subsequent possession of Canaan, without a miraculous interposition of God. What more improbable, if Moses worked no miracles, than that a whole nation, consisting of more than three millions, could be induced, in opposition to a powerful enemy, to leave Egypt? But this improbability is augmented a thousandfold when we consider the forty years' wanderings of the Jews in the desert. That three millions could subsist a year in the desert, or be induced to stay half that time as wanderers over the desolate land of Arabia, is an impossibility in itself, without a miraculous interposition of God. But not only were miracles necessary to deliver the Jews, but without them neither Pharaoh nor the Jews could be convinced of the divine mission of Moses. Moses was a fugitive from Pharaoh's court, a friendless outcast from the honors and emoluments of power; he had nothing in himself to deliver the Jews. He was no less an object of aversion to the Egyptians than of suspicion to his brethren. Without riches, fame, or military strength, his very proposition to deliver from bondage the Jews, without miracles, was the most visionary imaginable. But, more than this, Pharaoh was not to be persuaded to let the Israelites go without miracles. Even when he did let them go, after the most majestic tokens of divine power, it was extorted from his fears, and not from his love. His heart clung to his idols. How, without a miraculous interposition, was Pharaoh to be compelled to let the Israelites go? Consider the great interests at stake demanding miracles. If ever there was an occasion for their use, certainly the introduction of the Mosaic or legal dispensation was one. The patriarchal state was to

be succeeded by a higher development of the divine mercy to mankind. The promise to Abraham was to be fulfilled in the gathering together of a nation, free and powerful, in the predicted land of Canaan. Consequently, as preparatory to the coming of Christ, the unity of God, and the nature of his law, and the necessity of an atonement for sin, were to be revealed in a far more impressive way than ever before. If the calling of Abraham was attended with miracles, more truly the ushering in of the law of Sinai, and the political and moral elevation of a whole nation, under the most depressed circumstances, demanded the interposition of God.

Let us, then, consider the ten plagues of Egypt and the subsequent miracles of Moses. They come to us as facts revealed in the Bible and confirmed by the light that profane history throws upon that age. Miracles are events so extraordinary as to forbid the supposition of the operation of natural law. They come as events marking the supernatural working of God. Consequently, they are the credentials of God, to show that he works, and that he is to be believed in. In order to convince Pharaoh, or the Jews, Moses must work miracles. He goes to Pharaoh with the demand to let Israel go. What was the natural course, under these circumstances, for Pharaoh to pursue? Evidently, to question the authority of Moses for making a request so extraordinary; and thus he did. "And Pharaoh said, Who is Jehovah, that I should obey his voice? I know not Jehovah, neither will I let Israel go." Again Moses is sent to repeat the command. The king refuses, upon their want of authority, and demands a miracle as the evidence. A miracle is wrought,—Aaron throws down his staff, and it becomes a serpent. Now, whatever may have been the enchantments of the Egyptian priests, it is certain that they performed by their magic wonders, inferior, it may be, to those of Moses and Aaron, but of such a nature as to give a plausible objection to the refusal of the king to let the Israelites go. We pretend not to say whether the legerdemain of the magicians of Pharaoh was miraculous or not, but my argument for miracles of the most unquestionable nature is but the more confirmed when the preju-

diced mind of the king, shielding himself by the magic of his priests, arrogantly gave Moses and Aaron to understand that his men could work as good miracles, if not as great, as themselves, and, consequently, his authority was as good as theirs. Henceforth God commissioned Aaron and Moses to work other miracles. The Nile is turned into blood, and the frogs cover the land. The magicians, upon an inferior scale, to the mind of the king apparently effect the same wonders. Thus, in the trial between God and the gods of Pharaoh, the result thus far had been only to the king the acknowledgment that Moses was the superior magician. Now miracles were to be worked, so peculiar and so wonderful as to compel Pharaoh and his priests to give up in despair, and confess the divine authority of the mission of Moses. Commencing with the mildest form of miracle, there was to flash before the mind a far higher indication of the power of God. The plague of lice comes, a miracle of creation; the magicians renew their efforts, but altogether fail in imitating it. Pharaoh, now stripped of every apology, fiercely intrenches himself in the stubbornness of his heart, and refuses to let the people go. Then comes the swarm of flies; then the plague of boils and blains; then the plague of hail; then of locusts, which devour all the green herbage of Egypt; then of the three days' darkness; then of the more fearful visitation of the death of the first-born; and, finally, this increasing series of divine visitations of wrath upon a godless king and nation is consummated in the drowning of Pharaoh and the Egyptians in the Red Sea.

The circumstances in which the Israelites were placed, previous to this fearful destruction of the Egyptians, were most extraordinary. Skeptics have solaced themselves with the idea that the Israelites might have passed over a branch of the Red Sea, at the northern extremity, as being only an estuary at low tide. But what the Israelites might have done is quite different from the actual course they were required to take. The great design of the series of the Mosaic miracles was to convince the Jews of the unity and absolute supremacy of the God of Abraham above all the gods of

Egypt. Consequently, upon a scale the most magnificent, we read of that series of wonders that were to prepare the way for the emancipation of the whole nation from civil and religious bondage. The end was worthy of the means. The design was such only as God could conceive of and omniscience execute. True religion, the knowledge of the one infinite and glorious God, had nearly expired from the earth. In what better way, then, than that revealed in the Bible, was there to be a counteraction of an evil so universal and so threatening? But there was another design in the destruction of the Egyptians in the Red Sea, of vast importance. All the other miracles worked in Egypt had awed, but not subdued, the avaricious spirit of the Egyptians. The marching forth of the vast multitude of the Israelites from Egypt had been extorted from the fears and not the willing consent of either king or people. Consequently, a feeble, enslaved army, encumbered with women and children, wandering within a few days' march from Egypt, would be, sooner or later, a prey to the incensed Egyptians. Some decisive blow was to be struck, so great and so powerful as that henceforth the timorous hearts of the Israelites would have nothing to fear from their old oppressors. This was the primary object of the miracle of the Red Sea, expressly declared in the inspired word: "I will be honored upon Pharaoh and all his hosts, that the Egyptians may know that I am the Lord."

Instead, therefore, of the Israelites taking the main road, the open route at the head of the Red Sea, leading into the desert, they are ordered to march down the shore to the south, by a route which could lead them only into the heart of Africa, and in defiles so bad as that, if pursued, they could neither fight nor fly. Never were the wise taken in their own craftiness more effectually than Pharaoh and his host. Reasoning upon all human calculation, victory was both certain and easy for the Egyptians. Pharaoh pursued after his slaves, and soon reached their encampment. On one side was the desert, upon the other the Red Sea, and directly in their rear, shutting out all possibility of escape, were the mighty forces of the land of Egypt, with their chariots of war.

Under what circumstances could a miracle be more necessary, or impress the mind with a deeper conviction of the superiority of Jehovah to the false gods of Egypt? Unless God interposed, all was lost. With a bitter taunt the Israelites cry out against their leader, "Were there no graves in Egypt, that thou hast taken us away to die in the wilderness?"

God now commands Moses to stretch out his rod over the Red Sea, "that the Israelites may pass on dry ground." The Egyptians follow in after them. When the morning watch is come, the Israelites reach the shore, and the whole body of the Egyptians are in the sea-bed. What a spectacle now presents itself of awful grandeur!

Over the sea-sand the enemy's chariots drive heavily. At last they cry out, "The Lord fighteth for Israel." The command is given, "And the Lord said unto Moses, Stretch out thine hand over the sea, that the waters may come again upon the Egyptians." The destruction was total. "There remained not so much as one of them."

We will not dwell upon the other miracles of Moses. For wise reasons the Israelites were condemned to wander forty years in the desert. But for a multitude so great to subsist in the desert so long, miracles constant and vast were absolutely necessary. But the end was worthy of the means. The desert was to be the school of religion and good discipline for the Israelites. Here was the law of Sinai to be given, with its majestic glory. Here was to be the pillar of cloud by day, and the pillar of fire by night. Here the consecrated priests were to bear the Ark of the Covenant, where abode the awful *Shechinah*. Here manna daily was to come down from heaven, except upon the holy Sabbath. Here waters from the rock were to flow to quench the thirst of the multitude. All was one vast series of miracles such as man never yet had seen, for one great end, the preservation of true religion. For this object a nation was selected and surrounded with all the tokens of an ever-present God. For this object the rigid discipline of forty years was enforced to wean the Israelites from the idols of the heathen. A new dispensation was to be ushered in, amid the fires

of Sinai and its dread thunders. The end was such that nothing but miracle could secure it. God was to be everything, man nothing. Human instrumentality was to be forgotten before the steady blaze of divine agency. Now, such are revealed facts: of their philosophy we know nothing. But one thing is certain: the Israelites never could have been delivered from Egypt, never preserved in the desert, they neither would nor could have received Moses as their leader, or submitted to the law of Sinai, or conformed to the ceremonial ritual, or acknowledged as divine the Pentateuch, or confessed in every age that the mission of Moses was from God, had not the miracles recorded been worked.

CHAPTER VIII.

EVIDENCE OF PROPHECY.

PROPHECY is the history of the future ; it is the exercise of a foresight into events yet to come, such only as omniscience is capable of. Human beings have often attempted to pry into the future, and to pronounce with confidence upon events yet to take place. The heathen have had their oracles. The most renowned nations of antiquity have been influenced to place confidence in the auguries of soothsayers, or the famed responses of Delphi or Dodona. The restless curiosity of man has often attempted to unveil the secrets of futurity and fathom the deep purposes of God. To a certain extent, some knowledge of the future may be reached by an uninspired man. When some law of the mental or physical world is understood, it can be found out from its known results what in the future will be its operation. The mind of man may attain unto some knowledge of futurity by the experience of the past. But this knowledge is only of the most general nature ; nothing is known of particulars. The limit of human predictions is circumscribed within the most narrow boundary, and cannot extend to things specific, minute, and multiplied. We may say that a man who gives himself up to the habitual sway of his appetites or passions, having the love of strong drink, or anger and violence, will die prematurely. But who can designate the hour or minute of his decease ? We may predict from the ravages of the pestilence the widespread disease that will ensue ; but who can mark the number of victims, or foretell the exact period and extent of the inroads of the unseen destroyer ?

From mathematical laws the eclipse may be predicted years before the event takes place ; but who can say when law itself may not be suspended by miracle, or foretell the future changes that will take place among those myriads of worlds

that people the universe? Even upon the most common events of life uncertainty rests. The darkness that encircles the future, none but an omniscient eye can penetrate. The prophecies of the Bible differ in every respect from the productions of heathen oracles. Not more marked is the difference between gold and its counterfeit, than is the distinction between the prophecies of the Scriptures and uninspired productions. Take, as an illustration, the celebrated oracles of Delphi and Dodona. Here, as in false miracles, we can trace every wonder to mere human contrivance and the practiced arts of successful impostors. Reason itself would dictate that it was impossible for man to predict minutely, with great variety of specification, and combining a multitude of improbabilities, the history for a single year of any person, or that of a nation. Now, when the heathen oracles were consulted, the responses given had reference not only to a short period, but were in the highest degree general and vague. They were only procured by great riches, and were surrounded by such difficulties as to be for any good end not only inaccessible, but useless. Among the heathen it is estimated that there were in repute no less than three hundred oracles; but an illustration of a few will give the character of the whole. Their general characteristics were ambiguity, obscurity, and convertibility. Two instances in point will clearly show this. "When Cræsus was to invade the Medes and Persians, he consulted the oracle of Delphos as to the issue of his expedition." The answer was, "that by passing the river Halys, and making war upon the Persians, he would ruin a great empire." What empire? his own, or that of the Persians? Cræsus interpreted the empire to be that of the Persians, and consequently made war upon the Persians and lost his crown, and was upon the point also of losing his life. When Pyrrhus made war upon the Romans, the same oracle was consulted; the answer was couched in a single line of Latin, but so equivocal in meaning, that it may be read either that "Pyrrhus should conquer the Romans, or that the Romans should conquer Pyrrhus." The issue is well known. Pyrrhus, interpreting the oracle in his favor,

returned defeated to his country after a long and disastrous struggle.

Contrast the prophecies of the Bible. We have now reference to fulfilled prophecy alone. Unfulfilled prophecy has reference to the mighty events of the future, and, whether clearly or obscurely given, is to be interpreted when future history shall become past history, and the world itself shall end. But, for our purpose, it is only necessary to speak of those prophecies already fulfilled, and to show by the exact correspondence of the events themselves the divine origin of the Bible.

In considering miracles, it will be seen that a good end is one essential proof of a miracle. God is the author of order, of adaptation, of righteousness, and of wisdom. Consequently, when he works a miracle it is to some good purpose, to bring about some righteous and wise end. Now, the scheme of redemption from sin and its fearful consequences is an end sufficiently great, wise, and good to call for the interposition of miracle as an essential means for the accomplishment of such an end. It is this which makes Bible miracles so probable, and because of which we are called so firmly to credit the evidence given. But prophecy is as strong an evidence of the divine origin of the Scriptures, and is as essential to carry out the great system of redemption, as miracles. A large part of the Bible consists of prophecy. Commencing with Adam in Eden, it ends only when another Eden, fairer than that which was lost, shall be ushered into the world, renewed by the mighty power of God and regenerated by the Eternal Spirit through all its countless millions. If miracles hold a most essential place in the Bible, prophecy holds a position as important, if not more so. It forms an argument of irresistible force to prove that God himself was the author of the Bible, making use in its composition of man as the instrument of his will.

The great end of prophecy is to unfold the vast scheme of redemption by Christ in its commencement and in its termination. It is to unfold to man in every age the vast purposes of God's redeeming love. We therefore

find that prophecy bridges over the whole interval of man's history. It begins with an Eden lost, and ends in an Eden restored. Now, as it is impossible for a human mind to conceive of the scheme of redemption as revealed in the Bible, it is equally impossible for any uninspired mind to give the history of that redemption; and yet we find exactly portrayed in the Old Testament, centuries before the fulfillment, the character of Christ, the Messiah, and his future sufferings, death, and resurrection. What mortal man could fabricate such a character, or predict it? What number of men could combine together to invent a story to be proved true in after-ages in the most minute details, and, without collusion with one another, to find that story consistent in every part and realized in the whole? There is not only an impossibility upon the side of motive, but of ability. For Moses, for David, for Isaiah and Daniel to predict the coming Messiah, accurately portray his character, the redemption from sin he was to secure to mankind, and yet each living in different ages of the world, with no community of interest, no motive possible for deception, this must show them to be inspired by God.

Consider that the one was the lawgiver to the Jews, the other a mighty king. Isaiah, according to tradition, was sawn asunder six hundred and ninety-eight years before Christ, and Daniel was thrown for his integrity into the lions' den. Can now those separate predictions, all verified by the events with so remote a separation of time and so great a diversity of circumstance, have their origin from no divine source? If there is anything in which human ability shows its weakness, its utter impotency, it is in predicting things in the future. With all the light of experience, with all the aid of analogy, with all the assistance of history, philosophy, and science, nothing is so perfectly beyond the mind of man as any intelligent or minute predictions of events of human conduct to transpire a year hence; but that inability is augmented a thousandfold when centuries and ages must intervene between the giving and the accomplishment of the prophecy. Mohammed never based his Koran upon prophecy:

the most successful of impostors, he never presumed to tax the credulity of the darkest age of the world by any attempt at prophecy. So certainly would this fail him that he would not attempt that which, unsuccessful, would prove the most powerful enemy to his cause. Why, then, did the Bible risk everything upon prophecy, even as miracles? Why did the writers of the Scriptures attempt wonders so great? The reason is, God, not man, was the source of inspiration; divine truth fears no scrutiny, however searching. The end for which all prophecy was given was to subserve the great purpose of building the temple of Christianity. In that temple there was a use for stones of every variety, and every material that composed it; each had its separate position and its peculiar office. As one vast system, Christianity was a scheme to be developed gradually. Every age went to make up a part of that temple that was destined ultimately to be perfected in one glorious fabric of truth and love.

Let us now consider some of the prophecies of the Bible as revealing its origin from God. We have seen how we may discriminate between true and false prophecy. The last is general, equivocal, ambiguous, and having only a short period for verification, and, above all, given under circumstances highly favorable for conjecture. The true prophecy must be minute, discriminating, clearly corresponding with the event predicted, and given under circumstances where mere conjecture is impossible; and, to crown the whole, the end to be attained unto, as in miracles, must be shown to be wise and good, such as is worthy of God and useful to man. By such tests let us examine the prophecies of the Bible, to see if indeed they are genuine. We have spoken of the general scope of prophecy in its relation to Christ and his scheme of redemption. Before, then, entering upon the investigation of the more important prophecies, we will give, as an illustration of the minuteness of detail in the prophecies of the Bible, a few illustrations from those prophecies less noticed by the general reader.

The destruction of the altar of Bethel was predicted in the year before Christ 975: "And behold, there came a man of

God out of Judah, by the word of the Lord, O altar! altar! thus saith the Lord, Behold, a child shall be born unto the house of David, Josiah by name, and upon thee shall he offer the priests of the high places that burn incense upon thee, and men's bones shall be burned upon thee." An immediate sign was superadded in the withering of Jeroboam's arm, and in the rending of the altar, and the accomplishment of this prediction was in the year before Christ 624, and the interval between the prophecy and the fulfillment was three hundred and fifty-one years; Josephus makes the years that intervene three hundred and sixty-one. Thus we see in respect to time how remote the prophecy was from its fulfillment. In the twenty-third chapter of the second of Kings we read in these words of the fulfillment of a prophecy more than three centuries and a half after its prediction.

"Moreover, the altar that was at Bethel, and the high place which Jeroboam the son of Nebat, who made Israel to sin, had made, both that altar and the high place he broke down, and burned the high place, and stamped it small to powder, and burned the grove; and as Josiah turned himself he spied the sepulchres that were there in the mount, and sent and took the bones out of the sepulchres, and burned them upon the altar, and polluted it, according to the word of the Lord which the man of God proclaimed." Observe how exact was this accomplishment, although the distance that intervened was between the reign of Jeroboam and the reign of Josiah.

At the fall of Jericho, "Joshua adjured them, saying, Cursed be the man, before the Lord, that riseth up and buildeth this city of Jericho; he shall lay the foundation thereof in his first-born, and in his youngest son shall he set up the gates of it." This sentence was pronounced in the year before Christ 915. In the first of Kings, sixteenth chapter, we read: "In his days," that is, during the reign of Ahab, "did Hiel the Bethelite build Jericho; he laid the foundation thereof in Abram, his first-born, and set up the gates thereof in his youngest son, Segab, according to the

word of the Lord which he spake by Joshua, the son of Nun." Between the prophecy and the event there is a space of five hundred and thirty-three years. As an example of minute prediction and singular fulfillment, compare the twenty-fourth chapter of Jeremiah with the twelfth of Ezekiel. In the former scripture it was foretold by one prophet that Zedekiah, the king of Judah, should be delivered into the hand of the king of Babylon, and behold his eyes, and speak with him mouth to mouth, and go to Babylon. In the latter, it was foretold by another prophet that Zedekiah should not see Babylon, though he should die there. But is there not a contradiction here? How could Zedekiah be taken to Babylon, behold her king, and die there, and yet never see the city? But the history of the kings of Judah, written without any design of pointing out the fulfillment of prophecy, explains this difficulty. Zedekiah was delivered into the hands of the king of Babylon, and beheld his eyes, and spoke with him mouth to mouth, not, however, at Babylon, but at Riblah. Then *his eyes were put out*, by command of his captor. In this state he went to Babylon, and died there, *having never seen the city of his captivity*.

As another illustration of wonderful minuteness as well as accuracy, consider the prophecies of the fall and destruction of Babylon, the most ancient of the cities of the Old World. It became so famous after the time of Nebuchadnezzar that it was called the Great Babylon, the glory of kingdoms, the beauty of the Chaldee's excellency. With a circuit of walls sixty miles in compass, it was located in a most fertile plain. The city had a hundred gates, made of solid brass, and its mighty walls, according to Herodotus, were three hundred and fifty feet in height and eighty-seven feet in thickness, so that six chariots could go abreast upon them. How improbable, to human calculation, that a city so powerful, the metropolis of a vast empire, should come, with all its strength, to naught! But Isaiah, one hundred and sixty years before her ruin, when she was at the height of her glory, predicted: "It shall never be inhabited, neither shall it be dwelt in from generation to generation, neither shall

the Arabian pitch tent there, neither shall the shepherds make their fold there. But wild beasts of the desert shall lie there, and the houses shall be full of doleful creatures, and owls shall dwell there, and satyrs shall dance there, and the wild beasts of the desert shall cry in their desolate houses, and dragons in their pleasant palaces." "How hath the golden city ceased!" "Her pomp is brought down to the grave." Sixteen centuries have passed since her foundations were inhabited by a human being. Deterred by reptiles and wild beasts, the wandering Arab never pitches his tent there. Once famous for the richness of its pastures, the shepherds make no fold. Reptiles, bats, and doleful creatures, jackals, hyenas, and lions, inhabit the holes and caverns and marshes of the desolate city. In the fourth century Babylon was a hunting-ground for the Persian monarchs. By the overflowing of the Euphrates, pools of stagnant water are left in the hollow places of the ancient site, thus realizing the prediction, "*It shall be a possession for the bittern, and pools of water.*" The manner of the taking of the city was no less clearly predicted. First, the river was to be dried up; "And I will dry up the rivers;" and this is declared in reference to Cyrus, whom the prophet calls his shepherd; and by him the river was turned out of its channel. Then the brazen gates were to be left open. "Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus,—I will loose the loins of kings, to open before him the two-leaved gates, and the gates *shall not be shut.*" By the oversight of the Babylonians, the gates were left open on the night of the festival, when the king was slain. Notice another minute circumstance of a prophecy given more than a century before its fulfillment. The assault was to be on two sides of the city, north and south. "One part shall run to *meet another*, and one messenger to *meet another*, to show the king of Babylon that his city is *taken at one end*," or is taken at "each end." Cyrus commanded his troops to enter in two detachments the city, by each of the sides through which the river passed, and to advance till they met in the center.

Tyre was once the emporium of the world, the theater of

an immense commerce and navigation. "Situate at the entry of the sea, she was a merchant of the people for many isles, all nations were her merchants in all sorts of things. The ships of Tarshish did sing of her in the market, and she was replenished and made very glorious in the midst of the seas." It was of this mistress of princes that Ezekiel prophesied in the name of the Lord, "I will scrape the dust from her and make her like the *top of a rock*. It shall be a place for the spreading of nets in the midst of the sea." Not only was her utter ruin pointed out, but even the use that would be made of her site, and the kind of men that would inhabit her, were pointed out more than a thousand years before her complete destruction. Shaw, in his Travels, describes the port of Tyre as so choked up that the boats of the *fishermen, who now and then come to the place* and dry their nets upon its rocks and ruins, can hardly enter. The infidel Volney says the whole village of Tyre contains only fifty or sixty poor families, who live obscurely on the produce of their little ground and a *trifling fishery*.

Concerning Egypt, once so mighty, it was said, "It shall be the basest of the kingdoms; neither shall it exalt itself any more above the nations; that the pride of her power should come down; that her land, and all that was therein, should be made waste by the hand of strangers; that there should be no more a prince of the land of Egypt, and the scepter of Egypt should depart away." The most remarkable portion of this prophecy is that which declares that there shall be no more a prince of the land of Egypt. From the conquest of the Persians, three hundred and fifty years before Christ, to the present day, Egypt has been broken, she has been governed by strangers, and every effort to raise an Egyptian to the throne has been defeated. Egypt has literally been, since that conquest, the basest of kingdoms. Says the infidel Volney, confirming every delineation of revelation, "Deprived twenty-three centuries ago of her natural proprietors, she has seen her fertile fields successively a prey to the Persians, the Macedonians, the Romans, the Greeks, the Arabs, the Georgians, and at

length the race of Tartars, distinguished by the name of Ottoman Turks. The Mamelukes, purchased as slaves and introduced as soldiers, soon usurped the power and elected a leader. If their first establishment was a singular event, their continuance was no less extraordinary. They are replaced by slaves brought from their original country. The system of oppression is methodical. Everything the traveler sees or hears reminds him he is in the country of slavery and tyranny." Who but God could portray thus accurately, through ages of time, the history of these nations of antiquity?

Where now is Babylon, with her hundred gates of brass, her lofty walls, her noble palaces, the wonder of millions? Where is Tyre, queen of cities, the haven of ships, controlling the commerce of the nations? Where is Egypt, that land of the pyramids, where the Pharaohs reigned, the richest of countries, the granary of the world? Alas! desolation reigns supreme. The proud monuments of human grandeur and wealth have crumbled into the dust. The warrior and the slave, the king and the peasant, the mighty and the obscure, rest in one common oblivion and sleep in one common ruin. But the word of God shall stand, and his truth be fulfilled, though kingdoms fall to rise no more, though empires pass away as a dream, and all the glory of the earth come to naught.

Every reader of history knows that after the deluge the human family proceeded in three great lines of population from the three sons of Noah,—Shem, Ham, and Japheth. From these three sons the world was to be repopled with inhabitants. The human family was to diverge in three mighty streams of population, whose waters were ultimately to extend over the remotest regions of the earth, and yet each stream was to have distinct characteristics that should with infallible precision mark the history of each separate race to the end of time.

Let us then observe if actual events in the history of the world have verified the predictions of Noah to his three sons, as the representatives of the three great races of men who

have peopled, and do now people, the earth. It is unnecessary to dwell upon the circumstances of Noah's predictions to his three sons. The common version of the Bible reads, "And he said, Cursed be Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren. And he said, Blessed be the Lord God of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant. God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be his servant." Now, Canaan was the son of Ham, and Ham, the father of Canaan, is mentioned in the preceding part of the story. In these three verses the Arabic version has "father of Canaan" instead of "Canaan." Some copies of the Septuagint have Ham instead of Canaan; and, with great reason, the most correct reading of the Hebrew text has been believed to be, "Cursed be Ham, the father of Canaan; a servant of servants shall he be unto his brethren." But, however the Hebrew text may be translated, the import of the prophecy had peculiar reference to the posterity of the three sons, as the representatives of the three races that were to people the world.

What has been the fulfillment of this prophecy? In the first place, the descendants of Ham, or Canaan, were to be, in their social and civil condition, inferior to the descendants of Shem and Japheth, and in a state of servitude to them. This was the general characteristic of the posterity of Ham. From Ham descended the inhabitants of Sodom and Gomorrah, the aborigines of Palestine, under the general name of Canaanites, whom the children of Israel, or descendants of Shem, expelled from the land and reduced to servitude. From Ham Egypt was settled, and most of Africa. Observe, now, the history of Ham's posterity from the earliest age to the present day. Says Bishop Newton, "It is very well known that the word *brethren*, in Hebrew, comprehends more distant relations. The descendants of Canaan were to be subjected to the descendants of both Shem and Japheth; and the natural consequence of vice in communities, as well as in single persons, is slavery." The wars of the Israelites with the ancient Canaanites clearly show their subjection, through centuries, to the posterity of Shem. The land of Ham was

subdued by the Persians, the descendants of Shem; afterwards by the Grecians, the posterity of Japheth, and from that time it has been constantly in subjection to the posterity either of Shem or Japheth.

The whole continent of Africa was peopled principally by the children of Ham; and for how many ages have the better parts of the country been under the dominion of the Romans, then of the Saracens, and now of the Turks! Look to the barbarism, the deep ignorance, the innumerable savage tribes, the wide-spread bondage, and the fearful atrocities of the slave-trade, that for ages have existed in that ill-fated country! How evident the fulfillment of prophecy! Of Shem it was said, "Blessed be the Lord God of Shem, and Canaan shall be his servant;" plainly intimating that the Lord would be his God in a peculiar manner. Consequently, we find the Israelites the descendants of Shem, and that for several generations the church of God was among his posterity, and especially of them, as concerning the flesh, Christ came.

Of Japheth it was said, "God shall enlarge Japheth, and he shall dwell in the tents of Shem; and Canaan shall be servant to them," or their servant. Was, then, Japheth more enlarged than the rest? This was true in two respects, both in territory and in children.

Japheth's posterity included all Europe, and the possession of lesser Asia, Media, part of Armenia, Iberia, and Albania, and the vast regions of the North which anciently the Scythians inhabited, but now the Tartars. The progeny also of Japheth excelled that of Shem, or Ham. It was also said that he "should dwell in the tents of Shem." In either sense the prophecy has been most literally fulfilled. In the former sense, it was true when the Shechinali or divine presence rested on the ark, and dwelt in the tabernacle and temple of the Jews; and, in the latter sense, it was fulfilled when the Greeks and Romans, the descendants of Japheth, subdued and possessed Judea, and other countries belonging to Shem.

Of Ishmael it was predicted, "And he will be a wild man; his hand will be against every man, and every man's

hand against him, and he shall dwell in the presence of his brethren." "And I will make him a great nation." Most literally has this prophecy been fulfilled in the posterity of Ishmael. They have lived to the present day by prey and rapine. They have ever existed a distinct people. Two circumstances most extraordinary have marked the descendants of Ishmael,—a state of continual war, hateful and hated, and yet an existence in the presence of all other nations. While Ishmael's hand was against every man, and every man's hand against him, he yet, to the present day, has dwelt in the presence of his brethren. The sword, that has devoured so many nations, has spared the posterity of Ishmael. In constant warfare, the sons of Ishmael, free, independent, never subdued, have been the wild, untamed children of the desert. Notwithstanding the perpetual enmity between them and the rest of mankind, the Arabs, the children of Ishmael, have never been conquered. Alexander, the conqueror of Asia, in vain attempted to subdue them. The Persians, who preceded the Grecians, could never compel the nation, as a body, to pay tribute, or reduce the wandering Arabs to obedience. In vain the Romans strove to subdue the whole nation. Their success was only partial, and speedily followed by total discomfiture. Pompey, Trajan, and Severus, with great armies, attempted the conquest of this wild race, but only to experience defeat. When we come to the time of their famous prophet Mohammed, we see the Saracens overrunning, in a few years, more countries than the Romans in many centuries; but while the Arabs were often masters, they were never slaves, and when their great empire was dissolved, and they were confined to their native limits, they yet preserved their independence against Tartars, Mamelukes, Turks, and all foreign enemies whatever. To this day the Turks, lords of the adjacent countries, so far from being able to restrain the depredations of the Arabs, have been compelled to pay them an annual tribute for the safe passage and security of the pilgrims who go in great companies to Mecca.

Notice the predictions in relation to Abraham, Jacob, and his twelve sons.

Of Abraham it was said, "That in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed as the stars of the heaven, and as the sand which is upon the sea-shore; and thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies; and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed; because thou hast obeyed my voice."

Now, Abraham was born about two thousand years before Christ; and most literally have the predictions concerning Abraham been accomplished. First, as to his posterity. The family of this patriarch has from remote antiquity been extremely numerous; from him are derived many tribes of Arabs, descending through Ishmael, and others by Keturah, to say nothing of the Jews; neither has there been on the face of the earth, since Noah and his sons, any man whose posterity is equally extensive; any man to whom so many nations refer their origin. Others may have begotten families, but Abraham is the father of nations. How truly were all the nations of the earth blessed in the great fact that Christ was of the seed of Abraham!

Notice, also, the predictions of Jacob respecting his twelve sons. All were exactly carried out; their separate conditions in the land of Canaan, also the superiority of Judah, and that through him in the line of descent the Messiah should come, were each verified by the events. How wonderfully has history shown, in the relation Judah sustained to the other tribes of Israel, and that the scepter continued among the Jews, and that they had kings of their own nation in the persons of the Herods, the truthfulness of the prediction, "The scepter shall not depart from Judah, nor a lawgiver from between his feet, until Shiloh come; and unto him shall the gathering of the people be." It was only after the coming of the Messiah, the Shiloh of prophecy, that the final dispersion of the Jewish race took place, and the dominion passed away with their temple and civil power.

Consider, also, the surprising delineations of Daniel in respect to the four great empires of the earth, each to be erected upon the ruins of the preceding kingdom. Now, Daniel was born about six centuries before Christ. At the

time of his prediction, Babylon, the metropolis of Chaldea, stood at the head of the nations of the earth; and yet, soon after, the glory of it passed away. So minute and comprehensive were the prophecies of Daniel, embracing the history of Chaldea, Persia, Macedon, and Rome, so exact was the fulfillment in every particular, that Porphyry, the most learned of the enemies of Christianity in the third century, impressed with the exact correspondence between the predictions and the event, asserted that the prophecy could not have been written by Daniel, but by some one in Judea in the time of Antiochus Epiphanes; while Paine, famous for his infidelity, and no less so for his wretched end, confessed the authenticity of the book of Daniel. Paine denied the fulfillment, Porphyry the authenticity; Porphyry acknowledged the fulfillment, Paine the authenticity. "*He taketh the wise in their own craftiness.*"

"Now, we conclude," says Calmet, "that if we find certain events predicted long before they happened,—if they be so clearly described that, when completed, the description applies to the subject,—if they be related by persons entirely unconcerned in the events, and expecting to be removed from the stage of life long before they took place, then we demonstrate that some power superior to humanity has been pleased to impart so much of its designs and counsels as are referred to in such predictions."

Calmet in his Dictionary of the Holy Bible has, in Daniel's Prophecy of Four Kingdoms, represented by four beasts, given with great brevity and comprehensiveness their fulfillment. Let us observe this instance of prophecy compared with history, the chief incidents only being selected and numbered.

THE FIRST BEAST.

1. A lion,
2. having eagle's wings;
3. the wings were plucked;
4. it was raised from the ground,

ASSYRIAN EMPIRE.

The Babylonian empire;
 Nineveh, etc. added to it—but
 Nineveh was almost destroyed at the
 fall of Sardanapalus;
 yet this empire was again elevated to
 power,

THE FIRST BEAST.

5. and made to stand on the feet as a man,
6. and a man's heart was given to it.

(DAN. chap. iv.)

ASSYRIAN EMPIRE.

and seemed to acquire stability under Nebuchadnezzar, who laid the foundation of its subsequent policy and authority.

THE SECOND BEAST.

1. A ram,
2. which had two horns,
3. both high,
4. but one higher than the other ; “
5. the highest came up last ;
6. the ram pushed north west, south,
7. did as he pleased, and became great.

PERSIAN EMPIRE.

Darius, or the Persian power, composed of Media and Persia, both considerable provinces, Media the most powerful : yet this most powerful Median empire, under Dejoces, rose after the other, and extended its conquests under Cyrus over Lydia, etc., west ; over Asia, north ; over Babylon, etc., south, and, ruling over such extent of country, was a great empire.

THE THIRD BEAST.

1. A he-goat
2. came from the west,
3. gliding swiftly over the earth ;
4. ran into the ram in the fury of his power,
5. smote him,
6. brake his two horns,
7. cast him on the ground,
8. stamped on him, and
9. waxed very great.
10. When he was strong, his great horn was broken, and
11. instead of it came up four not able ones

GRECIAN EMPIRE.

Alexander, or the Greek power, came from Europe (west of Asia) with unexampled rapidity of success ; attacked Darius furiously and beat him at the Granicus, Issus, etc., conquered Persia and Media, etc., ruined the power of Darius, insomuch that Darius was murdered, etc. Alexander overran Bactriana, to India ; but died at Babylon, in the zenith of his fame and power ; his dominions were parceled among Seleucus, Antigonus, Ptolemy, Cassander (who had been his officers),

THE THIRD BEAST.

GRECIAN EMPIRE.

- | | |
|---|--|
| 12. toward the four winds of heaven ; | in Babylon, Asia Minor, Egypt, Greece. |
| 13. out of one of them a little horn waxed great | Antiochus the Great, succeeded by Antiochus Epiphanes, |
| 14. toward the south and east, | conquered Egypt, etc., |
| 15. which took away the daily sacrifice, and cast down the sanctuary. | and endeavored utterly to subvert the Jewish polity, polluting their temple, worship, and sacrifices to the utmost of his power. |

(DAN. chap. vii. 3-12.)

Now, Calmet makes Daniel's vision of the Four Beasts in the beginning of Belshazzar's reign, A. M. 3448; and the time when Darius Codomannus was conquered by Alexander the Great, A. M. 3674; and the time when Antiochus Epiphanes forcibly took Jerusalem and entered the temple, robbing it of precious vessels to the value of eighteen hundred talents, A. M. 3834. Thus, in one case there is an interval of one hundred and twenty-six years, and in the other of three hundred and eighty-six years, between the prediction and the fulfillment.

"When I behold a scheme," says Bishop McIlvaine, "so vast as to embrace all time, and yet so minute that it can detail the events of an hour; so general that in a few lines it predicts the history of the four mightiest empires, and yet so particular that chapters are devoted to the history of one individual; so diversified in its materials as to be made up of contributions from men of all ages and minds during a period of four thousand years, and yet so identical that one spirit and one grand harmonious purpose animate the whole; when I compare all this, arrayed as it is in the richest poetry and loftiest eloquence that eye of man ever read, with whatever else in the world ever pretended to the praise of prophecy: I behold a grandeur of conception, a sublimity of design, an all-controlling power of execution, a unity and self-depending supremacy of mind which bespeaks the omniscience and omnipotence of Him who '*was, and is, and is to come*, the Almighty.' I say nothing yet of the fulfillment of any

portion of this stupendous plan ; I only say, look at the plan itself in all its comprehensiveness and minuteness, and tell me if it be not utterly at variance with all human experience, and in itself perfectly incredible, that imposture should have conceived such a scheme, or should even have dared to commit its course to a venture that could only succeed by a continuance of miraculous fortune through all ages of the world. Consider the plan itself, the various minds that carried on the succession of its several predictions, forming a line of holy men from the earliest periods of antediluvian history down to the last of the apostles of Christ ; see how they all agree in spirit and purpose, while yet so different in character and circumstances ; see how they all unite in testifying of Christ ; so that, as the last of them said, ‘the testimony of Jesus is the spirit of prophecy ;’ then tell me how imposture can be supposed to have wrought unexposed for so many thousands of years ; how it could have chosen its agents out of forty centuries, out of circumstances so disadvantageous, and bid them embrace such an immense range of subjects for their predictions, and yet without any inconsistency, or want of harmony, or anything incompatible with the idea of one all-pervading mind having regulated the whole. I do not now say that so much as one prophecy has been fulfilled ; I only say, and I challenge all denial, that not a single prediction in the whole succession can be shown to have failed, or to be contradicted by the times or events to which it referred ; I only assert that, while many of the prophecies remain unfulfilled, because the times they relate to have not arrived, a very great number must have either been fulfilled already, or have utterly failed ; and yet no unbeliever could ever put his hand on that portion of history which contradicted the truth of any. I ask you to remember this important and undeniable fact, and then say whether it is not most impressive evidence that another mind than that of man was the author of the prophecies of the Bible ; whether it can be supposed possible, in the nature of things, that human ingenuity could have contrived a volume of predictions reaching so far,—extending so widely,—telling so much,—assuming such par-

ticularity, without having been contradicted by a single event in the history of nearly six thousand years."

This eloquent argument of Bishop McIlvaine we believe irresistible in its appropriateness and its truth. The most ingenious skepticism cannot reply to the *negative evidence* alone of prophecy. Here are these numerous predictions in the Bible, extending over the whole interval of time that marks the existence of man upon this earth. Has a single prediction been proved false? Has one recorded miracle, one prophecy, been shown a failure? We challenge the whole college of infidels to substantiate, by good argument, one solitary instance of failure. It cannot be done. The united skepticism of the world has never yet proved false a single recorded miracle or prediction of the Scriptures. Is not this negative evidence, saying nothing now of the fact of fulfillment, of immense value to prove the Bible from God?

What greater illustration of credulity than to believe this mighty system of prophecy, in its unity and minuteness of detail, to be the work alone, through so many ages, of uninspired men, and yet not be able to point out a single case of failure!

CHAPTER IX.

PREDICTIONS CONCERNING CHRIST, AND BY CHRIST.

As Christ, the Son of God, is the great theme of all revelation, so we find that all prophecy, in its main scope, centers upon him. Commencing with Adam, in Eden, in that memorable prediction, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head," we find the prophetic delineations of the Messiah that was to come, growing clearer, more minute, and more grand as that eventful period drew nigh when the Son of God was to become incarnate and suffer and die for the sins of the world. Christ not only based the truth of his Messiahship upon miracles, but upon prophecy. He acknowledged the inspiration of the Old Testament; he rebuked the Pharisees for corrupting it by giving undue prominence to the traditions of the elders; he discoursed to the people from the ancient prophets, and constantly turned the attention of the Jews to their own Scriptures, as affording irresistible evidence of the truth of his Messiahship. In the same manner did the apostles of Christ refer to the Old Testament as the strongest proof of the divine mission of Christ. With such a varied and great number of predictions in the Old Testament in respect to Christ, we can only select a very few; and the illustrations given will be to show especially one feature of prophecy, which is, *minuteness of specification*. We shall say nothing of the comprehensiveness, or grandeur, or great variety of predictions, in respect to Christ, that, commencing from the earliest age, reach to the last hour of time. It is enough for our purpose if we show from the wonderful minuteness of detail the impossibility of the Scriptures being the production alone of man. Daniel, five hundred and fifty-six years before Christ, determined the year of his coming,—when four hundred and ninety years should be

accomplished from the going forth of the command to rebuild Jerusalem. The accurate Dr. Prideaux has established that the event corresponded with the prediction exactly to a month. For in the month Nisan was the decree granted to Ezra, and in the middle of Nisan Christ suffered, just four hundred and ninety years after.

Christ was predicted to come into the world at that very time when he actually did come; and, as a wonderful confirmation of the truth of the predictions of the prophets concerning the Messiah, and the period of his entrance into the world, we find that there was, not only in Judea but in all the country round about, a universal expectation of the appearance of this Messiah. This is seen in the dismay and concealed envy of Herod when he interrogated the chief priests and scribes at what place the King of Israel should be born, and was troubled in his mind when they told him that their Scriptures said, in Bethlehem of Judea. It is seen, also, in his command to massacre the infants of that place, in the vain hope of including in the number the future King of Israel. The advent of Christ into the world was at the very time when the Jewish mind was most awake to his actual coming, and when they thought that the period had indeed come when the predictions concerning him would be accomplished. Christ was predicted to be betrayed and *sold*. Exactly the sum which Judas covenanted was foretold. Zechariah, personifying the Saviour, says: "They weighed for my price thirty pieces of silver." The very use of this money was foretold by the prophet: "And the Lord said unto me, Cast it unto the potter; and I took the thirty pieces of silver, and cast them to the potter in the house of the Lord." Thus Judas cast down the thirty pieces of silver into the temple, and the money was applied to the purchase of the "potter's field." He was to be forsaken by his disciples: "I looked for some to have pity, and there was none; and for comforters, but I found none." The place of his birth was designated by Micah: "But thou, B  thlehem Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be the ruler in

Israel ; whose goings forth have been of old, from everlasting." And in Matthew we read : " Now when Jesus was born in Bethlehem of Judea." Christ was to be preceded by a remarkable person, resembling Elijah. And in Isaiah we read : " The voice of him that crieth in the wilderness, Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make straight in the desert a highway for our God." In Matthew we find the fulfillment, in the words : " In those days came John the Baptist, preaching in the wilderness of Judea, and saying, Repent ye, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." He was to work miracles, says Isaiah : " Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb sing." In instances too numerous to mention, these were the very miracles Christ worked. He was to be rejected by his own countrymen, says Isaiah : " And he shall be for a sanctuary ; but for a stone of stumbling and for a rock of offense to both the houses of Israel." Says John, in confirmation : " He came unto his own, and his own received him not." He was to be scourged, mocked, and spit upon, says Isaiah : " I gave my back to the smiters, and my cheeks to them that plucked off the hair ; I hid not my face from shame and spitting." And we read in Matthew : " Then did they spit in his face, and buffeted him ; and others smote him with the palms of their hands." His hands and feet were to be pierced. In the Psalms we read : " The assembly of the wicked have enclosed me ; they pierced my hands and my feet." This is the more remarkable, as crucifixion was a punishment not known among the Jews. He was to be mocked and reviled on the cross ; and in the Psalms we read : " All they that see me laugh me to scorn ; they shoot out the lip ; they shake the head, saying, He trusted on the Lord that he would deliver him ; let him deliver him, seeing he delighted in him." It was predicted that his garments were to be parted, and upon his vesture lots were to be cast. In the Psalms we read : " They part my garments among them, and cast lots upon my vesture." And in John we read of the fulfillment, when the soldiers

said: "Let us not rend it, but cast lots for it, whose it shall be," while his garments they divided into four parts. He was to make his grave with the rich; and we read of Joseph of Arimathea laying the body of Jesus in his own new tomb, which he had hewn out of a rock.

In the Psalms we read: "It was not *he* that hated me, that did magnify himself against me; then I *would have hid myself from him*; but it was thou, a man, my equal, *my guide*, and mine acquaintance." In John we read: "And Judas also, which betrayed him, *knew the place*, for Jesus oftentimes resorted thither with his disciples."

In Micah we read: "They shall smite the judge of Israel with a rod upon his cheek." In Matthew we read: "They took the reed, and smote him on the head."

In the Psalms we read: "They gave me also gall for my meat; and in my thirst they gave me vinegar to drink;" and in Matthew we read: "They gave him vinegar to drink, mingled with gall." In the Psalms we read: "He keepeth all his bones, not one of them is broken." In John we are told: "These things were done that the Scripture might be fulfilled, A bone of him shall not be broken."

In Isaiah we read: "He was numbered with the transgressors." In Luke we are told: "They crucified him, and the malefactors, one on the right hand and the other on the left."

While in the Psalms we read: "They cast lots for my vesture," in John we are told the reason: "But his coat was without seam, woven from the top throughout."

Consider the predictions of Christ himself. Christ predicted his own resurrection; and yet how impossible an event of this nature, unless he had been what he professed to be, the Son of God! Christ foretold the rapid spread of the gospel; the persecutions of the disciples; the precise manner of Peter's martyrdom; the continuance of John till after the destruction of Jerusalem; the rejection of the Jews; and the bringing in of the Gentiles into the church of God. But let us consider the predictions of Christ in respect to the destruction of Jerusalem. History confirms, in the most

minute particulars, every prediction of Christ. Two great historians, Josephus and Tacitus,—the one a Jew, the other a Roman,—both unfriendly to Christianity, confirm by their united testimony the predictions of Christ respecting the destruction of Jerusalem and the subsequent condition of the Jews. The destruction of Jerusalem was in the seventieth year of the Christian era; the prophecies of Matthew were published thirty years before fulfillment, and were declared by our Saviour thirty-seven years before their fulfillment. Observe that at the time of prediction the Jews were at peace with the Romans, the temple stood in all its glory, and nothing corresponded with the fearful calamities foretold by our Saviour. False Christs were to appear; and not two years after the crucifixion, Simon Magus was heard boasting himself as the Son of God; and, as we come nearer the fatal event, the country was filled with impostors, who deceived the people. Christ also predicted *famines*, and *pestilences*, and *earthquakes* in divers places. And historians speak of the raging of pestilences in various places, and earthquakes, as signs of the times. Christ foretold who the enemy should be, their fury and power, in the proverbial expression: “*Wheresoever the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together.*” The carcass was the Jewish nation, given over as thoroughly corrupt and forsaken by God. The eagles were the characteristic insignia of the Romans. The means by which Jerusalem should be taken were minutely delineated. “The days shall come upon thee, that thine enemies shall cast a trench about thee, and compass thee round, and keep thee in on every side.” However improbable these events, they actually took place. The inhabitants were kept in Jerusalem by Titus, with a wall and trench measuring about five miles in circumference. The ruin of the city was foretold in these words: “They shall lay thee even with the ground, and thy children within them; and they shall not leave in thee one stone upon another that shall not be thrown down.” Jerusalem, with its massive walls, with its magnificent temple, was totally demolished. Terentius Rufus, a captain of the army of Titus, did with a plowshare beat up the foundations of the

temple. Says Gibbon: "A plowshare was drawn over the consecrated ground, as a sign of perpetual interdiction."

Christ predicted of the Jews: "They shall fall by the edge of the sword, and shall be led away captive into all nations." Josephus computes over eleven hundred thousand as destroyed in Jerusalem alone, and upwards of one million three hundred thousand who perished during these days of vengeance. Over ninety-seven thousand were carried into slavery, beside multitudes banished in different places. But there is another remarkable prophecy that has received an exact fulfillment. "Jerusalem shall be trodden down of the Gentiles, until the times of the Gentiles be fulfilled." Nearly eighteen hundred years have elapsed since the destruction of Jerusalem, and observe that, during these long centuries, the Jews have not been re-established in Jerusalem. Romans, Saracens, Christians, Turks, have in turn possessed and trodden down the holy city, but the Jews, strangers in their native land, outcasts in the home of their fathers, have wandered over the earth, a persecuted, despised, but distinct race; mingling with every nation, but uniting with none; a standing miracle of preservation, a perpetual monument of the truth of prophecy, showing the Bible from God, and proving conclusively the divine mission of Christ.

CHAPTER X.

THE SUCCESS OF CHRISTIANITY IN THE FIRST CENTURY.

IF the introduction of the Mosaic economy demanded miracles, the introduction of the Christian dispensation did much more demand miracles. There were greater interests at stake, more important ends to be accomplished, and far higher obstacles to encounter. The divine mission of Moses was principally to educate a nation in the unity of the one God, and preserve a chosen people from the polytheism of a world sunk in heathen idolatry. It was to keep for the appointed time the oracles of God among the chosen people, and secure a moral and political salvation to the lineal descendants of Abraham. But the introduction of Christianity was to break down the separating wall between Judaism and Gentileism. It was to teach new doctrines, make more clear the old, and embrace in the brotherhood of one faith not one nation only, but the world. It was not in Judea only, but in every land, that the true worshipers were to be publicly recognized as the accepted of God. The gorgeous ceremonial, the ritualistic service, of Judaism, had accomplished the end for which by God it had been instituted. All typical sacrifices were consummated in the great antitype, Christ, and the death of the Son of God had introduced a new era in human affairs. Here was come the mighty epoch sung by Jewish bards. Here arose in the world that event of transcendent interest that was to mould the destinies of every succeeding age. That miracles at such a period were necessary to confirm the divine mission of Christ, no infidelity can have the hardihood to deny. That they were really worked, history, both sacred and profane, combines to assure the mind. But there is another link to the chain of evidence to show the Bible the word of God. That link is the success

of Christianity during the first century that elapsed from the death of its divine author. The argument is simply this. The success of Christianity was of such a nature that no human power alone is an adequate reason for it. Consequently it must be from God, and therefore the Bible, that embodies all the truth of Christianity, is from God. Both must go together. The divine success of religion cannot be divorced from the divine record of that religion. If the one was of God, the other must also be of God. We do not now enter upon the subject of the inspiration of the Bible, but only the truth of the divine mission of Christ, and consequently the divine origin of his doctrines and instructions.

Let us consider the circumstances that existed at the introduction of Christianity, and the obstacles that the disciples of Christ had to encounter, and see if upon the principles of human reason we can attribute the success of the religion of Christ to any other cause than the power of God, or a supernatural and divine agency. There are some things which human beings can and will do, and some things which they either cannot do or will not do. Men act from motives. Let us, then, see if the success of Christianity can be accounted for upon any other supposition than that Christianity was from God. The introduction of Christianity was at a period of the world, and among a nation, and connected with such circumstances, that it could not possibly have encountered successfully the obstacles opposed to it, had not Christianity been from God. As the fabrication of man, a system of human device, it must have been strangled in its very cradle, and expired long before it could have attracted the notice of the world. One great reason existed for this. Christ came in a way and under those circumstances that directly arrayed against him the whole Jewish nation. Christ assumed titles, propounded doctrines, and denounced judgment, that made him peculiarly unacceptable to his countrymen. The learned men of the nation, looking only to the brilliant predictions in respect to his second coming in the Old Testament, had confounded his first coming with his second coming, and forgotten the necessary humiliation of the divine author of

Christianity in the regal triumph of that more brilliant epoch of the world's history when Christ shall assume distinctively to the world's gaze the attributes of a judge and a king. But, more than this, the Jews not only had lost sight of the predictions in respect to Christ's humiliation, but had carnalized all true ideas of the glory of Christ as a king and a judge. They fell into the twofold error of overlooking the humiliation of his first coming and Judaizing his second coming. Upon every principle of reason, then, the mission of Christ to the Jews, if not divine, would be accommodated to the prejudices and feelings of the Jews. If Christ was not of God, he neither would nor could have set himself against every prospect of worldly success, and perseveringly taken a course that ended only in ignominy and death and the deprivation of all that is held valuable upon the earth. One of two things is certain,—Christ was of this world, or he was not; he came as the divinely accredited messenger of God, or he did not thus come. What worldly motive could influence Christ to take the course he did take? All conduct must be based upon motives. If Christ was not divinely commissioned by God, he must be of this world. His mission, and his claims to be believed in as sent of God, must be either true or false. There is no middle ground between a heavenly Messiah and a worldly impostor.

The last supposition gives us the absurd anomaly of an individual actuated by worldly motives, and yet in his whole life and death taking a course that in the clearest and most effectual way was directly opposed to all worldly advancement, all that is honored or considered as pleasant and desirable by this world; a citizen alone of this earth, influenced as an impostor by worldly motives, and yet in every act of his life taking the very course that no man of the world will take, courting poverty, suffering, disgrace, death, and all for that which was false,—an impostor doing that which promised neither the favor of God nor of man, which could secure neither the riches of time nor eternity. Human nature is made up of no such kind of material as that. No axiom in mathematics more true than that motives will correspond to

the conduct pursued. For a man from God to act a whole lifetime like an impostor, or an impostor like a man from God,—for a person influenced by worldly motives perseveringly to live and die against worldly motives,—is the greatest of all absurdities. It is to suppose a criterion of conduct that the human heart never can adopt.

But consider the conduct of the Jews toward Christ. All their cherished hopes of an earthly potentate were studiously defeated by Christ. His cradle was the manger of oxen, his occupation that of the carpenter's son. His sympathies were with the despised of his race. His instructions constantly rebuked their pride, conflicted with all their ideas of worldly supremacy, threw contempt upon their priesthood, abrogated their ritual, and waged a constant war with their cherished exclusiveness as a nation. Christ promised nothing that was not most offensive to all influenced by earthly motives. A most expressive term embodies the appearance of Christ to his nation,—“*stumbling-block*.” The conduct of the Jews toward Christ evinced that he was looked upon peculiarly as a *stumbling-block*. No matter how clear the proofs of his divine mission, that mission itself was hateful in the extreme to the Jewish nation. No one fact in history is so clearly proved as this. What inference more natural, than that if Christ was only an impostor and did not come from God, his mission would die upon the same cross that witnessed his death? Not only is such an inference what all men in reason would make, but an inference certain to be verified by the actual results. But what was the fact? The success of Christianity was a success precisely under those circumstances that declared it to be from God.

Amid a nation's scoffs, in ignominy and fearful pain, the great author of Christianity had died upon the cross. No day of gloom like that in human history! Christ's body was committed to the grave; his disciples, disconsolate, had dispersed; few and despised, they possessed in themselves not one element of strength. Regarded as the victims of a miserable delusion, they were scattered, with no bond of union, and had no other protection than the world's contempt and

their own poverty and destitution of power and fame. Who but God was to resuscitate those almost extinguished fires of Christianity? It seemed as if every combination of circumstance had been brought together to show the impotence of human power, and the perfect helplessness of the disciples of Christ in every earthly point of view. But mark what followed. Upon the fiftieth day after the death of Christ, before a great assembly of Jews and strangers from other nations, Peter, one of the disciples, arose and addressed the multitude. Notice the character of his speech, and its effect upon the assembly:

“Jesus of Nazareth (said Peter), being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain: whom God hath raised up. Therefore let all the house of Israel know assuredly, that God hath made that same Jesus, whom ye have crucified, both Lord and Christ.”

Upon the supposition that Christ was of this world, and consequently not raised from the dead, what madness to utter such language! How could the deluded disciple of a false Messiah boldly charge home upon the Jews a crime of which they were guiltless, even the crucifixion of the Son of God, or dare avow an event so miraculous as his resurrection, if it had not taken place? Surrounded by a nation of unbelievers, with the whole Jewish hierarchy as enemies most bitter, how happened it that Peter (if Christ was not of God) presumed to utter an untruth at the time when detection was inevitable and exposure certain? But what was the result? Three thousand souls were that day added to the infant Church.

Observe, then, the success that ensued from that day. Twelve apostles are sent forth, to achieve a far mightier victory than the military conquest of the earth. They enter upon a warfare that brings to them neither riches, nor earthly honors, nor ease. And who are these twelve apostles? They are not famed for learning, they have no wealth, they command no force of arms. They enter upon this enterprise, obscure, friendless, simple, unprotected men, despised by the

noble and great, unhonored by the multitude, and unloved by the people. What do they propose to do?

It is the subversion of Judaism, an uncompromising hostility to the idols of the heathen, an open, life-long war with every embodiment of evil, be it in the individual or the state. What apostles of any other religion ever proposed to themselves such a task? And yet these twelve men, mostly fishermen, dare attempt a task more formidable than ever yet entered the heart of man.

Consider the state of the world at that time. The Roman Empire was master of the earth. The imperial eagle floated on every banner, and the remotest regions of the civilized world acknowledged the supremacy of Cæsar. But Rome was one vast superstructure of idolatry. The civil and the religious code were intimately blended together, and paganism embodied in itself all the wealth and power of the earth. The worship of idols was the law of the state, and disobedience was branded with infamy and subjected to torture and to death. It was also the most enlightened age of the world. Not only was all the idolatry of the earth arrayed against Christianity, but all its boasted philosophy. On one side was all the formalism of Judaism, and upon the other all the grossness of heathenism, both arrayed in deadly issue with the new religion.

Upon what principle, then, unless it be the supernatural intervention of God, an agency infinitely superior to human instrumentality, are we to account for the success of the apostles? Be it remembered, the weapons of their warfare were not carnal, but spiritual. They had no rank, no riches, no military power, to recommend them. They disclaimed all such instrumentality. Mohammed achieved his victories by the sword, and offered a paradise of sensualism to his followers. But the apostles of Christ held no sword in their hands, and offered to their disciples in this life nothing but the loss of all that the earth esteems valuable or pleasant. They held up, indeed, a crown of beauty and glory; but it was of heaven, not of this earth.

Such was the greatness of the task imposed upon the apos-

tles. Do they hesitate to undertake it? Far from it. The very disciples that fled upon the trial of their Master, and the apostle who trembled before the poor words of a woman in the hall of judgment, boldly take upon themselves a warfare against a world lying in sin, whose field of battle was in every land, and protracted as long as life itself; and what was their success? "And the word of God increased; and the number of the disciples multiplied in Jerusalem greatly; and a great company of the priests were obedient to the faith." The Christian religion was not confined to Judea. Its disciples penetrated far beyond the limits of the Roman Empire. Multitudes daily were added to the church. In Rome itself, in the palace of the Cæsars, the gospel was preached. In famed Corinth, abandoned to every vice, believers were found. At Athens the voice of Paul was heard. For the first time desert lands saw the banner of the cross, and lonely forests resounded with the hymn of Jesus. Before thirty years had elapsed from the death of Christ, churches were planted throughout Judea, Galilee, and Samaria, through Greece, the islands of the Ægean Sea, the sea-coast of Africa, and far into Italy.

The number of converts is described as "a great number," "great multitudes," "much people." The opposers of Christianity at Thessalonica exclaim against the apostles, "that they who *had turned the world upside down*, were come hither also." Demetrius complained of Paul, "that not only at Ephesus, but also throughout all Asia, he had persuaded and turned away much people." Jerusalem, the chief seat of Jewish bigotry, had in it many *thousands of believers*. The Christians, by the testimony of Tacitus, had become so numerous at Rome that a "great multitude were seized." In forty years more we are told, in a celebrated letter of Pliny the Roman Governor of Pontus and Bithynia, that Christianity had long subsisted in these provinces, though so remote from Judea; also, that "many of all ages and of every rank, of both sexes, likewise, were accused to Pliny of being Christians." Justin Martyr, who wrote one hundred years after the gospel was first preached to the Gentiles, thus de-

scribes the extent of Christianity in his time: "There is not a nation, either Greek or barbarian, or of any other name, even of those who wander in tribes and live in tents, among whom prayers and thanksgivings are not offered to the Father and Creator of the universe by the name of the crucified Jesus." Of the converts, even Gibbon unites in this testimony: "As they emerged from sin and superstition to the glorious hope of immortality, they resolved to devote themselves to a life not only of virtue, but of penitence; the desire of perfection became the ruling passion of their soul."

But not less remarkable was the success of Christianity in the first century than formidable the opposition encountered. Rome became alarmed for her idols. Superstition trembled on her throne. The great men of the earth were combined against the cross. Of the twelve apostles, all but one died martyrs to the faith; and even the beloved John, in his last days, was banished to the lonely Patmos.

The first apostles of Mohammed all entered into earthly honors and became chieftains over the conquered realms of their master; but the apostles of Christ were imprisoned, tortured, and persecuted unto death. Their baptism was a baptism of blood. To the contumely of a world, the bitter rage of incensed Judaism and pagan craft, were they constantly exposed. Weary, abandoned, desolate, with hunger, and cold, and want, unrewarded by riches, ease, or honor, they pursued their toilsome journey over land and sea,—harmless as their Master, they found no resting place. They spoke before princes and kings; but paganism, wielding the power of the state, exerted all her might to crush the religion of the cross. Upon the rack innumerable men and women and children were tortured,—infants were cast into the fire,—all that the dungeon, the stake, the wild beasts of the circus could do, was tried; and yet victory and the cross did but go together. In prisons dark, in the raging flame, upon the bed of torture, before the ferocious beasts of the amphitheater, did the song of the martyr arise, and a brighter crown than the Cæsars ever wore glittered before the eye of the

persecuted disciple of Christ. In his ear he heard a sweeter minstrelsy than ever echoed in Diana's temple or arose from the assembled multitude of the Parthenon.

The imposing system of paganism fell before the purity of the religion of Christ; and yet the only weapons were truth and love. Such was the success of Christianity. Reason as we may and believe as we may, the fact that it was from God, and not of man, was supernatural in its origin, and not natural, was accompanied by miracles and enforced by the eternal Spirit, is the only thing that can explain the mission of Christ, the power of his instructions, and the success of his apostles.

Take away from us this argument, and these great events, never to be effaced from the page of history, will present to skepticism an anomaly of absurdity, a contradiction in all the principles of human life, so strange that even a thousand miracles would be far more easy to credit than a supposition so unnatural.

The success of Christianity during the first century, under obstacles so great and in conflict with prejudices so inveterate, carries with it evidence most conclusive of the divine origin of the religion of Christ. The age when our Saviour came into the world was peculiarly unfavorable to any attempt to palm off upon the credulity of the multitude a system of imposture. It was just the age to test most clearly the reality of miracles, and displayed to the greatest advantage the truthfulness of the divine mission of the Son of God. It was the supernatural character of that mission, and its holy credentials from God himself, that carried with it the convictions of its disciples and made it triumph over all obstacles.

CHAPTER XI.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO HUMAN NATURE AND THE CONSCIENCE.

WHEN the great fact is shown that we need a revelation from God, when the mind assents to this clearest of truths, then are we in a favorable condition to go directly to the consideration of the evidences of Christianity. Let us, then, take the Bible and carefully examine its credentials. Let us thoroughly investigate its proofs demanding our belief and proclaiming itself from God. The Bible invites us to such an examination,—it seeks to impose no belief that is not based upon the highest interests of our nature, and that has not to support it arguments of irresistible strength and importance. Unlike all pretended revelations, it is open to the freest and the most searching scrutiny. Coming to us with its tremendous sanctions, it demands our most careful, most earnest, and most faithful examination. It has nothing to conceal in respect to its credentials. It seeks not to impose a faith without reason, or a practice without evidence. It calls not upon us to believe in its divine origin without giving the clearest proofs that it comes from God. Let us, then, commence the task of an examination whether the Bible is in truth a revelation from God, and an authoritative standard of belief and practice. But in what attitude shall we present ourselves? Shall we go as learners? Shall we come willing to receive the truth? Let us remember, we must be deeply committed to our own personal interests. Our belief or no belief will not change the immutable sanctions of the Bible. Our own opinions, right or wrong, will not alter one fact of inspiration. If the Bible is from God, it will stand immovable as the throne of Jehovah, even

though generations of unbelievers treat it as a fable. But there is one argument, before entering upon the evidences of Christianity, that we have the right to make the most of. What may affect our personal interests for time and eternity should be attentively studied, and every evidence given for its truth should be received with candor. It should make a great difference with a person who is told of the danger of a river that he must cross, and that of one which he has not to cross. Belief in the one affects his personal interests, but belief in the other does not. It is of little consequence what his belief may be of one river; while his personal safety depends upon a correct belief in the other case. Apply the same reasoning to the Bible. True or not true, our own interests are intimately involved. If true, it is the charter of a glorious immortality beyond the grave; if not true, we are shut up alone to the unassisted light of nature, with all its deepening gloom and fearful intimations of ruin. Now, such a subject is not to be treated as we treat the facts of science or the mere discoveries of human knowledge. He who plows the land may believe in either the Ptolemaic or the Copernican system of astronomy, but he will get as good a harvest whether he believes the sun moves round the earth or the earth round the sun; but it is a very different thing with him whether he believes the Bible is from God, or the offspring of human craft and simply a fable. As a wrong belief in the Bible is made a subject of condemnation, so the interests of the unbeliever are affected for time and eternity by the fact alone of his unbelief. This is the reason why it is so needful for us to consider the evidences of Christianity. What conclusion, then, are we to arrive at in respect to the evidence that the Bible comes from God? Just the conclusion that we arrive at from any evidence in respect to those things which affect our interests for this life alone. We take such evidence as presents itself, great or small, and make the most of it. All human action in worldly things is based upon this. The practical rule of all our conduct is *action*, whenever the evidence of a thing exceeds the evidence against a thing. What demonstrative proof has the merchant, who commits his trea-

sures to the treacherous sea, that he shall ever see the vessel in which his riches are embarked? And yet how little evidence is necessary to induce thousands, with sufficient reason, to do business upon the great waters! Of the millions who now travel by the mysterious agency of steam, how many personally examine that swift engine that brings them in safety to their journey's end? What but probable evidence, and that, too, of a very limited nature, controls our conduct in most of the affairs of this life? Principles of action that all in this world confess to be reasonable and good, many disavow when a revelation from God is presented. In this life many scruple not to risk everything upon the feeblest testimony, and yet no testimony, however great, will induce them to believe the Bible. Every difficulty is magnified into a mountain, and the smallest objections are made to offset the most irresistible arguments in favor of a divine revelation. Believing in the great facts of nature upon evidence the most feeble, they disbelieve the God of nature in his inspired word upon evidence the most grand and conclusive. Works of human production they receive with unhesitating confidence, while the inspired words of God are treated with contempt and neglect. Thousands admitting the existence and exploits of Alexander, or Cæsar, or Napoleon, with a confidence the most implicit, yet doubt or deny the divine mission of Jesus Christ, and his atonement for sin, although sustained by the accumulated evidence of centuries and made memorable by the blood of unnumbered martyrs. How shall we account for this? Simply upon the ground that in one case our personal interests are affected, and in the other they are not. To admit the truth of the Bible is to admit its divine sanctions, and to believe that it comes from God is also to believe in the condemnation that it pronounces upon its rejection. Here lies the secret of that infidelity that would do away with the Bible, and consequently with its sanctions. Here is the cause of that sophistry that would reject inspired truth because of the personality of its application. Yet the very fact that our interests are intimately involved in our belief or disbelief of the Bible, is the highest reason for a most earnest and faith-

ful examination of its evidences. The very fact that our destiny for eternity may be at stake, is the most convincing of arguments to induce us to treat with candor every proof that the Bible comes from God. Here we take our stand. We say, be the evidences great or small for the inspiration of the Scriptures, that evidence, if good, should be received such as it is, and the most made of it.

We come now to the Bible, and inquire if this book, which professes to be from God, is *adapted* to our nature. Does it meet the demands of our moral constitution? Is it in all respects suited to be our guide in this world to a better? If *not*, then the evidence of miracles and prophecy must, with us, have little weight; if its representations of our state are erroneous and its general character destitute of purity or veracity, we say such a work cannot be the offspring of a good and holy God. God cannot be the author of that which belies his nature or throws contempt upon his attributes of truth and holiness.

But we say more than this: it is impossible that the record of miracles and prophecy should, under such circumstances, be a *true record*, as God only can work miracles and predict events to take place hundreds and thousands of years before their actual occurrence. So, also, a Bible of the character described would be impossible to be substantiated by genuine miracles and prophecy; for God never would work miracles for an end unworthy of himself.

But if we find the Bible is adapted to our nature, as the key is adapted to the lock,—if we see that it presents a perfect model of purity, love, and goodness for imitation,—if it reflects like a mirror our condition, and combines every excellence to attract the mind,—if it suits us in every condition of life, and has in all ages and every land an adaptation to our necessities,—if it delineates God as the universal Father, caring equally for the humblest as the greatest of beings,—if it shows the infinite love of Christ his Son, and reveals an atonement for the sins of the world,—if it unfolds a redemptive process commencing from the earliest age and consummated in the salvation of millions of the human race,—if it

discloses the law honored and the sinner saved, justice and mercy meeting together,—if at every period of our lives it has something fitted for our instruction, and can adapt itself to every variety of intellect, and give lessons of wisdom to the peasant-boy and the king, to the young and the aged,—if to every faculty of our nature it gives out a note of harmony, and insinuates itself into all the intricacies of our moral being, then do we have the most convincing proof that such a book must come from God.

Let us, then, examine the Bible, to see if it is adapted to our nature,—if it unlocks the door of our hearts. We will commence with conscience. Does the Bible meet the demands of our conscience? Do its truths alone give peace to the conscience and a ground of firm support? Search the world over, and we find that no religion but that of the Bible can satisfy the conscience, or meet its boundless wants. It belongs to the intellect to tell us what is *true*, but the conscience has the prerogative alone of telling us what is *right*; its decisions are immediate and intuitive. What is there in the Bible that the conscience can show is wrong? Look to the morality of revelation. What is there in it that conscience does not approve of? What purity of thought, as of overt act, is commanded in the Bible! What moral excellence is there that conscience does not respond to as most noble and worthy of God?

Consider, then, in what respects the Bible is adapted to the conscience. It is peculiarly adapted to it in its decisions of what is morally good and right. It is not in the power of the intellect to make what is in itself wrong right, or to turn right into wrong. There is an essential difference in our perceptions of what is true and right, and that which is false and wrong. The Bible is distinguished above all other books in that pre-eminently it is addressed to the conscience. It comes to this noblest of our faculties, and speaks directly to the deepest convictions of our moral nature. It delineates the character of God in such a light that conscience, if it dreads divine justice, yet responds immediately to the truthfulness of its exhibition. It delineates the purity of God and his be-

nevolence in such a way that conscience at once pronounces a verdict of approbation.

There are certain moral duties so plain, so needful, and so imperious in their obligation, that when clearly exhibited to the mind there will be a response from conscience of approbation, from the most degraded even as the most exalted of men. Thus, sincerity and truth in our intercourse with society,—thus, self-denial for others' good,—thus, the possession of a just and benevolent spirit,—thus, the shunning of treachery, murder, or violence upon the property or character of our neighbor,—thus, uprightness in our daily intercourse, and freedom from avarice, revenge, and deceit,—thus, kindness toward the helpless, affection to parents or children, are duties as universal as man, all growing out of the great law of love, as boundless in its extent as the universe of God.

All these duties are enforced in the Bible in a way peculiar for the greatness of their sanctions and the clearness of their application. What does conscience do when appealed to by these duties of the word of God? Conscience pronounces them right. It has no long process of argument to go through with, no complicated series of questions to ask. Conscience at once says, These duties are right, these duties promote our noblest interests, these duties we must comply with or we endanger our immortal happiness. Nor does it demand a mind educated in the schools, or learned in the arts and sciences. In the heart of the most ignorant, the simplest, the rudest of men, yes, in the infant soul of the child just entering upon the stage of life, conscience, true to its high origin, true to the noblest prerogative of its being, tells us all that these duties are right, are good,—that they harmonize with our highest welfare, and will secure, if performed, the approbation of God.

We ask, where in any book but the Bible is conscience so intelligently, so earnestly, and so effectually appealed to? We ask, where among all the books of human origin is conscience so deeply, so truthfully addressed? But there is another argument, of the highest importance, to consider. What book but the Bible imposes such sanctions

upon the conscience, demands so imperiously its cultivation and the bringing it under the truth and all good influences? What book but the Bible so widely addresses itself to the conscience under all circumstances and in all relations of life? The conscience is that which tells us what is right. Where except in the Bible do we find the appeal so constantly and so effectually made to that which conscience tells us *is right*? Is the principle of right the principle of false religions? Is the conscience intelligently, truthfully, and rightfully appealed to in the pagan shasters, or in the pretended revelations of successful impostors? Is the conscience, the noblest faculty of man, the thing most sought after in the Koran of Mohammed? Is it esteemed chief in value in the Sibylline leaves of the Roman and Grecian prophetess,—the Druid rites of the ancient Briton,—the songs of the Scandinavian warrior,—the Bible of the Persian fire-worshiper,—or any of those pagan Scriptures that now hold sway over millions of the human race? Where except in the Christian Bible do we find the conscience treated as God intended it should be treated? Where except in inspiration do we find every sanction, every command, every duty, based upon the immutable, the eternal principle of right,—right such as the conscience feels and knows,—such as it recognizes immediately in every age and every land,—right such as the peasant-boy feels as keenly as the monarch upon his throne,—right so universal, so clearly defined, so pervading, so omnipresent in every action and thought, that among all races and in every country, in the earliest cradle of civilization as in the latest abode of refinement and wealth, human nature gives but one response, and conscience pronounces but one unchanging verdict?

Where except in the Bible do we find conscience treated as the minister of God? Where except there do we find the unsullied, the perfect mirror of every moral excellence and of all right presented to it? In every other system of religion conscience is abased, is trampled upon, is perverted, is made the tool of designing men, is seduced into sin, is denied, or considered unworthy of attention. This mighty

principle of human nature, to which all superstition owes its power, and by which all false religions achieve their triumphs, is degraded from its lofty seat in the heart of man, is drugged with the cruel nostrums of impurity and deceit, is imprisoned in an iron cage, is made a perjured witness in man's heart. How unlike the treatment it receives from the Bible ! There it is recognized in man and woman ; there it is tenderly cared for ; there it is cherished even as a plant of celestial beauty ; there it is talked unto even as a father converses with the child of his love ; there a more than mother's sympathy greets it even in its wanderings, and the wisdom of God stoops to beguile it into the path of duty. There is the conscience of the repenting sinner received even as that prodigal was welcomed to a feast such as the eldest brother never saw. But the Bible not only shows itself the best friend to the conscience ; it also reveals itself as its guide. It has already been seen that conscience in itself is not a sufficient guide,—that it needs something more clear, more imperative, and more effectual, to restrain sin. Where except in the Bible is there a guide for the conscience ? Where is there in any other religion a directory of conduct so comprehensive, so universal, as is found in the word of God ? What duty so small that it does not enjoin ? what virtue so great that it does not include ? As a system of morality alone, what so good as the Bible, or so convincing ? Where are sanctions so commanding, or rules of behavior better for this life ? We need for the conscience an authoritative and an unerring guide. We need something that shall enlighten it in duty, awaken it to right action, purify it from corrupt desires, and make it sensitive to wrong. Where except in the Bible is the conscience able to find such a guide as shall deliver from all error, preserve from all corruption, make courageous in adversity, and pure in prosperous days ? Where except in the Bible are we to look for a guide to conscience so effectual as that in all relations of life and in every age it shall be competent for all wants ? If there was no other argument for the divine origin of the Scriptures, this alone is reason enough for a cordial reception. We would say that the Bible

being so superior to all other productions as a guide to the conscience, this should be, until a better substitute was provided (if such a supposition is possible), our practical guide through this world. Try any other key but the Bible, and in vain will it fit itself to the mysterious lock of the conscience; in vain can any other system be found that shall meet the wants of conscience. Rather, all false religions live by the perversions of conscience. Like tyrants, they use conscience as a slave; they so misuse, or blind, or harden conscience, that it gives a forced acquiescence to errors the most fearful and practices the most corrupt. Conscience is compelled to walk barefooted over the iron spikes of superstition, and its lacerated body made to bleed at every step.

There are some subjects connected with human interests beyond the grasp of the unassisted mind of man. One is, how man, a sinner, can be justified with God. Equally difficult is it for man to declare the future condition of the body after death, or to prove the immortality of the soul. Such subjects reach far beyond the efforts of the intellect. If the Bible comes to us throwing the brightest light upon the realities of the future state,—if it comes opening up the deep mysteries of our nature, our existence in this world and the life beyond the grave,—if it speaks of the resurrection of the body, and confirms the truth of that resurrection by the well-authenticated resurrection of Christ,—then such gleams of light into futurity, such glorious yet awful distinctness of delineation of another world, such an amazing insight into the deepest yet greatest of truths, can come from no human source. This we do know from history, even as from the clearest deductions of reason. We do know that where the Bible is unknown, where man is left unassisted by any light from revelation, these truths are not known. The deepest, the most wide-spread ignorance prevails upon subjects most intimately connected with man's welfare. The experiment has been tried upon a great scale, how much man left to himself can find out in respect to his condition for a future life. That experiment has uniformly been found to reveal

the human mind utterly inadequate to make known such truths or give any satisfactory evidence of them.

In respect to the resurrection of the body, no conjecture of man has been made. This truth, when announced by Paul to the Athenians, was ridiculed as the wildest dream of the imagination. The Bible makes known not only new truths, as the resurrection, God reconciled to man by the death of Christ, an immortality of soul and body, and the absolute creation of matter from nothing, but it throws the greatest distinctness upon those truths that the light of nature has dimly apprehended. Just as when the naked eye sees in the heavens the obscure outlines of stars, or gazes upon the moon reflecting the sunlight, and then assists its vision by a telescope, so that the stars appear clearly and revolving planets are seen, and mountains and mighty ravines upon the moon's surface are discovered,—even thus the Bible throws light upon truths obscurely intimated by the unassisted reason of man. What in the physical world the telescope does to the heavens, in the moral world the Bible does to the mind and heart. Here alone we might rest our argument for the divine origin of the Bible. We might say, if the reason of man has never found out such truths, and if the truths that reason has made known are revealed with a hundredfold distinctness in revelation, then certainly such a production must come from a higher than human source. But let us consider the Bible as adapted to the conscience. The conscience is a discriminating faculty. However perverted, it does not lose all of its power or susceptibility to good impressions. If treated as a slave, yet even when degraded by abuse, and manacled with the chains of superstition, it is not wholly deadened to every idea of right, or unconscious of all moral beauty and equity. Trembling it may be in every sinew and nerve, suffering it may be under the cruel lash of bigotry and ferocious ignorance, yet even in its lowest estate it will assert the high prerogatives of its existence and reveal the nobility of its divine original.

When false philosophy and the superstition of centuries have thrown their black foliage over the foundation of the

greatest of truths, yet conscience, the wall of adamant, is still seen by the observer through the chinks and openings of that fatal drapery that surrounds it. Consider, then, the adaptation of the Bible to it. In the first place, conscience has a natural sense of justice; it feels that wrong should be punished, and goodness rewarded; it feels that inequality of birth, or wealth, or station, does not give impunity to transgression, or make wickedness right. It instinctively declares that the man of rank and riches should not murder, or defraud, or in any way injure his neighbor, any more than the man of obscurity and poverty; it pronounces the law right when its penalty is visited impartially upon all transgressors and none are suffered to escape punishment when condemned as guilty. What conscience declares is right to be done to others, it declares is right to be done to self. Take two persons, a man guilty of an atrocious crime and a man innocent of it. You cannot reverse the decision of conscience in these two persons. The feeling and the approbation of innocence cannot dwell in the heart of the guilty man; neither can the sting of remorse embitter the thoughts of him guiltless of this crime.

Such being conscience, what is its decision in respect to the actual existing state of the world? Here often crime is triumphant and vice successful, while virtue frequently is defamed, and goodness pining in want. Here is the strongest inequality of merit, ignorance and vice advanced to wealth and rank, while knowledge and virtue are condemned to destitution and suffering. It is often true that crime will secure rewards that ignorance sighs for in vain. The natural feeling of justice, that conscience possesses, declares that such a disturbed state of things, such an inequality of merit, should be adjusted in another state. If here punishment and reward cannot be meted out to every individual, there should be another state, where the equilibrium of justice will be restored, where successful crime shall find no impunity, and unrewarded virtue shall completely triumph. The Bible meets this discriminating sense of justice in conscience; it acknowledges the disorders of the present world, and makes

certain another state where those disorders shall be rectified. Thus, as long ago as the time of Job, we read of a state of things like that which exists at the present day. Some, says he, "remove the landmarks: they violently take away flocks, and feed thereof. They drive away the ass of the fatherless. They take the widow's ox for a pledge. They cause the naked to lodge without clothing, that they have no covering in the cold. They pluck the fatherless from the breast, and take a pledge of the poor. Men groan from out of the city, and the soul of the wounded crieth out: yet God layeth not folly to them." "Wherefore do the wicked live, become old, yea, are mighty in power? Their seed is established in their sight with them, and their offspring before their eyes. They spend their days in wealth, and in a moment go down to the grave."

"The earth," says he, "is given into the hands of the wicked, he covereth the faces of the judges thereof; if not, 'Where and who is he?' " As much as to say, this must be reconciled, whether we can reconcile it with the righteous government of God or not. Thus was Job perplexed before the light of Christianity.

The Psalmist found no relief under the same difficulty until he went to the sanctuary of God and there saw the end of the wicked. Solomon, too, says, "Moreover, I saw under the sun the place of judgment, that wickedness was there, and the place of righteousness, that iniquity was there." Then, as furnishing the true solution of the difficulty, he exclaims, "I said in my heart, God shall judge the righteous and the wicked."

Thus revelation refers those cases which need adjudication to God and a future state, and thus complies with that principle of equity that is felt in every conscience. In this respect, how peculiarly adapted is the Bible to the conscience! It assures the mind of a judgment to come, and of the restitution of all things, when every difficulty shall be solved, and every doubt removed of equity in the administration of the world. But the Bible meets the demands of conscience in that it furnishes a perfect system of ethics, or moral duties. Con-

science is a faculty that discriminates between right and wrong. The Bible is distinguished above all other books in that the conscience finds in it a standard of absolute perfection in every moral duty. It is alike comprehensive and particular, comprising all duties to God and man, and yet giving to each duty its appropriate value. It does not exalt a minor virtue into a superior virtue, nor degrade the higher traits of moral excellence to a subordinate position. It does not affix an undue prominence to alms-giving and neglect the duties of honesty and truth. It does not extol courage at the expense of humility, nor recommend fast-days and festivals to the detriment of industry and justice. It enjoins parental obedience and submission to civil magistrates, but not when that obedience conflicts with the higher claims of God and humanity. It instructs servants to work faithfully for their masters, and masters to treat their servants as children of a common parent and brethren in the Lord. It discountenances impurity in thought even as in overt act, and yet affixes the seal of the divine approbation upon the sacred ordinance of marriage, and carefully watches over that solitary rose brought from the garden of Eden. It delegates to man a sovereignty over the lower orders of creation, but refuses to call him good who is unmerciful to his beast. Thus the conscience finds in the Bible a perfect system of ethics,—a summary of duties that comprehend all things needful to be done in every relation of life. But, what is of more importance, all these duties have their proper place. Like some beautiful temple of harmonious proportion, the ethics of the gospel never conflict with each other; from the foundation to the dome, every stone is where it should be, and every column preserves its proper symmetry. Go round about that temple, examine every separate part and the whole collectively, and the artist eye of an angel can neither discover a fault nor recommend an additional beauty. For fallen man the morality of the Bible is just what it should be, and no better can be made or even imagined. The ethics of the Bible are immeasurably superior to those of any other book; confirming all the good the light of nature discovers, it adds to it a

morality peculiarly its own, and blends both together in a way impossible to be improved upon. What better code of morality than the ten commandments? What discourse more excellent than Christ's sermon on the Mount? History has shown us how distorted a morality human ingenuity can get up when it attempts to improve upon the Bible,—when it sets itself up to be wiser than God. Thus, for ages, celibacy was recommended as the pattern of all goodness, and marriage contemned even when monkish presumption dared not to call it wrong; but the fruit of this *extra virtue* was widespread dissoluteness, and the sacrifice for an imaginary excellence of the noblest of social blessings, as well as the most commanding of domestic duties. Thus, for ages, fasts and penances were unduly extolled, and an exaggerated merit put upon the laceration of the body and the denying the lawful claims of our physical nature; and the consequence was a pharisaical righteousness and the forgetting of the chief duties of the gospel. Thus, for ages, festival days and pilgrimages were observed; and the fruit was universal idleness and poverty. Thus, in times past and at the present day, socialistic ideas of civil government, of servitude, of the domestic relation, and of the free community of persons and goods, have prevailed, and the maxims of the gospel have been derided as antiquated and oppressive; but the fruit of all this progress beyond the Bible has been found to be only strife, impurity, and dissoluteness. So exactly adapted is the morality of the gospel to conscience and the state of man as a fallen being, that every attempt to improve upon the Bible in its representations of human nature, in any of its maxims, or the duties imposed upon us as members of the family or the state, has invariably proved a failure. The ordinances of God have shown themselves better and wiser than the devices of man. If, now, the Bible is not from God, why is it that the conscience finds in it a truthfulness, a propriety, an adaptation, and an excellence in the morality enjoined that it finds in no other book? How happens it that, if this is a human production, its ethics are so superior, that the greatest skeptics speak of it in its moral duties as the best, the purest, the

noblest of books? How happens it that a volume that consists of sixty-six separate books, of which the book of Psalms contains no less than one hundred and fifty distinct compositions,—a volume that contains many hundred separate treatises, having no other connection with each other than that they treat of the same general matters or were composed by the same persons,—a volume of different compositions, that occupied a period of fifteen or sixteen centuries in their production, and which professes to cover, historically and prophetically, the whole period of man's existence upon this earth,—a volume embracing every variety of style,—whose principal authors were about thirty, not including those under the general division, from every rank in life, kings, shepherds, magistrates, soldiers, scholars, judges, priests, generals, fishermen, farmers, tax-gatherers,—a volume with ethics so pure, with no collision of facts, no disagreement of truths, alike the most diversified and yet the most unique,—a volume embracing the whole circle of duties to God and man, adjusted for every age, appropriate for all countries, alike good for the peasant-boy and the king, the refined and the rustic, the rich and the poor,—a guide alike excellent for every conscience, suitable for all times and occasions,—how happens it that such a volume should spring from human contrivance and be alone the offspring of human learning? How happens so great an agreement with so wonderful a diversity of subjects? No other such book is there in all the libraries of the world. How wonderful that moral duties should be so delineated and enforced as to be recognized appropriate and excellent by the conscience in all ages and countries! If ethics so pure, so universal, so commanding, were only of *human* origin, would it not be a miracle of strangeness more wonderful than all other miracles together? If the writers of these books were honest men, they would not palm off their compositions as divine, if they were human; and if these men were dishonest, they could not. Take which supposition we please, and we arrive at the same conclusion: *honesty would not*, and *dishonesty could not*, compose the Scriptures.

There is an incidental proof of the divine origin of the Bible deserving of high consideration. This proof consists in the fact that, while so perfectly adapted to the conscience as a discriminating power, it never attempts to secure an influence over the conscience by any of those methods so common in false religions. Every system of human invention is local in its nature, and consults present advantage rather than future success. Thus we find all the common ideas of science and art prevailing at the time the pretended revelation is made, eagerly made use of as available to secure a power over the conscience. No matter whether those popular ideas are true or false, no matter whether they correspond to actual facts in science or not, they are embodied in all the antichristian Bibles. Thus it is only necessary to give the actual truths of natural science and philosophy to prove false the heathen shasters, and every production of man presuming to claim a divine origin. A correct demonstration in astronomy or chemistry will undermine the whole fabric of any book professing to be a revelation from God, other than the Bible.

What is the course pursued in the Scriptures? Had the actual facts of science been made known, the ages in which the different treatises of the Bible were written would not have been prepared to receive them; and had the false ideas been communicated, after-ages of infidels would have gloried over the fallibility of the Bible, the conscience would have been imposed upon by untruths, and the proud philosophers of the present day would have pointed with a skeptical sneer to the Bible as a musty collection of antiquated notions, unfit to be received by the more advanced children of civilization and knowledge.

But what is the fact? With a studied reserve and a guarded caution impossible for uninspired men to exercise, all the compositions of the Bible were made. The unavoidable prejudices and feelings of ages less enlightened found nothing in the Bible to contradict directly the prevailing opinions in astronomy, chemistry, and geology, and at the same time nothing to substantiate or confirm those opinions.

The language of popular life, even as at present, was made use of, but in no such sense as to authorize the belief of a single false statement in science, history, or physical geography. Here consists the immeasurable superiority of the Scriptures to every human production. Take any history, or important composition of poetry or philosophy of any one age, and the prevailing errors of the day are found interwoven into it. Not so, however, in the Bible; adapted to the age in which each separate treatise was written, extending over a period of sixteen centuries, it has in it not one false statement in science,—it seeks to impose upon the conscience not a single influence that owes its charm to error. It is as true to the intellectual as to the moral nature; and every research of the present day, in every department of knowledge, is forced to acknowledge the consummate wisdom that dictated the writings of the Bible; a wisdom infinite in foresight, and not less infinite in beauty of adaptation; a wisdom so great that the revelation of the remotest age of antiquity can be adjusted to the present day, and from which not a single chapter can be spared without a detriment to the whole. *

But the Bible is not only adapted to the conscience in that, unlike false religions, it seeks to secure no influence over it by error, but especially in that it affords to the conscience the only firm and the only good foundation to rest upon. There is that in man's nature that points to something higher than man, higher than law itself, higher than all created power, as necessary to save from sin. There is that in conscience that cannot be satisfied with the imposing glare of religious deceit, or the most attractive mummeries of superstition. There is a feeling in conscience that can find no resting-place except it be in the cross of Christ. As the dove sent out of the ark by Noah flew restless over the waters of a drowning world, and found no green spot to repose her wearied body amid the wide-spread desolations of the flood, so conscience can find no resting-place in false religions, and wanders unsatisfied among the ruins of a fallen nature. It is in the Bible alone that the conscience finds its deepest

wants met. Here is found that perfect key that opens the door of human nature. What more convincing argument to reveal its origin from God?

Why for so many ages, if the Bible is not divine, have not human wisdom and learning found out something adapted to the conscience? How happened it, if the Bible is not from God, that there sprang up amid the mountains of Judea, amid a nation comparatively obscure and in every respect inferior to the renowned nations of antiquity in learning, in refinement, in science, in philosophy, and art, a book adapted to the conscience in all ages and in every land; a book so superior that it has triumphed over every device of superstition and every argument of infidelity; so superior that conscience finds alone in it a perfect standard of conduct and yet the only panacea for sin; so superior that it has found its way to millions of firesides and is bowed to as divine alike in the palace and the hovel; so superior that it has supplanted the proudest systems of superstition, and formed the foundation of the highest civilization of modern times; so superior that it has commanded the respect and obedience of the wisest and best of every age, and for whose preservation the blood of countless martyrs has flowed, and would yet flow, if necessary, to the last hour of time?

CHAPTER XII.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO THE AFFECTIONS AND THE WILL.

THE popular language of the word of God in respect to the affections will be found, upon a careful examination, to embody more truth in the relation which the affections sustain to the intellect and the will, than can be found in any metaphysical treatise. The difficulty often in metaphysical reasoning is that the will is divorced from the affections and considered too exclusively the moving agent of human conduct; but, in fact, the affections have as much to do with our actions as the will has. The will is the executive agent, and its decisions control the conduct: without volition we will never act. But what is it, in the main, that leads to volition? what is it that makes the will decide upon any course of life? Evidently, the affections: lying back of the will, they yet most powerfully influence it. Whenever the will attempts to act contrary to the affections, the action is constrained, reluctant, and cheerless. The outward obedience may be rendered, but inwardly there is something that hangs like a weight upon the will; that something acts constantly as a restraining power, ever increasing in energy, until, like a rolling ball under the influence of ceaseless friction, the will at length stops.

Thus difficult is it in human conduct to act against the affections. The intellect, the conscience, and the will may all be upon one side, and yet if the affections are upon the other side they will turn the balance. How often is this seen in human life! How often is it true that the lover of strong drink, or of any other vice, has turned back again, against his better judgment, against his conscience, and made even the opposing will at last to yield! Thus, in the Bible we read, "With the heart man believeth unto righteousness," rather than with the will. The heart is the seat of the affec-

tions, and it is always addressed in the Bible in preference to the will: that right, and the will is right,—that wrong, and the will must be wrong. The overlooking of this fact has often occasioned great error in presenting the subject of religion to the mind. It is sometimes said that conversion consists in volition; but conversion consists in a change of heart rather than in right willing.

No difficulty about the will, if the heart is right; but unless that is so, the will is more unmanageable than any mind can conceive of. Its volitions are cheerless, reluctant, inconstant, and feeble. There is a moral gravitation in the wrong direction, a principle of vicious attraction that invariably overcomes at last. Overt acts may indeed be performed, but a loveless obedience is soon converted into open rebellion. With the affections against the will, there is an under-current of unremitting energy; nothing can effectually stem that current. The will may try to do it, but every moment it grows weaker. Before the will can grow daily in strength, until it becomes fixed into habit, and habit becomes converted into nature, there must be the turning of the affections. If the will has the affections upon its side, it will triumph over all obstacles; if against it, the smallest impediments will be enough to prevent success. When the serpent in the garden tempted Eve, the appeal first was made to the understanding. The devil, skilled in the science of war, stormed first the castle that guarded the entrance to the affections. Says the tempter, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? As much as to say, Is it possible that God, a good being, could have prohibited a single tree in Eden? Here doubt of the goodness and veracity of God was suggested. Then comes the bold avowal, “Ye shall not surely die.” With the principle of confidence in God destroyed, the next step to be taken is the securing of the understanding. The tempter now appeals directly to the strongest principle of human nature,—the love of knowledge, or curiosity, and the love of ambition, or aggrandizement. “For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened, and ye shall be as gods, knowing good and evil.”

The way is now fully open for the conquest of the affections; these must first be gained over to the side of sin before there is a direct action of the will. "And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat, and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat."

Thus we see that the affections were appealed to in a threefold way. The tree was good for food; that carried the appetites: it was pleasant to the eyes; that gained over the love of the beautiful: it was a tree to be desired to make one wise; that secured the love of knowledge. Here is a striking illustration of the manner in which the affections are appealed to. The affections have to do with three parts of our nature,—the sensuous, the æsthetic, and the intellectual. One is the seat of the appetites, the other of the taste, and the last of the reason. No sooner had these susceptibilities of our nature been gained, than we read of the overt act which consummated the decision of the will, in the words, "She took of the fruit thereof, and did eat."

Let us, then, consider in what respect the Bible is adapted to the affections. The affections are the emotional part of our nature, intimately associated with the body, the taste, and the mind,—sensuous, æsthetic, and intellectual. Let us consider first the sensuous part of our nature. The body, since the fall, with the animal wants has stepped beyond its legitimate sphere and encroached upon the nobler part of man, the conscience and the mind. Appetite has made man, created in the image of God, the slave of unlawful desires. What is the result? The appetites getting the ascendancy over the conscience and the reason, the affections are carried away by the sensuous part. In the æsthetic and intellectual nature of man, also, all the susceptibilities being upon the side of sin, the will and the conscience are weakened and depraved. Before the fall the affections were exactly balanced, and ever acted in harmony; but since the fall the sensuous part of the affections has preponderated over the nobler part, and consequently the result

has been that sin, exercising a control over the affections in every part, has, through the heart, made tributary to it the will. Consider, then, the adaptation of the Bible to the affections. In the first place, the Bible regulates the affections. The sensuous love that exists at the expense of the æsthetic and intellectual is made subordinate to the nobler principles of our nature. The gratification of the appetite is considered inferior to the love of that which is beautiful, or noble, or refined, or intellectual. Those mental and moral traits that ally man to an angel are deemed infinitely superior to those animal propensities that are common to the brutes. But the Bible especially cultivates that part of the affections which is most intimately connected with the conscience. Thus, when the mind perceives some good action, some noble or worthy deed in another, there is a feeling of moral approbation. The affections are so constituted as to feel resentment at wrong conduct, while they can be awakened to a high degree of pleasure when there is the consideration of some illustrious act that confers lasting benefit upon mankind. They can also be aroused to the deepest feeling of contempt or hatred of some atrocious deed of treachery or crime. Where except in the Bible is there such an appeal made to the moral feelings? Where are the affections in any other book so often, so earnestly, and so effectually addressed in all that exalts or ennobles man? Here is man, with a sensuous nature that from the fall constantly seeks, with its passions and appetites, to encroach upon the nobler class of affections. How is that ever-increasing tendency to the undue gratification of sense to be obviated? Evidently, by the most skillfully adjusted system of motives to those affections which comprehend the love of the beautiful, the wise, and the good; which are associated peculiarly with the intellect and the moral sense. The affections find the Bible in every respect adapted to every existing want of the social and family relation. No religion like Christianity so guards and honors the relation of father and mother, or brother and sister. Rather, other religions leave the most sacred ties of nature exposed to the rude inroads of enemies; other re-

ligions pull down those barriers that God in nature has erected to preserve the purity of the domestic institution; other religions foster those appetites that constantly need the most vigilant caution to restrain. The pagan shasters and the Koran of Mohammed have no effectual antidote to the immoderate indulgence of the senses. Rather, in their delineations of heathen gods or the paradise of the Mohammedan, little or no restraint is exercised over the appetites. This was a part of human nature too difficult to manage. Consequently, we find license is given to those passions that, unlawfully indulged in, do more to injure the moral and intellectual part of man than all other sins together. Here the profound wisdom of Christianity is displayed to most advantage. It seeks not to destroy the passions, but to regulate them. It keeps the river of sense within its natural bounds, and throws up an embankment when its swelling waters would deluge the land. By appealing more to the æsthetic and intellectual part of the affections, it nicely preserves the equipoise that ever should exist between the varied classes of feelings that agitate the soul. Thus we find that the affections have in the Bible their highest security and their noblest development. Whatever is pure, or generous, or noble, or good, whatever tends to repress what is low, or degrading to a human being, finds in revelation a most effectual aid.

The Bible is especially adapted to the affections in the religious sensibilities. Man has moral feelings as well as appetites: one allies him with the angels, the other with the brutes. Thus, in the heart of man there are two classes of feelings, each pulling in an opposite direction. That which pertains to the moral nature speaks of God, of the future world, of right and wrong, and of human accountability. That which pertains to the sense urges on to sensuous gratification in its varied forms. It is the preponderance of this part of the affections in the heart of man that leads him so constantly into sin; with mighty attraction it draws all the nobler feelings after it, until by successive stages of debasement there seems to be obliterated, except in the intellect, everything that distin-

guishes a man from a brute. Here, then, consists the highest adaptation of the Bible to the affections; for that only is adapted to them which ennobles and purifies them.

The religious sensibilities, the moral feelings, are most effectually and constantly appealed to, cherished, and strengthened. Where nature fails, a supernatural grace is given. Thus, the whole tendency and aim of the Bible is to reverse the fatal attraction in man's heart to that which pertains alone to the body. Compare by this test the religion of Christ with the religions that disclaim Christianity. In the one case we see a uniform, persevering effort to raise man above the unlawful sway of the senses; in the other, as marked an influence to bring him into bondage to his lower nature. The one raises man to the level of the angel, the other degrades him to that of the brute. No matter if the intellectual and æsthetic part of the affections is addressed in other religions than the Bible,—no matter if the heathen have their code of morals that comprise some of the duties of life,—yet we judge of false religions by their prevailing spirit and tendency, not by their occasional virtues. By *such a test*, what contrast greater than that which exists between the religion of Christ and every system that disavows Christianity?

But the Bible is adapted to the affections in the intimate sympathy manifested toward those who suffer when the ties of social life and of family are sundered. What more soothing than the words of consolation addressed to him who has lost a father, or mother, or brother, or sister? Where do poverty and want find such supports when the world is dark and life's pilgrimage is strewn with thorns? A Bible for the prosperous and the happy,—a Bible for sunny days and bright skies,—a Bible for the noble, the rich, or the gifted,—a Bible for such classes only,—such a Bible would be no Bible for the great mass of mankind. It is the appropriateness of Christ's religion for dark days and storms, for adverse winds and the cold winter of life, that makes it most useful and that most clearly reveals its divine origin. It is when affliction, like night, comes down upon the heart, and suffering and pain are the daily lot, when friends are taken away

and the dearest ties of earth are sundered,—it is in such a fire that we test the purity of the gold. By such an ordeal, how immeasurably superior the Bible is shown, to all other books! To the soul of man it speaks of Christ the Saviour, of the resurrection, and the life of heaven, and the guardian angels,—of God the infinite Father, and the Holy Spirit the regenerator. Well might the martyrs rejoice at the loss of all earthly things, well might they triumph upon the rack and at the stake, when themes so grand, so pure, so noble, and so soothing absorbed the affections. For every deprivation of sense it repays by treasures whose value is but faintly shadowed forth in the words, “a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory.”

Consider not only the appropriateness of the Bible to the affections, but the wise indulgence it gives to them in seasons of affliction. Stoicism, with its rough severity, engenders an unnatural pride, while it sacrifices the natural feelings. If it teaches us not to weep, it attains its end only by the dismemberment of our nature. By repressing the outbursts of natural affection, it converts humanity into a stone. Far more wisely adapted is Christianity to our nature. The great author of Christianity wept at the grave of Lazarus, and in the sublime words, “Jesus wept,” we have humanity revealed in its noblest, its most exalted form. Stoicism would destroy such a humanity; but in its ruin would be buried the best part of man. Directly the reverse of the influence of Stoicism is that of Epicureanism. The affections by this are brutified, drowned in a sea of sensuality. They are stupefied and infinitely debased. The themes that the Bible presents to the affections are pure, noble, and most excellent. By them, while the affections are softened, they are also strengthened, made to entwine around pillars of immortal beauty and loveliness. But Epicureanism tramples the affections into the mire and shuts out from the mind every beam of glory. Its religion is, Eat, drink, and be merry. Its only life is this world, and all that lies beyond is oblivion and death. Thus it gives to the sensual gratification a value most disproportionate, and, having no heaven in the future, it

would make out the short pleasures of sense the only paradise for man. To man in darkness of mind, in those hours when affliction throws gloom and wretchedness over the soul, Epicureanism has the same unvarying lesson, the same dull and groveling humanity, "Eat, drink, and be merry," and the lacerated feelings of the soul are soothed with the only words, "Live while you live, the Epicure would say, and seize the pleasures of the present day." How differently are the affections treated in the Bible! Before the riches of heaven, earth's riches appear infinitely little; before the pleasures of immortality, all the pleasures of the world dwindle into insignificance.

Let us, then, consider the adaptation of the Bible to the will. The will is intimately associated with the affections. What, then, is true of the affections is equally so of the will. What is adapted in the Bible to the one must be so to the other. There are two aspects in which the will finds the Bible adapted to it: first, as a regulating power; secondly, as a strengthening and energizing power. When the appetites and affections are enslaved by sin, the result is that the will is to the last degree irregular and inconstant in the performance of duty; it is so unstable in doing right that every wind can blow it round the compass, and every breath of air make it change from a right direction. The smallest temptations will upset the best resolutions. What matters it that the will is right this moment, if the next moment it is a slave to every gust of passion or appetite?

With the affections and appetites enchained by sin, the will is mighty for vice and persevering in wrong. Like some sick man in a delirium, it possesses great strengths and weaknesses, now working miracles of energy, again more feeble than an infant. Here it is that Christianity comes in as a regulator to movements so inconstant and so vicious. For every emergency of our nature it has its separate class of motives: those motives act in a twofold way: first as a restraining power, again as an invigorating power. Fear is the mighty instrument by which it restrains the will from sin, hope the elixir of life by which it strengthens it to good.

No sanctions so terrible to the transgressor as those of revelation, no inducements so persuasive to right action. To the sinner, rushing impetuously into iniquity, it speaks of the worm that never dies, and of the fire that is never quenched; it speaks of a prison whose gate mercy never enters, and of a punishment where justice never tires.

This is not the place for us to discuss the question of the truth of such representations. Our only object now is to consider the Bible as adapted to the will; and here, resting the whole question of future punishment upon the fitness of things, we say, that to accomplish the end effectually of securing men from sin, the element of fear in a divine revelation is absolutely necessary. It is so in human governments; why not so in the divine government? All law rests upon the element of fear; all penalties are but living embodiments of fear realized. Constituted as men are, to make the Bible adapted to restrain from sin, it must have the element of fear; and thus we find it. No book has in it such motives of fear to deter the will from sin.

Consider also the Bible as adapted to the will, in having the element of hope. Despair is the death of all action, the sepulcher of all happiness. Did the Bible present but one kind of motives, and that resting alone upon the element of fear, no language could describe the gloom that would rest upon all human affairs, no thought conceive of the depression that would weigh down the spirits of men. Observe how revelation adjusts itself to that which most effectually can move the will. What are the inducements a skillful general presents to his soldiers when the battle waxes hot and gleaming swords and the storm-fire of death rage around? Is the element of fear, of disgrace, the certainty of a worse end than that secured by the enemy, alone appealed to? Far from it. A twofold combination of motive is presented,—fear and hope. Other principles of human nature are addressed than those affected by fear. Amid the smoke and the carnage of war, the soldier's eye is lighted up with the hope of victory, the glory of conquest, and the laurel of fame. Honor holds over his head her glittering

crown, and the music notes of a nation's gratitude steal upon his ear. Just so is it in the word of God. The Christian soldier is nerved to his more difficult and far longer warfare by a combination of motive to the will, surpassing all language to describe. Would the tired soldier retreat and go back to sin? Fear stands at the gate of such a thought, and urges him to stand his ground, by representations of disgrace and ruin such as make the blood run cold to think upon. Would he go forward? Hope stands with angel smile, and cheers him with music richer by far than earth's sweetest minstrelsy. Thus, while on the one side the will is restrained, on the other it is encouraged and strengthened. Deficient in vital power, by seeking divine help a celestial energy is bestowed; then does it recover from its natural fickleness in doing right, and perseveres in a true direction.

Thus, the will of man, by nature weak, inconstant, changeable, and uncertain, becomes, through the word of God imparting to it a vital power, strong, constant, unwavering, and fixed, and triumphs at last, with heaven for its home, Christ for its portion, and immortal blessedness for its reward. We could not, if we would, improve upon the philosophy of the Bible.

CHAPTER XIII.

ADAPTATION OF THE BIBLE TO THE INTELLECT AND THE IMAGINATION.

MAN is a complex being; he has body, soul, and spirit. The body is material, the soul mental, and the spirit directly of divine origin. Thus, we read of the body at death returning to the dust, but of the spirit as returning to God who gave it. The soul and spirit of man possess not only a conscience, or a moral nature, but most intimately associated with that nature are the intellect, the imagination, the affections, and the will. If it is of the highest importance that the Bible should be adapted to the conscience, which peculiarly distinguishes man as a moral agent, it is no less important that there should be an adaptation in the Bible to the other faculties of man's nature; but most intimately associated with that nature are the intellect, the imagination, the affections, and the will.

Let us, then, consider the adaptation of the Bible to the intellect of man. Before truth can reach the conscience and the affections and direct the will, it must first be perceived by the intellect. The understanding must be enlightened, or the heart cannot be reached. Christianity is a system of great truths; and these truths must be apprehended, or the conscience and the will cannot act. Thus we see Christianity comes to us as light comes to the material world. The very design of the Bible is to chase away moral darkness. One of its chief ends is to correct the errors of a wrong understanding. But how is this to be done? Evidently, by the communication to the mind of new truths, and the making clearer old truths, by telling us what the unaided light of nature cannot reveal, and making more sensible to the mind those truths which it may reveal. Thus we find

the Bible: it comes to us not as the enemy of natural religion, not to oppose or supplant it, but to give an immeasurable value to every truth of nature, and then to supply what it is most essentially deficient in by new truths of its own. Christianity, then, is adapted to the intellect in that it tells us, in respect to all moral duties, truths more clearly than nature, and adds others peculiarly its own. It takes every sound timber out of the old fabric of nature, and reconstructs a new temple of truth with every material available in the old. It gives to the intellect strength, by giving to it light; it greatly expands the mind, by giving to it worthy objects of contemplation. As food nourishes the body, so do the truths of the Bible nourish the mind of man, imparting vigor, energy, directness of application, and comprehension of thought. But the Bible greatly enlarges the intellect by the variety of subjects upon which it treats. Commencing with the fall of man, it carries the understanding through ages of time, even until the mediatorial kingdom of Christ is delivered up unto the Father. From the infancy of humanity to its highest maturity, from the blissful Eden of primeval innocence to the last closing scenes of a redemptive process, we find comprehended an epitome of man's history. In antiquity no book is like the Bible. Some of its treatises were written far beyond the age of Herodotus; far beyond the founding of Greece or Rome; far beyond the time when Homer sang of Ulysses and Priam and ruined Troy; far beyond any authentic history of the most ancient nations of Asia or Africa. Of the vast interval of time that comprehended the antediluvian world, of those centuries that elapsed after the flood to the exodus of the Israelites from Egypt, no uninspired history can give any intelligent account. All is involved in fable or dreamy speculation. But the Bible, briefly and sufficiently for our wants if not for our curiosity, has bridged over the mighty chasm that separates authentic from fabulous history; it has supplied the lost links in that great chain essential for any intelligent comprehension of man's history and destiny. Not only does the intellect find this great want supplied, but it has an unbounded field

for the noblest exercise in the vast, the diversified and deep truths communicated.

God might have given us a Bible consisting of only one book, and yet that book would be more valuable to us, as coming from God, than all the libraries in the world; but he has given to us, in the Old and New Testaments, sixty-six books. These treatises are written in every variety of style; they are composed by the most diverse class of writers; they extend over a period of sixteen centuries, and yet comprehend, with the highest adaptation to after-ages, all the peculiarities of language and customs of each separate period of their composition. Particular and yet general, they embody the widest latitude of style with the greatest beauty of language. No uninspired productions have equaled the Scriptures in intellectual merit. In poetry, David and Isaiah, in the sublimity of their subjects, the majesty of their delineations, far excel Homer, Virgil, Dante, or Milton. In history no book can compare in value to Genesis. In ethics the instructions of Christ and the apostles, in respect to every duty of man, are infinitely superior to all other writings. Who ever in philosophy has excelled Paul in depth or clearness? It is not only in the higher departments of literature that the Bible is so superior, but also in the more delicate and refined descriptions of incidents and persons. No appeals to human sensibility are so chaste in beauty or so true to nature as those found in the Scriptures. No story, for simplicity, or pathos, or beauty of delineation, has yet equaled that of Joseph and his brethren; or, for appropriateness and surpassing directness of application, Nathan's parable to David. Thus, were the Bible looked upon only as a book for the intellect, its absence could not be supplied by all other books. What has so waked up the human mind as the Bible? What has so absorbed the attention of all thinkers as the Scriptures? From the nursery, where childhood's youngest days are spent, to manhood's highest development, the Bible has been the book of books, so simple and clear in some parts that an infant can understand, and in others so deep, so profound and mysterious, as to baffle the keenness of an angel's vision;

here a stream so lucid and gentle that a child may cross unhurt, and there an ocean of thought so interminable and so majestic as to elude forever all human discovery.

But the chief merit of the Bible as a production for the intellect is that every important truth of immediate utility and pertaining to direct duty, either to man or to God, is revealed with the utmost clearness. What is necessary to save man as a sinner and make him better for this world and fit for heaven, is communicated with the most wonderful appropriateness and directness. When the Bible is read, there is something in its style so unlike that of all other books, such a deep transparency of thought in respect to our nature, such amazing sagacity to detect all the windings of man's heart, a wisdom so unequaled for its suitableness to the everyday duties of life, that the most common conviction of the mind, even when the evidence of miracles and of prophecy is not considered, is, Such a book must proceed from God himself. Who else can produce it? Where that college of sages existing over the long period of sixteen centuries, who could have composed the Scriptures, embodying the excellences of every age and adapted to the wants of all,—whose truths, like virgin gold, are unalloyed with error and absolutely free from any imperfection? But the Bible is also most suitable for the intellect in that it closely imitates nature in its composition. Look to the material world; the great facts of science do not all lie upon the surface of things; running through all the works of nature there is a vast system, or order of arrangement; but that order is concealed from common observers. The mind must study long and patiently, with earnestness and the docility of a child, before even the outlines of that mysterious harmony will reveal itself. The intellect must be tasked before it can grasp even the rude shadow of that glorious order that reigns triumphant in nature. Here, in the universe of God's works, the mind of man may wander over riches surpassing all thought; but yet that mind must work. All around nature profusely spreads her unexhausted stores; but they come not to man without his own exertion. Just so is it in the Bible. Here are pearls and diamonds, there

rubies and sapphire stones, and gold and silver, and marble and iron; but man must use his intellect to get at them; he must work, as in nature, to be rich, with the riches of the word of God. These treasures lie concealed beneath the surface; they call for vigorous energy to secure them; and never yet did an earnest mind fail in having a reward. Here consists peculiarly the adaptation of the Bible to the intellect. No other book has ever so awakened, or can so awaken, man's thoughts. How noble that order, that all-comprehending system that reigns in nature! How divine the harmony that exists in the works of God! But the Bible reveals to the intellect an order more glorious and a harmony more beautiful in the moral world. It reveals the moral law extending over angels and men, with a wider range than that of the mysterious principle of attraction that keeps planets and suns in their spheres. It reveals a system of redemption far more wonderful than nature's greatest truths.

But the Bible is also adapted to the intellect in that it reveals the best kind of knowledge. There are two departments of knowledge. One has reference to the separate parts that go to make up the whole, and the other to the ultimate design of the whole. The former, to a good degree, may be attained by man without a revelation direct from God; but the latter is altogether beyond human cognizance. Thus, a man may tell the relation the bones bear to the body, and how the process of digestion is carried on, or how the blood flows and the muscles and veins are connected with the body; but no man, without a divine revelation, can tell the great end of existence, or the ultimate design of God in creation, or what should be the chief object of human existence. We may know something of the relations of parts to the whole, but not the ultimate object of the whole itself. Here man's knowledge must fail him, when he attempts to explain the great mystery of the end of man in creation, and the ultimate design of the redemptive system, coeval with the fall of man; a system devised from eternity by God, and destined to be carried on through higher and yet higher stages of development, until the redeemed of the

human family shall reach a stage of absolute perfection; until in heaven the regenerated family of man shall look back upon the old home of their sorrow and sin as the mariner upon the ocean looks upon the dim and far-distant outlines of some barren island where once he had spent days of shipwreck and of trouble. Such a system, in its ultimate end, cannot be apprehended by an uninspired mind. It demands a knowledge far superior to human power. Thus the intellect, in the Bible, is impressed not only with the beauty of the several parts that go to make up the whole, but with the perfection of the whole and the design of the system of Christianity itself. The mind finds in the Bible a system old as the world, coeval with man, and extending through successive stages of higher development to the last hour of time; a system that adjusts itself to every age and yet is equal to the wants of all ages; a system rich with the treasures of the Godhead, and alike universal in its sanctions and its blessings; a system waking up the mind with ideas of the most amazing grandeur, and presenting for action the most powerful motives.

The Bible is also peculiarly adapted to the intellect in that for the multitude it presents the most useful and appropriate subjects of thought. To the favored few of wealth and leisure and highly cultivated taste, to that smaller number who are giants in reason and scholarship, no book is more worthy of study than the Bible; they may know ever so much, but there are fields of thought in the Scriptures that can never be explored, subjects too great for angels to grasp. But the mass of mankind have not the advantages of wealth and learning. The pressing calls of business, and those avocations that demand constant labor, leave but little time for study or reading. Now, the Bible is just the book for the multitude. It is not so voluminous as to require for its perusal much time, or so exclusively of one style as to be unsuited to the different classes of minds. Children may delight themselves with its stories and histories; the more advanced may ever meditate with profit upon its moral truths and reasonings. Some may please themselves more with the

sympathy and patience of Job, others with the everyday wisdom of Solomon. Some may love more the lofty devotion of David, others the sublimity of Isaiah or Ezekiel. The lover of narrative may be more attracted by the books of Moses, while the keen investigator of deep things may find a mine of gold in the revelations of Daniel and John. Nothing in solemnity, or beauty, or appropriateness, can equal the teachings of the apostolic epistles. And yet there is another adaptation of the Bible to the intellect which should never be omitted. It is the revelation of a remedy for sin. This has been alluded to in considering the adaptation of the Bible to the conscience; but there is a natural restlessness in the mind of man in connection with conscience, that needs something to moderate the anxiety of thought that arises under the consciousness of sin.

In nothing is the Bible more appropriate to the intellect than in that, when received into the heart, it gives peace alike to the understanding and the conscience. Man may degrade himself to the level of the brutes; he may practically think and act as if eating and drinking and sleeping and hoarding up money constituted the chief and only business of life; but there is something about the intellect that will not always be cajoled by such a perversion of its powers; the fires of an innate immortality will at times blaze forth, and the thoughts restlessly ponder the great question of human destiny. When, then, the intellect and the conscience both are awakened, the scoff of the skeptic or the sneer of the infidel will not always lull into slumber with the delusive idea that death is an eternal sleep, or that man and the brute differ only in respect to their bodily construction or animal wants. When the mind in any respect apprehends the great truth of the immortality of the soul, it will ponder the question of its probable happiness or misery in the future; it will meditate upon the nature and end of sin, and shrink with instinctive fear from its legitimate fruit. The intellect of man needs not only the Bible to show how it may attain true peace, but it needs it to give a right end and purpose to the mind.

The world is full of wasted intellects, genius misapplied, and learning abused. Let no man talk of the waste of money, when the waste of mind is infinitely greater. While man has a soul, he must think; before thought can be stopped, the mind itself must be annihilated. The question is not whether a mind shall think, that is already settled, but *how* it shall think. Shall man immortal think only of his animal wants, the gratification of his sensual nature, or shall he think upon his destiny for two worlds, upon God and Christ, and being good, and fitting himself for a holier and better state than this life? If such subjects should awaken attention and employ the thoughts of man, then for such an object the Bible is alike the greatest and the best of books.

The Bible is adapted equally to the imagination. Says Stewart, "The faculty of the imagination is the great spring of human activity, and the principal source of human improvement. As it delights in presenting to the mind scenes and characters more perfect than those which we are acquainted with, it prevents us from ever being completely satisfied with our present condition or with our past attainments, and engages us continually in the pursuit of some untried enjoyment or of some ideal excellence." Again he says, "Tired and disgusted with this world of imperfection, we delight to escape to another, of the poets' creation, where the charms of nature wear an eternal bloom, and where scenes of enjoyment are opened up to us suited to the vast capacities of the human mind."

The imagination may be looked upon as a source of enjoyment and principle of activity. In one respect it gives the highest pleasure, in another it inspires to action and exists as an efficient agent in moulding the human character. God has given to man no impertinent faculty. In the material world we find that beauty is consulted as much as utility. Flowers are not suitable for food, but they are none the less good in their place. They are a high source of pleasure; their beauty pleases the eye, and their fragrance the sense of smell. Now, the imagination is a faculty that loves to

form ideal pictures of loveliness and joy. How airy are its castles in youth! How is manhood charmed with its creations!

The question, then, is, How shall the imagination God has given to man be most suitably employed? Where shall it find its purest enjoyment and its noblest sphere of activity? In the Bible, is the reply. How often has an ill-regulated fancy engendered the worst mischief to the mind! How often have its feverish dreams embittered the sweets of life and unfitted for active duty! How often has its improper exercise created a sickly sensibility, and nourished a mental disease as pernicious as any malady that ever has affected the body! But in the Bible, while the imagination has the widest scope, there are innumerable checks to its unlawful roving. Here every element of beauty is brought into requisition, and infinitely nobler paintings than nature can offer. Here a richer rainbow of colors spans the sky than man ever saw arching the material heavens. Here the judgment day and the resurrection morn, here the world enveloped in one sheeted flame, and the archangel's trump, and the Son of God descending from the skies, and the great white throne, and angels innumerable, and myriads of human beings, are the themes for contemplation. Where such another field for the imagination? where other elements of such sublimity and transcendent glory? The imagination needs realities to dwell upon,—not dreams. There, in the Bible, are living certainties surpassing the highest stretch of thought. Here “eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love him.”

But the Bible is adapted to the imagination in that it gives perfect models for imitation. Thus, it is peculiarly constructed as a formative power to the imagination; it regulates it, moulds it into a proper shape, and preserves it from false standards of character. No language can describe the mischief engendered by the imagination degrading virtues into vices and elevating vices into virtues; and yet the whole heathen mythology is full of this inversion of moral traits.

Witness the pagan representations of heaven, the speculations of Plato respecting a future state, the Hindoo system and transmigration of souls, and the paradise of Mohammed. How impure and unnatural the heathen gods! How debasing their morality! How pernicious their influence upon the mind! Now, the most marked effect of the Bible upon the imagination is, it purifies while it strengthens it; it refines and yet regulates it. It exerts a mighty power in preserving it from the seductive charms of sense and time keeping it from the corruption of the world while elevating it above the world. Thus, the imagination, by reading the Bible, is not only kept from Utopian dreams, but exists in the soul as a deep incentive to useful action. Coming in contact with the mind of God, dwelling upon holy and divine themes, it catches the immortal fire of heaven, warm with the flame of the sacred altar; it stimulates the dormant faculties of the soul, gives new strength to the affections and new energy to the will. Thus the Christian martyr serenely encounters the torture of the stake, and sings hymns of victory upon the gibbet and the rack. Thus, when pagan persecution became hot as Nebuchadnezzar's furnace, even women and children welcomed death, and the aged and the infirm exultingly gave themselves up to the civil power. Thus, under the cruel sway of papal bigotry, we read of the heroic firmness of the Waldenses and the Albigenses, and the noble army of Huguenot martyrs, and Scotland's bravest sons. Call this, if you please, an excited imagination; it was an imagination with reason for its guide and God for its end. It was an imagination purified by fine gold, and as superior to the cold and selfish maxims of the world as heaven is higher than the earth. It was an imagination reposing on no damask cushions, regaled with no voluptuous incense, and dwelling in no marble palace, but disciplined in the rough school of adversity, with the storm-cradle of war for its couch, and hunger and nakedness for its daily lot.

Call not that of human origin that can so elevate man above this earth; say not that a book that can so reach every faculty of man can be the fruit of uninspired wisdom. Go,

if not yet convinced, to the death-bed of the Christian, and witness amid the dissolutions of nature the last utterances of the good. Observe the smile that lights up the countenance ere yet the spirit has left the body; meditate upon the hope, the peace, the faith, and the joy that leave their last impress upon that countenance now fixed in the slumber of the grave; and then think not strange the exclamation of a celebrated infidel, when questioned by his child in whose system he should believe, *in his* or that of her *Christian mother*: "Believe, my child, *in the religion of your mother!*"

CHAPTER XIV.

MORAL POWER OF CHRISTIANITY.

IN the two kinds of evidence that exert an influence upon the heart, we see that the evidence which convinces the reason differs only from that which satisfies the feelings by the *mode* in which it is apprehended. Reason arrives at proof by a slow process, the affections by a quick process; the former is protracted in time, the latter immediate. The sphere of the one is the intellect, that weighs and compares arguments; the other the moral sensibilities, that instinctively decide upon the question of right and wrong, of fitness or unfitness. The sensibilities are intimately affected by whatever pertains to moral beauty and harmony, just as we see in a harp that the kind of music given is made to depend upon the skill and delicacy of the touch of the hand. Thus with the moral sensibilities: some foreign power must reach those sensibilities and come in contact with them, before there comes forth a response.

The first evidence of the moral power of Christianity upon the human soul is shown in the exclusive supremacy it gives to God, and the infinite authority of his will to control our conduct. When, then, the Bible is welcomed into the heart of man, the intellect pronounces that such an authority has to support it, in the Bible, sufficient evidence for belief; and the sensibilities pronounce a decision in favor of the rightness and fitness of such an authority. Consequently, Christianity reveals itself as a power, a divine power, laying alike its sanctions upon the reason and the affections, compelling the one to assent to the divine truth of the Bible, and the other to admit the divine excellence of the Bible. Thus is there made known a power bringing into captivity the thoughts

and feelings to the obedience of Christ, and leading the reason and the conscience to the condition of submission to the authority of God. It is in this respect that religion owes its very meaning. Its derivation, from the two words *re* and *ligo*, is to bind anew, or bind over again. Thus Christianity as a religion evinces its power in binding anew the mind and heart to the service of God, and urging to a cordial obedience the reason and the conscience, throwing over both the commanding sanctions of a superior power, and leading to its reception from the conviction of the transcendent excellence of the divine will. It is this peculiarity that distinguishes the Bible from uninspired productions. When we read the words of a man, we find that, resting upon no higher authority than human reason, we are at liberty to treat those words according to that common standard by which we measure one man by another or compare ourselves with others of mankind. But when we read the words of God the case is altogether different: we come then to a standard of belief and practice as far above man as God himself is above the creature. Here we see a power revealed by which anew the reason and the conscience are bound, a power that rests itself upon omnipotence and a wisdom as boundless as the universe.

Such is the manner in which Christianity comes to us. It comes making known to the reason and the sensibilities a standard of belief and practice that embodies in it not only a divine authority, but a revelation of that which is as superior to the unassisted light of nature as heaven is higher than the earth. Consequently, we see in the Bible a sacredness that is absent in any production of man. There are gleams and flashes in it of a divine light. We discover in its representations of human nature a handwriting so peculiar as to baffle alike the ingenuity of man to imitate or invent,—such a deep transparency of wisdom, such inimitable conciseness and yet comprehensiveness of thought, that the mind of man seems to come, as it were, into the presence-chamber of the Deity and see there reflected from its walls the brightness of his glory. The moral power of Christianity is seen,

like a mighty magnet, drawing to itself the endless diversities of human thought and feeling, infusing into the soul of man a new life, urging to duty by new ties, and controlling with heavenly sanctions every conflicting element of the nature of man. Another evidence of the moral power of Christianity is manifested in the harmony it preserves between reason and faith. No word has been so misused as the word faith in relation to the Bible and to Christ. Because faith has its own peculiar sphere, it has often been imagined that it is opposed to the reason, or in its nature hostile to it; but such an objection would be equally valid against the affections. There is nothing in faith opposed to right reason; it is only when reason is perverted, when it is abused and transcends its sphere, that any issue exists between the two. True faith is the result of the reason and the sensibilities submitting to the reality of good evidence in the Bible to prove it from God. It is simply the affectionate assent of the mind to revealed truths so entire as to lead to right practice. There can be no true faith without the exercise of the reason, any more than without the exercise of the sensibilities; both are necessary for the existence even of faith.

Such being the fact, the power of Christianity is peculiarly displayed in the harmony it institutes with faith and all the faculties of the soul. The error of skepticism is that it overlooks the true sphere of reason, while that of superstition is that it binds it in its sphere. The one makes reason a homeless fugitive without a guide; the other, a timorous slave trembling under the lash of a tyrant. Thus it will be seen that while the one drives reason over a sea of doubts, the other imprisons it upon a desolate island. But Christianity avoids both extremes, and preserves a happy medium between the two. Does not reason find in revelation a boundless field for activity? Is it not there treated as a friend? Is anything demanded of it that is not most suitable? Is it not right that reason should not go out of its sphere and reject facts because of the difficulties connected with those facts? When belief upon the highest reason is demanded, should reason object?

What, then, is the relation that faith sustains to reason and the sensibilities in the Bible? There are two kinds of evidence to these two parts of our nature to show it from God. Upon the great question of what is right, what in its nature is fit and suitable, the sensibilities give an immediate response in favor of the Bible. They declare that it is right that God should command and man obey, that it is suitable to practice the precepts of the Old and New Testaments, and good to do that which they demand of us toward God and man. There is a moral beauty in the Bible that the sensibilities instinctively perceive; there is a correspondence to the laws of our being that they at once recognize. They feel that the divine law should tolerate no sin, and that its sanctions are founded in justice; however indisposed by sin, they must yet confess the purity and excellence of Christ. There is such a divine goodness about the Bible, such a sympathy with man as a fallen being, such an interest displayed in his welfare, such a solicitude to heal his spiritual maladies, that the sensibilities must feel that the Bible is the best of books. The reason also, when it uses appropriately the varied instruments which God has placed in its hands to detect falsehood from truth, finds in the Bible no contradiction in recorded facts, and no error in principles. All the evidences from miracles and prophecy are found to be valid. Reason is obliged to assent not only to the reality of the proof, but to the greatness of the proof.

There is in the Bible a combined power of evidence, accumulating with every age, and growing brighter and brighter with the flight of time. What, then, is the relation that faith in the Bible sustains both to reason and the sensibilities? Reason and the sensibilities having evidence enough to prove the Bible from God, it only remains that the heart should believe it such, and practice what it believes. The moral power of Christianity is seen in that it ennobles both the reason and the sensibilities and harmonizes both. The sensibilities it makes pure, the reason it exalts. It reconciles both. Conscience finding in revelation a right standard, and reason a sufficient evidence, by a true belief they both

move on in unison. No higher proof can there be to the soul of the divine power of the Bible, than the peace it gives to the conscience, and the assurance it imparts to the reason. Man, as a fallen being, as a sinner before God, carries about in his heart discordant elements, a state of perpetual disquietude, and a ceaseless conflict in the sensibilities and the reason. Conscience feels the existence of sin, and the reason proves it.

Another illustration of the power of Christianity is displayed in the treatment of those sensibilities of our nature that show human accountability. There are in our nature religious wants that must be satisfied, a deep apprehension of the justice of that Being before whose tribunal the conduct must pass for scrutiny and the deeds of a whole life be examined.

Human nature must be annihilated before those sensibilities that speak of obligation to the Deity, and that mysterious relation that man sustains to God, can be destroyed. Amid the grossest errors of superstition, or the blind groping of skepticism, man yet carries about in his own heart that which tells of duty to a superior Being and unfolds a dread accountability to the infinite Creator of body and spirit. In nothing is the power of Christianity more clearly seen than in the cultivation of this religious sense in man, and the careful fostering of those sensibilities that distinguish him from the brutes. When Christianity speaks to our moral nature, it touches upon that which at once reveals its divine source. Amid the endless diversities of human character, it speaks of the greatness of man's spiritual wants and the efficacy of the remedy as revealed in Christ. Christianity presents the only true sphere for the moral nature of man. Away from God, reason becomes dark, and the sensibilities corrupt. As the moral nature departs at a greater distance from him, there reigns within a wider anarchy, or a more debasing bondage to error. Christianity tends directly to reverse this downward progress: it counteracts the repulsive power of sin that alike darkens the intellect and corrupts the heart. With mighty attraction it brings it back to the

genial warmth of the sun, it melts that ice which encircles the heart, it penetrates with its warm beams the frozen regions of spiritual death, and creates the verdure of summer where once ruled the desolation of winter.

But the peculiar power of Christianity is seen in the intimate alliance with it of the Spirit of God. It was the co-operation of the Eternal Spirit that first indited the words of the Bible, and gives such energy to the truth of God. He is a discernor of the thoughts; with infinite sagacity he brings to the conscience and the reason the truths of the Bible, and compels us to look to the faithful exhibition of our own hearts. Our motives are weighed in the balances; our most secret thoughts are scanned; the deepest recesses of our souls are laid open to our inspection. To make us know ourselves is as much the aim of Christianity as to lead us to the knowledge of God. Thus, the power of Christianity is shown by leading the heart to the knowledge of itself and the knowledge of God, leading to the renunciation of sin, imparting to the soul new hopes, and throwing over every relation of life new sanctions. Man, a sinner, through a divine influence finds strength to resist temptation, courage to contend with difficulties, and hope to inspire to effort. Thus there begins in the soul a reverse movement from sin. That fatal attraction of a corrupt nature that once kept from the service of God is exchanged for that other attraction that draws the heart to God, leading nearer and yet nearer to the fountain-source of heaven's love, the peace of conscience, and the enjoyments of that which surpasses all thought to describe. The Holy Spirit always acts in unison with the Sacred Scriptures; he teaches no revelation not comprehended in the Bible; being the embodiment of the mind of God, he takes of the inspired word and impresses that word upon the heart of man, writing it as it were upon the table of the soul with the point of a diamond, and inscribing in legible characters those immutable truths contained in the Holy Scriptures.

Thus the power of Christianity is seen by bringing the sensibilities and the reason into a condition of obedience to

God. As a messenger from heaven, the Bible comes to us revealing Christ our Saviour, and opening up to the lost family of man the way to eternal life. It urges us to listen to the voice of our best friend and hear the entreaties of that celestial wisdom that would secure for us the immortality of the sons of God, and warns us not to reject our noblest security, and that salvation purchased for us by the blood of Christ.

The moral power of Christianity is also seen in its direct effects upon society, and its remote influences. Its power has been contemplated upon the individual heart. Observe, now, how society is made to feel its presence. The religion of Christ is peculiarly the light of the world. It has in it the truth that is able to make wise unto salvation. Its power is seen in every community where it exists, in raising the standard of moral excellence and suppressing the more vicious inroads of selfishness. Thus, when those lands where the Bible is read and Christ's religion prevails are contrasted with the regions that are destitute of Christianity, we see at once a marked superiority in all that advances the welfare of man. What is it but the moral power of Christianity that has relieved the horrors of war, that has suppressed the evils of slavery, or checked the ravages of intemperance? What is it but Christianity that has discountenanced every form of licentiousness, and thrown in every age its shield of protection over the most sacred relations of the family and the rights of woman? What is it but Christianity that has curbed the violence of war, or given moderation to civil rulers, or guided with safety human governments, or repressed the arrogance of party spirit? Christianity has changed, wherever it has prevailed, the whole condition of society. By making supreme the authority of God, it has most effectually put down the tyranny of man, and given a sure foundation to all the virtues. By revealing a Saviour from sin, it has satisfied the demands of conscience, and opened up to the soul an immortality and blessedness beyond the grave. Thus has this power effected the reconciliation of man to God, broken down that wall of adamant that separates the sinner

from the Deity, and thrown upon the path of the sincere believer the full blaze of heaven's glory. How great, then, the responsibility the very existence of Christianity brings with it! It places man upon a new trial for his happiness, and binds him to the performance of duties that no ingenuity can evade, no hatred escape. Those duties rest upon us wherever we may go; and, ever present, man has no other alternative than to obey and be saved, or disobey and be lost.

With the highest meaning the words come to us, as once they came to the woman of Samaria:

“Jesus said unto her, I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live.”

CHAPTER XV.

THE HARMONY OF SCIENCE AND REVELATION.

WE can conceive of no greater injury to the cause of Christianity than the over-zealous effort to represent the investigations of science as opposed to revelation. Science is a record of *facts*; and what is revelation but a record of facts? The student of science may be in error in what he believes to be the record of facts; and what is to prevent the student of revelation from being in error also in respect to some of its facts? Why is the human mind more infallible in the one than in the other? Why does the interpreter of Scripture assume that his system of interpretation in all things is *necessarily right*, and that of those who in honesty differ from him is wrong? It is of the very essence of dogmatism to pronounce without examination upon the interpretation of another, while it eulogizes its own as the only correct one. Especially is this so when the subjects proposed for discussion are recondite and not of vital consequence; when diversity of view may be held without any departure from essential truth; when minute coincidences and subtle distinctions only are called in question; when no one prominent doctrine of the Bible is doubted or denied; when there is only a difference of sentiment upon views of altogether inferior importance, and which should only be treated with moderation or dissented from with good temper. But, most unnecessarily, it happens that when the lover of science propounds, as did Galileo or Copernicus, views somewhat different from the common interpretation, there is often, with overheated theological partisans, an alarm raised, as if the whole Bible was in its credibility endangered, and in its very foundations undermined. But the difficulty is, they were wrong, and not their Scriptures. It is their interpretation that is er-

roneous, and not the Bible. Why should every new discovery in the sciences be hailed as the harbinger of evil, and a new truth made known be regarded as an obtrusive novelty? The Bible is no suspicious character, deprecating the steps of every adventurer in knowledge; it thunders no anathema against the student of science. Free as the air itself, generous as the magnificent variety of nature, noble as its great Author, it offers itself for the deepest, the widest, the most searching scrutiny; it fears no foe, and it compromises with no enemy; it has no retraction to make, and no chain to fetter the loftiest stretch of human thought. But it does, with reason, demand that thought should be lawful and investigation true,—that the lover of science should be humble before the infinite Author of science, and treat with deference the unequivocal assertions of revelation. It does demand that unripe speculation should not be indorsed as truth, nor infant theories be worshiped as the maturity of knowledge. Let us, first, ask ourselves, What is the attitude of the Bible toward science? what ground does it take? Everything depends upon a correct answer to this question. The business of revelation has especial reference to all moral duty, to our relations, as responsible beings, to God and man. All truth made known has immediate bearing upon this point. Here is the dividing line between essential and unessential truth. Whatever has a moral aspect—whatever relates to God or to man—is essential. Beyond this point truth made known is incidental; and views, correct or incorrect, upon such truths, never should be regarded as of vital importance. Now, all the cardinal doctrines of the Bible are intimately connected with duties toward God and man, and therefore come under that which it is essential to receive. A man if he does not breathe the air will die; but it does not follow that death will result from his wearing a red coat rather than a black one. To demand a rigid and undeviating uniformity upon the minutiae of revelation, an exact agreement upon all unessential truth, is asking too much of human nature. So long as God has made minds to differ, and constitutional varieties of thought as much as of body, it follows that there must be dif-

ferences of opinion upon the minutiae of the Bible. The Bible treats all scientific truth as pertaining to the minutiae of revelation; it treats it as unessential for uniformity of belief. All moral duty and right belief upon Christ are of the utmost importance; but not so with the discoveries of science; not so with the beauties of art or the embellishments of poetry; not so with the graces of style or the closeness of logic. It is the Christian infinitely more in his heart than in his speculative notions that is looked at; his uprightness of conduct, more than his expansion of mind. Consequently, with revelation the greatest heresy is wickedness, and the worst infidelity a bad life. And yet, while regarding mainly the conduct, the right reception of the Bible leads directly to uniformity of belief upon all essential truth. The Bible uses popular language upon all subjects. The precision of the metaphysicians can be obtained only by adopting their abstruseness of language. Their exactness is purchased at the expense of clearness. But would it be proper for the Bible, made for all ages and all men, to make use of a dialect unintelligible to ninety-nine hundredths of the human family? Would it be proper for God to exchange adaptation for exclusiveness, compactness for indefinite expansion, and that golden coin current among all nations for bills of credit valueless beyond a limited circle? Would it be proper to throw away in popular language a medium of thought as universal as the water we drink, for metaphysical preciseness that, like the spiced wines of the rich, are only available for the few? We come, then, to the conclusion that the language of the Bible is the best possible. Does that language conflict with any of the plain facts of science?

There is yet to be shown the first discrepancy with the truths of science. Remember, the Bible presents no formal treatise upon astronomy, geology, or chemistry. It would not, if it did, adapt itself to the moral wants of the world in all ages; it would have been in the highest degree premature to enter into the intricacies of recent discoveries, or teach those scientific truths made known within the last three centuries. Moral truth comes before intellectual novelty; the

former relates to salvation, the latter to refinement of mind, and is as inferior in value as the soul is of more consequence than the body. The only thing necessary to show is that there is no collision between the two, that one is in harmony with the other, that no theory in the Bible is propounded inconsistent with any legitimate truth of science. Right science does not demand of revelation the giving up of popular language, nor does revelation demand of science the abandonment of a single truth. Both are in unison. Ignorance may imagine a disagreement, and make discrepancies out of its doubts, but knowledge, like the telescope, resolves mists into nebulae, and nebulae into stars. Let the arrogant disbeliever clear his glasses, or make better ones, and he will soon find all mistakes summed up in his own presumption and want of knowledge.

“Christianity,” says President L. W. Green, “courts investigation,—she invites scrutiny,—she challenges discussion,—she throws down her gauntlet of defiance to every antagonist,—and in every age a thousand foes have leaped forward to mingle in the assault. They come from every quarter, and of every character,—each hoary superstition, each beardless science. They wield every weapon of refined or barbarous warfare, drawn from the domain of history or fiction, of imagination or of fact. They dig into the bowels of the earth, and hew the granite mountain,—they explore the unfathomed depths of space, search the sepulchers of buried nations, decipher hieroglyphical inscriptions in temples, pyramids, and tombs, study the fabulous genealogies and fabulous astronomies of races whose sublime progenitors, according to their own account, must have been cotemporaries of the saurian tribes of an earlier world. There is not a false religion upon earth that could bear the test of such a scrutiny for a single year,—that would not vanish instantaneously before the light of a single science. The *telescope* and *microscope* alone would suffice to overthrow all the ancient religions of Farther Asia. That the Sacred Scriptures should have come forth not only unharmed, but victorious, from all the conflicts of eighteen centuries,—that not one of their fifty

writers has ever uttered or suggested an opinion contrary to any of those facts which the lapse of twenty-three hundred years has revealed,—that each new discovery in science, each fact drawn forth from pyramid or pillar, from sepulcher or coin, from mutilated monument or half-defaced inscription, should only serve to throw new light upon their meaning and add new evidence to their credibility,—is perhaps the completest specimen which the whole range of human learning has yet afforded of the truth of a theory established by millions of independent harmonies, mounting up, in their combined and multiple result, to billions of probabilities in its favor, with absolutely nothing to the contrary. The history of these objections against Christianity would be, indeed, her proudest vindication. Geology herself, in all her cycles, does not present more curious specimens of infidel objections, long buried and forgotten beneath the huge masses of argument and learning with which consecrated genius has overwhelmed and preserved them,—at once their monument and sepulcher. First it was objected against the genuineness of the sacred records, ‘that we have not the very works of the evangelists and apostles themselves.’ Sacred learning has distinctly proven that these identical writings existed, and were read in public assemblies throughout the civilized world, during the first century,—were quoted by numerous writers, their immediate successors, during the three succeeding centuries, in such profusion that the whole New Testament, in every essential fact and doctrine, might be reconstructed from the quotations by these various authors; thus presenting a larger amount of testimony to this single book, in the course of three centuries, than could be gathered *from all the writers of all centuries*, in behalf of the Greek and Roman classics, *all combined*. It was then objected against their ‘*uncorrupted preservation*,’ ‘that they had been transmitted, through many centuries, by means of various manuscripts written by different hands; and that Mill, and other critics, had discovered a corresponding number of various readings, casting thus a serious doubt over the integrity and authority of the received texts.’ The most profound investi-

gations of modern times have proven that all these doubtful readings are really of slight importance ; and even were each admitted, or the passages in which each occur all stricken from the Bible, not one essential doctrine of our faith would be in the slightest degree affected ; and the great fabric of sacred truth would remain as complete in its proportions, its symmetry and strength, as some vast cathedral, from whose strong foundations or lofty dome the hand of folly or the lapse of time had crumbled the minutest portion of the cement which served to unite, but did not constitute, the massive marble of which the building was composed. Driven by successive defeats from the sure *terra firma* of historical testimony, infidelity took refuge amidst the hieroglyphics of Egypt and the astronomy of the Hindoos. Bailly proved to his own satisfaction, from the record of eclipses among the Hindoos, that the existence of man upon earth was many thousand years earlier than the Mosaic history would allow ; and this whimsical vagary of a visionary man, though hooted out of France by the wit of Voltaire and the science of D'Alembert, was long an established article of faith among the enlightened infidels of England, Scotland, and America. Mathematical demonstration and historical testimony have since combined to show that these eclipses were calculated *clumsily*, backwards, for ages that were past, and cannot be dated so early as the commencement of the Christian era.

“Some French savans attached to Napoleon’s army during the expedition into Egypt discovered mysterious zodiacs. Though unable to decipher the hieroglyphics with certainty, one thing was indisputable,—that the zodiacs were constructed at the lowest seventeen thousand, probably eighteen thousand, years ago ; and the writer well remembers how his boyish faith was shaken by the bold assertions and contemptuous sneers of the Edinburgh Review against all who hesitated to receive their oracular utterance, founded, as they said, upon mathematical demonstration. Champollion and his co-laborers have read the inscription, and find that it belongs to the age of Tiberius Cæsar. Comparative anatomy, meantime, had become, through the genius of Cuvier,

an important field of investigation, and presented many striking examples of the analogical resemblance between the structure of man and that of other animated beings. Professor Oken, descending one day the Hartz Mountains, beheld the beautiful blanched skull of a hind. 'I picked it up, regarded it intently,' says he: 'the thing was done.' Since that time the skull has been regarded as a vertebral column. Rapidly over all Europe and throughout all scientific circles spread the bold hypothesis that the skull is but a development of the spine, part of that other more comprehensive theory of development which represents man—intellectual, moral, immortal man—as the development of the brute,—itself the development of some monad, or mollusk, which has been smitten into life by the action of electricity upon a gelatinous monad. This vertebral portion of a brutal theory, sprang from the skull of a beast, long since emptied of its brains, had passed like a flood of lightning through his *disorganized brain*, and he very naturally concluded that all *human intelligence* is the result of an electric spark passed through an unorganized gelatinous monad. It has been well remarked by an able writer that the strongest argument in favor of this theory is, that any human being should ever have been found willing to adopt, much more to assert with eagerness, this high relationship to the orang-outang and ape. Congeniality of sympathy may have community of origin. 'A fellow-feeling makes us wondrous kind.' Hooted from the earth, the development hypothesis took refuge amidst the distant nebulae of the farther heavens. Driven thence by Lord Rosse's telescope, it returned again to the earth; and the last sad record of its tragic fate assures us that, hemmed and jammed in at last between granite pyramids and huge masses of old red sandstone, it was shattered to atoms by a blow from the stone hammer of a Caledonian quarrier, and of all its prodigious 'creations' no 'vestiges' now remain."

When we observe the countless worlds opened up to our view by the telescope, we perceive that the vast creation of God is as diversified in its nature as it is boundless."

tent ; we enjoy new and grand fields of thought, that find no limit in subjects and no sameness in variety. Happy is it for the cause of truth that the Bible, while it touches cautiously upon themes of purely scientific interest, never infringes upon any well-attested fact of science. It does indeed clothe its language in a popular garb ; but so carefully worded is every sentence that no assertion is made to conflict with the clearly established truths of nature. But more than this : whatever revelation says, when subjected to a careful investigation, confirms science rather than otherwise. Its testimony is positive, rather than negative ; it not only says nothing against the facts of science, but much to strengthen them. Thus, while every other book presenting claims of a religious character, and in opposition in its teachings to the Bible, stumbles upon the very threshold of the new discoveries of science, the Bible, true in every age, is yet revealed with brighter luster in the more brilliant unfolding of the truths of nature in the present age.

It has been thought by many that if the researches of astronomy or chemistry are not in conflict with revelation, if nothing of validity can be found to disprove the Mosaic account of the unity of the origin of man, the oneness of his descent from a single stock, yet at least the discoveries of geology, or its teachings, are opposed to the Mosaic account of the six days' creation. But let it be remembered, the Bible does not hold itself as the servant of the particular features of geology. It does not undertake to father all the conflicting views of this new science ; it does not indorse all that may be called the instructions of this science ; and yet it will be seen that it does not conflict with its essential features, but rather is in harmony with the whole scope of geology, when viewed with a spirit of candor and impartiality. What, then, are some of the essential elements of geology ?

First. It teaches that one epoch of ruin and creation is succeeded by another of a higher grade of vegetable or of animal being.

Second. It teaches gréat catastrophes of ruin as followed by creations of vegetable and animal life.

Third. It teaches that these epochs extended over vast periods of time and were of indefinite extent.

Fourth. It teaches every epoch as introduced by miracle rather than a gradual development of natural law.

The question, then, is, Are these teachings *in reality* opposed to revelation? To investigate this subject, in justice to the Bible, is our object. We do not now discuss the question whether geology is true or whether the Bible is true. The only thing to be done is to ascertain what is the true interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis. How are we to understand it? The Mosaic narrative commences with the declaration that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." These few words briefly state the great fact of the original creation of the material elements at a time distinctly preceding the operations of the first day. This opinion is in accordance not only with the most natural interpretation, but it harmonizes with the sentiments of the whole scientific world, and has to support it the authority of the most learned of the Christian church. It is a sublime exhibition of the great truth of the absolute creation of God, and his perfect power in bringing into existence every material element. Thus, the first verse explicitly asserts the creation of the universe, including the sidereal systems; "and the earth,"—especially alluding to our own planet as the subsequent scene of the operations of the six days about to be described. Thus, in this verse no information is given of events unconnected with the history of man. Millions of years may therefore have intervened before the creation of man, in which the sidereal systems and the earth may have passed through vast periods of time. No limit is placed to the ages which may have elapsed between the *beginning* in which God created the heaven and the earth, and the evening, or the commencement of the first day of the Mosaic narrative. To assert the contrary is acting without any good reason. Why may not this be so? Does Moses assert the contrary? So far from this, Moses expressly declares, in the following verse, that "the earth was without form, and void," evidently speaking of a chaotic state of the earth;

but this condition of the earth must have been subsequent to the state of things spoken of in the first verse, where the original creation of the earth, or its elements, is described. There is no authority for making the first verse and the first half of the second verse cotemporary with the first day's work. Says E. B. Pusey, Regius Professor of Hebrew in Oxford: "The point, however, upon which the interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis appears to me really to turn, is whether the first two verses are merely a summary statement of what is related in detail in the rest of the chapter, and a sort of introduction to it, or whether they contain an account of an act of creation; and this last seems to me to be their true interpretation: first, because there is no other account of the creation of the earth; secondly, the second verse describes the condition of the earth when so created, and thus prepares for the account of the work of the six days. But, if they speak of any creation, it appears to me that this creation 'in the beginning' was previous to the six days, because, as you will observe, the creation of each day is preceded by the declaration that God said, or willed, that such things shall be ('and God said'); and therefore the very form of the narrative seems to imply that the creation of the first day began when these words are first used, *i.e.* with the creation of light, in verse third. The time, then, of the creation in verse first appears not to be defined; we are told only what alone we are concerned with,—that all things were made by God. Nor is this any new opinion. Many of the fathers supposed the first two verses of Genesis to contain an account of a distinct and prior act of creation; some, as Augustine, Theodoret, and others, that of the creation of matter; others, that of the elements; others, again (and they are the most numerous), imagine that not these visible heavens, but what they think to be called elsewhere 'the highest heavens,' 'the heaven of heavens,' are here spoken of. Our visible heavens being related to have been created on the second day, Petovius himself regards the light as the only act of creation of the first day ('*de opere primæ diei, i.e. luce*'); considering the first two verses as a summary of the

account of creation which was about to follow, and a general declaration that all things were made by God."

Professor Pusey also remarks that the words "Let there be light" "by no means necessarily imply, any more than the English words by which they are translated, that light had *never* existed before. They may speak only of the substitution of light for darkness upon the surface of this our planet. Whether light had existed before in other parts of God's creation, or had existed upon this earth before the darkness described in verse second, is foreign to the purpose of the narrative."

Dr. Buckland, in his *Bridgewater Treatise*, remarks, concerning the earth mentioned in the first verse of Genesis: "We have further mention of this ancient earth and ancient sea in the ninth verse, in which the waters are commanded to be *gathered together* into one place, and the dry land to *appear*; this dry land being the same earth whose material creation had been announced in the first verse, and whose temporary submersion and temporary darkness are described in the second verse. *The appearance* of the land and the *gathering together* of the waters are the only facts affirmed respecting them in the ninth verse; but neither land nor water is said to have been *created* on the third day. A similar interpretation may be given of the fourteenth and four succeeding verses. What is herein stated of the celestial luminaries seems to be spoken solely with reference to our planet, and more especially to the human race then about to be placed upon it. We are not told that the substance of the sun and moon were first called into existence upon the fourth day; the text may equally imply that these bodies were then prepared, and appointed to certain high offices of high importance to mankind: to give 'light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night;' to be 'for signs, and for seasons, and for days, and years.' The fact of their creation had been stated before, in the first verse. The stars also are mentioned in these words only (Gen. i. 16), almost parenthetically, as if for the sole purpose of announcing that they also were made by the same power as those luminaries

which are more important to us. This very slight notice of the countless hosts of the celestial bodies, all of which are probably suns, the centers of other planetary systems, while our little satellite, the moon, is mentioned as next in importance to the sun, shows clearly that astronomical phenomena are here spoken of only according to their relative importance to our earth and to mankind, and without any regard to their real importance in the boundless universe. It seems impossible to include the fixed stars among those bodies which are said (Gen. i. 17) to have been set in the firmament of the heavens to give light upon the earth; since, without the aid of telescopes, by far the greater number of them are invisible. The same principle seems to pervade the description of the creation which concerns our planet. The creation of its component matter having been announced in the first verse, the phenomena of geology, like those of astronomy, are passed over in silence, and the narrative proceeds at once to details of the actual creation which have more immediate reference to man. The interpretation here proposed seems, moreover, to solve the difficulty which would otherwise attend the statement of the appearance of light upon the first day, while the sun and moon and stars are not made to appear until the fourth. If we suppose all the heavenly bodies and the earth to have been created at the indefinitely distant time designated by the word 'beginning,' and that the darkness described on the evening of the first day was a temporary darkness produced by the accumulation of dense vapors 'upon the face of the deep,' an incipient dispersion of these vapors may have readmitted light to the earth upon the first day, while the exciting cause of light was still obscured; and the farther purification of the atmosphere upon the fourth day may have caused the sun and moon and stars to reappear in the firmament of heaven, to assume their new relations to the newly modified earth and to the human race. We have evidence of the presence of light during long and distant periods of time, in which the many extinct fossil forms of animal life succeeded one another upon the early surface of the globe. This evidence consists in the petrified

remains of eyes of animals found in geological formations of various ages."

"It appears highly probable, from recent discoveries, that light is not a material substance, but only an effect of undulations of ether; that this infinitely subtle and elastic ether pervades all space, and even the interior of all bodies: so long as it remains at rest, there is total darkness; when it is put in a peculiar state of vibration, the sensation of light is produced: this vibration may be excited by various causes; *e.g.* by the sun, by the stars, by electricity, combustion, etc. If, then, light be not a substance, but only a series of vibrations of ether, *i.e.* an effect produced on a subtle fluid by the excitement of one or many extraneous causes, it can be hardly said to have been *created*, though it may be literally said to be called into action."

"Lastly, in the reference made in the fourth commandment (Exod. xx. 11) to the six days of the Mosaic creation, the word *asah*, 'made,' is the same which is used in Gen. i. 7, and which has been shown to be less strong and less comprehensive than *bora*, 'created;' and, as it by no means necessarily implies creation out of nothing, it may be here employed to express a new arrangement of materials that existed before. After all, it should be recollected that the question is not respecting the correctness of the Mosaic narrative, but of our interpretation of it; and still further, it should be borne in mind that the object of this account was not to state in *what manner*, but by whom, the world was made."

"Neither the first verse, nor the first half of the second," says Chalmers, "forms any part of the narrative of the first day's operations,—the whole forming a preparatory sentence, disclosing to us the initial act of creation at some remote and undefined period, and the chaotic state of the world at the commencement of those successive acts of creative power by which, out of rude and undigested materials, the present harmony of nature was ushered into being. Between the initial act and the details of Genesis, the world, for aught we know, might have been the theater of many revolutions, the traces of which geology may still investigate."

Our object, in these extracts from men whose opinion is deserving of high consideration, is simply to show that there is no inconsistency between revelation and the essential features of geological science. It is enough if it is proved that the statements of the one do not, in respect to the antiquity of this earth, conflict with the statements of the other. It is all-sufficient if the Mosaic narrative is found, in its essential features, to correspond with the records of natural science. The only apparent difficulty presented is in the light of the first day, and the appearance of the sun and moon the fourth day; but this difficulty vanishes upon a careful consideration of the true import of the Mosaic narrative. Recent investigations in astronomy have shown the intimate analogy of our sun with the fixed stars. It has been proved that the stars are suns, like our own, and that variability, rather than uniformity, is the condition of their light: thus, at different periods of the world, some stars have, even within the short record of man, been found to intermit in their light, to blaze forth with unwonted brilliancy, and then suddenly die away altogether, or vastly decrease in the light given.

Says Nichol, Professor of Astronomy in Glasgow University: "The question cannot fail to suggest itself here, *'whether the sun is now as he ever will be, or only in one state or epoch of his efficiency, as the radiant source of light and heat.'* The new star in Cassiopeia, seen by Tycho, for instance, indicated some great change in the light and heat of an orb. *That star never moved from its place; and during its course from extreme brilliancy to apparent extinction, the color of its light altered, passing through the hues of a dying conflagration.*"

Here have we facts unquestionable of astronomy, showing that suns in their light at different epochs may and do pass through an amazing change. Some are relighted and some extinguished. Thus, the sun is a *light-bearer*; and why may it not at the great epoch of the six days' creation, during the period of chaos and darkness, have been obscured or previously been in a mighty transition from light to darkness? Why may not the chaotic state of the preadamite earth have been

owing to one of those vast catastrophes that suddenly, through the loss of the heat and light of the sun, have thrown all things into darkness and chaotic confusion? Why should our sun prove an exception to other suns? If this hypothesis cannot be proved, it may be safely said that it cannot be disproved. There is every analogy in science to favor it, and nothing against it. Thus, the more we study the true import of revelation the more clearly do we discover the real harmony existing between it and science. While the Bible does not profess to give a treatise upon the sciences, there yet is nothing to conflict with them; and where it does speak out, all its allusions are such as make known its origin from God.

“There is, then,” says the eloquent Gaussen, “no physical error in the Scriptures; and this great fact becomes always more admirable in proportion as it is more clearly contemplated. Never will you find a single sentence in opposition to the just notions which science has imparted to us concerning the form of our globe, its magnitude and its geology, —upon the void and upon space, —upon the planets and their masses, their courses, their dimensions, or their influences, —upon the suns which people the depths of space, upon their number, their nature, their immensity. You shall not find one of the authors of the Bible who has, in speaking of the visible world, let fall from his pen one only of those sentences which in other books contradict the reality of facts; none who make the heavens a firmament, as do the Seventy, St. Jerome, and all the fathers of the church; none who make the world, as Plato did, an intelligent animal; none who reduce everything below to the four elements of the ancients; not one who has spoken of the mountains as Mohammed did, of the cosmogony as Buffon, of the antipodes as Lucretius, as Plutarch, as Pliny, as Lactantius, as St. Augustine, as the Pope Zachara. When the Scriptures speak of the form of the earth, they make it a *globe*; when they speak of the position of this globe in the bosom of the universe, *they suspend it upon nothing*. When they speak of its age, not only do they put its creation, as well as that of the heavens, in the ‘beginning,’ —that is, before the ages which they cannot or

will not number,—but they are also careful to place it before the breaking up of chaos and the creation of man, the creation of angels, of archangels, of principalities and powers, their trial, the fall of some and their ruin, the perseverance of others and their glory. When they speak of the heavens, they employ to designate and define them the most philosophic and the most eloquent expression which the Greeks in the Septuagint translation, the Latin Vulgate, and all the Christian fathers in their discourses, have pretended to improve, and which they have distorted because it seemed to them *opposed to the science of their day*. The heavens in the Bible are ‘the expanse,’ they are the vacant space, or ether, or immensity, and not the ‘firmamentum’ of Jerome, nor the ‘στερέωμα’ of the Alexandrian interpreters, nor the *eighth* heaven, *firm*, *solid*, *crystalline*, and *incorruptible*, of Aristotle and of all the ancients; and although the Hebrew term, so remarkable, recurs seventeen times in the Old Testament, and the Seventy have rendered it seventeen times by ‘στερέωμα’ (firmament), never have the Scriptures in the New Testament used this expression of the Greek interpreters in this sense. When they speak of the *air*, the *gravity of which* was unknown before Galileo, they tell us that at the creation ‘God gave to the *air its weight*.’ (Job, xxvii. 5.) When they speak of the light, they present it to us as an element independent of the sun, and as anterior by three epochs to the period in which that luminary was formed. When they speak of the interior state of our globe, they teach us that while its surface gives us bread, ‘*beneath it is on fire*.’ (Job, xxvii. 5.) When they speak of the mountains, they distinguish them as primary and secondary; they represent them *as being born*; they make them *rise*; they abase the valleys; they speak as a geological poet of our day would do: ‘The mountains were lifted up (elevated), O Lord; the valleys were abased (Hebrew, “descended”) in the place which thou hadst assigned them.’”

Thus do science and revelation walk together in harmony, both pointing to the same glorious power and wisdom, revealing the same infinite Author, and urging to Christian duty with the tokens of an ever-present God.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

THE doctrine of the Bible upon the origin of the human family is, that the whole race of man proceeded from Adam and Eve; that their first home was the garden of Eden; their condition one of perfect innocence, and as they came from the hands of God they had enstamped upon them the image of their Maker, and were alike sinless and free in the exercise of their natural powers. As such, of their own freedom, as responsible moral agents, they fell from their high estate, and thus brought upon themselves the punishment of sin.

Is there anything in the condition of the human family to disprove this statement? anything to show the Mosaic record false? It will be our design to reply to this question. If history, so far as it can be relied upon, *confirms* the record of Moses, if the researches of science can show nothing in the diversity of the human race to disprove this statement, then have we a high proof of the genuineness of the Mosaic history, and additional argument to confirm the inspiration of the Bible.

Consider, in the first place, that all the earliest accounts of the origin of man point to a first period of innocence and happiness. The golden age of the poets of antiquity pointed to such a period. The traditions of the earliest state of man all had reference to a condition different from his present state. As the majestic columns of some ancient temple, that lie scattered upon the ground, point out the grandeur of its former state, so, also, there is that in human nature that seems to intimate that man is but a wreck of what he once was, and that he only carries about with him the remnants of his original glory. Thus, as we study the tra-

ditions of history or look to man in his present condition, there is nothing to disprove the Mosaic record, but rather much to confirm it. Among the many events of history, few can surpass in interest the occasion when Paul for the first time addressed the learned Athenians. Ascending the steps of the Areopagus, there was presented to his eye a scene of nature unequalled in majesty and loveliness. There lay behind him the Ægean Sea. Upon Mars Hill stood the famed temple of ancient idolatry. Before him were gathered the inquisitive, the imaginative, the pleasure-loving Athenians. Among them were the philosophers, and such as delighted in the arts and those works of beauty for which the land of Greece was renowned. But what was the mission of Paul? It was to teach doctrines, to advance opinions, opposed to all their previous habits of thought, their ancient customs, their religion, and their habitual life. It was to show their whole system of idol-worship wrong, their whole theology based upon error. It was to reveal the one infinite God, the one perfect atonement of Christ, and that only system of redemption by which man can be saved. It was to make known the unity of the human family as descended from one common parentage and having one common blood. It was to make clear the great truth that man was involved in the ruin of the same fall, and had the same duties to perform, and the same immortality of blessedness to secure, and greatness of misery to avoid. But the unity of the human race, as descended from Adam and Eve, was an idea foreign to the proud Athenians. They gloried in an origin distinct from that of other nations. They regarded themselves as *αυτοχθονες*, sprung from the sacred soil of Attica, underived, and independent of other families of mankind. Paul considered it essential to Christianity to show that the unity of the divine nature involved the unity of the human, and that the oneness of the race involved the oneness of the source from which the race sprang. "God, that made the world and all things therein, hath made of *one blood* all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth; and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation."

Thus the unity of the human race was by Paul regarded as essential to the system of redemption by Christ, since that redemption was based upon the idea of one common exposure to ruin, through the fall of one common parentage: this is seen in the parallel run at length between the fall of the race in Adam, and its redemption in Christ. Thus, the apostle, in Romans, declares, "By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men." "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." Thus, in the universal headship of the one we see the counterpart in the universal headship of the other. We do not attempt to define the mysterious relation Adam sustained to the human family. It is not our object to illustrate in its essential elements the oneness of the human race through a common parentage. We only state that the Scripture language unequivocally asserts that oneness. It declares the fact of a descent from Adam, the first man, of all the nations of the earth; it asserts that as sin was introduced by the first man, so was redemption by the second man, Christ; it compares the two together, contrasts the difference of each, and most plainly asserts but one common father of the whole human race. Now, this truth stands upon the same ground as do all the revealed truths of the Bible. It is most intimately linked with the inspiration of the word of God. It is asserted not only in Genesis, but implied in every book of the Bible. Not a single intimation is there to the contrary in any book of the Bible. Thus the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures must be shown to be erroneous, before the fact of a common origin can be disproved, even if its general inspiration is admitted; because the unity of the human race is one great link in the chain to show the fullest inspiration of the Bible.

If, then, history and the Bible point to the central region of Asia as the cradle of the human race,—if early tradition

in all the works of ancient philosophers and poets speak of a golden age of innocence, and correspond in their essential features with the account of inspiration,—must not the most demonstrative, the most irresistible evidence be presented to lead us to doubt a fact admitted so universally in all ages of the world?

Is it enough to raise objections only from the diversity in the human family? Are we to throw every evidence from history and revelation away, because of the cavils of modern skepticism upon this subject? Who knows not how easy it is to raise objections upon all subjects? Who is ignorant how common doubt is? If some students of science please to question the parentage of man from Adam, is it not equally evident how unanimous has been the opinion of the wisest and the best in every age in confirmation of the oneness of the family of man as coming from a single stock? But, leaving the ground of inspiration, let us see if upon the ground alone of science the descent of the human family from one stock can be disproved.

We will first see if there are greater varieties in the human species than among the different species of animals; *if so*, are those varieties so peculiar and distinct as to authorize the setting aside of the voice of history and revelation? Now, it can be most clearly proved that the varieties of animals of the lower species are as great and even far greater than exist in the human species; and that also among existing varieties the distinction is not so marked among men as among quadrupeds. Thus we must in consistency believe that the human species had a common parentage, even as all other distinct species of animals, if we repudiate the idea of a distinct parentage for every variety of animals. We cannot suppose that the most marked peculiarities of the human species had each a distinct creation, any more than the most marked peculiarities of the dog race or the cat race. But this is not all. Varieties of form, color, size, strength, and intelligence among the different species of animals are so blended gether in each that it is impossible to say where the creation of these distinct species, or varieties, com-

menced. One man may make out two, another five, and another ten distinct creations for each prominent variety in each species; and yet some other student, progressing farther in science, may even double the number. Where is this subdivision of creation among the varieties of species to end? So of the human species: upon the ground of a common origin from one stock, we can find no difficulty with the existing varieties of the race of man; but, if we must go to a different creation for each of the most prominent varieties, we know not where to stop. The varieties of form, color, strength, intelligence, are so infinite in their minute shades, these varieties so blend with one another, that the most difficult of tasks is to separate each prominent variety. How, upon the score of ease in classifying the varieties of the human family, are we bettered when we resort to the theory of five or six different origins? We must, in consistency, carry out the same principle in classifying the varieties of each species of animals. What are we to do in determining how few or how many are the diverse creations in each species? Thus we see at once how inextricable is the confusion that arises from attempting to make out so many different origins in the human family. What prevents the same principle of analogy from holding equally good in the existing varieties of animals? Now, in the strict nomenclature of science, a species is a class of animals having a descent from one stock: if, then, we ignore the idea of the human race coming from one stock, why, when greater varieties can be shown in the species of animals, are we to single out the human race as an exception? Why are we to resort to a kind of argument with the race of man that we do not follow out with the race of dogs, cats, lions, or horses?

There are two great laws in respect to species. One is that each species, within certain limits, is susceptible of infinite variety; another law is, that beyond those limits each species remains permanent, with rigid adherence to an undeviating law of development. Thus, we may see a vast variety of dogs, but no dog ever emerges into the sheep, no sheep ever puts on the features of the cat. Nature has interposed

an impassable barrier to each species of animals, so that amalgamation is impossible; and thus there can be no interchange with each species. Thus, by the law of variety, we see a most happy adaptation to the differences of climate and country; while, by the law of development of species, there are no monstrosities in nature and no compounding of original differences. By the one law we have a most useful facility of being conformed to the varied climates and countries of the earth, while by the other law is preserved the harmony of animal existence. With the first law domesticity and migration are possible, and with the latter the peculiarities of each species are permanently retained. Both are indispensable. We see that nature has implanted an invincible repugnance to union among the different species, and given to each species an undeviating character of oneness. The law of organic life is that each species shall propagate its kind, and no other; and whatever apparent exceptions may exist, we know the limit of development is exceedingly contracted, and that, as in the case of mules and hybrid plants and animals, there is wanting the power of reproduction. Consequently, the race becomes extinct, and the hybrid is incapable of establishing a new species. The question, then, to decide is, Are there greater varieties among the human species than among the species of quadrupeds? If the varieties of animals in each species are as great, or greater than in the human race, then, if we admit that species means the descent from one stock, we cannot with any shadow of reason doubt that the human race came from one stock. Varieties of species are formed from an endless diversity of circumstances. Not only are climate, domestication, country, the intermingling with different varieties of the same species, to be considered, but occasional accidents without any known cause. Thus, in 1791, upon the farm of Seth Wright, of Massachusetts, one ewe gave birth to a male lamb which had a longer body and shorter legs than the rest of the breed, with the fore-legs crooked. This form making it impossible for the sheep to leap fences, it was resolved to perpetuate this accidental

variety, which was accordingly done. Thus, also, a race of swine with solid hoofs arose in Hungary in the same way; and recently, without any assignable cause, the same singular variety has made its appearance along the banks of the Red River, in our own country. The Spaniards, when they discovered this country, found none of the domestic animals existing here which were used in Europe. They were accordingly introduced, and, escaping, strayed from their owners and ran wild in the forest, and have thus continued for several centuries. The result is, the obliteration of the characteristics of the domesticated animals, and a reappearance of some of the typical marks of the wild state, and a generation of new and striking characteristics, in accommodation to their new circumstances.

“The wild hog of our forests,” says T. V. Moore, “bears a striking likeness to the wild boar of the Old World. The hog of the high mountains of Parumus resembles the wild boar of France. Instead of being covered with bristles, however, as the domestic breed from which they sprang, they have a thick fur, often crisp, and sometimes an undercoat of wool. Instead of being generally white or spotted, they are uniformly black, except in some warmer regions, where they are red, like the young peccary. The anatomical structure has changed, adapting itself to the new habits of the animal, in an elongation of the snout, a vaulting of the forehead, a lengthening of the hind legs; and, in the case of those left on the island of Cubagua, a monstrous elongation of the toes to half a span. The ox has undergone the same changes. In some of the provinces of South America a variety has been produced called ‘prelones,’ having a very rare and fine fur. In other provinces a variety is produced with an entirely naked skin, like the dog of Mexico or of Guinea. In Columbia, owing to the immense size of farms and other causes, the practice of milking was laid aside; and the result has been that the secretion of milk in the cows, like the same function in other animals of this class, is only an occasional phenomenon, and confined strictly to the period of suckling the calf. As soon as the calf is removed, the

milk ceases to flow, as in the case of other mammals. The same changes have taken place in other animals. The wild dog of the Pampas never barks, as the domestic animal does, but howls like the wolf; while the wild cat has, in like manner, lost the habit of caterwauling. The wild horse of the higher plains of South America becomes covered with a long, shaggy fur, or is of a uniform chestnut color. The sheep of the central Cordilleras, if not shorn, produces a thick, matted, woolly fleece, which gradually breaks off in shaggy tufts, and leaves underneath a short, fine hair, shining and smooth, like that of the goat, and the wool never reappears. The same changes have been produced in geese and gallinaceous fowls. A variety has sprung up called rumpless fowls, which want from one to six of the caudal vertebræ. The same varieties have sprung up in other parts of the world. The fat-tailed sheep of Tartary loses its posterior mass of fat when removed to the steppes of Siberia, whose scant and bitter herbage is less favorable to the secretion of adipose matter. The African sheep has become large, like the goat, and exchanged its wool for hair. The Wallachian sheep has put on large, perpendicular, spiral horns, and in like manner become clothed with hair. Some also have four, and even six, horns. The wild horses of Eastern Siberia have the same anatomical differences from the tame ones that we noticed in the case of the swine; and culture, climate, and other causes have produced the widest varieties,—from the little, shaggy pony of the Shetlands, that scrambles up the highland crags like a goat, to the gigantic steed of Flanders, or the Conestoga of Pennsylvania, which will sometimes drag a load of four tons on the level ground. Whether the dog and the wolf are of the same species, is a question about which there is some difference of opinion among naturalists; but there is a very general agreement that all varieties of the dog must be referred to one species. Between these there is the widest difference,—from the gigantic St. Bernard, that will carry a frozen traveler to the convent; the shaggy Newfoundland, with his webbed feet and his aquatic habits; and the scentless and almost tongue-

less greyhound; to the little lapdog that nestles in a lady's arms, the nosing foxhound, whose scent is almost a miracle, the ratting terrier, and the naked Mexican dog, that has an additional toe. The cow presents the most diverse varieties,—from the little Surat ox, not larger than a dog, to the humped and long-eared Brahmin cow, and the gigantic prize ox that will weigh two tons. The domesticated fowls and pigeons have assumed varieties enough to fill a page, some of them of the most diverse character; varying from the largest size to the most dwarfish, and possessing every peculiarity compatible with the preservation of the species, in the feathers, the form, the wattles, and the psychological traits and habits."

From this brief summary of facts, is there any greater variety among the human species than exists in the different species of the lower orders of animals? Are we to infer that the diversities of color and form are as great even as exist in the species of the dog, the cat, the sheep, and the ox? The resemblances in all essential respects are identical in the human race. The race presents only varieties of form and color that cannot compare, in extent and diversity, to the varieties existing in the different species of animals.

Observe that the range of circumstances for the existence of the human family is vastly greater than for that of any other species of animals. Man exists all over the earth, and yet there is not in any respect so marked a difference as exists among the varieties of any one extended species of animals. Why, then, when there are greater reasons for varieties of the human family from greater combination of circumstances, and yet not so great or prominent distinctions as are manifested in the species of animals, should we, against the voice of history and inspiration, attempt to designate different origins to the human race, and not do the same with the varieties of the species of dog, cat, sheep, and oxen? Why is skepticism reasonable upon the subject of man's single parentage in denying it altogether, and unreasonable when it uses the same argument in respect to the varieties existing among the different species of animals? Why should we doubt the origin of all the human race from Adam, and

not believe that the fundamental idea of species among animals forbids the supposition of distinct creations for each existing variety in the human family, as it does in the particular species of animals and birds?

The argument is simply this. Believing that the widespread varieties among each species of animals must all, from the fundamental idea of *species*, proceed from one common stock, then, there being no greater, or even so great varieties in the human species as in the lower species of animals, it follows conclusively that the human race also came from *one stock*. But there are those who deny the premises upon which the argument from *natural* causes is built to establish the fact of the unity of the human race. We then will take those who claim for the wide varieties of animals a distinct creation, and, consequently, a distinct creation for the fundamental varieties of the human species, upon *their own ground*, and show that even there the unity of the human race cannot be disproved.

Those who deny the oneness of the origin of man claim at least four marked varieties among the human species as having each a distinct creation. These are the Caucasian race, the Mongolian, the Indian, and the African race. The advocate for the distinct creation of the parentage of each of these races must also, in consistency, admit a distinct creation for all the existing varieties that are most marked of the different species of animals. All admit creation by miracle of every species of animals. The question is, are the varieties also created by miracle? Are they also placed by miracle in their peculiar locations? Miracle, if it means anything, is something that supersedes or transcends natural law. We do not say the hair grows by miracle, but by the agency of natural law. What is miracle is the creation of man or the creation of the different species of animals. Natural law cannot create: it may perpetuate existence, but it never can give it. Whoever reads the Bible must be impressed with the fact that miracle is never resorted to except in extreme emergencies and under the most imperious circumstances. It comes in only as an extraordinary event when natural causes

are perfectly inadequate to effect objects the most desirable. Thus, the creation of the world, of the first parents, of each species, and the resurrection of Christ, were miracles simply because natural causes were perfectly inadequate for such events. But where do we find miracle resorted to except when absolutely necessary? Where do we find the course of nature interrupted, and its uniformity broken in upon, except under circumstances the most extraordinary, and only when the sphere of law was too limited to effect objects of transcendent importance?

One great objection to so many distinct creations among men and animals is, that there is a superfluity of miracle. It has already been seen that variety among species is a law as needful as the law of propagation of distinct species. Variety subserves purposes as useful within a certain sphere, as uniformity out of that sphere. We can well imagine the necessity for a great variety of dogs, cats, horses, oxen, and sheep; but we are at a loss to conceive of the benefit of an amalgamation together of all these five species. It is very serviceable to have so great a diversity in each species, but very unserviceable to have one species confounded with another. There is a vast difference between diversity and monstrosity. Suppose we believe that natural causes, such as climate, habits of life, domestication, locality, etc., are not sufficient to account for the wide diversity existing among the species of animals; does the distinct creation of the fundamental varieties of each species of dogs, cats, horses, oxen, and sheep, by miracle, present with the placing of them in different localities a hypothesis as natural, as free from objection, as consistent with natural history and revelation, as the hypothesis that God, when he created each species of animals, created with that species a principle of variety, not simply dependent upon natural causes, but to a certain extent of greater inherent potency, which, combined with natural causes, would eventuate at the necessary period in all the needful diversity of species? Call this principle, if you choose, miraculous interposition, yet it is vastly more simple, more free from objection, more in accordance with natural history and the law of

propagation of species, than the operation of two distinct and disconnected influences, first miracles for each variety of importance, and then natural causes.

Reflect upon the vast multiplicity of miracles, and upon the cumbersome and complicated agency that is demanded to account for the diversities of the species of animals. Reflect upon the unnecessary amount of miracle involved in this last hypothesis. It is a good rule in philosophy never to bring in more causes than are appropriate for a given result. Where is the necessity for so many miracles? It is no reply to this objection to ascribe to the believer in the unity of descent of each species of animals and of the human race, the empty sophism of continued supernatural interposition to bring about the existing varieties among the different species of animals or of the human race. It is time enough to make an assertion when proof is given. We do not hold to the necessity of a constant supernatural intervention to account for the varieties of species. We believe that at *one bold stroke* God may have implanted in the physical constitution a principle amply sufficient to account for the most wide-spread varieties among species, in combination with natural causes. We believe, if natural causes may not of themselves account for these varieties, *law* may, as originally implanted by a supernatural agency in the constitution. Is not this a hypothesis far more natural than the twofold multiplicity of miracle demanded by the contrary hypothesis,—first, that by the distinct creation of fundamental varieties; second, that by the placing of animals in distinct localities? Both hypotheses demand miracle; but the question is, Which demands the fewest miracles?—which miracles upon the most reasonable grounds, and most in harmony with the agency of natural causes?

The first hypothesis, which combines miracle and natural causes together, makes physical law, originally implanted in the constitution, the great fact itself of supernatural interposition by God; while the latter hypothesis, besides having as many dividing lines in the shape of *varieties* as there are hairs upon the head, demands miracles as numerous as the

fundamental varieties of the human race and the species of animals.

Let us now confine our attention to the race of man. It is objected to the theory of natural causes and of accidental varieties that they are insufficient to account for the four great races included in the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Indian, and the African race. Let us, for argument's sake, admit the objection. But does it prove four distinct creations? Far from it. There must yet be proved, from other and different sources, four distinct creations. It is not enough to batter down the argument of natural causes or accidental varieties. The fact must be shown that history and inspiration are friendly to this hypothesis. If both are opposed to it, then there remains a hypothesis that must be overthrown, or all the learned disquisitions to the contrary amount to nothing. What matters the insufficiency of natural causes or incidental varieties, if but one solitary fact well attested arrays its bold front against the hypothesis of different creations? What matters it, provided upon the score of miracle the unity of the human race from *one origin* is more natural, through the supposition of one great law of miracle originally implanted, and if also, upon that of history and revelation, this unity of origin is doubly confirmed? Are facts to give place to fanciful theories? Are novelties of science to browbeat all sober science, and with it also the voice of history and revelation?

There are those at the present day who think they can give proof of Moses tripping up upon great spiritual facts of science and history. But Moses is a far more stubborn authority than many are sufficiently aware of; and a man may as well make up his mind to encounter the lightnings of Sinai as to demonstrate in a blunder this greatest sage of antiquity. We have read of the weak sophism that Moses only intended to teach great moral truths, and not science. This, however, is not the question. The question is, Did Moses, in fact, teach *any physical error*? Did Moses inculcate anything opposed to the clear truths of geology, astronomy, chemistry, and natural history? *This is*

the question. Not what Moses designed to teach, but what in *fact* he *did* teach. Believing that not a single error can be found in all his writings, we will not admit in him blunders without proof. If God gave him inspiration enough to teach moral truths, and great facts of history from the earliest ages, he gave him inspiration enough to avoid making physical blunders that would inevitably, in a later day, be made the excuse for rejecting his morality and his history in one lump, and with it undermining the whole superstructure of the Bible as inspired by God. Inspiration has as much to do in keeping from all error as in imparting truth; and we will not bow to the dogmatism of those skeptics who think they have done Moses a vast favor by indorsing *alone*, with a patronizing air, his morality and civil code. Whether Moses was learned in the *new discoveries* of modern times or not, he was made by God sufficiently learned not to bring into disrepute the Bible by arraying it against the absolute truth of science. Let us, then, briefly look to two sources of evidence, to show the unity of the human race, as descended from one stock:

1st. History.

2d. Miraculous interposition, in combination with natural law.

“We find,” says Layard, “that it has been assumed and reasoned upon, as an admitted fact, that Egypt was first peopled from Ethiopia proper,—that is, from the countries to the south of it. That Egypt was settled by the children of Mizraim, the second son of Ham, is universally admitted. But that the land from whence they came and peopled Egypt was Ethiopia, is not made probable by any good evidence. It has been supposed that Meroë, the capital of Ethiopia, was the cradle of Thebes, and that the nation of the Ethiopians lived under a civil and religious system identical with that of Egypt, long before Egypt was inhabited. But there are many monumental and historical evidences to the contrary. The pyramids were, by the unanimous tradition of the Egyptian priests, the oldest monuments of Egypt; but they are not in the neighborhood of Thebes, but of Memphis, on the crown of the delta, on the east bank of the Nile.

“The first mortal who ruled Egypt, according to Manetho, was Menes. This name occurs at the head of a procession of statues of the kings of Egypt, depicted on one of the walls of the palace of Luxor, at Thebes. This king is said to have laid the foundation of Memphis, which was hitherto a marsh, by means of embankments, lakes, and other artificial means. Josephus, the Jewish historian, informs us that he lived many years before the times of Abraham. From the monuments of Ethiopia the inference from the inscriptions is that they were among the most ancient erected in the eighteenth dynasty of the kings of Egypt, who reigned long after Egypt became a settled kingdom. They also intimate plainly that Ethiopia was a province or dependency of Egypt, and continued apparently so until the Psammeticus, about five hundred years before Christ. The picture of a pyramid forms a part of the hieroglyphic name of Memphis, and the inference is, from the immutability of all things in Egypt, that the foundation of the pyramids was coeval with that of the city. The form of the temple of Belus, at Babylon, according to Herodotus, was pyramidal. It is also an ascertained fact that the ancient idolatries, all over the world, particularly affected this form in their sacred edifices. These circumstances, with others, render it probable that the temple of Belus served for an example and pattern of the pyramids of Egypt. Thus, the early migration to Egypt was not from Ethiopia, but the plain of Shinar, or from the banks of the Euphrates, where once stood the city of Babylon, near the place of the tower of Babel. It was soon after the confusion of tongues that befell the impious builders of Babel, about two thousand two hundred and sixty-six years before Christ, that we have good evidence to believe there first proceeded the emigration to Egypt, and the settlement of the country. We must look to the Bible for our clearest light upon the first settlement of Egypt.”

Before the confusion of tongues there was but one language spoken. We know that the plain of Shinar was the place where the tower of Babel was built. It was then from ancient Assyria, in the land of Chaldea, that civilization and

the arts came to Egypt, and all the monumental evidences of Egypt evince the fact, so clearly established in the Bible, that its early origin is to be attributed not to a roving tribe dwelling in Ethiopia, but to the builders of the tower of Babel or their immediate descendants.

There is one strong probability, from the comparison between the ancient language of the Egyptians and that of the Shemitic race, through the line of the ancient Hebrews. There can be no doubt that the origin of language with alphabetical characters could not be of mere human invention. Without a written language, society goes back to barbarism. Now, it was not from the savage state, but from the civilized state, that all nations had their origin. The fact that before the confusion of Babel the earth was of one tongue implies a high degree of civilization. Without a common language there could be no union and no great undertaking. The impious attempt to build a tower for idolatrous purposes, with the monumental evidences of it, and all the intimations of sacred and profane history, shows this. One great effect of the confusion of tongues, and the dispersion of those engaged in erecting the tower of Babel, would be to bring on, in the course of time, an uncivilized state. It is clearly shown in the Scriptures that the descendants of Shem retained longer than those of Ham or Japheth the knowledge of God, and were to a greater extent free from idolatry.

The inference must be plain, that the curse of the confusion of tongues would rest more lightly upon them than upon those who descended from Ham and Japheth. The descendants of Shem have always written alphabetically the most perfect kind of writing.

The Shemitic race was permitted to take up their residence not far removed from the scene of the confusion of tongues. But the unhappy sons of Mizraim, the son of Ham, appear to have wandered forth from their habitation disabled from any longer articulating the sounds of that which has been the language of the whole human race.

When we have arrived at the great fact that Egypt was settled not by a roving tribe of Ethiopians, but by the im-

mediate descendants of the builders of the tower of Babel upon the plain of Shinar, then, knowing the origin of one of the most ancient of the nations of antiquity, we have a stand-point of the highest value in tracing the historic unity of the human family as descended from one stock. Two great events are clearly proved by sacred and profane history: first the deluge, and then the confusion of tongues upon the plain of Shinar, two thousand two hundred and sixty-six years before Christ.

We will not enter upon the disputed question of the extent of the deluge; the only fact of material importance to know is, whether it was so universal as to drown all the existing families of the earth but one, that of Noah. We have not the slightest proof that any of the antediluvians survived the flood except the family of Noah. Sacred history is strengthened by profane history in the position that this great catastrophe completed the ruin of all but one family of the antediluvians. Great speculations have been made to show the vast extent of the population of the world at the time of the flood; but, in our opinion, the number of the antediluvians was far less than is commonly supposed. From the great longevity of the inhabitants before the flood, Methuselah being removed but three generations from Adam, we know that the ratio of increase could not correspond with that which exists under our short-lived generations, which, upon the most liberal calculation, do not extend over thirty-five years as an average.

The drowning of the Old World must, according to the intimations of history, have swept away a population that was mostly included in a comparatively limited extent of country. That event taking place, according to the common chronology, in the year of the world 1788, we have only one hundred and thirty-two years intervening from the flood to the building of Babel and the confusion of tongues; and we are informed that Noah lived after the flood three hundred and fifty years. The evidence, then, is very clear that we have first the year of the world 1656, or nearly that, to show that the deluge swept off a race of men evidently in their lan-

guage homogeneous, and in their local residence living near together. And then to show also that there was but one language and nation upon the earth, we have another period, the building of the tower of Babel and the confusion of tongues, one hundred and thirty-two years after, and, according to the common reckoning, two hundred and eighteen years before the death of Noah. Admitting the longevity of the antediluvians, we are distinctly informed that the *whole earth* was of one language and of one speech, in the first verse of the eleventh of Genesis, and in the eighth and ninth verses of the same chapter, we are also told that the "Lord scattered them abroad from thence upon the face of all the earth, and they left off to build the city. Therefore is the name of it called Babel; because the Lord did there confound the language of all the earth."

Now, history, both sacred and profane, assures us that the three sons of Noah, Shem, Ham, and Japheth, were, with their immediate descendants, each, a few years after the confusion of tongues, the patriarchs of three great divisions of the earth, not *exclusively*, but *generally*, the original founders of Asia, Africa, and Europe. To Shem, with his grandsons, was portioned out Asia, to Ham Africa, to Japheth Europe. The issue of the three sons of Noah, as they are set down in Holy Writ, are, commencing with Japheth,—the sons Gomer, Magog, Madai, Javan, Tubal, Meshech, and Tiras. From Gomer descended the Cimbrians; from Magog the Scythians and Turks; from Madai the Medes; from Javan the Ionians, Greeks; from Meshech the Muscovites; from Tiras the Thracians.

The sons of Shem were Asshur, Mynas, or Elam, Arphaxad, Lud, and Aram. From Asshur came the Assyrians; from Mynas, or Elam, the Persians; from Arphaxad the Chaldeans; from Lud the Syrians, and from Aram the Aramites.

The sons of Ham were Cush, Mizraim, Phut, and Canaan. From Cush descended Nimrod, from whom came the Ethiopians; from Mizraim descended the Egyptians; from Phut the Mauritians; and from Canaan descended the Canaanites.

Thus does the voice of history identify the peopling of the earth with the descendants of the family of Noah. But that family were evidently homogeneous in their language with the antediluvians, and in their features resembled those who were swept away by the flood.

We have, then, the starting-point of the confusion of tongues at Babel, from whence to trace the vast differences of language that subsequently arose. We know that the peopling of the earth and the dispersion of the inhabitants over the earth must proceed from necessity, rather than from choice. A race of men who are homogeneous in language, customs, habits, color, etc. do not readily emigrate into different portions of the world, far apart and separated from each other by natural obstacles of great power. Men are naturally social in their tendencies, and it is impossible that the whole race will be dismembered, and form separate and distinct parties, which diverge from each other with increasing energy from year to year, unless there are causes of mighty efficacy at work to bring about this end. The confusion of tongues presents the solution of the most difficult problem of history, even the fundamental differences of language. That confusion was effected evidently by miraculous agency, and was of such power as to secure the widest dispersion over the earth. It has been seen that Nimrod was the father of the Ethiopians, and Mizraim, the second son of Ham, of the Egyptians.

“There is nothing,” says Layard, “in history, either sacred or profane, or in the traditions handed down to us, against attributing the highest antiquity to the Assyrian empire. In the land of Shinar, in the country watered by the Tigris and the Euphrates, the Scriptures place the earliest habitations of the human race. We have evidence that at the earliest period the belief was current, both among the Egyptians and Jews, that the first settlements were in Assyria, and that from Chaldea civilization and the arts and sciences were spread over the world. Abraham and his family, above 1900 years before Christ, migrated from a land already thickly inhabited and possessing great cities. According to Josephus,

the four confederate kings who marched in the time of the patriarchs against the people of Sodom and the neighboring cities were under a king of Assyria whose empire extended all over Asia."

We arrive, then, at a conclusion, confirmed by sacred and profane history, that the gross idolatry that prevailed in Egypt had its origin in Assyria, and that, as early as the time of Abraham, Egypt was far advanced in civilization, and even then the seat of monuments pointing out to the aged patriarch an origin from the plain of Shinar. The curse pronounced against Babylon, consigning one of the most fertile portions of the earth to the most fearful desolation, lay evidently in a deeper cause than the mere oppression of the Jews. Egypt oppressed them more, but its punishment has not been so conspicuous. Babylon was far more the mother of idolatry than of oppression. Here originated those germs of error that found in Egypt so prolific a soil. The first settlers on the banks of the Nile were idolaters. From the first truths in respect to God, the immortality of the soul, a future state of rewards and punishments, we notice upon their monuments the most striking evidence of successive stages of degeneracy, by which the earlier intimations of sacred truth were hidden under a darker robe of idolatry. The deification of the sun appears to be the earliest form under which idolatry manifested itself. From a metaphor, or type of God, the sun became a symbol, an image,—God's vicegerent, his living representative,—God himself. There is hardly a monument upon which that luminary is not represented and invoked as a deity. Thus the unity of God was set forth in a way that led the people into polytheism, while the real unity of the Deity was known only to the priests, and hidden from the common people. The result was soon the grossest form of idol worship. Animal worship, according to Manetho, was introduced by Chous, the second king of the second dynasty. The origin of this appears to have been the endeavor to express in their picture-writing the various attributes of God, by the delineation of a living being possessing, as they fancied, similar attributes. Thus,

the hawk was the living representative or embodied symbol of many gods. In the same spirit of coarse symbolism, the vigilance and watchful care of God over the creation were degraded into the likeness of a dog. The vengeance of God was personified under the form of a crocodile, or an idol having the head of this reptile. But the study of the Egyptian temples reveals the fact that they were acquainted with the mysterious truth of the triple existence of God. The primary form or antitype of their mythology is a triad of divinities, composed of Ammon, the father, Mout, the mother, and Chous, the infant son. This triad passes through an immense number of intermediate triads, until it reaches the earth, where, under the forms of Osiris, Isis, and Horus, it becomes incarnate. Thus, the innumerable idols of Egypt had their origin from the perversions of sacred truth, and reveal the fact that the land of the Chaldees—the region washed by the Tigris and the Euphrates—was the mother of those impious idolatries that brought on the ruin of Nineveh and Babylon.

We have thus shown that the plain of Shinar, in Chaldea, where stood the tower of Babel, evidently points out the source of the first emigration into Egypt, and was the earliest cradle of the civilization of the earth. What follows, but that to the marked event that brought on the change of language and the dispersion over the earth we are to attribute those essential differences that subsequently have characterized the human race?

If one clear case of miraculous interposition can be made out to account for the diversities of the human language, then certainly one of the most marked peculiarities that appear in the different nations of the earth can be accounted for. We say, then, to him who denies the unity of the race from one stock, that, even supposing incidental varieties and natural causes not sufficient to account for such a wide-spread diversity, it does not follow that there are no other causes independent of distinct creations, in different localities, to account for the wide differences existing in the form, color, and anatomical construction of the diverse nations of the

earth. Suppose the great law of adaptation, in combination with habit, climate, distinct locality, etc., does not clearly reveal the secret of human diversities; are we therefore driven to the hypothesis of distinct creations at different periods of the world? Certainly not.

We can trace the thread of history to a period when the whole earth was of one language. We can trace the origin of nations to the three sons of Noah and their immediate descendants. We can trace upon the monuments of Egypt and Assyria the birthplace of these respective countries. We can trace the first great break in one universal language. We can see miracle as clearly inscribed upon the confusion of tongues as upon the first creation of man. We have, then, only to say that if the researches of science compel to the conclusion that incidental varieties and natural causes will not satisfactorily account for the fundamental diversities existing in the four great races of the earth, there remains another hypothesis that must be overturned before any good reason can be found for four or more distinct creations of man. The miracle invoked to account, if needed, for the diversities of the human family at the confusion of tongues, in combination with natural causes, is far more probable than the contrary hypothesis of varied and distinct miracles of creation at different times and in different localities.

The great catastrophe of the confusion of tongues introducing with it organic changes and fundamental varieties of color and form, to be more permanently developed in after-ages in combination with differences of habit, climate, country, and other causes, is a hypothesis, to say the least, that cannot be shown false. It is vastly more in unison with history, sacred and profane; it is amply sufficient for the greatest changes; and there is no argument which can avail to overthrow it upon the ground of the impotency of natural causes.

Above all things, the voice of history, the earliest traditions of mankind, point to the family of Noah as a second time peopling the earth, and as the only stock whence

have issued the existing varieties of the race of man ; and whoever denies this has a harder task before him to sustain his position than ever Pharaoh had in making war against the ten plagues of Egypt.

Thus we see the twofold difficulty to overcome, of those who deny the unity of the human race from one common parentage. First, they must show, upon the ground of natural causes, that the diversities existing in the human species are greater than those existing in the species of dogs, horses, sheep, oxen, cats, etc. Secondly, they must show that, provided the diversities in the human race are greater, or that natural causes may not be sufficient to account for them, God did not, at the confusion of tongues upon the plain of Shinar, by one bold interposition of miracle, in connection with natural causes, bring about all the existing varieties in the human family. We do not see any necessity for introducing miracle at all in securing the known diversity in the human race, for we do not see in this race such great varieties as exist in the different species of animals ; but, if miracle must be invoked to account for these varieties among men, yet even then we must see that one miracle such as that which took place at Babel, is an hypothesis far more reasonable, and more in accordance with history, than four, six, or a greater number of miracles in the creation, in different parts of the earth, of those marked diversities that appear in the human family.

CHAPTER XVII.

INTEGRITY OF THE SACRED CANON.

THE New Testament canon contains no book written by Christ. It consists of five historical books, one prophetic, and twenty-one epistolary. Of the historical books, four, called Gospels, are ascribed to Matthew, Mark, Luke, and John. They contain brief histories of the life and death of Christ, his teachings, and his resurrection. The fifth, called the Acts, is ascribed to Luke. Of the Epistles, fourteen are ascribed to Paul; the remaining seven, called *Catholic*, are ascribed one to James, two to Peter, three to John, and one to Jude. The only prophetic book is ascribed to John, the author of the Gospel and the three Epistles.

Consider, first, the language and the style. After the conquests of Alexander the Great, the various dialects of the Greeks became mingled together and extensively diffused all over the East. The Greek became the court language of the Romans in the East. While, therefore, the Syro-Chaldaic, or Hebrew, was the vernacular tongue of the Jews who resided in Palestine, Greek was extensively spoken as the language of commerce. Thus the Greek, partaking of the Jewish idiom, was the dialect current at the time, in which are interspersed some traces of the Latin language. Such is, in fact, the language of the New Testament, in its style and manner. In its minute correspondences it was just what might be expected of the age in which it was written. What now is the external evidence of the genuineness of the New Testament?

Let us commence with the age of the apostles. Barnabas of Cyprus is frequently mentioned as a co-laborer of Paul; Clement, as a fellow-laborer of Paul, afterward Bishop of

Rome; Hermas, probably the same saluted by Paul in the Epistle to the Romans; Ignatius, Bishop of Antioch, in Syria, where he is said to have been ordained by Peter; Polycarp, a disciple of John, ordained by him Bishop of Smyrna, where he died a martyr; and Papias, the companion of Polycarp. Now, in the brief writings and fragments of these few apostolical fathers which have descended to us we find nearly all the books of our New Testament quoted or alluded to; nor did they recognize any other books than those in our canon.

Let us descend a little later into the second century, and examine the writings of Justin Martyr, A.D. 140, of Irenæus, A.D. 178, of Clement of Alexandria, A.D. 194, and of Tertullian, A.D. 200. Justin tells us that the memoirs and records of the apostles and their companions were read and expounded in the assemblies of Christians for divine worship on the Sabbath-day. Irenæus says, "there were but four gospels," the same as we now have; he also says of Polycarp, whom he had seen in his youth, "I can tell the place in which the blessed Polycarp sat and taught, and his going out and coming in, and the manner of his life, and the form of his person, and the discourses he made to the people, and how he related his conversation with John and others who had seen the Lord, both concerning his miracles and his doctrines, as he had received them from the eye-witnesses of the word of life; all which Polycarp related *agreeably to the Scriptures*."

Of Polycarp one undoubted epistle remains; and in this, though short, we have about forty clear allusions to the New Testament. Twenty-five or thirty-five years after follows Justin Martyr, universally known in the ancient Church. In his writings are thirty-five plain quotations from the Gospel of Matthew alone, and in one part a considerable portion of the Sermon on the Mount, in the very words of Matthew. Irenæus mentions the code of the New Testament as well as the Old, and calls the one, as the other, the oracles of God. Says Irenæus, "We have not received the knowledge of the way of our salvation by any other than those by whom the gospel

has been brought to us: which gospel they first preached, and afterwards by the will of God committed to writing, that it might be, for all time to come, the foundation and pillar of our faith. For after our Lord arose from the dead, and they were endued from above with the power of the Holy Ghost coming down upon them, they received a perfect knowledge of all things. They then went forth to all the ends of the earth, declaring to men the blessing of heavenly peace, having all of them, and every one alike, the gospel of God. Matthew, then among the Jews, wrote a gospel in their own language, while Peter and Paul were preaching the gospel at Rome and founding a church there; and, after their exit, Mark, another disciple and interpreter of Peter, delivered to us in writing the things that had been preached by Peter; and Luke, the companion of Paul, put down in a book the gospel preached by him. Afterward, John, the disciple of the Lord, who also leaned upon his breast, likewise published a gospel while he dwelt at Ephesus, in Asia."

Says Justin Martyr, speaking of the general usage of the Christian Church, "The memoirs of the apostles or the writings of the prophets are read according as the time allows; and, when the reader has ended, the president makes a discourse."

Polycarp, a companion of the apostles, says, "I trust ye are well exercised in the Holy Scriptures, as in these Scriptures it is said, 'Be ye angry and sin not;'" thus showing that there were Scripture writings distinguished as the "Holy Scriptures." In the first century we have more than two hundred quotations and allusions to our sacred books, in which there is an incidental testimony more valuable than any formal testimony could be. In the second century the testimony is more full and express. Of this age there are thirty-six writers whose works in some parts have come down to us. In the third and fourth centuries there are more than one hundred authors whose works testify to the authenticity of these books. Dr. Lardner, in speaking of the works of Irenæus, Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian, says, "There are perhaps more and larger quotations of the small

volume of the New Testament than of all the works of Cicero, though of so uncommon excellence for thought and style, in the writers of all characters for several ages."

There have descended to us *thirteen* well-authenticated catalogues of the genuine and canonical books in the two following centuries. In settling the canon we find from Eusebius, A.D. 315, that there were seven books concerning which the grounds of the doubts are fully given. He says, "In the first place are to be ranked the sacred four Gospels; then the book of the Acts of the Apostles; after that are to be reckoned the Epistles of Paul; in the next place, that called the First Epistle of John, and the Epistle of Peter, are to be esteemed authentic. After this is to be placed the Revelation of John, about which we shall observe the different opinions at proper seasons. Of the controverted, yet well known or approved by the most, are that called the Epistle of James, and that of Jude, and the second of Peter, and the second and third of John, whether written by the evangelist or by another of the same name." But concerning the last all doubts were gradually removed; and by the time of Jerome and Augustine, A.D. 342-420, many catalogues are given, including our present books and none other.

President Hopkins, in a very comprehensive yet brief manner, embodies a great amount of argument upon the integrity and authenticity of the books of the New Testament; and we shall from him make a few extracts.

"While, therefore, it appears that the writings of the New Testament were some of them collected into a volume in the apostolical times, under the name of the Gospels and the Epistles; while the references to this volume during the second century are almost numberless; while no doubt ever arose respecting the mass of them,—still, the book which we now receive was not, in all its parts, formally agreed upon, in consequence of a careful examination of ancient testimony, until between three and four hundred years after the birth of Christ. It will be remembered, however, that if

every part of the New Testament concerning which there was then dispute were blotted out, the argument for the truth of Christianity would not be in the least invalidated. There is, therefore, direct evidence, as perfect as the nature of the case admits, that those writings on which we depend for the truth of the Christian religion have existed, and were received without doubt, from the very first. So full and unexceptionable is the testimony thus given by the early writers, that it would seem, in the absence of anything to contradict it or to throw over it the slightest discredit, that further evidence could not be needed. Indeed, if we were to stop here we should have a body of evidence for the authenticity of these writings such as can be adduced in favor of no others of equal antiquity. The writings of Cicero are quoted by Quintilian, which shows that they were then extant and ascribed to him. But the writings of Cicero excited no controversy; they gave rise to no general opposition; they created no sects. Hence we have no means of knowing how these works were regarded by enemies or by rival parties appealing to their authority. This, when it can be obtained, is the very highest kind of evidence; and in respect to the Christian Scriptures it is most full and satisfactory. The heretical writers do indeed sometimes deny that the apostle or writer is an infallible authority; but they never deny that the books were written by those to whom they were ascribed. Thus, the Cerinthians and the Ebionites, who sprang up while St. John was yet living, wished to retain the Mosaic law, and hence rejected the Epistles of Paul while they retained the Gospel of Matthew; and Marcion, A.D. 130, who rejected the Old Testament and was excommunicated, though greatly incensed, and though he speaks disparagingly of several of the books, nowhere intimates that they were forgeries.

“The same may be said of the ancient sects. We have, also, the indirect testimony of the enemies of Christianity, as Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian. Of these, Celsus flourished only about a hundred years after the Gospels were published,

and was an acute and bitter adversary; and it seems quite impossible that any one of them, much more the whole, should have been forged and yet he not know or suspect it. He attacks the books; he speaks of contradictions and difficulties in them; but he hints no suspicion that they were forged. Indeed, he admits the writings, for he says, ‘These things, then, we have alleged to you out of your own writings, not needing any other weapons.’ In Porphyry, born A.D. 233 (the most sensible and severe adversary of Christianity that antiquity can produce), we find no trace of any suspicion that the Christian writings were not authentic, though he pronounces the prophecy of Daniel a forgery. Porphyry did not even deny the truth of the Gospel history. He admitted that the miracles were performed by Christ, but imputed them to magic, which he said he learned in Egypt. Julian, commonly called the Apostate, flourished from A.D. 331 to 363. He quotes the four Gospels and the Acts, and nowhere gives any intimation that he suspected the whole or any part of them to be forgeries.

“Another source of evidence is to be found in ancient versions and manuscripts. The Syriac version was probably made early in the second century, and the first Latin version almost as early. Of course the New Testament must have existed, and been received as the standard of Christian truth, before these versions were made. Of ancient manuscripts containing the New Testament or parts thereof, there are several thousands. About five hundred of the most important have been collated with great care: many of them are of great antiquity. The Codex Vaticanus is believed, on very satisfactory evidence, to be of the fourth century, and the Codex Alexandrianus of the fifth,—perhaps both much earlier. Thus these manuscripts connect with manuscripts compared by Jerome and Eusebius, A.D. 315–420, who prepared critical editions of the New Testament from manuscripts then ancient. The prodigious number of these manuscripts, the distant countries whence they were collected, and the identity of their contents with the quotations of the fathers of different

ages, place the New Testament incomparably above all other ancient works in point of authenticity.

“Is there, then, we are ready to ask, any kind of external evidence conceivable which is wanting to our sacred books? But, strong as is the external proof, it hardly equals that which is to be derived from the circumstances of the case, and from internal evidence. For if these writings are not authentic they must be forgeries; and they are of such a character, and purport to have been written under such circumstances, as to render a forgery of them impossible. Here, for example, are no fewer than nine letters which claim to have been written to numerous bodies of men and received of them; and can any man believe that such letters, often containing severe reproof, could have been received and read, as we know these were by the early Christians, if they were forgeries? Come, now, says Tertullian, born only sixty years after the death of St. John, ‘Come, now, who wilt exercise thy curiosity more profitably in the business of thy salvation, run through the apostolical churches in which the very chairs of the apostles still preside, in which their authentic letters are recited, sounding forth the voice and representing the countenance of each.’

“Can any man suppose that letters thus spoken of at that early age could be forged? Besides, when could they have been forged? Not, certainly, during the lives of the apostles, for then they would have confuted them; and after their death it is morally impossible that such letters should have been received as from them by any body of Christians.”

We have not time to dwell longer upon the New Testament; and we now will briefly consider the Old. In the first place, Christ and the apostles indorsed the Jewish canon, as it then existed, as divine Scripture; and this canon was the same as our Old Testament.

“I was daily with you,” says Christ to those who came to apprehend him, “in the temple, teaching, and ye took me not; but the Scripture must be fulfilled.” “Think not that I am come to destroy *the law, or the prophets*; I am not come to

destroy, but to fulfill." "These are the words which I spake unto you while I was yet with you, that all things must be fulfilled which were written in the *law of Moses*, and in the *prophets*, and in the *Psalms*, concerning me." "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God," says Paul. Thus, in the New Testament, the apostles indorse all the Scriptures in current use among the Jews. The Old Testament is constantly appealed to as the *word of God*. While, also, the Jewish Scriptures are constantly quoted, there is no intimation that they are in any part what they should not be. The common allusions to them show the esteem in which they are held; as, "Thus saith the Scriptures;" "Thus saith the Lord;" "As the Holy Ghost saith;" "As it is written." Is, then, the Jewish canon the same as our Old Testament? Consider the testimony of the New Testament. In the New Testament nearly all the books of the Old are alluded to or quoted. Then, again, we have the testimony of Jewish writers, especially of Josephus, born about A.D. 37, a few years after the death of Christ. In his treatise defending the authenticity and credibility of the Jewish Scriptures, he says: "For we have not among us myriads of books, discordant and conflicting, but only twenty-two books, containing the history of all past time, and justly believed to be divine. Of these, five belong to Moses, which contain the laws, and the traditions of the origin of mankind until his death. This period is little less than three thousand years. From the death of Moses to the reign of Artaxerxes, king of the Persians after Xerxes, the prophets who came after Moses recorded the events of their times in thirteen books. The four remaining books contain hymns to God and rules of life for man. From Artaxerxes to our own time, everything has been written; but it is not esteemed of equal credit with what preceded, because there has not been an exact succession of prophets. And it is evident from fact how we believe in our Scriptures; for through so long a period already elapsed, no one has dared to add anything, or take from them, or to make alterations; but it is implanted in all

Jews, from their very birth, to consider them oracles of God (*θεοὶ δόγματα*), and to abide by them, and for them, if need be, cheerfully to die." The testimony also of the early Christian fathers conclusively shows that the Jewish canon, as indorsed by Christ and the apostles, was precisely the same as that of our Old Testament. Consider, also, the great fact that from the time of Christ to the present day Christians as well as Jews have held in equal veneration the Old Testament. In respect to the preservation of the text of the Old and New Testaments, we cannot do better than quote the language of Professor Sampson, of Virginia:

"I return, then, to the affirmation that of no books so ancient has the text been so certainly and so well preserved as that of the books which compose our Old and New Testaments. There are, indeed, here and there passages, and still oftener clauses, the integrity of which there may be some good reason to suspect; and there are hundreds and thousands of minor variations brought to light by a careful comparison of manuscripts, versions, and quotations. But of these the great majority do not affect the sense in the least, and could not, therefore, be expressed in a good translation; and where they do, either a judicious criticism can determine the true reading, or it is unimportant to the Christian system, and generally to the passage itself, which of several readings, that may be about equally sustained, shall be adopted as original. The very means of multiplying the various readings, viz. the great number of documents to be compared, have always furnished so many effectual guards to prevent corruption of the text, and furnish now ample means of correcting it, where correction is needed. It is precisely those books, classic as well as sacred, of which we have fewest manuscripts and other documents, and, consequently, comparatively few various readings, that the text is most liable to suspicion. On the other hand, the text of those is most certain for which we have the greatest number of documents, especially manuscripts, to compare, and, consequently, the greatest number of various readings actually occurring.

Thus has Providence by natural means, and without a miracle, preserved the text of all the Sacred Scriptures; and it is vain for skepticism longer to hope to find a cover for its unbelief under the flimsy pretext of its corruption,—either accidental or designed. The worst text that could be published on the authority of any manuscripts would not alter a single phase of Christianity.”

Can we, then, question the integrity of the sacred canon, or the truth of the words of inspiration, “I, Jesus, have sent mine angel to testify unto you these things in the churches”?

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE PLENARY INSPIRATION OF THE BIBLE.

WHEN, in addition to prophecies and miracles, we have in the Scriptures a most wonderful adaptation to our wants; when we see in them the exhibition of truths far more clear than the light of nature can make known, and the revelation of new and most important truths that no uninspired mind could discover; when, looking at the character of Christ, we see a perfect model of all virtue, as well as the only possible medium of salvation for sinners, and then consider the success of Christianity under circumstances that would crush it, if not divine, the conclusion is irresistible that the whole system of religion in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testament is of God, and not of human origin.

The inspiration of the Bible does not rest upon the fact alone of the assertion of the sacred writers to their inspiration. While this assertion is an additional argument to prove the Bible from God, it yet forms but one link of a mighty chain that binds the whole together. Until the other evidences have been disproved, there is not the shadow of a reason for the assertion that the Bible is not of God. With the existence of the great facts of the adaptation of the Bible, miracles, prophecies, the divine excellence of Christ's character, and the success of Christianity, the authority of the Bible, as revealing a system of religion from God, rests upon an immovable foundation: that authority is infallible, and therefore not of human origin.

But the general inspiration of the Bible is not to be confounded with the plenary inspiration of the Bible. The former has already been shown. If nothing more was done, this would be enough to authorize us to receive the Bible as

the word of God, and to submit to the Christian religion with all its truths as alike infallible and divine. With the general inspiration of the Bible it is perfectly consistent that there may exist some errors of history or science, some mistakes of dates or persons or representations of physical phenomena, or even some deficiencies of moral truths. We do not think these things actually to exist in the Bible; but suppose they do? Suppose, for reasons best known to God, he should permit a record defective in some respects to be given to man: does that prove the whole defective? Are miracles, prophecies, the adaptation of the Bible to our wants, the divine virtues of Christ, and the success of Christianity, all to count for nothing because of such deficiencies? Must we throw away the Bible because of some imperfections? Must we disown in the main the divine authority of the Scriptures because it does not extend to every chapter and verse? Here infidelity, upon its own ground, may be shown to be baseless and unworthy of confidence. Even should we go so far as to admit that a very large part of the Bible was not inspired, this would not prove the whole Bible uninspired. If the objections of infidelity were conceded as to many things recorded as facts, yet this would not do away with the evidence of miracles and prophecy; this would not subvert the proof of the divine mission of Christ; this would not do away with the adaptation of the Bible to our wants. We assert that, taking the lowest ground, admitting even a thousand mistakes, and confessing to great error upon much that is of importance to believe in the Scriptures, enough would still remain to prove that the Bible in all essential respects is of God, and bears the impress of a higher than human authority. God has not placed his word upon such precarious ground that it will be subverted, or proved not divine, unless everything claimed for it is established. Not one angel, but a thousand, guard its divine authority; and before that authority can be destroyed it is necessary that the whole angelic band that stand sentinel over their sacred trust should be disarmed. We believe that no idea is more fallacious than the assertion that one, or two, or twenty, or a hundred errors in

the Holy Scriptures would conclusively show that the Bible was not divine and that God had nothing to do with its composition. These errors would, indeed, be clear objections to the divine authority of those parts of the Bible where they existed; for God is the author only of truth; but they could not form a valid argument for the rejection of the whole Bible as from God, and for the assertion that it had but one element, even the human, and therefore must stand upon the same ground as all other works. Consequently, we say that, under the most unfavorable admissions, even upon the very low ground that some delight to stand upon, it cannot be shown that the Bible has not general inspiration, that Christianity as a system is not divine, that the Old and New Testaments do not, in their essential features, bear the impress of God, and that there is not a high sense in which the Bible differs from all other books, giving to it a supreme authority that would not be applicable to any human production.

We claim for the Bible a general inspiration, if nothing more. We say that even if that inspiration was made in a high degree defective, yet the Bible would stand upon a foundation altogether different from all other books; that enough would still remain in it to make the Holy Scriptures worthy of the highest respect and deserving the most considerate attention and love. So long as the grand central truth stands out, of Christ, the Messiah, sent by God,—so long as any one undisputed miracle of his can be proved, or a single prediction that carries with it the impress of a divine mind,—then, upon the simple authority of but one miracle and but one prediction, we claim for the Bible enough of inspiration to make it worthy of confidence, when upon the side of this miracle and prophecy there is the conclusive test of *adaptation* and *appropriateness* to our wants as sinners. But, in claiming at least for the Bible a general inspiration, we would be understood clearly to deny that there is any necessity for taking the low ground supposed, or that general inspiration does not comprehend vastly more than this. Our object is only to show that there is no reason in the argument that one or many errors, even if established, would prove the Bible not

from God. These errors would be defects, but not reasons for an absolute rejection of the Bible. We might wish the Bible free from them, but their existence would not show that no parts of the Bible were from God. It must ever be remembered that objections against the Bible must be proved before they can have any weight, and that those who would undermine its divine authority must have something better than assertion. When the general inspiration of the Scriptures is shown, be it of a high or low character, enough will always remain to show the divinity of its origin; and this, considered simply as a fact established, must ever bring with it the deepest claim upon our homage and respect.

But we enter now upon the subject of the *plenary inspiration of the Bible*. This is a step higher than the general inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. Plenary inspiration includes all that general inspiration does; it differs only in that it is a more perfect kind of inspiration. The Bible is generally inspired if it shows conclusively the divine authority of the Christian religion, and all the essential facts relating to that religion. It is generally inspired if the writers of the Bible were under such an influence of the Holy Spirit as to enable them to communicate the great facts of the Bible as infallible truths, with the sanction of God as to their reality and their binding obligation. Inspiration rests not so much upon the truth of the Bible,—other books are as true,—as upon the fact that those books proceed from God, are enforced by his authority, and are required to be believed in by divine sanctions. The plenary inspiration of the Bible comprises all this; but its peculiar distinction from general inspiration consists in the fact that plenary inspiration has allusion to the mind especially of the writer. Plenary inspiration has reference to the precise language of the writing itself. As language is made up of words, and the best mode of inspiration must be the expression in the original manuscripts of the exact words of the Holy Spirit, consequently the Holy Scriptures, if plenarily inspired, must embody the selection of the best kind of language to accomplish the precise end of every book in the word of God. But what is the best kind of lan-

guage to communicate the mind of God to man, unless it be language embodying the very words of the Holy Spirit? This is in no respect inconsistent with the great idea that the Bible has in it largely a human element as well as a divine element. The Bible was made for man; it must, therefore, have in it the human as well as the divine, and both elements blended together. The divine element must exist to show its infallible authority; the human element, to adapt it to the endless conditions of human wants. Without the one, it would not be from God; without the other, it might do for angels, but not for mankind. Now, whenever the plenary inspiration of the Bible is spoken of, we would be understood to mean simply that the minds of the writers of the Bible were under such guidance or influence of the Holy Spirit as to give in human language, in a way the most appropriate under the circumstances, the mind of God, his thoughts or will. Thus, while the human element is made use of, it is under such control as to secure also the divine element. The human element, in all its numberless modes of expression, is employed, while the divine element, as a restraining and regulating power, exists to give those sanctions that should exalt the Bible above all other books. Now, to speak of the plenary inspiration of the Bible, with the mind alone of the writers inspired in different degrees, and yet no direct superintendence in respect to their choice of language,—no such inspiration as to lead in all cases to the selection of the best words, words the most appropriate, concise, and adapted to the ideas that are communicated,—is in no respect to come up to the full meaning of plenary inspiration.

It is evident that the best kind of inspiration must have relation not only to the substance of truth, but also to its *mode*. There must be some regard to the *dress* of truth, as well as to the body of it. Ideas, to have their most appropriate meaning, must be embodied in appropriate words. Language must lose much of its power unless there is due regard to suitable expression. This is what we claim for plenary inspiration. It is simply divine truth clothed in suitable words, and in that

very language most appropriate to convey the mind of God. By plenary inspiration of the Bible it is not meant that no verbal inaccuracies may not have crept into the translations of the Bible from the original copy: we do not hold that the translators of the Bible were inspired, because that is not necessary in a translation; a heathen as well as a Christian may translate from one language to another; but what is meant is that the very language of the original manuscripts of the Bible, as much as the thoughts of the writers, was under the direct superintendence of the Holy Spirit, so that the writers of the Bible were truly the amanuenses of the Holy Spirit, presenting his thoughts with the best selection of words. But should it be said that this would exclude the human element and leave only the divine, in reply we say, this does not follow if the Holy Spirit makes use of the *idiosyncrasy* of the different writers of the Bible, and permits each to express himself after his own peculiar constitution and in accordance with the varying conditions of the human mind. The essential thing is to avoid error, and express truth in the *best manner*; this may in the wisest manner be attained by leaving each writer to speak in his own way, and in harmony with the nature God has given him, and the circumstances in which he is placed.

Our idea of plenary inspiration is simply that God communicates his mind in the best way for mankind. Now, the question is, Does plenary inspiration discard the human element? Not at all. It makes use of it intimately blended or pervaded by the divine element. Thus, the human element is that which makes a revelation adapted to man in sympathy with man,—something permitted to man in accordance with the endless diversities of his condition in this world; while the divine element preserves from error, and gives the sanction of God to the truth. We hold that all this is perfectly consistent with plenary inspiration. It is not that God speaks alone, or that man speaks alone, but that God, through his all-pervading and controlling Spirit, makes use of the *idiosyncrasy* of each writer, while he preserves that idiosyncrasy from error,

and leads it to the expression of such ideas in such a way as best to secure the end of a suitable revelation of his will and thoughts to man. God gives a Bible not to angels, but to mankind; and therefore all his communications to men must be in accordance with their peculiar wants and circumstances. Thus the human element and the divine are made to blend together in this respect, that God condescends to the limited capacities of man in such a way as to communicate his mind as best it may be understood within the sphere of the human, while the human is so guided as to be kept from error, and so enlightened as to declare such truths as most truly will secure the great end of human redemption. How, then, is plenary inspiration inconsistent with the fullest admission of the human element in the Bible? There is no more difficulty in God's consulting the *mode* of truth than in his consulting the substance of truth, and no more inappropriateness in his prescribing the *manner* of revelation than in his prescribing the *essences*. Rather we should infer that God would have respect not only to his word, but to the way of its communication; and this is just what we mean by plenary inspiration. Will, then, any one say that because God makes use of the peculiar idiosyncrasy of each writer of the Bible, the Bible is therefore not plenary inspired? We do not see *how* both the human and the divine elements combine; but do we not see the fact itself? Do we not see that God speaks to us not in angelic but in human language, and therefore must accommodate himself to the essential limitation and even imperfection of human language? God comes with just as much truth in the different conditions of our earthly existence as we can most suitably comprehend, and at the same time with just that truth which most wisely in all ages will secure the great end of human redemption. We think a singular want of consideration has been shown in accounting for this peculiarity of the revelation of God's mind to man. That which is the highest excellence of the Bible is interpreted into the denial of its plenary inspiration; and because the human element is admitted we are told that the divine element is either unnecessary or impossi-

ble. But how does this follow? The divine element is indispensable to keep from error, and equally essential to secure the best *mode* of presenting truth. Why may not both be made use of in perfect consistency with the proper development of the human element? We think the most dangerous heresy of the present day in relation to inspiration is found in the assertion that if God speaks man cannot speak, and if man speaks God cannot speak,—in other words, the denial of the blending of the human and the divine elements in inspiration. It is this very union of both that makes the Bible the noblest, the best and most useful of all books, and gives to it in all conditions of life the authority of God.

There are three forms of error into which the mind falls in relation to the inspiration of the Bible,—those of infidelity, of pantheism, and of superstition. Infidelity denies the divine element in the Bible altogether; pantheism makes all in the Bible an emanation from God alone, in common with everything else; while superstition misapplies the human and the divine in the Holy Scriptures, so as to degrade both. The infidel sees no God in the Bible; the pantheist sees no man; while the superstitious sees neither God nor man, in the sense in which both are delineated in the Sacred Scriptures.

After the general inspiration of the Bible is shown, but two things are needful to be established in order to show the plenary or the best possible kind of inspiration. No person can doubt that if there runs through the Bible a great chain of prophecy,—if there are scattered all over the Sacred Scriptures predictions fulfilled and unfulfilled,—then the writers of the Bible must be under a general inspiration of God; for they certainly could not foretell, hundreds of years before accomplishment, events to take place. Prophecy of itself shows inspiration; and now if, in connection with this, a most wonderful adaptation to human wants is seen in the Bible, and truths are declared which were never known before, or which were universally forgotten or perverted if ever known, then the reason is more conclusive still for concluding that the Scriptures are generally inspired. What man cannot do must, if done, be accomplished by God;

and we have only to notice in the Bible that which man cannot do, thrown alone upon his own resources, to find an irresistible argument for the general inspiration of the Bible. This general inspiration is not destroyed because of errors discovered in history, or science, or even ethical statements. It is not destroyed if much can be shown in the Bible that is useless, or inappropriate, or inconsistent with other portions of the Scriptures; for, remember, miracles, prophecy, adaptation, success of Christianity in the first century, and the perfect character of Christ, must each and all be shown false before with clear argument a person can say that in no sense is the Bible inspired or the work of God. What a hopeless task has the infidel, then, before him! This fivefold rope of strength ties the Bible together. Not one strand, but all, must be cut before any valid excuse can be given for the rejection of the Scriptures. How preposterous, then, the conduct of those who think, feel, and act as if the Bible was proved to be only of human origin, because they believe some objection has been sustained against the Scriptures! They might as well deny the existence of the sun because of some spots on its surface, or that of the moon because it is partially obscured by the clouds.

We do not hesitate to say that the general inspiration of the Bible rests upon a foundation of granite as firm as the everlasting hills,—a foundation even more strong and enduring, since the earth itself shall pass away. Infidelity, then, under the most favorable admissions, can accomplish nothing against it; and, consequently, there is an all-sufficient ground for loving and receiving the Bible as the word of God, if it is only generally inspired. The diamonds and pearls in an earthen vessel are none the less diamonds and pearls because of the rubbish that may be mixed up with them; and, if it would be insanity to reject the treasures because of the rubbish, has infidelity anything to boast of because it thinks it can show valid objections or errors in the Bible?

We are convinced that not only the general inspiration of the Bible can be shown, but that we can even take a higher step, and prove it plenary inspiration, in the true sense of this language.

What, then, is necessary to prove the plenary inspiration of the Bible? After the general inspiration of the Scriptures is shown, but two things are needful to be established, to show the plenary or best kind of inspiration.

1st. That no errors in history, science, or ethical truths exist in the Bible.

2d. That the inspiration of all the Scriptures be asserted in the Bible in such a manner as to show their plenary inspiration.

The first proposition has nothing to do with variations of language, or those slight discrepancies of words that arise from different copies. The Bible does not attempt to father the mistakes of copyists or the different interpretations of its readers. If, according to the well-established laws of popular language, no error can be shown in the Bible, then it is conclusively *proved* to be free from all scientific, historical, or ethical untruths. What erroneous statement is there in the Bible? If one can be shown, then, so far as *that statement* is concerned, the Bible in that portion is not inspired, for the Holy Ghost is not the author of error, but of truth; but even this admitted, and the general inspiration of the Scriptures is not touched. But it can with confidence be said that no such statement can be shown. The skeptic cannot lay his hand upon a single error in the word of God. Often has it been tried, and as often has it been found that the mistake existed in the mind of the objector, and not in the Holy Scriptures.

The more careful the investigations into the field of science, and the more clear the classification of the facts of history, the deeper has been found the harmony of science and profane history with the Bible. While the Bible comes to us with the main object of teaching moral truth, it has never asserted a single thing inconsistent with any truth made known in science or with any fact of history. That the Bible does not profess to give us a treatise upon geology, or astronomy, or chemistry, so far from being a blemish, is a great excellence. It has higher objects to accomplish than to waste time upon subjects that are connected only

with the intellect and of no immediate use to advance the end of revelation.

Consider the second proposition. Is the plenary inspiration of the Bible asserted in the word of God ?

Plenary inspiration has already been defined to be such a superintendence of the Holy Spirit as to reach to the language of the writers of the Bible, and consequently as including the choice of the most appropriate words that embody in the best phraseology the natural characteristics of the writer. What constitutes plenary inspiration is far more the condition of the writing than of the writer. The mind of the writer may be in different states under the influence of the Holy Spirit, or that mind may be left to write many things in the natural state, under no particular excitement of the Holy Spirit. What constitutes plenary inspiration is simply that the thoughts and language of the writer should be precisely such as the Holy Spirit would compose if left to write the Bible without the aid of human instrumentality. The confusion that rests upon this subject is cleared away if we distinguish between the Scriptures and the human instrumentality that composed them. Plenary inspiration has reference to the Scriptures themselves, rather than to the writers of them. The end to be secured was the composing of certain events in history and certain great moral truths in such a variety as to be adapted to every class of mind and every human want. To accomplish that end, human instruments were made use of; as to the mode of the divine influence upon the mind, this is a matter that it does not concern us to investigate. The inspiration was such as to be adequate for the task to be performed; and that task was the composing of truths without error, facts without needless redundancy, events with conciseness, and all things suitable to know best adapted for the age in which they were written, and for subsequent ages, under the direct supervision of the Holy Spirit, so that no human imperfections should mar the writings or human mistake destroy their divine authority in any respect. But the same infinite wisdom that made use of men, and not angels, to compose the Scriptures, to secure their highest adap-

tation, selected different writers in different ages, who should embody in writing enough of the peculiarities of the age in which they lived to mark the period when they were written, and at the same time enough of the peculiarities of the writers not to weaken the evidence of their individuality.

The differences of style, the singular diversity of expression, so often objected to the plenary inspiration of the Bible, is the highest evidence of that inspiration. This diversity of style, these numerous writers, with all their peculiarities of thought and expression, give an individuality to the Bible infinitely superior to one dead level of style and expression. The Holy Spirit made use of such a variety of instruments to make their writings adapted to the diversities of every age, the peculiarities of every land, and every condition of life. Thus, as the divinity of Christ became incarnated in his humanity to give a more perfect illustration of virtue and secure the redemption of man, so the mind of God may be said to be incarnated in the Holy Scriptures through the use of human instrumentality in their composition, and the embodying, in perfect consistency with divine truth, all the endless diversities of human thought and feeling and action. And yet one of the highest internal evidences of inspiration is made use of by many to disprove altogether the plenary inspiration of the Bible; as if God, who condescended so much to human wants as to suffer his Son to assume humanity and die upon the cross, could not make use of all the diversity of human instrumentality without destroying the divine authority of his word. It is sometimes said that the plenary inspiration of the Bible is unnecessary, provided the mind was inspired in respect to the thoughts, and that the writers of the Scriptures were left alone to their own judgment and fidelity. But an inspiration that had no reference to the manner, the peculiar selection of the right language or words, would not be sufficient to guard against all redundancy, all improprieties of expression, and all mistakes. Without such an inspiration as directly to affect the language or secure the right selection of words, essential error might be communicated, and mistakes be made, through the too great

liberty of the writers. How without a plenary inspiration could such an inimitable conciseness be manifested as is seen in the Bible, embodying such an immense variety of truths, through so many centuries, in a space so small? How could there be a perfect assurance that all the Bible is the word of God, or that man is not by his own authority speaking to us rather than God himself, and therefore we must pronounce an opinion from a human rather than a divine source? Consider directly the evidence of the Scriptures upon this subject. When Christ, in Luke, speaks of the persecutions the apostles should experience after his death, he declares to them, "For I will give you a mouth and a wisdom which all your adversaries shall not be able to gainsay or resist." In John he declares, "The Comforter, which is the Holy Ghost, whom the Father will send in my name, he shall teach you all things, and bring all things to your remembrance whatsoever I have said unto you." The claim to inspiration is clearly made by the apostles in those passages where they place their own writings upon the same footing with the books of the Old Testament. For St. Paul, speaking of the *Holy Scriptures*,—a common expression among the Jews,—in which Timothy had been instructed from his childhood, says, "All Scripture is given by inspiration of God;" thus including the Old and New Testaments. St. Peter, speaking of the ancient prophets, says, "The Spirit of Christ was in them," and "The prophecy came not in old time by the will of man; but holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The quotations of our Lord and his apostles from the books of the Old Testament are often introduced with the expression in which their inspiration is directly asserted. "Thus spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias;" "By the mouth of thy servant David thou hast said." And St. Peter charges the Christians, "Be mindful of the words which were spoken before by the holy prophets, and of the commandments of us the apostles." In the book of Revelation we read of the personal inspiration of John in the words, "Jesus sent and signified by his angel to his servant John the things that were to come to pass." Paul to the Corinthians thus ex-

presses himself: "Which things we speak not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth." Storr and Platt give the following interpretation to this text: "Paul," they say, "asserts that the doctrines of Christianity were revealed to him by the almighty agency of God himself; and, finally, that the inspiration of the Divine Spirit extended even to his words, and to all his exhibitions of revealed truths." They add that "St. Paul clearly distinguishes between the doctrine itself and the manner in which it is communicated." St. Peter tells us that he wrote all his letters not only with the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth, but also, as were *the other scriptures* (of the Old Testament), according to the wisdom given unto him. All the Scriptures are also indiscriminately called *the word of God*; not only is the entire Bible called the *word of God*, but without distinction it is called the *oracles of God*. What word more expressive to show a complete inspiration, extending even to the words, than the language, *oracles of God*? Christ, speaking of the Old Testament, says, "All things which are written concerning me in Moses, the prophets, and the Psalms, must be fulfilled." It is worthy of remark that Jesus Christ and the apostles habitually applied the title of *prophets* to all the authors of the Old Testament. Their habitual designation of the entire Scriptures was, "Moses and the prophets." David says, "The Spirit of the Lord *has spoken by me*." "And *his word* was upon *my tongue*." Says Christ to the Jews, "Is it not written in *your law*?" thus affirming the divine authority of their Scriptures; thus agreeing with the testimony of Zacharias, in Luke, "It is God who hath spoken by the mouth of his holy prophets, which have been since the world began." It was twenty or thirty years after the Pentecost that Peter was pleased to quote "All the epistles of Paul, his well-beloved brother," and that he spoke of them as "sacred writings," which already in his day made part of the holy letters and were to be classed with *the rest of the Scriptures*. He assigns to them the same rank, and he declares that ignorant men could not pervert them but to their own

destruction. We quote this important passage : “ Even as our beloved brother Paul also, according to the wisdom given unto him, hath written unto you ; as also in all his epistles, speaking in them of these things ; in which are some things hard to be understood, which they that are unlearned and unstable wrest, as they do also the other scriptures, unto their own destruction.”

Many other passages might be given to show the plenary inspiration of the Bible, an inspiration so perfect as to extend to the words written. Such an inspiration is also confirmed by the reason that often the prophets themselves did not understand the full import of what they wrote, and consequently must have been directed in their very language. With such an inspiration the conduct of the Jews in respect to their Scriptures, and the sentiments of the Christian Church in the first century and in later times, concur. If such an amount of evidence does not establish the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures, we are at a loss to conceive what argument can do it.

Plenary inspiration has, especially, relation to the original manuscripts from which the Bible has been copied. Nor does it attempt any nice subdivision, or lay down any rules by which in one chapter we may detect the inspiration of suggestion, in another that of elevation, and in another that of superintendence. Great confusion has arisen from confounding the book itself with the mind of the writer. But plenary inspiration does not so much contemplate the mind of the writer as that which is written ; its purpose is consummated if what is written is such as God himself would write were human instrumentality discarded. Consequently, the mind of the writer may be in an endless variety of states, and yet, with the widest diversity of feeling and thought, there may be plenary inspiration. Nor does the true idea of this inspiration admit that one part of the Bible is any less or any more inspired than another, or that in one place there is an inspiration of a high kind and in another of an inferior kind. Either the Bible is plenary inspired, or it is not : *if it is*, then one part of the Bible is as truly the word of God as another

part; *if it is not*, then those parts of the Bible which are uninspired are not of divine authority. If the general inspiration of the Bible is admitted, then it becomes those who deny its plenary inspiration to show clearly what parts are not inspired. It is not enough to admit in vague language that the Bible is the word of God; it must be shown what part is not the word of God. It is not enough to contend for diverse kinds of inspiration; the line should be clearly drawn where the inspiration of superintendency becomes that of elevation, or the inspiration of elevation becomes that of suggestion. If the Bible makes no such distinctions, it is not necessary that we should. The difficulty lies in misapprehending what is meant by the plenary inspiration of the Bible. Let us suppose that a man who wishes to communicate certain important facts in respect to his family, and with those facts certain moral instructions, to a friend in a distant land, employs his son as an amanuensis to write to that friend. Now, some things the son may know without any direct instruction from the father; some things he may not know, and may need direct instruction; some things he may partially know, and in those respects in which he is ignorant he may need to be set right. The son writes the letter, and the father indorses it, after reading it over, with his name. That letter is truly the father's letter; it communicates his mind, it expresses his thoughts,—it may be all the better for embodying the peculiarities of the son's mind. What more reasonable than that God should in like manner, in his letters to his children, make use of the diverse individuality of the writers of the Holy Scriptures and embody the endless diversities of thought peculiar to each writer? Why doubt the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures because a free use is made of the peculiarities of every mind and age? Were truths communicated by every writer in the same manner, we should suspect collusion or mutual connivance. But the very diversity of style by each writer obviating altogether this difficulty, is often spoken of in such a way as to disparage their plenary inspiration. Great confusion will arise in the mind unless the writing and the writer are not always kept distinct in the consideration of the sub-

ject of plenary inspiration. Upon the day of Pentecost many spoke with new tongues, and in a high sense may, in their thoughts and feelings, have been under the influence of the Holy Spirit; but Peter and the apostles alone were authorized to write with an authority as great for their Epistles as for the very words that issued from them upon that memorable occasion. The Apostle Paul, for example, had not "received the gospel from man, but by revelation of Jesus Christ." He wrote "all his letters," as St. Peter tells us, "not only with the words which the Holy Ghost teacheth, but also as were *the other scriptures* [of the Old Testament], according to the wisdom given unto him."

It will, then, be seen that what may have been the peculiar state of the mind of the writers of the Bible, what may have been the diversity of the influences of the Holy Spirit upon each writer, are inquiries that do not enter into the subject of plenary inspiration. From the nature of the case, these inquiries are too intricate and involved to afford any good ground to stand upon. We do not know but that the mode of the Spirit's influence changed with every writer, or that the same writer was under different influences of a high or a low degree at different times; but, as in the illustration of the son who was the amanuensis of his father in writing to a friend in a distant land, it was seen that the authority of the father was not affected by his accommodation to the peculiarities of the mind of the son, or by his permission to write things known equally as well by the son as by the father, so also in the word of God an accommodation to the mind of the writer, or a permission to write things that did not need a direct revelation, in no respect invalidates the divine authority of the writing. All that is necessary to know is the simple fact, Are the writings of the Old and the New Testaments, *indiscriminately* called the word of God, acknowledged without *limitation* to be inspired, and treated as such, by the Jews and the early Christians?

We have already shown the frequent and direct assertion by the sacred writers of their inspiration. It has been seen that they acknowledged no graduated scale of high or

low inspiration, or confessed to one part of the Bible as of greater authority than another. These refined distinctions are the work of a later day. They are not even intimated in the Bible. The Gospels are not extolled more than the Epistles, or the New Testament praised at the expense of the Old. Christ himself asserts that he came not to destroy the law or the prophets, but to establish them; he came as a living illustration of the divine truth of the Old Testament, not to supersede it as good only for a barbarous age, but through all coming time to give the impress by every prophetic fulfillment of the divinity of its origin. No reasoning is so destitute of proof as that which infers that because the coming of Christ was the superseding of the ceremonial law, therefore it was the superseding of the Old Testament. But nothing can supersede or dispense with an inspired book: if it comes from God, its authority is divine, were its age millions of years. The ceremonial law, with the Levitical rites, as adapted for one age and one nation alone, like the Ark of the Covenant or the sacred temple, has passed away, and the express mission, example, and precepts of Christ have dispensed with their observance.

But what has that to do with the fact of the inspiration of the Old Testament, or the binding authority of that, even as of the New, with the single exception of the ceremonial and Levitical law and rites, alone instituted for a particular age of the world and one nation?

One of the greatest mistakes in respect to a divine revelation is the losing sight of its progressive nature. The Bible is not stereotyped for one age; it is a book for all ages. Consequently, it must at the same time be local and universal, must have a specific adaptation to certain periods of the world and a general adaptation to all periods and all nations. Why overlook a feature so essential for a genuine inspiration, and make that very fact which is a high argument for its divine authority an excuse for the disparaging of its claims? Were the Bible adapted only for the present age of the world, we should see indeed nothing in it antiquated or old-fashioned, nothing but an exclusive fitness for the present state

of society. But would not this supposed excellence be a great defect? In some other age of the world, where revolutions have altered all the existing relations of society, how deeply would be felt this deficiency in the Scriptures! Why, then, should we seek to improve upon God's method of revealing truth? Why should we imagine that our modern standard is any better than the standard of God's own choosing?

There is another mistake in respect to the inspiration of the Bible, deserving of careful consideration. It is that direct assertions of inspiration should be made by each writer of the Bible to give sufficient proof of the plenary inspiration of the Scriptures. But upon what does the inspiration of the Scriptures rest? Not simply upon their own assertion of inspiration. What would that assertion be worth were there no adaptation in the Bible to our wants, no miracles and no prophecies? To prove conclusively the inspiration of the Bible, we must first consider those separate chains of argument embodied in the necessity, the adaptation, the miracles, the prophecies, the success of Christianity in the first century, and especially the perfect character of Christ and his divine mission. While these separate chains of proof exist, the Bible would be clearly of divine origin, even if not one word was said of its inspiration. The inspiration of the Bible is shown far more by these tests than by any assertions by the sacred writers of their own inspiration. But the manner in which Christ referred to the Old Testament, the uniform respect and deference with which he treated it, the way in which it was regarded by the Jews, their scrupulous exactness in its preservation, the testimony of Josephus and all their historians to its sacred character, and the subsequent testimony to the inspiration of the New Testament, combine to give a higher confirmation to the divine authority of the Bible. The difficulty in our ideas of the inspiration of the Bible is that we are constantly inclined to look only to one side of the question and to confine our view to one aspect of the subject. But let us consider that all the separate proofs given to us of the divine authority of the Bible

are intimately blended together, and, like the colors of the rainbow, form one glorious arch.

Consider, then, the magnitude of the task of that man who attempts to prove the Bible uninspired. Before he can succeed in such a task, he must show false not one chain of proof, but the whole foundation upon which rests the inspiration of the Bible. He must, step by step, remove each separate chain from its place, and prove the whole a fabrication of man. He must impeach the character of Christ himself, and prove the divine Author of Christianity either an impostor or an ignorant enthusiast. He must show that the writers of the Bible were either deceivers or deceived; and then, after establishing as a fact that the Bible is the work either of impostors or of men imposed upon, he must admit, in the very face of his successful logic, that the Bible, after all, is the most sublime, the most useful, the most excellent production the world has ever seen,—that, true or false, to remove it from society would leave a *blank* so deplorable as to make even atheism tremble and infidelity grow pale with fear.

Upon such a foundation does the inspiration of the Bible rest. Did we look to one kind of proof alone, our minds might sometimes be troubled by the objections of the skeptic; but when we consider that the inspiration of the Bible can lay claim, directly or indirectly, to all the separate chains of reasoning that go to prove the Scriptures from God,—when we consider that the deeper the examination the more clearly blazes forth the truth of the divinity of the Scriptures,—then truly do we have the highest demonstration that they come from God.

Of those who deny the plenary inspiration of the Bible, it may be asked, Why more difficult for God to have the whole Bible inspired than a part of it? In nature we see no half-work; what is made is perfect in its kind, as it comes from God, and adapted to its end. Is it not as necessary that the written word should be as free from defects as the works of nature? Is the mighty process of redemption in its record less important, and do we see a finish in the one that we do

not in the other? Consider that the separate chains of evidence upon which the entire inspiration of the Scriptures rests are not confined to one book of the Bible, but are common to the whole. When, therefore, we say such a part of the Bible is not inspired, to be consistent we must show that it is not linked in with the rest, and that its removal would be no injury to the whole. But can we cut out this or that part of the Bible as useless or as an excrescence? Can we treat the Holy Scriptures as we would treat a vase of precious stones and stubble and dirt and rubbish? Can we say, Here are the precious stones, and here the useless rubbish? But, if the Bible was only in part inspired, this would be a correct proceeding. The business of the commentator would be chiefly to separate the inspired from the uninspired; to label one part of the Bible as from God and another as from man,—one as of divine authority and the other as only of human origin and consequently having no more than a human sanction. But, worse than this, upon such a supposition we are afloat upon a wide sea of uncertainty and doubt. Who can prove that any landmarks are given in the Bible by which one part may be shown human and another divine,—one from God and another only from man? Who can show those places that rest upon the infallible authority of God, and those portions which are supported only by the fallible opinions of man? Is it not easy to see that instead of our reason deciding upon the general fact of the Bible as the word of God, it must have put upon it the task of culling out the human from the divine,—that the infallibility of the Scriptures would be seriously injured? Here are two authorities,—one fallible, the other infallible, and both mixed up together. Where are we? The boast of the Papal church is its infallibility, but the glory of Protestantism is the belief in the *one only infallible standard* contained in the Bible.

But when we admit that some parts of the Bible are from God and some parts not from God,—some portions divine, some only human,—we must, to be consistent, say that those parts of the Bible alone human must be fallible, and carry

with them no higher sanction than any other production of man. And then at once we come to the chief difficulty, How are these two parts to be so separated as always to be distinguished and never to blend into each other? Would we not by this really give to Romanism its greatest power of assault, and confess that the church alone should say what is to be received as divine and what is to be rejected as only human? Would we not say by this that the Bible was not to be read by all classes of persons, unless as interpreted by the constitutional authority of the church? Thus it will be seen that the moment we undertake to cut up the Bible into two parts, one fallible and the other infallible, we weaken the evidence of the whole; we give credit to the assumptions of the Romanists, and give the highest plausibility to the papal dogma of infallibility.

The true idea of plenary inspiration leaves an ample margin for the human element in the Bible, while it does not conflict with the divine element: it only insists upon the plain fact that what it indorses by God as his word should have his authority coexisting with it. In no other way can the Bible, with its ample proofs of divinity, have that influence over the human mind that belongs to it by equity and all reason. True, in the interpretation of the Bible according to the fundamental principle of Protestantism, every person must answer to his own conscience and to God for the word read; but this is infinitely safer and more in harmony with right liberty and wisdom, than having the Council of Trent decide upon our faith, or a papal priesthood tell us what of the Bible we should read and what we should not read, what we should believe upon in it and what we should not believe.

One of the most fruitful sources of infidelity is the confused idea held as to the inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Whether the Bible is indeed from God, or only from man, is the great question of the present day. It has been the question of all ages, and will be to all time to come, until sin, temptation, and all moral evil are banished from the earth. Constituted, then, as human nature is, fallen as it is, can it be expected that a book that comes into such antagonism

with all sin, be it in the individual or in the State, that sets forth principles that cut at the root of every organized system of oppression or error, of superstition and wrong, should not encounter the most searching scrutiny? The Bible welcomes such a scrutiny, but pronounces its anathema upon those who are compelled to confess its truth, its divinity, and yet who will not receive it or in any true sense believe in it. Now, we say that the Bible, affixing consequences so weighty upon its reception or rejection, will not, if from God, be deficient in evidence to show this. There is too much at stake to doubt for a moment this assertion. Consequently, the Bible may justly be said to be full of *all evidences* to show it from God. View it under any or all aspects, and the mind is overwhelmed with the greatness and the variety of proof. It is most suitable that the plenary inspiration of the Bible should be just as it is,—no more, and no less. No more; for then the human element intimately blended with it, interwoven like the thread in the very cloth itself, would be deficient, and then the Bible would lose its strongest access to the heart of man: it might be a better book for angels, but it would not be so good for man. All that plenary inspiration claims is just enough of divinity to give to the Holy Scriptures the royal seal of God's own hand; this, with all reasonable persons, should be sufficient. In the Bible, human instrumentality, with the endless diversities of human feeling and expression, and the modes of thought common to one age of the world and to all ages, is made use of. But this is its highest charm: it shows that, as the Sabbath was made for man, so the Bible was made for man; it is man's book and it is God's book; it is man's treasure and God's blessing; it is man's birthright, and yet God's gift. All other books in contrast are insignificant; for it contains all human wisdom and all divine wisdom, an incarnation of truth and a divinity of origin. Plenary inspiration is, then, appropriately the summing up of all the other multitudinous evidences of the Bible, and carrying with them the declaration "that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God." So intimately blended together are all the Scriptures, that we cannot sever

one portion from the rest without invalidating the whole. To prove the Old Testament not divine, is not indeed to prove the New not from God; but most seriously it injures the evidence of the New Testament. To prove one book of the New Testament not from God, does not disprove the other books; but it greatly weakens the strength of their evidence.

In respect to the variations in different readings, they are too insignificant to deserve attention, and all can be referred to the diversity of copyists. In no respect can it be shown that they affect the fact of inspiration; and as for errors, it is time enough to admit them when they are proved. More than eighteen centuries have elapsed since the death and the resurrection of Christ; there has been no want of opposers and enemies to the Bible, of every variety of talent and every advantage of observation; and yet not a single error of any fact of history, any truth of science, or any contradiction of testimony among the writers of the Bible has been shown. Every discovery of science, every additional light thrown upon the history of the past, every research into antiquity, has only confirmed the truthfulness of the Bible. The progress of knowledge has shown that the errors lay in our minds, not in the word of God, and that our ignorance was the mother of those faults that are attributed to the Bible. And thus will it be proved true that the Bible is inspired by God, even though the heavens and the earth should pass away.

CHAPTER XIX.

HISTORIC OUTLINE OF THE OLD TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

THE Old Testament marks a period of the world essentially different from the New Testament. With the former commence the creation of the world, the fall of man, the patriarchal and the legal dispensations.

Let us consider the Old Testament in its revelation of God. But what is the mode of all revelation of God to us? Is it a complete communication of all truth at once, or is it the gradual unfolding of truth at different periods of the world? Evidently, the latter. And yet, because there is not the same communication of truth in the Old Testament as in the New,—because when the Christian economy commenced there was a higher development of truth,—many have underrated the Old Testament; they have imagined that it was superseded by the New Testament. But the New Testament uniformly confirms the Old and is built upon it. It indeed introduces us to a higher stage of truth, but at the same time it rests as a foundation upon the Old. In considering, then, the revelation of God in the Old Testament, we must bear in mind that this revelation was in accordance with the existing wants of the world. It was a revelation that was best adapted to the state of society existing before the ushering in of the Christian dispensation. Many seem to forget this great fact, in judging of the Old Testament. They do not carry their minds back to the early age of the world, and consider the peculiar wants of a period far remote from the present. The Old Testament has three distinct periods of time,—that which is comprised in the antediluvian world, that which is included in the post-diluvian age, or the age of the patriarchs, and that which comprehends the Mosaic

economy, or legal dispensation. The antediluvian world forms a period of history remarkable for its brevity. All that remains to us of this distant age is embodied in a few chapters of Genesis; but enough is told us to reveal the extreme apostasy of man and the mercy and justice of God. The age of the post-diluvian patriarchs makes known to us a period of the world recovering from the great catastrophe of the deluge, with the confusion of tongues at Babel, and the regal authority invested in a few great heads of families. The Mosaic dispensation gives to us an election from the nations of the earth of a distinct people, who were destined to be the chosen depositaries of the Scriptures and to be signally distinguished by privileges and divine interpositions in their favor. Thus the different ages of the world before the coming of Christ demanded a revelation from God adapted to the peculiar state of each period of time; and thus we find it. One melancholy fact, confirmed by all history, is taught us in the Bible,—the extreme tendency of man to degenerate. We find this most clearly shown in the antediluvian world. Here we read of two classes, called the sons of God and the daughters of men, and of the rapid corruption of the better part of society by the unlawful intercourse with the most depraved, until the whole earth then peopled revealed one loathsome mass of moral pollution. A few good men in vain strove to resist the depravity of the times. Then came the deluge, sweeping away the guilty inhabitants of the world. But the antediluvian earth, from the great longevity of the population, had the noblest opportunity of having through tradition a knowledge of the fall, and of becoming acquainted with the character of God. When the legal dispensation was introduced, we see a widely different state of the world. The new world had become to a great extent peopled. The confusion of tongues had resulted in scattering multitudes over the earth. But the whole earth then inhabited had relapsed into idolatry. The primitive ideas of God in his unity and moral excellence had been greatly obscured. Subordinate divinities had usurped the place of the supreme God, and the nations of the earth

had followed after idols that neither see, nor hear, nor taste, nor smell, nor touch,—idols originally but representatives of imaginary gods, but whose worship soon degenerated into the deification of human beings. What, then, was the great design of the legal dispensation? It was to rescue a people from the grossness of the surrounding paganism, and free them from the bewitching snares of idolatry. But in what did the idolatry of the ancient world consist? Was it the denial altogether of one supreme God, or was it not rather the gross corruption of this first truth of religion? Evidently, the latter.

The learned Cudworth has clearly proved “that the pagan polytheism must be understood as used for created intellectual beings, superior to men, that ought to be religiously worshiped. That this was no refinement or interpolation of paganism, as might possibly be suspected, but that the doctrine of the most ancient pagan theologers and greatest promoters of polytheism was agreeable hereunto. First, Zoroaster, the chief promoter of polytheism in the Eastern parts, acknowledged one supreme Deity, the maker of the world, proved from Eubulus in Porphyry, besides his own words cited by Eusebius. That Orpheus, commonly called by the Greeks the Theologer, asserted one supreme Deity, proved by his own words out of pagan theology. That the Egyptians themselves, the most polytheistic of all nations, had an acknowledgment among them of one supreme Deity. That the poets, who were the greatest depravers of the pagan theology, and by their fables of the gods made it look more aristocratically, did themselves, notwithstanding, acknowledge a monarchy, one prince and father of gods. That all the pagan philosophers who were theist universally asserted a mundane monarchy. Pythagoras, as much a polytheist as any, and yet his first principle of things as well as numbers, a monad or unity. Anaxagoras, one mind ordering all things for good. Xenophanes, one and all, and his one god the greatest among gods.”

This opinion of Cudworth is high authority to confirm the fact that a First Cause, or Supreme God, was generally ac-

knowledge among the ancient pagans. But here was the *great mistake*. The idea of one supreme God was not only merely speculative, exerting no practical influence over the popular mind, but that idea was immeasurably corrupted by the introduction of subordinate divinities. God was forgotten among the increasing host of idols who had usurped the place of all worship. Thus, while one God in theory might be held to, in practice inferior divinities controlled the mind and absorbed the affections of the multitude. Indeed, the pagan polytheism consisted in the deification of the creature and the total neglect of all devotion to the Creator. Commencing in its mildest form with the worship of the sun and moon and stars, the adoration of fire and the elements of earth, air, and water, it passed through successive stages of degeneracy until it comprehended the adoration of the meanest of reptiles and insects. Thus the host of gods continued to increase, until in some places there were as many gods as people, thirty thousand being reckoned at Rome itself. But the worst feature connected with the pagan polytheism was the rapid corruption of manners from the deification of things vicious and contemptible. When the standard of moral excellence was so low, what must have been the depravity engendered! Thus, we see the most cruel rites, the most licentious practices, connected with the worship of the gods. The intellect and heart were immeasurably debased. The most sacred relations of the family were grossly broken in upon, and the transition was rapid from the corruption of manners to the most galling servitude of body.

Another feature connected with the ancient polytheism was its alliance with the state. The state upheld the popular religion, and the religion upheld the state. What was the consequence? Political slavery went hand in hand with the superstition of the masses, and the idolatry of the people helped on the tyranny of kings and nobles. Thus was ancient paganism not only the source of the deepest moral corruption, robbing God of his rightful homage, removing from the mind the restraining fear of an All-wise Being, absolving from human love his attributes of goodness and

mercy, and eradicating from the mind the lofty hopes his true worship only can create. But ancient paganism was a terrific state engine. Superstition, taking the place of the true worship of God, brought with it civil bondage. Forging a double chain for mind and body, it plunged the human family into a deeper abyss of wretchedness. Taking advantage of the principle in man that upbraids for sin, it held over an enslaved conscience a whip of scorpions. Cruelty and impiety were the constant attendants upon pagan superstition; but there followed in its train, also, a demon as fearful,—that of universal political and moral slavery. Thus, wherever pagan superstition most abounded, there also it engendered a more debasing bondage of body and mind. Freedom died upon her impure and bloody altars, and even the natural virtues became ferocious when nurtured by her unhallowed religion. The guilt of pagan superstition and the idolatry created by it consisted in an abuse of the light of nature, and the reckless disregard of the light communicated through tradition from the earliest ages. The growing love of idol worship engendered worse idols, and the corrupt philosophy and poetry of the ancients introduced a more debasing condition of things. The words of the Apostle Paul give us a true picture of the sin of heathendom: “Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the incorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things.”

What, then, was the great design of the Jewish theocracy and the legal dispensation? It was, evidently, to counteract the ancient idolatry and preserve the worship of the true God. The end to be secured was to unveil the character of God with greater distinctness, and select a nation for the preservation of the divine oracles. But how could this end be reached without the miraculous interposition of God? When Abraham was called, we see in the father of the faithful the

first commencement of that series of divine interpositions that were, through successive ages, to grow brighter and brighter, and secure the great end of rescuing the world from total apostasy. Many seem to forget the peculiar circumstances that demanded the Jewish theocracy, and the mighty reasons for that series of stupendous miracles that took place upon the leading of the Israelites from Egypt. Egypt then was the most powerful and civilized nation of the earth. But all this supremacy imparted only a more fatal energy to the debasing superstitions of the Egyptians. The land of Egypt had degenerated into a land of idols. Priestly and civil tyranny, both wedded to the grossest idolatry, had withered the virtues of the people and given to their vices a more than ordinary virulence.

What was to be done? If the world was ever after to be redeemed, or future millions preserved from total estrangement from God, what better course could be conceived of than was devised to turn back the tide of moral corruption that was fast fitting the world for another deluge? The Israelites never would have followed Moses, never would have submitted to the long journey in the desert, never would have obeyed his rigid enactments, had not his mission to them been most clearly proved to be divine! How absurd the supposition that nearly three millions of people would all consent to leave their home in Egypt, to encounter the perils of the desert, to give up the idol-worship of their Egyptian masters, to wander with no natural means of subsistence for so many years in the desert, if God had not directly interposed to supply their wants!

But the great fact of the drowning of the Egyptians in the Red Sea has been confirmed by sacred and profane history. No proof has ever been offered to show that this memorable event did not take place. Here, then, in the miracles worked for the preservation of the Israelites and the ruin of their tyrannical masters, we see the great end secured of interposing a barrier to the wide-spread desolations of polytheism. Everything was adapted to this end. The ancient systems of superstition took captive the senses. Stealing with magical

power over the heart, they corrupted the affections. Their superstition, allying itself with the state, wielded the power of the civil magistrate, and, both being linked together, there followed one vast system of bondage to body and mind, and the gross corruption of morals. The worship of the one true God was forgotten in the homage paid to inferior divinities, and the tendencies of the human heart, naturally downward, received from the reigning idolatry a threefold energy for evil.

Conceive, then, if possible, how dark must have been the prospects of the world if no such system as the Mosaic economy had been introduced. Superficial and unthinking minds look with contempt upon the Jewish ritual and the peculiar laws and ordinances of the Israelites. They seem to think unnecessary the forms of the theocracy, and all the details of the temple service and priesthood and sacrifice. They cannot understand the meaning of so strict a ceremonial and such rigid rites. But are such persons conscious what the condition of the world then was, and what was the peculiar character of the Jewish mind? Do they imagine that, with their constant tendency to relapse into the gorgeous idolatry of the heathen around them, they needed nothing to strike favorably the senses and beguile them from the snares of false idols? The whole system of the Jewish theocracy was admirably adapted to the wants of the Israelites. Their ceremonies, free from the impurity and cruelty of the heathen rites, were most happily designed to wean them from their attachment to idolatry. All their rites were calculated to make a deep impression upon the senses, and thus to forestall the fascinations of heathen worship; and yet their worship was highly spiritual. God was recognized as the supreme authority, and the temporal rewards and chastisements he sent were of the very nature to deliver the mind from the bondage of idolatry. We have spoken of the union of church and state among the heathen, of the intimate connection of the civil and the ecclesiastical power, and of the immeasurable strength given to idolatry by this course. The Jewish theocracy struck a death-blow at the universal triumph of superstition: by uniting the civil with the religious govern

ment of the Jews, by making the authority of God supreme in church and in state, it linked both together at a period of the world when every external restraint was needed to suppress the encroachments of heathenism.

The power of ancient paganism consisted especially in leading the mind of the people to believe that the control of their gods was exercised in all their domestic concerns and all their civil relations. The one God obscurely recognized by the multitude was forgotten in the host of subordinate divinities that took under their management the everyday affairs of life and all their social and political relations. Consequently, all true ideas of the providence of God, extending to all things, exercising a care over the smallest as well as the greatest affairs of life, were wholly lost sight of. With this forgetfulness, all homage of God was corrupted into the worship of his creatures; and false idols took away that sense of duty, of obligation, of fear, of hope and love, that should be centered upon the one God. The church and state mutually sustaining each other in corruption, both secured the fatal bondage of mind and heart. But the Jewish theocracy, by uniting church and state, by making all authority to emanate from God, presented a double barrier to the encroachments of superstition. God, in his daily providence; God, in his hatred of idols; God, in his personal agency; God, as the rewarder of the good; God, as the immediate author of temporal prosperity or adversity; God, as forgiving sin through the medium of sacrifices; God, as a visible guide, infinite in power and goodness; God, in his divine unity, abhorring any representation by images,—this was the great barrier against the attacks of idolatry. Here idolatry was met upon its own ground. Superstition had bound, for greater strength, church and state together; the Jewish theocracy cemented in one bond of friendship the civil and religious power. Superstition had captivated the senses by imposing rites and a gorgeous ceremonial; the Jewish theocracy gave rites more imposing and a ceremonial far more lofty and grand. Superstition had seduced the conscience by a false expiation in sacrifices to idols; the

Jewish theocracy gave peace to the troubled conscience by pure sacrifices to the one⁴ God. Superstition taught the providence of innumerable gods over all the affairs of life; the Jewish theocracy inculcated the providence of God in everything relating to this earthly existence. Superstition invoked temporal sanctions, and all the motives drawn from earthly prosperity or adversity, to sustain its power over the mind; the Jewish theocracy also revealed earthly sanctions, and powerfully influenced the mind by fear and hope, drawn from worldly adversity or prosperity.

Thus it will be seen that, wherever the sway of false idols extended, there yet existed upon the earth one living illustration of the one only true God. The Jewish theocracy, resplendent in miracles, made invincible by the personal interposition of God, stood like a mighty rock against the waves of superstition that rolled against it. It met superstition at every avenue. It lived as a constant rebuke to the grossness of idolatry. Both by rewarding the Israelites for obedience and by punishing them for disobedience, it gave a lesson of infinite value to the world. It rescued the unity of God from the fatal perversions of superstition, enforced its sacredness by demonstrations of almighty power, and threw gleams of light over that moral darkness that had settled upon the nations. But the Jewish theocracy was most wonderfully adapted for the illustration of an atonement for sin. There is no error more fatal than the belief that the obedience of the sinner can atone for sin, or satisfy the demands of infinite justice. But in all the sacrifices of the Jews the doctrine was distinctly taught that some way was provided, symbolized by the blood of the Lamb, for the expiation of sin. Here conscience found a valid ground of hope; here it rested under its load of sin. The Jewish theocracy inculcated faith, the very principle that lies at the foundation of all true religion, and the only thing that can ever lead the heart to a cheerful obedience. But here was its infinite superiority to the superstitious belief of the heathen. The faith in false idols, in their power of averting calamity or giving favors, was a false faith,—a faith of incalculable mischief to the heart, for

it was at war alike with true reason and true piety. But the faith demanded of the Israelites in the offering up of sacrifices was a faith that embodied in it a security, a reasonable sense of acceptance with God, that superstition was utterly deficient in. Consequently, the whole system of Jewish theocracy was most appropriate for an introduction to the Christian dispensation. It had a part to fulfill of the greatest importance in the ushering in of a nobler system upon the world.

Let us, then, look to some of the principles of the Hebrew polity, as revealing the character and attributes of God. One great truth, that of the creation, was taught by Moses in a way unknown to heathen philosophers. The reason of man, attempting to go beyond its depth and to plunge into the deepest mysteries, made darkness more dark, and led the popular mind into greater errors than even the theology of the poets. A misguided fancy was bad enough, but the misguided philosophy of the ancients was worse. The former was the mother of superstition, but the latter of the most pernicious skepticism. Thus the popular mind, vibrating between the two extremes of superstition and infidelity, never became fixed upon the great truth of God as the Creator of the world. Thus, erroneous upon the first truth of revelation, there was no limit to the multiplication of gods representing the greatest inconsistency of principle, so that divinities grew in number as the world became older, and were more corrupt in the highest civilization than even in the depths of savage existence. Thus, while on the one side ignorance was the parent of superstition, upon the other side knowledge became the author of the highest refinement of cruelty and corruption. Thus, had it not been for the Jewish theocracy, the world would have lost its last hope. But upon the great fact of the creation of the world the Mosaic record is most clear and authoritative. Here an amount of knowledge is communicated vastly surpassing all the learning of paganism. In nothing was the impotence of heathen philosophy more clearly displayed than in its vain attempt to thread its way through the ages of patriarchal and antediluvian times. Here science and poetry and history threw only

faint gleams of light, that seemed but to make more palpable the darkness that involved in oblivion the early ages of the world. But the Mosaic record, by briefly communicating the fact of the creation and the fall of man, at one stroke demolished all the theories of pagan theologians. The fall of our first parents is the only key that explains the mystery of human corruption, while at the same time it reveals the necessity of the direct interposition of God to counteract the inevitable ruin of that fall. The Hebrew polity revealed also the great fact that the worship of God, the purity of his service, was a higher end than state expediency. With the heathen, religion was made subservient to the state; among the Jews, the state was subservient to religion. In the Jewish polity, the salvation of the state, its noblest development, its highest prosperity, were made to hang upon the purity of the worship of God. Thus, the Sabbath to be kept holy was recognized as of binding obligation upon the people,—the public worship of God was to be strictly observed,—the ceremonial law, demanding the greatest personal cleanliness and purity of sacrifice, was in every place enjoined. The priesthood were placed above a slavish dependence upon the caprice of the multitude, and their support was a duty that involved the very existence of their polity and state. The state in its very existence hung upon the obedience of God. With this obedience came glory and prosperity; without it, disgrace and ruin. The system of the Jewish theocracy was designed to be a living contrast to heathenism and an ever-present rebuke to false idols. In the land of Judea there was a demonstration to be made of the momentous truth that the worship of the one God was an end immeasurably superior to any other object. What was the revelation of God and of his attributes in that worship? First, God in his unity was made known, God as the infinite Father, God as the Creator, God as transcendently just and good and merciful and forgiving of offenses,—God, through the institution of sacrifices, as making known a way of redemption for the sinner,—God as a personal agent,—God in his love of men of sincerity and truth, of men liberal and

kind toward strangers and charitable to the poor,—God in his purity,—God the avenger of the oppressed, the punisher of the sacrilegious and the licentious,—God in his greatness, his omniscience, omnipresence, and omnipotence. Thus the Hebrew polity was not more singular in its construction than adapted to the end of the redemption of a nation and the salvation of millions. To make more conspicuous the personal agency and character of the true God, all the circumstances connected with the Jewish state were such as to preclude the glory of man or the arrogance of human boasting. Small in territory, surrounded by rival or hostile communities, unwarlike as a nation, the Jewish state was confined within a narrow circle. In human learning it was greatly surpassed by heathen nations. Judea was not the land for philosophy or for science. The Jews were not the warriors of the earth. Their generals led no great armies far off into the remote regions of Asia or Africa. No Jewish legions entered the wastes of Europe. The wars of the Jews were wars more of protection than of aggression.

The chosen people were confined to a territory comparatively small. It was the purity of religious worship, the preservation of the church, for which the whole Hebrew polity was instituted. The glory of foreign conquests, the glitter of human learning, the refinement of philosophy, the beauties of statuary or painting, the magic of science, did not belong to the Jewish theocracy. Why not? Evidently, because the whole design of the system was to make God everything and man nothing. It was to show the immeasurable superiority of the true worship of God and of the duties that grow from his service, to the glitter of human glory or the pride of human art or learning. What was the result? Judea was a moral oasis in the great desert of the world. In spite of all the apostasy of the Jews, notwithstanding their constant declension into idolatry, the ancient world never saw a land so blessed as Palestine.

While the lust of conquest swept as a desolating scourge over the earth, while war brought political slavery and a new host of idols in its train, Judea probably enjoyed a higher

degree of real freedom than the whole world besides. Its law enjoining a seven-years jubilee and absolving the helpless from degrading bondage had in it more of true liberty than all the exaggerated freedom of Greece or Rome. With Greece and Rome, state considerations were everything, moral considerations nothing. The highest virtue was patriotism, or obedience to the state; but the state was a coalition of idolatry and the spirit of war. The one held a sword over the soul, the other over the body; the one was moral, the other military, despotism. But in Judea servitude died out before the worship of God, and oppression was rebuked the more the true spirit of the theocracy was cultivated. In Athens there were usually from ten to thirty thousand freemen; but the slaves amounted to four hundred thousand, and even more. The freemen of Sparta and Rome were not more numerous, in proportion to those whom they held in a slavery even more terrible than the Athenian. To use the language of Edmund Burke, "The free states never formed, though they were taken all together, the thousandth part of the habitable globe; the freemen in those states were never the twentieth part of the people; and the time they subsisted is scarce anything in that immense ocean of duration in which time are so nearly commensurate. Therefore, call these free states, or popular governments, or what you please, when we consider the majority of their inhabitants and regard the natural rights of mankind, they must appear in reality and truth no better than pitiful and oppressive oligarchies."

But the Hebrew polity was not more eminently favorable to freedom and adapted to secure the highest practicable civil and religious liberty, than it was deeply opposed to the common crimes of the heathen. In Sparta infanticide was enacted by law. The parent in Rome had absolute control of the life of his children. The murder of children was often a part of the religious worship of the heathen. The whole system of paganism is pervaded with the spirit of cruelty to aged parents and to children, and also with the most wide-spread dissoluteness of manners. When cruelty and

impurity entered into the very heart of heathen religion, what must have been the corruption engendered among the worshipers!

How foreign was all this from the Jewish code, when the professed design of that code was to present a contrast as great as possible to the religion and manners of pagan nations! Thus, we read the language, "Defile not ye yourselves in any of these things, for in all these the nations are defiled which I cast out before you; and the land is defiled; therefore I do visit the iniquity thereof upon it, and the land itself vomiteth out her inhabitants." "Ye shall be holy unto me; for I the Lord thy God am holy, and have severed you from other people that ye should be mine."

The prevailing spirit of the Hebrew literature is shown in the Scriptures as noble and pure. Moses was not a law-giver only, but a moralist. Outward obedience to law was not only enjoined, but the true spirit of divine law was taught, commanding not only not to steal, but not to covet. A good state of mind and heart was enjoined, as much as external conformity to rulers. The Hebrew literature and history, as given to us in the books of Moses and the writings of the prophets and eminent men recorded in the Bible, not only reveal the character of God in a way so sensible and plain as to reach every understanding, but in the way that is best adapted to give us grand and pure conceptions of the divine nature and attributes. Extending over so many centuries, composed of such a diversity of persons, one would imagine that all unity would be lost and errors innumerable would creep in. And thus it would be were the books of the Old Testament *not inspired*. Not so. Although written in popular language, although using the utmost freedom of description, there exists in the Bible no error in science, no unworthy conception of the divine character. God is revealed not in the abstract, as an idea, a spiritual substance, a vague First Cause, a mere originator of matter, or the first order or law of things, not with the indefiniteness of heathen sages, nor yet clothed in the sensuous dress of poetic genius. But he is everywhere spoken of as a personal

God; he is delineated in all the vividness of actual life, feeling, thinking, seeing, knowing, acting, loving all good, hating all evil, a rewarder of righteousness, an avenger of sin, superintending the works of his hands, divinely one in his substance, infinitely pure and good, self-existing from eternity, one Father in heaven, and one omnipotent King upon earth. What if pagan nations excelled the Jews in mere earthly literature or learning? what if Palestine was despised before great emperors whose dominion extended over the remotest regions of the world? what if the glory of arms was the ruling passion of the nations of antiquity? what if battle-fields and the blood of slaughtered enemies were the highest themes of poetic praise? what if Roman conquests or Grecian statuary and painting called forth the noblest art of the historian?—yet Hebrew literature, sublimely great in its theme, majestic with the fire of inspiration, noble as the lofty song of praise that echoed within the walls of the consecrated temple, divinely pure and grand as the evening sky trembling all over with starry pulses of glory, could yet throw into the shade all pagan learning and art. Before the words of the sacred prophet we bow the knee and are silent:

“Thou, O God, hast laid of old the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of thy hands; they shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed; but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end.”

CHAPTER XX.

HISTORIC OUTLINE OF THE NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY.

ALL history reveals the great fact that the revelation of God is given in the most appropriate period for such a revelation. When we come to the period of the Christian dispensation, we come to a state of the world very different from the ages that preceded it. The Roman power was then in its glory. It was in the Augustan age of Rome that Christ our Saviour came to this world. It was in the fullness of time that the Son of God became incarnate and provided a way for the redemption of the earth. In the dream of Nebuchadnezzar we read of the great image of gold, silver, brass, and iron, symbolizing four leading monarchies of the world,—the Babylonian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman. The inspired Daniel portrayed, before the monarch of famed Babylon, the destiny of those kingdoms that were to succeed each other and each in turn ravage the earth. First came Babylon, the richest nation of the East. Nebuchadnezzar, exulting in the pride of his power, saw, in the words of the prophet, his vast dominion pass into the hands of Persia. Then Persia, with her gorgeous pomp and servitude, came under the brazen sway of the Grecians. Then Greece, the land of philosophy and poetry, fell beneath the iron rule of Rome. Here were four great powers, each to succeed the other; each was to exert a mighty influence over the world, and each at last was to be conquered by the power that came after it. But there was a fifth power, greater than all the other powers put together. It was a power distinct from the powers represented by the gold, silver, brass, and iron of the image. It was a power supernatural in its origin, symbolized by a *stone* cut out without hands, which smote the

image upon his feet, that were of iron and clay, and broke them to pieces. Looking upon the historic map of the world, let us briefly survey those four great powers that were ultimately to be supplanted by the fifth power, spoken of in the prophetic words, "And in the days of those kings shall the God of heaven set up a kingdom, which shall never be destroyed; and the kingdom shall not be left to other people, but it shall break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and it shall stand forever." Babylon, the powerful oppressor of the Jews, in one memorable night fell before the arms of Cyrus the Persian. The infatuated monarch, at a great festival, had left the gates of the city open, and himself and his lords were reveling together when a mysterious handwriting upon the walls of the palace made his knees to tremble, and foretold the immediate ruin of himself and his kingdom. Soon the city was captured by the Medes and Persians. Less than two hundred years after, the general profligacy of paganism, the wide-spread dissipation of manners, the fruit of luxury and despotism, and the oppression of the chosen people, hurried on the ruin of the mighty Persian empire. Alexander, the most resistless devastator the world has ever seen, in two years laid the Persian monarchy even with the ground. But the empire of the Macedonian soldier, reared by ambition and blood, fell in fragments on his grave. Four dynasties divided the power of Alexander; but the two most sanguinary and hostile to Palestine were the Ptolemies and the Seleucidæ, the sovereigns of Egypt and of Syria. From the division of the Macedonian empire to the reign of Herod Jerusalem was captured six times by foreign armies. For two hundred years Judea witnessed a fearful duration of misery and carnage. In the language of Josephus, "The Jews resembled a ship tossed by a hurricane and buffeted on both sides by the waves, while they lay in the midst of contending seas." In that century events of transcendent interest were crowded, even the birth, life, and death of Christ, the promulgation of Christianity, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the final ruin of the Jewish nation. But the Roman power that then triumphed

over the earth was a power of iron. It consolidated in one vast empire the whole civilized earth. It extended from the Caucasus to Mauritania, and from the rising to the setting of the sun. Nothing could withstand the colossal strength of the Roman legions. Greece overran the earth,—Rome conquered it. Rome itself was but a military camp, vast, resistless, and unyielding. With an energy undaunted by the greatest obstacles, the Roman armies brought under their sway the remotest regions of the earth. When Christianity was given to the world, the Roman empire had received that form of government which was best adapted to its universal diffusion. It was a government that had the energy of a republic with the broad ambition of a monarchy. Roman arms introduced civilization. Hostile nations were united under one vast power. The science and literature of the conquered were welcomed in the imperial city. Memorable was that general peace which for a short time, in the reign of Augustus Cæsar, rested upon the earth. It was fitting that the Prince of Peace should come at a time when the clash of arms was lushed, and belligerent nations took a short respite before the world was again to be given up to foreign and civil violence. Gently, almost unnoticed and unknown, did the fifth power, symbolized by the stone cut out without hands, make its appearance.

In Bethlehem of Judea there was born, in the manger of oxen, an infant. The shepherds, keeping their sheep by night, heard the song of the angels, and, guided by a star of glory, visited the little stranger. The world's Redeemer, heralded by angels, came in poverty, obscurity, and want. In a Roman palace there sat a dark-minded man. Restlessly did Herod ponder over the prophetic intimations of the mysterious king *who was to come*. The public mind was awake. The wise men of the land were looking for some great event. The suspicious Herod issues his decree. There is weeping with the mothers of Bethlehem. The savage command had had gone forth and spent its force in vain. The parents depart with the young child into Egypt, and there for thirty years dwells the Son of God. The time of his public mission

commences. For three years he becomes the great teacher of his countrymen. He works miracles to prove his divinity. He speaks the word, and the dead are raised. He heals the blind. The ears of the deaf are opened. The lepers are cleansed, and the lame are made whole. The sick in a moment are restored to health. He walks upon the waves of the sea. The winds obey his voice. Christ, our Saviour, was the world's creditor, but the world knew him not. His disciples that followed him misunderstood him. He was despised and rejected of men. But before his wisdom human malice stood abashed. Enemies innumerable surrounded his path. The chief priests and scribes seek his death. Before the Roman governor he is brought. The multitude cry out, "Not this man, but Barabbas!" A slavish fear stifles the sentiment of humanity and justice in Pilate. Christ is crucified between two thieves. Hours big with the destiny of the world roll on. The last moment comes. The words, "*it is finished*," fall from the lips of Jesus. The battle is fought and won. Christ is laid in the grave. In three days he breaks from the bondage of the tomb. Death is conquered. Our Saviour ascends to God his Father, and now begin the great victories of the kingdom of the stone.

In the survey of the early prophetic developments of the kingdom of the stone that was to appear during the existence of the four great powers of the earth, and destined to break in pieces and consume all these kingdoms, and to stand forever, let us contemplate two things as revealing God and his attributes:

1st. What is Christianity?

2d. What is the relation it sustains to the world, and its ultimate condition in the world?

"The true conception of Christianity," says Croly, "is not that of a new religion, but of an old receiving a more perfect form; the seed planted in the day of Abraham, shut up but maturing in the day of Judah, and shooting above the earth in the day of Christ; the primal faith, buried in weakness to be raised in power; the body laid in the grave with the patriarchal dispensation; the spirit existing, but separate

and viewless, in the Mosaic; the spirit and body reunited, with more vivid attributes, a nobler shape, and a perpetual existence, in the Christian. The apostles continually declare this identity of principle with the religion of Abraham. They claim expressly under the Abrahamic covenant. St. Paul, alternately astonished at the dullness and indignant at the prejudice which could doubt that he himself was a champion of the true national religion, cries out, 'For the hope of Israel am I bound with this chain.' He unhesitatingly accounts for the reluctance of the Jews to adopt Christianity, not on ground that they were wedded to the religion of Abraham, but that they had substituted another in its place; and loftily denies their claim to the very title of Israelite: 'all are not Israel that are of Israel.' Peter, like the preachers of righteousness in the days before the flood, warns the Jews of the ruin which is the inevitable consequence of their *apostasy* from the primal faith; and our Lord himself, in the most distinct, detailed, and impressive declaration of divine wrath ever given, first charges the people with revolt from the spirit of this faith, and then pronounces the coming of that deluge of fire and sword which was to extirpate the being of the nation as the result of the crime."

Thus, it will be seen that Christianity in its spirit was essentially the same with the religion of the patriarchal and Mosaic dispensations. But in what respects did it differ? Just as the full development of a tree differs from its infancy and early youth; just as the body of the child differs from the maturity of a man. The primal faith had existed from the fall; it lived in the hearts of the good of antediluvian times; it inspired the devotions of the early patriarchs; it assumed a national, visible form in the Mosaic economy; it took upon itself a more glorious shape in the Christian dispensation. Old as the world, it called upon man in every age to recognize the great truth of God infinite in justice, goodness, and mercy. But in the Christian dispensation gleams of vivid light revealed God not only in his unity, but in the threefold existence of his unity. God the Father,

God the Son, and God the Eternal Spirit were the three personal agents made known in the vast system of redemption; a mystery explaining the deep secrets of the moral universe, yet most unexplained in itself.

Thus the Christian was called upon to recognize, in his salvation, *three personal agents*,—the Father, the Redeemer, the Sanctifier, unity in trinity, trinity in unity. It was the glory of the New Testament to unfold the system of redemption so as to meet the wants of all ages and all classes, so as to reveal God in his attributes of mercy, condescension, compassion and love, in a way impossible by the light of nature. God incarnate in Christ was that mystery of mysteries that upheaved the foundations of the old world, changed the whole aspect of society, gave to man the security of a happy immortality, and disarmed death of its dread sting. The cross became the hope of millions. An empire was founded before whose victories the exploits of Alexander or Cæsar became infinitely insignificant.

Thus, the religion of Christ embodied in it every truth known before, with truths peculiarly its own. It spoke of the world to come in its spirituality and its happiness, of the resurrection, and the judgment. But Christianity in its nature was universal, and not local. It was not a religion peculiarly for the Jew, but a religion as much for the Gentile as the Jew, a religion that comprehended the world. Its very forms were simple, adapted for all ages and nations. Its whole spirit was fitted for the moral elevation of man, calling forth the exercise of every virtue, and making the heart no less happy than good. But Christianity was also the noblest development of moral freedom. So clearly did it teach the relations of man to man, and of man to God, that its reception into the heart emancipated the conscience and redeemed the soul. It brought with it the restoration of man. By making supreme the authority of God, and infallible the declarations of his word, it effectually delivered the conscience from the tyranny of man.

Thus, the gospel, wherever it made progress, and just so far as it was welcomed in its purity, laid a foundation for

true liberty such as the world had never before seen. It was not in Jerusalem that God only was to be worshiped, it was not alone to the chosen people that Christ came upon his mission of love. Wide as the world were to be the triumphs of the cross, boundless as the wants of man were to be the blessings of the gospel. Consequently, there was the development of a power immeasurably superior to Roman arms. It came in direct collision with the iron sway of the fourth kingdom. Its war was personal with pagan idolatry. It entered into no compromise with the tyranny and impurity of superstition. It was death to civil and religious despotism.

Thus a divine force was revealed,—a power that trampled into the dust the altar and the throne of paganism, a power that hurled defiance at the whole pantheon of heathen gods. Judaism was local, and could not call forth the same hostility of superstition; Christianity was universal, and essentially aggressive. Consequently, superstition and Christianity could not live together. The triumph of one was the death of the other. The world had either to exterminate Christianity or to corrupt it. It could not exist in its purity in alliance with superstition. Hence the reason for its hatred, and those fierce battles that were fought to stay its progress. Christianity is especially to man the highest development of the character of God. Christ was God manifest in the flesh; his humanity shot forth vivid gleams of light that unveiled the heart of the Deity himself. The disclosures of truth are far greater in the New than in the Old Testament. Christ impersonated the virtues of God. In him purity, love, compassion, truth, were divinely embodied. The virtues of Christ were virtues subjected to the severest trials, virtues godlike and infinite. The character of God was represented to man so sensibly that Christ himself was declared to be the express image of the Father. In him was a revelation of goodness such alone as reigns in the heart of God. In him was mercy delineated such as God alone could manifest. In him was love expressed whose depth was infinite,—love boundless as the great ocean of eternity, love vast as the universe, love not only re-

vealed in glory, not only resplendent upon its throne of dominion, love not only grand as heralded by angels and sweet as the music of heaven's choir, but love in suffering, love groaning beneath the terrors of divine law, love expiring upon the cross, love resting itself in the grave of man. Here was a development of God such as the world had never before seen,—a development of God in his condescension, whose mystery the angels desire to look into. It is not abstract virtue, but impersonated virtue, that most moves the heart of man; virtue sensible, virtue in action, virtue in trial, virtue a living embodiment of thought, feeling, purpose, will, and affection. Such was the virtue of Christ; such, in Christ, is the image of the Father. Thus the attributes of God, through Christ, are revealed with a distinctness such as most sensibly to influence the mind of man. As accountable beings, the knowledge of the moral attributes of God is inconceivably more valuable than the knowledge of his moral attributes. The knowledge of God made known to us in the Old and New Testaments is to us of the highest possible importance. In the inspired oracles all the light of nature is confirmed, and in addition to that light there is a development of the character of God that affects our condition for two worlds. It is not the fact that the Bible reveals life and immortality to man, that makes it a gift of the noblest value, but it is because God, in our relation to him, is there shown to us in the threefold office of Father, Redeemer, and Sanctifier. It is not because heaven is unveiled resplendent in purity and glory, but because a way is shown to us by which we may reach heaven. It is not because divine justice is seen with sanctions vast as the universe, and law comprehensive as God himself, but because an atonement for sin is provided which, through faith in the great Mediator, can save unto the uttermost those who believe and repent of sin.

What, then, is the relation Christianity sustains to the world, and what its ultimate condition in the world? Christianity, in its origin, nature, power, and success, involves in its existence the noblest development of God and his attributes. It is Christianity that gives peculiar brightness, as

well as distinctness, to the moral character of God. Let us, then, consider the relation Christianity sustains to the world, and its ultimate condition in the world. Christianity and the world lying in sin are antagonistic forces. The one is natural, the other supernatural; the one is temporal, the other spiritual. How, then, is Christianity to exist in the world? It can only exist by the subjugation to itself of the world. Two powers so opposite in their nature can never coalesce. Does not the prophetic history of the four kingdoms of the earth coming in contact with the fifth kingdom of the stone, reveal this? How can two forces so opposite in their character and manifestation unite?

The relation, then, Christianity sustains to the world must be the relation of hostility to the development of all sin. But sin develops itself in the individual and collectively in the nation. It is revealed in the person, and in the mass the aggregate of persons. Its action is twofold, forgetfulness of God and evil toward man; the heart wrong with the Deity and wrong with our fellow-men. The external development of sin toward God is shown in false religions and no religion, in superstition and infidelity. The former includes the endless forms of delusion by which the conscience is bound, the liberty of the soul encroached upon, and the open vices of impurity, cruelty, and religious slavery deified. Superstition inverts all moral distinctions. It degrades virtues into vices, and exalts vices into virtues. But infidelity, in throwing off the shackles of superstition, throws off also all subordination to God. It acknowledges no God to control the life, and to whose obedience the heart should submit. Its highest authority is itself. Its only idol is the uncontrolled gratification of its desires. Thus, both superstition and infidelity embody those sins that make war directly with the supreme authority of God; both result in man's highest ruin, while each secures it in a different way. Superstition undeifies the Creator; infidelity deifies the creature. Superstition drags God down to the low level of man and even to the beasts that perish; infidelity arrogates for man that which only God can have. Superstition dwells in low marshes and stagnant pools where

a deadly miasma perpetually ascends; infidelity makes its home in frozen regions where all life and vegetation die out. Superstition is the nurse of ignorance and sensuality; infidelity of presumption and pride. Superstition enchains the reason; infidelity maddens it. The one reduces human nature to abject servility; the other drives it into senseless arrogance. Superstition erects its throne upon the conscience blind and brutish; infidelity, upon the conscience conceited and foolish. The one refuses to exercise the reason God has given to man; the other refuses to submit the reason where alone reason can become reasonable.

What is especially the development of sin toward man? Sin exists under all those forms of vice toward man that conscience so instinctively pronounces to be wrong. Thus, it reveals itself in oppression, in envy, hatred, malice, avarice, wastefulness, and all unlawful gratification of the appetites and the passions. Must not Christianity, then, be at war with all the developments of sin? Must it not in its influence be a spiritual power, creating in man a true recognition of God, and a true love to man? Must it not be an agency bringing the world, wherever it exists, into harmony with God, and the obedience of virtue? But its ultimate condition in the world can only be known by the revelation of God to man. Is the Bible such a revelation? Then the question is settled: admit its truth,—admit that it gives to us a higher manifestation of the character of God, his moral government, and the purposes of his scheme of redemption than the light of nature can or does make known,—admit that history confirms its great facts, that Christianity is a divine reality,—and at once we must come to the conclusion that the final triumph of Christianity is certain; just as certain as the word of God.

Let, then, the world roll on,—let, like the raging sea, the nations be troubled,—let nature open her storehouse of tempests and the elements be confounded together. Yet the war shall not be forever. Freedom shall not always groan in chains, or the altars of superstition be red with blood. Infidelity shall not forever scourge the earth, nor despotism crush

the nations into the dust. God may not constantly be forgotten in his works, nor the creature be deified at the expense of the Creator. The fifth kingdom is to stand forever, its power is never to end. The cross must yet triumph over pagan lands, and Christianity reign from pole to pole. Nature is yet to reveal with greater loveliness the power of God, and earth to smile with the nobler beauty of his wisdom. The moral excellence of God is yet to flash with brighter light from the sacred page, and God in his goodness is to be made known with far more vivid clearness. Nature and revelation shall then unite with greater glory their beams of light, and both shall speak of the mercy of God to man forever.

Then with truth, in the significant words of Gilfillan, it can be said that "the prophecies of all genuine poets since the world began shall have a living fulfillment in the general countenance and heart of man. Nor shall the spirit of progress and aspiring change be extinct. To meet the new discoveries below, and the new stars and constellations flashing down always from the infinite above, or drawing nearer, or becoming brighter in the mystic dance of the heavens, men's minds must arise in sympathy and brighten in unison. Who shall picture what the state of society, and what the progress of human souls, at that astronomical era when the Cross shall shine in our southern heaven, and the Lyre shall include our polar star amid its burning strings? Must there not then break forth from our orb a voice of song, holier than Amphion's, sweeter than all Orphean measures, comparable to that fabled melody by which the spheres were said to attune their motions; comparable say rather to that nobler song wherewith when earth, a stranger, first appeared in the sky, she was saluted by the morning stars singing together, and all the sons of God shouting for joy?"

CHAPTER XXI.

THE DIFFICULTIES OF SKEPTICISM.

It is wise to inquire of any system of skepticism that discards the Bible, what it proposes as a substitute for Christianity.

The Bible comes to us embodying a religion of facts, a statement not only of principles, but of events, based upon the authority of God, with those evidences that invite our investigation and challenge our belief. It has been seen that man as an intellectual and moral being, as possessing conscience, reason, and affections, has certain wants in his nature, as in his body, that demand their appropriate food. Those spiritual wants demand, like the body, that which shall satisfy them, that which shall fill the vast capacity of the human heart, and heal the moral disease that sin has introduced into the soul. The Bible comes to man professing to be a divine remedy, and giving the credentials of its heavenly origin. It consists of two divisions: that which pertains to theology or to belief, and that which is comprehended in ethics or practice. It teaches us first what we are to believe, and then what we are to do.

What, then, is the relation that the Bible sustains to human reason? Here is the point at which skepticism enters upon its diverging road; here commences the issue between infidelity and Christianity. The ground taken in the Bible in relation to human reason is simply this: here are certain facts in respect to God, his moral government, and a system of redemption, and certain facts in relation to man, his past, present, and future condition; and here are the evidences to show that what the Bible demands as necessary to believe and practice are not only true, but have a divine sanction. What the Bible demands of human reason is, that

those evidences to show it from God should be carefully examined and treated with candor. For this purpose the Bible presents its varied kinds of evidence to every faculty of the mind and every susceptibility of the nature. The question it puts to the reason is, Do not these evidences prove the Scriptures divine? Can adaptation, prophecy, miracles, the truth of Christ's mission from God, be denied? Can its moral excellence, its suitableness for the everyday duties of life, be questioned?

The province of reason, then, is to examine the credentials of the Bible, to decide the question of their genuineness, to come to a definite conclusion whether one or all of them do not show the Scriptures to be from God. In connection with human reason is the conscience, whose duty it is to decide upon the right or wrong of things. The fact that the evidences of the Bible appeal to the conscience is a proof of its rightness, of its harmony with virtue and all moral excellence. The only question, then, to decide is, Does not the Bible give sufficient evidence to prove it from God? Can the reason and the conscience deny the varied arguments to prove the Bible from God? Remember, every evidence the Bible presents to the mind to show it from God must be received or shown false. If the skeptic denies the evidences, his reason must be good for that denial; he must show that his objections are sufficient to authorize the rejection of the Bible. If he cannot thus do, if the evidences are valid to prove the Bible the word of God, then the question is settled. All that reason has to do is to believe and submit.

For the reason to sit in judgment upon the facts of revelation, to object to this or that event or statement on account of the incomprehensible, the mysterious, or the difficult connected with those facts, while the Bible is confessed to be from God, shows not merely presumption, but absurdity. What is the course the Bible takes with the reason, and the relation it sustains to it? It presents the credentials of its divine authority, demands their examination by the reason and conscience, and then, upon the ground of the validity of its claims, requires that its facts should be believed in and

its duties practiced. Is it not right that God should say what he pleases, and reasonable that man, when good evidence is given, should believe what is said? The question is not, Are we to believe in what we cannot understand? but, Should not facts recorded in the Bible be believed in, whatever may be the mystery connected with those facts? Here it is that skepticism dissents from a proposition so plain. It takes the ground that the reason should decide not only upon the evidences of a divine revelation, but upon the *facts* of a divine revelation. It assumes that reason should pass judgment upon every Bible fact, and receive or reject every recorded fact according as it suits the reason or does not suit it. What is the result? The ground of infallibility is shifted at once from revelation to reason. It is not revelation that is infallible, but reason; not the facts of the Bible that are to be received, but the philosophy of those facts that must be inquired into. Instead of reason submitting to the standard of the Bible, the Bible must submit to the standard of reason. What it approves of is true, what it does not approve of is false. What it likes is to be received, what it dislikes rejected. Consequently, the only authority to be relied upon is the reason. Instead of the Bible being a guide to the reason, the reason is a guide to the Bible. It is the judge not only of the evidences, but even of the facts, of the Bible, and this book before the reason must assume the same attitude as any uninspired production. Skepticism, commencing with this fundamental error, is compelled, however reluctant, into another.

Human reason being the only infallible authority, and assuming to sit in judgment upon the facts of revelation with their philosophy, it follows that every man's reason as to what should be believed and practiced in the Bible is his own exclusive master and sole authority. Thus, after shifting the infallibility of the Scriptures to human reason, it gives no better rule of judgment than the endless diversities of every man's reason. Every difference of opinion is right if the reason thinks so, and to be believed in if the reason assents to it. One man rejects this fact because of its mys-

tery, another that statement on account of its incomprehensibility. This precept is absurd because it does not suit the feelings, and that command of God is unsuitable because of its harshness. Thus, instead of the Bible regulating our feelings and reason, they must both be called upon to regulate the Bible. It is not enough that the Bible gives evidences to prove it from God to the reason and the conscience, but reason must also decide, even upon recorded facts, what are to be received and what rejected.

Consider, now, the difficulties skepticism brings upon itself when it assumes this standard. By elevating reason *above its sphere*, it degrades it *in its sphere*. When reason submits to revelation, both move together harmoniously. Reason finds in revelation an infallible guide upon subjects of the deepest value to human interests. Revelation comes to reason as a friend; it urges it to walk in that way that secures its lasting benefit. Thus united in one bond of friendship, reason becomes ennobled, it enlarges itself to its glorious teachings, and grows wise unto salvation; but in the other case reason becomes of necessity the enemy of revelation. They are at issue upon a vital point. Reason demands of revelation that which it will not submit to, and revelation demands of reason that which it rejects. What is the consequence? As God's word is greater than human reason, so in a drawn battle between the two the weaker side must be crushed. Here is the issue. The Bible will not go down to the level of the reason, and the reason will not come up to the standard of the Bible. Revelation will not be the servant of reason, nor reason the servant of revelation. Consequently, all the blessings of a revelation from God must be lost to the reason. What are the benefits skepticism secures by such an unnatural warfare? It is proper that after it presumes to be wiser than revelation it should show its superiority by the greater blessings it bestows. What are those blessings? One is, every man should believe what facts of the Bible he thinks best, and perform what duties he pleases. Our reason is our only infallible standard, and if it blows every day round the compass, we must go with it. Thus does skepti-

eism force us upon a boundless sea of uncertainty and doubt. Reason, throwing, like a mad mariner, the chart and compass overboard, floats upon the waters at the mercy of every gale, and exposed to every quicksand and rock. What, then, does skepticism gain by making a Lucifer out of reason and exalting it into a god? Having seated itself upon the throne of revelation, what good does it secure to reason by thus pampering its pride? Here is sin, with its countless evils, in the world. Here is conscience, accusing of sin. Here are the upbraidings of remorse and the exposure to punishment. Let the reason of the skeptic assure us how we may escape punishment, avert all evils, and secure our highest welfare in this world and the next. But can he do it? Alas! while reason rejects the Bible, it has no ark to save us from the deluge. Flying from revealed to natural religion, it loses all the benefits of the former and secures no certainty in the latter. Driven over a wild ocean of doubt, it is tossed by every billow, only to be engulfed when hope expires and happiness finds an eternal grave. The greatest difficulty of skepticism is, it makes no provision for the highest want of our nature. That want is, some infallible authority revealing facts that shall satisfy the conscience, regulate the affections, and guide the reason. Certainly that infallibility cannot lie in the reason; for it is liable to error, and subject to endless differences of opinion. If infallibility is to be found anywhere, it must be in the Bible; and as such the reason must submit to revelation or suffer the consequences of its rejection. Now, the reason, by presuming to pass judgment upon the facts of the Bible, by not contenting itself with the evidences, but assuming to admit only such facts as suit the mind, leads to the virtual denial of any higher authority than its own, and therefore makes itself infallible rather than the Scriptures. Thus skepticism denies to man his greatest want, that which he needs most deeply, and substitutes for heaven's light the false fire that but dazzles to mislead. For certainty it gives doubt, and exchanges the bread of eternal life for a scorpion or a stone. Man, feeble, erring, sinful, and unhappy, is flattered with a profane idea of his

godlike reason, and instructed in the art of believing in everything else rather than those immutable truths that bear upon their face the impress of the Deity. Thus skepticism, having deprived the reason of its noblest security and best friend, sends it, a homeless fugitive, to wander where night never ends and toil is forever destitute of hope or joy.

Consider, also, another great difficulty of skepticism. On account of the incomprehensibility of the Bible, or the mystery of its facts, or their unpleasantness to the feelings, the reason rejects revelation and suffers itself to be led alone by its own standard. But when it comes to the works of nature, when it considers the endless variety of the things of earth, it encounters that which is equally mysterious or incomprehensible. Reason does not escape from that in nature which it finds in the word of God. Here are obstacles as great to be surmounted, facts as dark to be explained, and wonders as mysterious as meet the mind in revelation. Why does not the skeptic take the same liberty with the facts of nature that he indulges himself with when he comes to the Bible? Why does not he use the same argument with nature as with revelation? If the incomprehensible in the Bible is to be rejected, why not that in nature? If the skeptic must lower revelation down to his standard, why not the works of nature? There are other mysterious facts than those found in the Bible. The skeptic walks in a world of mystery. The incomprehensible surrounds him wherever he may go, and does he think any objection will hold good against revelation that is equally valid against nature? Can he believe in one, and for the same reason disbelieve the other? If the reason of the skeptic will not reject the facts of nature on account of their mystery, why does he presume upon the ground of the incomprehensible to reject the facts of revelation?

But there is another difficulty that encounters the skeptic. He cannot divorce the ethics of the Bible from its doctrines, or its morality from its facts; they stand or fall together. If he receives the one, he must receive the other; if he practices the duties of the Bible, he must believe its facts; or if from the heart he believes the facts, he must practice the duties.

The reason is obvious. The duties of the Bible grow out of the facts and are founded upon them. Repentance rests upon the revealed fact of an atonement; love to God, upon his personal existence and attributes; faith, upon the character of Christ; and all the virtues enjoined in the Bible, upon motives that spring directly from the belief of the mind in recorded facts. Thus the ethics and the facts of the Bible are so intimately blended that the reason is compelled to submit to both, if it is willing to submit to either. Another difficulty of skepticism is, that it removes the best standard of virtue and the highest incentive to moral excellence, without affording any equivalent. What better standard of virtue than the precepts of the Bible? What higher authority than the word of God, or greater motives to a good life than the sanctions of revelation? What is the authority of skepticism?

The reply is, reason. But what one reason declares true another reason declares false, and what one decides to be virtuous another contends is vicious. Thus, the reason that needs itself a standard to go by is compelled to invent one without revelation, which satisfies neither itself nor any other reason. Nor is the reason any better off in telling us what we should practice; having disowned the Bible, it is driven to a fabrication of a code of morals without it. But here it is at a perfect loss what to do. It certainly enjoins no duties so good or so numerous. It cannot improve upon the morals of revelation, nor recommend a single virtue not found in the word of God. Thus the skeptic's code of morals is as poor as Pharaoh's lean kine, and introduces a worse famine in morality than ever visited the land of Egypt. But skepticism in its duties has no sanctions. The duties of the Bible have the authority of God and motives that embrace three worlds. Here are sanctions that come with impressive weight to the mind and address every susceptibility of our nature,—sanctions wide as the universe, and binding in their obligation upon every heart. But what sanctions has the skeptic's code of morals? Discarding the facts and duties of the Bible, where is the obligation to conform to the morals of the infi-

del? Where, with no revealed will of God, is the binding power of the ethics of skepticism? Thus, when we ask of the skeptic what we are to believe and what we are to do, we find that our belief must be without certainty, and our duty without obligation.

Finally, skepticism has in it no unity of belief, no harmony of sentiment, and no consistency of practice. Of the three kinds of skepticism that are comprehended in atheism, pantheism, and deism, where is the unity of one system with itself, or the harmony of all three united? Among the endless divisions and subdivisions of these systems, who does not know that skeptics are as inconsistent in their theories as in their practice, and that, having rejected the infallibility of the Bible, they suffer as the consequence the endless fallibility of themselves? The atheist believes in no God; the pantheist confounds God with his works, and calls nature and law God; while the deist believes in a personal God at the same time that he denies the Bible as a revelation from God. Thus the atheist is at war with the deist, and the pantheist at war with both, and while all agree in doing away with the Bible, they show the consistency of the brotherhood in contending with each other. Every new school of skeptics is opposed to that which preceded it, and no sooner does one kind of unbelief die out than another is found to take its place. Thus does skepticism, assuming as many colors as a rainbow, pass away to return again when there turns up anything to favor its pretensions.

Reason, that submitting to revelation would become ennobled, and grow with the strength of an angel, and be the handmaid of virtue, and roam over heaven's fields, and exercise itself with a seraph's thoughts, and have the joy of God and the peace of Christ, by the rejection of the Bible, flutters like a wounded bird in the air, or wanders as a homeless voyager over an unknown sea of doubt and delusion.

Thus, when we view every system of skepticism that discards revelation, we find that the skeptic, by attempting to exalt reason above its sphere, in reality degrades it within its sphere. The skeptic, possessing no unity of belief or con-

sistency of practice, can promise nothing better than the disquietude of doubt or the blind submission of superstition. Having no agreement in himself, and no harmony with others, the skeptic carries an element in his heart of wretchedness, that will but increase in strength with every perversion of reason and abuse of conscience.

If no other objection could be raised against skepticism than its want of all unity and its perpetual disagreement, that in itself should be enough for reason to renounce it. But when, with this, its danger, its fearful difficulties, and its inutility are taken into the account, how much more powerful the motive for a cordial rejection !

Well said Rousseau of his infidel brethren, "I have consulted our philosophers; I have read their books; I have examined their opinions. I find them all proud, positive, and dogmatic, even in their pretended skepticism,—knowing everything and proving nothing. If you count the number of them, each one is reduced to himself; they unite but to dispute."

CHAPTER XXII.

THE UNREASONABLENESS OF SKEPTICISM.

MAN possesses a physical, an intellectual, and a moral nature; but it is man's moral nature that peculiarly distinguishes him from the brutes, and the elevation of which is the chief end of the Bible. Consequently, our physical and intellectual condition holds a vastly inferior position in the Bible to the moral state of man. It is this which the Bible seeks chiefly to benefit, since the highest ruin of sin lies in man's moral nature. In what way, then, can man, as a moral being, be most benefited by a revelation from God? Is it by a revelation exclusively for the intellect, to gratify chiefly the curiosity of the mind, or by a revelation that shall more intimately adapt itself to the wants of our moral nature? Evidently, the latter. The Bible has a far higher end than simply to gratify human curiosity. It exalts virtue above mind and duty above knowledge. The chief excellence of the Scripture consists in its adaptation to man's moral nature. It seeks, first of all, to elevate man in the noblest part of his being, to make him a partaker of the purity of heaven and an associate with holy angels. Such being the great end of revelation, let the skeptic tell us what better end the Bible could reveal, or what nobler method it could devise of securing its end, than it has done. If the skeptic can improve upon the Bible, let him tell us how he can thus do. Would he consult more the interests of man's physical and intellectual nature? would he gratify more the curiosity of man in respect to the mode or the reasons of the great facts of revelation? But could this be done unless at the expense of our moral nature? Could any wiser course be taken than has been done, in respect to the bettering of man's moral state? What better rule of obligation, or more impressive

sanctions to enforce it, could the skeptic devise, if to him it was left to invent a code of morals or, a law of duty? The skeptic must admit that man's moral nature is superior to his intellectual, and that if a revelation is given to benefit man it must be chiefly directed to bettering his moral state or making him more virtuous and good. Such being the case, the intellect must hold an inferior position to the heart, and to cultivate virtue rather than mind should be the great end of a revelation from God to sinners; and thus we find it. But the very thing which is the chief recommendation of the Bible is that which the skeptic most stumbles at. The skeptic treats with contempt the Bible because such a fact is difficult to comprehend, or such a doctrine is hard to understand, or the reasons for such a statement of truth are not given. In one place the Bible is too puerile; in another, too abstruse. Here its repetition is objected to, and there its conciseness. In one part its simplicity is found fault with; in another, its obscurity. The skeptic complains that his intellect is not fully satisfied by the Bible; that he cannot understand all the doctrines or comprehend many of the facts of revelation. Suppose this may all be true with the skeptic, what does it amount to? Is the Bible only given for the intellect? Is it to gratify simply the curiosity of man that God reveals his word? Is the superior part of man to be neglected in order to gratify the mind? Is the intelligence to be worshiped at the expense of virtue? Is knowledge to be preferred to duty?

It is the glory of the Bible that while it satisfies all the just demands of the mind, it yet does not sacrifice the moral nature to the intellectual. The skeptic makes this highest excellence of the Bible the reason for its rejection. He comes to it alone as a book addressed to the mind; he reads it as he would read a work upon science and mathematics, or a treatise upon philosophy or history. It does not enter his mind that, superior as may be its intellectual merit, its chief excellence consists in the fact that it consults infinitely more the moral state of man than his mental condition; that to renew the heart and life is vastly more its object than to

impart knowledge. Such being the end of revelation, how unreasonable are the objections of the skeptic! This is more evident when we consider that the real difficulty lies not in the mind of the skeptic, but in his heart. The Bible reveals enough for all practical purposes, and is clear enough for all duty.

There is nothing in the Bible that the reason can suitably object to, and nothing that is unfriendly to the highest exercise of the mind. It forbids no investigation, nor disapproves of any proper exercise of the intellect. Why, then, does the skeptic object to the Bible? He cannot devise any better remedy for sin, any nobler inducements to virtue, any higher rewards for goodness; he cannot show a safer road to heaven, or a clearer path to happiness; he cannot say that we ought not to love God with our whole heart, or that we should not obey his law, or believe upon Christ his Son, or repent of sin, or perform every duty that conscience responds to in revelation. Why, then, does the skeptic continue objecting to the Bible? Does the reason lie so much in the mind as in the heart? In all moral duties what we dislike we uniformly misrepresent; and this is precisely the condition of the skeptic. He misrepresents the facts of the Bible because he dislikes the duties of the Bible; he makes a stumbling-block of his intellect because his heart is wrong. Can anything be more unreasonable? The Bible presents itself embodying every duty needful for practice, and every fact essential for belief. It demands a reception from motives addressed to our highest interests for two worlds; it comes to secure for us our noblest welfare in all that relates to body and soul. Its great end is to make us wiser, better, and happier, to impart a salvation such as God alone can give and alone can fully comprehend.

Under such circumstances, does not the difficulty of the skeptic rest rather upon a wrong state of heart than of mind? So long as his objections lead him to the rejection of the Bible, can he practice its duties? Can he obey the precepts of the Bible while he disbelieves its doctrines? Can he be a lover of its morality while he is uninfluenced by its sanctions?

If he considers the Bible unworthy the belief of the mind, is it strange that he should deny it the love of the heart?

The unreasonableness of the skeptic is also seen in that he cannot prove false the great facts of the Bible, even were they not made known in the Bible. Those facts may be divided into two classes: truths to be believed in, and duties to practice. Let us look at the first class of facts. Consider the two states of future happiness and future misery. Can the skeptic prove these facts untrue, even if not revealed in the Bible? Can reason show them impossible, even if not a word had been written in respect to those two states of existence? The Bible did not invent these separate states of being. The Bible records them as facts, but it had nothing to do with the making of them. Their existence would have been equally as true had no information been imparted in respect to their reality. The Bible acts the part of a chart that reveals to the mariner the port of safety and the rocks that endanger the vessel; but is that to be considered a defect which with one hand points out our ruin, and the other our security?

Consider also the character of God, who is revealed as our moral Governor, a Being of infinite perfection, immutable in his purposes, alike omnipresent in his existence and omniscient in his knowledge. But the character of God was the same before the Bible was written as since. His moral government possessed, millions of ages ago, the same elements of durability, of certainty, of wisdom, of goodness, and of strength, that they now have.

If, again, we consider the facts in respect to the threefold existence of God, the divine atonement of Christ, and the operations of the Eternal Spirit, we arrive at the same conclusion. The Bible makes known truths that would be equally realities even if not recorded upon the inspired page. Consider also the second class of truths that comprehend the duties of the Bible. The truths that are comprised in the great law of moral obligation, which the reason and conscience declare as right and suitable for man, which speak of human liberty and human responsibility, which re-

gard man as a moral and accountable being, which point to reward and punishment for human conduct, would not be less true even if there was no revelation from God. Our liberty and our responsibility commenced with our moral agency. The great law of obligation that binds us to the service of God, that imposes upon us duties to our Creator and to man, that treats us as endowed with conscience to discriminate right from wrong, and with liberty to act as free agents, did not owe its origin to the Bible. This is a fact that revelation makes clearer, but can never create. It is as indestructible as our own existence, as permanent as our moral nature, and as certain as God himself.

In our infidelity we may cheat ourselves into the belief that man is compelled by necessity as absolute as that of a machine to act always as he does act,—or we may, with the pantheist, confound God with nature and make man a part of God, a strict emanation of his essential being, and thus by a different road arrive at the same negation of moral obligation as the advocate of necessity,—or, with the mystic, we may contend that we are only the passive recipients of influences which we can neither avert nor control,—or, with the skeptic, we may deny the certainty of all knowledge and attempt to destroy the foundation of all human belief, and thus equally with the advocate of necessity, the pantheist, and the mystic, aim to make false or useless the law of obligation, and seek to absolve man from his highest duty,—and yet the law of obligation would still remain, the eternal principle of right and wrong would be unaffected. God's government would be as immutable as before, and conscience, true to its high origin, would give its verdict in favor of divine justice and the rightful claim of God upon the obedience of the heart. Thus, let the mind cover itself with sophistry,—let the reason try ever so hard to prove false to itself,—let the heart, impatient of good restraint, treat the Bible as a fable, and obey no other voice than that of passion or of selfishness,—and yet, amid the ever-changing forms of error, or tossed ever so madly upon the sea of delusion, there still would rest upon the soul the same undeviating law of duty, and the same eternal account-

ability to God. Thus, Bible or no Bible, human responsibility with human liberty would go together, and duty and virtue would ever remain to bind man to his Maker and his fellow-man. How unreasonable, then, to find fault with the facts of revelation, which only reveal more clearly the truths of nature!

The unreasonableness of skepticism is also seen in that the most it can pretend to is that it is a system of doubt, and not of evidence. The skeptic doubts the facts of the Bible,—he doubts its truth, its divine origin, its harmony, its excellence and proffered remedy for sin; but he cannot give good reasons for his doubts,—he cannot offer any proof to convince the mind of the validity of his doubts,—he cannot show evidence that he is right and that all who believe the Bible are wrong. The most he can do is to work his own mind into error or plunge deeper into self-delusion; he may consider himself as an irresponsible being, or his soul as mortal as his body, or his only duty to live in obedience to passion or selfishness,—he may consider as visionary God's law, and unreal the claims of his moral government,—he may look upon Christianity as an imposture, and the atonement of Christ as a delusion,—he may imagine himself absolved from every duty of Christianity,—he may doubt the existence even of God, or confound his personality with nature,—he may acknowledge no higher law than his own pleasure, and deride any idea of a judgment to come,—and yet his doubts are doubts without proof,—doubts that conscience disowns, and which reason, if true to itself, declares baseless,—doubts that can bear no investigation, and which vanish as darkness before the sunlight of truth. If the skeptic could only offer something better than doubt,—if his objections could be proved or his infidelity shown reasonable,—the case would be different. It would be another thing if he could give some substitute for what he rejects, or make peaceful that heart whose faith he has destroyed; but when for confidence he gives distrust, and for hope despair,—when he destroys the noblest security of man, and brings midnight over his brightest prospects,—it is then that skepticism is seen to be no less deplorable in its delusion than miserable in its end.

The unreasonableness of the skeptic is seen in the war he institutes with his conscience and moral nature. There is that in man that calls loudly for a religious faith. There is a perceived want in our nature that must have something to satisfy it. Man restlessly turns away from a chaos of doubt. Doubt itself is a ceaseless source of trouble; it is foreign to all peace of mind and all true happiness. The doubter feels himself miserable; he finds in his own heart an unending source of disquietude. To be ever doubting and never coming to the knowledge of the truth is the very life of skepticism. As such, it must be at war with conscience and the moral nature. Both demand some foundation to rest upon. They are not content to be at the mercy of every idle wind of error or the sport of every shifting current. With human liberty there awakens in the mind a sense of accountability ever coextensive with the perception of freedom. Conscience speaks of right and wrong, of duty to God and man. No sophistry can stifle the war we wage with our highest welfare for two worlds.

As right belief is intimately associated with right practice, so we must believe the Bible, or we cannot practice its duties. We must have faith in its doctrines, or we never will obey its precepts. The skeptic who gives himself up to doubt must, if the Bible is true, be at war with himself; he enters into a controversy with his own nature, where his endless doubts allow him neither stability nor safety.

If the skeptic realizes his situation, he must be unhappy; his nature demands some foundation for his doubts, and he cannot show it; his reason demands some evidence of his unbelief, and he is unable to give it; his conscience importunes him to obey the truth, and he refuses to listen to its voice. Thus does the skeptic raise in his own heart a strife that must last as long as his doubts; he carries about in his own heart a judge that will, whenever interrogated, decide against him. The evil of the skeptic is not that he doubts because sufficient evidence is not given for the facts of the Bible, but because all evidence is not given; his unbelief rests not upon reason, but upon the want of it.

Does the skeptic consider how finite must be his mind, how limited the range of his observation? Does he consider that every day he believes in what passes about him, upon the slightest evidence, while he rejects the Bible upon the greatest? Does he think upon the limitation of his knowledge and the infinitude of that universe that opens up to his inspection? Is the skeptic aware how wide the space that exists between him and God, how measureless the distance between the creature and the Creator? Does he feel, as he should feel, what interests he endangers by the rejection of the Bible? Can he realize the magnitude of his loss with no faith? Living, as he does, an unbeliever, does he think where unbelief will land him? When he thinks of death and what lies beyond, is it a matter of indifference how poor may be the hopes and how uncertain the foundation where rest the feet?

Does the skeptic imagine his doubts can benefit him when reason is shipwrecked and conscience abused? Is he confident of safety while neglecting his Bible and throwing contempt upon all its provisions of mercy? Does the skeptic think his unbelief will not injure him, while it is at war with reason and conscience and can live only by the rejection of the Bible? If he feels himself accountable, should he not fear for duty neglected, truth not believed in, God disregarded, Christ unsubmitted to, heaven uncared for, an immortality of glory unsought, and the soul wandering reckless over a sea of doubt and never coming to the knowledge of the truth?

INDEX TO AUTHORS.

(555)

INDEX TO AUTHORS.

THE Theological Index, or Referenees to Works in all Departments of Religious Literature, by Howard Malcom, D.D., LL.D., is a most thorough and exhaustive work, and will be found indispensable to those who may wish to enter into an extended investigation of any of the subjects that come under the head of natural or revealed theology.

The present index is exclusively taken from that of Dr. Malcom, and is designed to assist those who may not be in possession of his valuable work. Only a small proportion of the authors who have written upon the different subjects suggested under natural and revealed theology are here referred to; but my object has been, as far as possible, to secure such a list as may be most desired by the general reader and best adapted for the object aimed at in the preparation of my book.

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 Tilene, de la Cause et de l'Origine du Pêché.
 Am. Bibl. Repos. 2d series 8:314. 10:353.
 Am. Quart. Register. 15:113.
 Balguy on Divine Rectitude.
 Bayles's Origin of Evil.
 Bays on Divine Benevolence.
 Bellamy's (Joseph) Sermons.
 Bennet on the Cause of Evil.
 Biblioth. Sac. 7:254, 479.
 Brougham's (Lord) Dissertations on Natural Theology. Diss. 3.
 Butterworth on Moral Government.
 Casaubon's Origin of Temporal Evil.
 Chalmers's Natural Theology. (On the theory of Leibnitz.)
 Christian Disciple. 1:300.
 Christian Exam 33:169.
 Christian Rev. 7:520. 8:7.
 Christmas's Sin; its Causes and Consequences.
 Cudworth's Intellectual System of the Universe.
 Clarke's (John) Boyle Lectures. 1719, 1720.
 D'Oyley's (George) Dissertations. Diss. 1.
 Duncan's (John) Philos. of Human Nature.
 Edwards (Pres.) on the Will. Part IV.
 — Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity.
 Fénelon's Philosophical Works.
 Ferguson's Principles of Moral Science.
 Fleming's Necessity not the Origin of Evil.
 Foster's (Dr. James) Sermons.
 Gales's Court of the Gentiles. Part IV. Bk. 3.
 Gilbert's (Jos.) Reply to Bennet.
 Glanvil's Lux Orientalis.
 Grove on the Wisdom of God.
 Hussey's (Christopher) Sermons.
 Jeffrey's (John) Sermons.
 Jenyns's (Soame) Enq. into the Origin of Evil.

- Johnson's (Dr. S.) Rev. of S. J.'s Enquiry.
 King's (Abp.) Origin of Evil.
 Law (E.) on the Origin of Evil.
 Lovett's Cause of Evil, Physical and Moral.
 Müller's Christian Doctrine of Sin. New Englander. 1: 110.
 Placette's Refutation of Bayle.
 Priestley's Disquisitions. Princeton Review. 14: 529.
 Shepherd's Nature and Origin of Evil.
 Smith's (John Pye) Sermons.
 Squiers's Problem Solved. (Not quite.)
 Stillfleet's Origines Sacrae. Bk. 3. ch. 3.
 Todd's (H. J.) Declarations of the Reformers.
 Universalist Quarterly. 4: 221.
 West on Moral Agency.
 Williams's Hypothesis Respecting etc.
 — Vindication of do.
 Young's Evil not from God. (One of the last and best.)
 A good key to the controversy on this subject may be found in Chis-sold's *Connection of Theology, Psychology, and Physiology*.

LIGHT OF NATURE.

- Chauvin de Religione Naturali.
 Creutzer de Leibnitii Doctrina.
 Diogenes Laertius de Vitis Philosophorum.
 Grotius de Veritate.
 Hammii Scrutatio Principii primi.
 Hansennii (Petr.) Meditationes.
 Mori (Henr.) Demonstrationes.
 — Enchiridion Ethicum.
 Pföhner, Systema Theologiæ Gentilis.
 Platonis Opera. (De Rebus divinis, etc.)
 Plutarchi Moralia.
 Poiretus de Deo.
 Proclus de Theologia Platonica.
 Puffendorf de Officiis Homini et Civis.
 Reimar's (H. S.) Naturalische Religion.
 Simon (Jules) Religion naturelle.
 Velthusii de Cultu naturali.
 Vossius de Philosophia et Philos. Sectis.
 — de Theologia Gentili.
 Waleh's (C. W. F.) Natürlichen Gottesgelehrtheit.
 Wolfii Theologia Naturalis.
 Abernethy's (John) Sermons.
 Barr's Summary of Natural Religion.
 Bates's (William) Works.
 Baxter's (Andrew) Matho.
 Blackwell's (Thos.) Sacred Scheme.
 Bourn's (Samuel) Sermons.
 Boyle Lectures for 1692, 1695, 1704, 1713, 1717, 1721, 1747, 1766, 1778, 1808, 1847.
 Boyle (Robt.) on the Veneration due to God.
 Broughton's Christianity Distinct from the Religion of Nature.
 Brown's Natural and Revealed Religion. Bk. 1.
 Bulkley (C.) on Natural Religion.
 Bushnan's Introd. to the Study of Nature.
 Calamy on the Light of Nature.
 Charnock (Stephen) on Providence.
 Cheyne's Philos. Principles of Religion.
 Christian Examiner. 52: 117.
 Christian Monthly Spectator. 4: 249. 3: 85.
 Clarke's (S.) Boyle Lectures. 1704.
 Conybeare's Defence of Revealed Religion.
 Culverwell on the Light of Nature.
 Cumberland's Laws of Nature.
 Dick's Philosophy of Religion.
 Dryden (J.) on Natural Religion.
 Duncan's (J. S.) Botano-Theology.
 Duncan's (H.) Sacred Philosophy.
 Durham's Astro-Theology.
 — Physico-Theology.
 Edwards on the Causes of Atheism.
 Ellis on the Knowledge of Divine Things.
 Erbury's Confutation of Deism.
 Fiddes's Theologia Speculativa.
 Foster's (James) Discourses on Social Virtue.
 Gardner's (James) Sermons.
 Gastrell on Natural Religion.
 Gerard's Evidences of Nat. and Rev. Religion.
 Glover's (P.) Tracts.
 Greenfield's Connection of Nat. and Rev. Religion.
 Hale's (Chief Justice) Knowledge of God.
 Hallet's Future State not proved by the Light of Nature.

- Halyburton's Insufficiency of Natural Religion.
 Harris's Eight Sermons on the Being of God.
 Hey's (Dr. John) Lectures.
 Hume's Dialogues on Natural Religion.
 Jack's Mathematical Theology.
 Kames (Lord) on Natural Religion.
 Law's (W.) Theory of Religion.
 Mackay's Progress of the Intellect.
 Mole's Obligations of Natural Religion.
 Morehead's Dialogues.
 Nye on Natural and Revealed Religion.
 Orr's (J.) Theory of Religion.
 Parker's Defence of Natural and Revealed Religion.
 Peabody's (A. P.) Lowell Institute Lectures, 1864.
 Ramsay's Principles of Religion.
 Scott's Christian Life. Part II.
 Sherlock on Providence.
 Simon on Nat. Religion. Trans. by Marsden.
 Squiers's Natural and Revealed Religion.
 Stanley's Lives of the Philosophers.
 Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae.
 Sturm's Reflections on the Works of God.
 Stuyne's Salvation by Christ Alone.
 Sykes's Connection of Nat. and Rev. Religion.
 Taylor's (Jer.) Ductor Dubitantium. — Necessity of Faith in Christ.
 Tenison against Hobbes.
 Totham's Scale of Truth.
 Tucker's Light of Nature Pursued. (Profound and clear. First published under the name of Edward Search.)
 Tunstall's Natural and Revealed Religion.
 Twell's Vindic. of the Gospel of Matthew.
 Tytler's Essays on Important Subjects.
 Watson's Popular Evidences of Nat. Religion.
 Watts's (Isaac) Berry Street Sermons.
 Wayland's Elements of Moral Science.
 Whiston's Astronomical Principles of Religion.
 Willatts on the Religion of Nature.
 Wilson's (Jos.) Letters on Religion. (A good introduction to Butler's Analogy.)

LIMITATIONS OF HUMAN THOUGHT.

- Abercrombie's Intellectual Powers.
 Baker's Reflections upon Learning.
 Balguy's (John) Discourses.
 Bourn's (Samuel) Sermons.
 Boyle's Use of Reason in Religion.
 Brown's Procedure and Extent of the Human Understanding.
 [Calamy (Ed.)] Philologus's Use and Abuse of Reason.
 Campbell (Abp.) on the Necessity of Revelation.
 Clark's (John) Office of Reason in Religion.
 Croft's Bampton Lectures. 1786.
 Curry's Confirmation of Faith.
 Davies's (J.) Estimate of the Human Mind.
 Eclectic Review. 1859: 225.
 Ellis's Knowledge of Divine Things.
 Ferguson's Interest of Reason in Religion.
 Gale's Court of the Gentiles. Part III.
 Gilderdale on Natural Religion.
 Glanvill's Vanity of Dogmatizing.
 Holden's (Lawrence) Sermons.
 Letters between Ant. Tuckey and B. Whichcot.
 Manning's (James) Sermons.
 Manningham's Use of Speculative Philosophy in Religion.
 Mansel's Bampton Lectures. 1858.
 Nelson's (G.) Use of Human Reason.
 Newton's (Bp.) Dissertations.
 Norris's Mysteries of Christianity. Princeton Review. 32: 648.
 Rust on the Use of Reason.
 Sharp's (Abp.) Sermons.
 Smith's True Method of Obtaining Divine Knowledge.
 Stephen's Human Nature Delineated.
 Stone's (Edward) Sermons.
 Tuckey's Letters.
 Twinning's Reason in Regard to Revelation.
 Van Mildert's Boyle Lectures. 1802.
 Wardlaw's Christian Ethics.
 Whately's (Bp.) Sermons.
 Whichcot's Aphorisms in Religion.
 Whiston's Reason and Philos. no Enemies.
 Witsius on the Abuse of Reason.
 Worseley's P. of Reason in Religion, deduced from the Sermon on the Mount.
 Young's Province of Reason. (An able criticism on Mansell.)

ATHEISM.

- Adams on the Existence of God.
 Alexander's (J.) Observations. (Ag. Hobbes.)
 Allen's Oracles of Reason.
 Allen's (Thomas) Modern Atheism.
 Balguy's Sermons and Tracts.
 Batchellor's (H.) Logic of Atheism.
 Bayle's Dictionary. (Under Diogenes, Theodorus, and Vaninus.)
 Beecher's (Lyman) Atheism, considered theologically and politically.
 Bentley's (Richard) Sermons.
 Berkeley's (Bp.) Works.
 Boyle Lectures. (From 1692 to the present.)
 Boyle's Inquiry into Received Notions.
 — Essay on Final Causes.
 Buchanan's Modern Atheism: as exhibited under the Forms of Pantheism, Materialism, Secularism, and Development. 1855.
 Carleton's Darkness of Atheism.
 Charnock's Works.
 Cheyne's Philosophical Principles. Christian Examiner. 50:309. 78:
 Clarendon's Reply to Hobbes.
 Clarke on the Being and Attributes of God.
 Cudworth's Intellectual System.
 — Abridged by Dr. Wise.
 Cumberland's Law of Nature.
 Delany's Revelation examined with Candor.
 Doddridge's Lectures. Part II.
 Dix's (Morgan) Lectures on Pantheism.
 Durham's Demonstration.
 Dwight's Discourses. Disc. 1, 2, and 3.
 Eclectic Review. New series. 7:329.
 Edwards on the Visible Structure of the World.
 Elliot's Folly of Atheism.
 Foster (James) on Natural Religion.
 Fotherby's Atheomastix.
 Gardner's Doomsday Book.
 Grant's (Brewin) Public Discussion with G. J. Holyoake, in 1854.
 Godwin's Lectures on the A. Controversy.
 Gregory's Modern Atheism.
 Grew's Cosmologia Sacra.
 Hale's (Sir Matthew) Origin of Man.
 Hall's (Robt.) Modern Infidelity.
 Harris on Atheistical Objections.
 Hattecliffe's God or Nothing.
 Hill's Lectures and Reflections.
 Howel's Spirit of Prophecy. (Agt. Hobbes.)
 Howe's (John) Works.
 Hunt's Essay on Pantheism.
 Lectures on Secularism, by Gregory, Condor, Savage, and Mellor.
 Lesser's Insecto-Theology.
 Lewis's (Tayler) Plato against the Atheists.
 McAll's Logic of Atheism.
 McLaurin's Essays.
 McCulloch's (John) Sermons.
 Mill on the Attempted Application of Pantheistic Principles to the Historic Criticism of the Gospel.
 Monthly Review. 54:163.
 More's (Henry) Philosophical Works. Part I.
 Nelson's Cause and Cure of Infidelity.
 Nieuwentyt's Religious Philosopher.
 Nichol's Conference with a Theist.
 Parker on God and Providence.
 Pattison's Anti-Nazarenus.
 Pilling on the Existence of God.
 Pironett's Disquisitions. (Against Hobbes.)
 Phillips's Dis. Historico-Philosophica.
 Ray's Physico-Theology. (Great, and most useful.)
 Saisset's Modern Pantheism. 1863.
 Seed's (Jeremiah) Sermons.
 Sparks's Antidote of Atheism.
 Talmot's (Bp.) Sermons.
 Temple's Doctrine of Leviathan.
 Tenison's (Abp.) Sermons. (Agt. Hobbes.)
 Thompson's (R. A.) Christian Theism.
 Tower's Atheismus Vapulans.
 Tullock's Theism. Burnett Prize Essay. 1854.
 Vaughn's (J.) Lectures. Lect. 4.
 Vince's Laws and Constitutions of the Heavenly Bodies. (Uses profound astronomical knowledge in the simplest language.)
 Ward's (Bp.) Essay toward an Eviction, etc.
 Whish on the First Cause.
 Wise's (Tho.) Reason and Philosophy of A.
 Wisheart's (William) Sermons.
 Wharton (Francis) on Theism.
 Woolsey's Unreasonableness of Atheism.
 The above are a very small specimen of the numerous writers on this subject.

REVEALED THEOLOGY.

NECESSITY OF DIVINE REVELATION.

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| <p>Clemens Alex., <i>Exhortatio ad Gentes</i>.
 Justin Martyr, <i>Apologia</i>.
 — <i>Cohortatio ad Græcos</i>.
 — <i>Dialogus cum Tryphone</i>.
 Auberlen, <i>die Göttliche Offenbarung</i>.
 Bretschneider's <i>Systemat. Entwicklung</i>.
 Campbell, <i>de Vanitate Luminis Naturæ</i>.
 Laget, <i>Sermons sur divers Sujets</i>.
 Turretini (Jo. Alphonsi) <i>Cogitationes</i>.
 Appleton's Works. Lects. 11, 12, 13.
 Baker's (T.) <i>Reflections on Learning</i>.
 Barrow's <i>Necessity of Christianity</i>.
 Brown's <i>System of Nat. and Revealed Religion</i>.
 Bundy's (Richard) <i>Sermons</i>.
 Chandler's <i>Revelation and Society</i>.
 Charnock's (S.) Works.
 Christian Review. 12: 186.
 Conybeare on <i>Revealed Religion</i>.
 Delany's <i>Revelation examined with Candor</i>.
 Edgecombe's <i>Reason an Insufficient Guide</i>.
 Ellis's <i>Knowledge of Divine Things not from Reason</i>.
 Farrer's <i>Mission of Christ</i>.
 Foster's (Dr. James) <i>Discourses</i>.
 Fuller's (And.) <i>Part of a Body of Divinity</i>.
 Gale's <i>Court of the Gentiles</i>.</p> | <p>Gastrell's (F.) <i>Boyle Lectures</i>. 1793.
 Glanvill's <i>Vanity of Dogmatizing</i>.
 Halyburton's <i>Natural Religion Insufficient</i>.
 Hamilton (W. T.) on the <i>Pentateuch</i>.
 Hey's <i>Lectures</i>. Bk. 1, ch. 12.
 Jenkins on the <i>Christian Religion</i>.
 Jones's <i>Bampton Lectures</i>. 1821.
 Law's <i>Considerations</i>.
 Leland's <i>Advantage and Necessity of Revelation</i>.
 Mant on the <i>Gospel</i>.
 Miller's <i>Division of Scripture</i>.
 Morehead's (R.) <i>Sermons</i>.
 Nares's <i>Evidence versus Reason</i>.
 Norman on the <i>Necessity of Revelation</i>.
 Penrose's <i>Bampton Lectures</i>. 1808.
 Taylor's <i>Apology of Ben Mordecai</i>.
 Umfreville's <i>Excellence and Necessity, etc.</i>
 Vincent's (William) <i>Sermons</i>.
 Warburton's <i>Divine Legation of Moses</i>.
 Watson's <i>Tracts</i>.
 Watts's <i>Strength and Weakness of Human Reason</i>.
 West's <i>Defence of the Christian Revelation</i>.
 Whiteley's <i>Essays</i>. (Praised by Porteus.)
 Witherspoon's (John) Works. Vol. 2.
 Woodgate's <i>Bampton Lectures</i>. 1838.</p> |
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CHRISTIANITY.

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| <p>The Fathers here cited are arranged in chronological order.
 Hermas, <i>Philosophi Philosophorum Irrisio</i>.
 Justin Martyr, <i>Parænesis ad Græcos</i>.
 — <i>Oratio ad Græcos</i>.
 — <i>Apologia pro Christianis</i>.
 — <i>Apol. secunda pro Christianis</i>.
 — <i>de Monarchia Dei</i>.
 — <i>Dialogus cum Tryphone</i>.
 — <i>Epistola ad Diognetum</i>.
 Tertullian, <i>Apologeticus adversus Gentes</i>.
 — <i>ad Nationes</i>.</p> | <p>Tertullian, <i>de Testimonio Animæ</i>.
 — <i>ad Scapulam</i>.
 — <i>adversus Judæos</i>.
 — <i>Oratio ad Catechumenos</i>.
 Athenagoras, <i>Legatio pro Christianis</i>.
 — <i>Atheniensis Apologia</i>.
 — <i>de Mortuorum Resurrectione</i>.
 Theophilus, <i>contra Calumniatores</i>.
 Clemens (Alex.), <i>Protrepticon ad Gentes</i>.
 Minucius Felix, <i>Octavius</i>.
 Origen, <i>contra Celsum</i>.
 Cyprian, <i>de Idololatriæ Vanitate</i>.
 — <i>Testimonia ad Quirinum</i>.</p> |
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- Lactantius, de Mortibus Persecutorum.
 Athanasius, Oratio contra Gentes.
 Cyril (Alex.), contra Julianum.
 Eusebius, Preparatio Evangelica.
 — Demonstratio Evangelica.
 Chrysostom, adversus Judæos.
 — contra Gentiles.
 Ambrose, Responsio Relationi Symmachi.
 Augustine, de Vera Religione.
 — de Moribus Ecclesiæ Catholicæ.
 — adversus Judæos.
 — de Civitate Dei.
 — adversus Paganos.
 Arnobius, adversus Gentes
 Arndtius, de Vero Christianismo.
 Bergier, Preuves du Christianisme.
 Bernard, de l'Excellence de la Religion chrét.
 Boesnier, Préservatif contre l'Irréligion.
 Bretschneider's Systematische Entwicklung.
 Buddei Miscellanea Sacrorum. Part I.
 Cartwright, Certamen Religionum.
 Châteaubriand, Génie du Christianisme.
 Curellii (Steph.) Opera.
 Du Plessis de Veritate Relig. Christianæ.
 Edemus de Veritate Relig. Christianæ.
 Fabricius de Veritate Relig. Christianæ.
 Gotti de Veritate, etc. (Acta Erud.)
 Grotius de Veritate Relig. Christi. ("Equally approved by Catholics and Protestants."—C. BUTLER. A fine edit., with English notes and illustrations by Middleton. Printed 1855.)
 Hornbeckii Summa Controversiarum Relig.
 Houtville, la Religion chrétienne prouvé par les Faits. (Highly esteemed. It is preceded by an acc. of the methods taken by writers for and against Christianity.)
 Huetii Demonstratio Evangelica.
 Kortholti Grundlichen Beweis, etc.
 Lamy, Preuves évidentes de la Vérité, etc.
 Le Clerc, Bibliothèque ancienne et moderne.
 Limborch, de Veritate, etc.
 Malebranche, Conversations chrétiennes.
 Pascal, Pensées sur la Religion. ("Contains the germ of all that can be said for or against the Christian religion"—VENTOULLAC.)
 Pieteti Dissertationes Theologicæ.
 Sagittarii Intro. in Hist. Ecclesiasticæ.
 Schuberti de Veritate, etc.
 Stattleri Demonstratio Evangelica.
 Tappen, Wahrheit der christlichen Religion.
 Tollner's Göttl. Eingeb. der heiligen Schrift.
 Turretini Dissertationes.
 Abbadie's Truth of Christ. Trans. by Booth.
 Addison's Evidences, etc. (Many editions.)
 Alexander's (W. L.) Christ and Christianity.
 Alley's Vindiciæ Christianæ. (Comparison of the Greek, Roman, Hindu, Mohammedan, and Christian religions.)
 Allix's Reflections on the Holy Scriptures.
 Apology of Ben Mordecai. (Powerful; with valuable notes by Henry Taylor.)
 Appleton's Works. Lectures 18 to 25.
 Aphor's Obser. on Gibbon's Decl. and Fall.
 Arndt's True Christianity.
 Bampton Lectures. (Particularly for 1780, '84, '86, '87, '88, '92, '94, '97, '98, 1803, '08, '11, '12, '23, '25, '31.)
 Bassett's Reasonableness of Revelation.
 Bates's (William) Works. Chap. 5.
 Baxter's (Rich.) Reasons of the Christian Religion. (Dr. S. Johnson pronounced it the best work on the subject.)
 Bean's Evidences, etc.
 Beattie's Evidences, etc. (Popular.)
 — Nature and Immutability of Truth.
 Benson's Hulsean Lectures. 1820.
 Biscoe's Acts of the Apostles confirmed from other Authors.
 Bolton's Evidences. (Prize Essay. 1852.)
 Bonnet's Philosoph. and Critical Inquiries. (Refutes modern French philosophy.)
 Boyle (Robt.) Lectures. (Commenced 1692.)
 Broadley's Christianity a Divine Revelation.
 Brown's Essay on the Characteristics.
 Burgess's (Bp.) Easter Catechism.

- Butler's Analogy of Relig. and Nat. Part II.
 Carey's (P. M.) Evid. and Corruptions of C.
 Chalmers's Evidences, etc.
 Channing's (W. E.) Duddleian Lecture.
 Chelsum's Remarks on Gibbon's Rome.
 Chichester on Deism.
 Clarke's (Dr. Sam.) Reflections on Amyntor.
 — Truth and Certainty of the Chr. Rel.
 — Sermons.
 Cook's Historical View of Christianity.
 Croly's Three Cycles of Revelation. (Argues the parallelism of the patriarchal, Jewish, and Christian dispensations.) ("More fanciful than sound."—BRIT. CRITIC.)
 Crosskey's Defence of Religion.
 Dalrymple on the Causes which Gibbon assigns for the Progress of Christianity.
 Davies's Exam. of the Fifteenth and Sixteenth Chapters of Gibbon.
 Doddridge's (P.) Evid. (Many editions.)
 Duchall's Presumptive Evidence, etc. ("Singular merit."—KIPPIS.)
 Duguet's Principles of Relig. Tr. by Lalby.
 Durham's Christianity the Friend of Man.
 Dwight's (Prest.) Discourses.
 Edwards (Dr. John) on the Authority, etc.
 Fawcett's (James) Sermons.
 Fell's (John) Lectures.
 Foote's Leading Aspects of Christianity.
 Fuller's Gospel its own Witness.
 Gastrell's Necessity and Certainty of Religion.
 Gisbourne's Survey of Relig. (Admired.)
 Goddard on the Mental Condition necessary to a Due Inquiry into Religious Evidence.
 Gray's (Robt.) Ten Discourses.
 Green's (Robt.) Demonstration of the Truth of Christianity.
 — Nine Discourses.
 — Norrisean Prize Essay, 1796.
 Greenfield's Evid. by Inductive Philosophy.
 Grew's *Cosmologia Sacra*.
 Grotius on the Truth of the Ch. Religion.
 Gurney's Evidences, etc.
 Hale's Influence of Gibbon's Five Causes.
 Hammond's Reasonableness of the Christian Religion.
 Hampden's Essay on the Evidences, etc. (A worthy companion to Butler's Analogy.)
 Harness's Connection of C. and Happiness.
 Hey's Lectures on Divinity. Vol. I.
 Hodge's Summary of Corroborative Evid.
 Hulsean Lectures. 1820, 1821, 1831, 1837.
 Hunter's (Henry) Evidences, etc.
 Inglis's Vindic. of the Christian Faith.
 Ireland's (J.) Chr. and Paganism Compared.
 Jenkins's Reasonableness and Certainty, etc.
 Jortin's Truth of the Christian Religion.
 Knox's (Vicesimus) Christian Philosophy.
 Lardner's Credibility of the Gospel History.
 Leslie's Short Method with the Jews.
 — Short Method with the Deists.
 — Truth of C. Demonstrated.
 Less's (G.) Demonstration of the Truth of the Christian Religion.
 Littleton's Conversion of St. Paul.
 Locke's Reasonableness of Christianity.
 Melville's Evid. (A brief compilation.)
 Maltby's Illustrations. (Eight good dissertations.)
 Marsh's Evid. and Nature of the C. Religion.
 Middleton's Miscellaneous Works.
 Moore's (D.) Chr. Vindicated. (Cambridge prize essay.)
 Nares's Evidences, etc. (Able and original.)
 Osterwald's Grounds and Principles, etc.
 Paley's Evidences, etc.
 — *Horæ Paulinæ*.
 Parker's Demonstration of the Divine Authority, etc.
 Penrose's Evidences, etc., from its Wisdom.
 Porteus's Summary of the Evidences, etc. (Good for young people.)

- Price's (Rich.) Dissertations. Diss. 4.
 Priestley's Letters to a Philosophical Unbeliever.
 Roberts's Vindication, etc. (Reply to Volney's Ruins.)
 Robinson's (Tho.) Nature and Evidence, etc.
 Rosse's (Earl of) Proof of the C. Religion.
 Ryland's (John) Essays.
 Salisbury's Strictures on Gibbon's Rome.
 Scott's (Tho.) Works.
 Seiler's Reasonableness of Belief.
 Sharp's (Gregory) Defence of C.
 Sheppard's Divine Origin, etc. (Deduced from evidences which are not founded on the authenticity of Scripture.)
 Sherlock on the Resurrection of Christ.
 Simmes's Nature and Reception of Chr.
 Smith's (J. Pye) Testimony to the Messiah.
 — Sacrifice and Priesthood of Christ.
 Sprague's Contrast between Christianity and other Systems.
 Steele's (J.) Philosophy of the Evidences.
- Stephens's Comparison of Christianity with other Systems.
 Stillingfleet's Origines Sacrae.
 Sumner's (Bp.) Nature and Reception of C.
 Sykes's (A. A.) Truth of Christianity.
 Thompson's Types, Prophecies, and Miracles.
 Tillotson's Sermons.
 Tunstall's Academica.
 — Lectures.
 Warburton's Divine Legation of Moses.
 Watson's (Bp.) Apology. (Reply to Gibbon.)
 — Tracts.
 Wellwood's Authority of the New Testament.
 West's Defence of Revelation.
 Whitby's Necessity, Usefulness, etc.
 Wilson's (J.) Reasonableness of C. (An able development of the principles of Butler's Analogy.)
 The above are but a fraction of the writers on this subject, but are abundantly sufficient for the purpose of this work. See a full list of writers for and against Christianity, up to the 14th century, in Cave's *Hist. Literaria*.

MIRACLES.

- Bragge on Our Saviour's Miracles.
 Bulkley on the Miracles of Christ.
 Campbell on Miracles. (Answer to Hume.)
 Chapman's M. the Proper Credentials, etc.
 Clarke's Boyle Lectures. 1705.
 Collyer (W. B.) on Scripture Miracles.
 Cox's (R. C.) Lectures on Miracles.
 Ditton on the Resurrection of Christ.
 Douglass's Criterion of True Miracles.
 Doyle's Answer to Woolston.
 Encyclopædia Britannica. Art. "Miracles."
 Entick's Evidences of Christianity.
 Farmer's Dissertation on Miracles. (Great.)
 Fleetwood's Essays on Miracles.
 Hallett's Nature, Kind, and Number of Christ's Miracles.
 Hovey's (Alvah) The Miracles of Christ.
 Howarth's Hulsean Lectures. 1836.
 Humphrey's (W. G.) Discourses on M.
 Jameson's Analogy between the Miracles and Doctrines of Scripture.
- Jepton's Reality of our Saviour's Miracles.
 Jortin's Boyle Lectures. 1750.
 Lawson (Cha.) on the Miracles of Christ.
 Le Bas (Cha. W.) on Miracles.
 Locke on Miracles.
 Mackenzie (M. J.) on Miracles.
 Mant's (Bp.) Works.
 Marsden's Hulsean Lectures. 1844.
 Mayo on the Miracles of our Lord.
 McGuire's Miracles of Christ.
 Mozley's Bampton Lectures. 1800.
 Myers's Mosaic, Historic, and Prophetic M.
 Ogilvie's Bampton Lectures. 1836.
 Owen's (H.) Boyle Lectures. 1769, 1770, 1771.
 Peabody's (A. P.) Lectures before the Lowell Institute. Lect. 3.
 Penrose's Use of Scripture M. (Very able.)
 Ray's Vindication of Christ's Miracles.
 Reinhard on Miracles.
 Rutherford's Credibility of Miracles. (Much valued.)

Seaton's Compendious View of Miracles.
 Sherlock's Trial of the Witnesses.
 Smallbrooke on Miracles.
 Stebbins's Defence of Scripture History.
 Stevenson on the Miracles of Christ.
 Sutton's Christ's Miracles no Allegories.
 Sykes's Credibility of Miracles.
 Taylor's Apology of Ben Mordecai. (Strong.)
 Thompson's (Edw.) Bulwarks of Christianity.
 Trench (Francis) on the Miracles of our Lord.
 Van Mildert's Boyle Lectures. 1802-1804.
 Vince's Credibility of Scripture Miracles. (Masterly reply to Hume.)
 Wardlaw (Ralph) on Miracles.
 West on the Resurrection.
 Westcott's Characteristics of the Gospel Miracles.
 Weston on the Rejection of the Christian Miracles by the Heathen.
 Westcott's Elements of the Gospel Harmony.

Miracles of the first ages of the Church:

Pro.

Augustine de Civitate Dei.
 Justin Martyr, Apologia.
 — Dialog. cum Tryphone.
 Irenæus, Opus eruditissimum. Ed. Frobenii.
 Minucius Felix, Octavius.
 Origen, contra Celsum.
 Tertullian, ad Scapalam.
 Mosheim, de Rebus ante Constantinum.
 Pfannerus, de Donis Miraculis.
 Schulz's Geistesgaben der ersten Christen.
 Balmer's (Robt.) Academic Lectures.
 — Pulpit Discourses.
 Barrington's (J. S.) Miscellanea Sacra.
 Boys's Suppressed Evidence; or, Proof from the Records of the Fathers, Waldenses, etc.
 Brook's Exam. of Middleton's Free Enquiry.
 Burton's Eccles. Hist. of the 2d and 3d Centuries.
 Chapman on the Miraculous Powers, etc.

Chapman's Jesuit Cabal Farther Opened.

Church (Tho.) on the Miraculous Powers, etc.

— Appeal to the Unprejudiced.

Dodwell's Free Answer to Middleton.

Douglas's Criterion. (Excellent. Exposes Hume.)

Fleury's Eccles. Hist. (An essay at the end.)

Heathcote's Animadversions on Middleton.

Jackson's Remarks on Middleton's Inquiry.

Jenkins's (Tho.) Exam. of M.'s "Inquiry."

Newman's (J. H.) Miracles of Eccl. History.

Parker's Miraculous Powers of the Early Fathers.

Rawlinson's Bampton Lectures. 1859.

Reeves's Apologies of Justin, Tertullian, and Minucius.

Rutherford on Miracles.

Stebbins's Observations on Middleton.

Sykes's Credibility of Miracles.

— Two Questions impartially considered.

Walton's Miraculous Powers of the Church.

Whiston on Demoniacs.

— on the Exact Time when Miraculous Gifts ceased in the Church.

Con.

Jenkins's Examination of Dodwell's reply to Middleton.

Middleton's Free Inquiry into the Miraculous Powers supposed to have existed in the Church.

— Vindication. (Reply to Dodwell and Church.)

— Reply to Stebbins and Chapman.

— Reply to Mr. Toll.

North British Rev. Vol. 4.

Tillotson's (Abp.) Sermons.

Toll's Defence of Middleton's Free Inquiry.

Yates's Defence of Middleton's Inquiry.

See a notice of this controversy in a note, by Dr. Kippis, to Doddridge's *Lectures*, Part VI.; and in Joseph Clarke's *Theological Treatises*.

PROPHECY.

- Arnold on the Interpretation of Prophecy.
 Barker's P. concerning Messiah.
 Bates's Use and Intent of Prophecy.
 Bickersteth's Guide to the Prophecies.
 Bouchier on Prophecy and its Fulfilment.
 Brooks's (J. W.) Elements of Prophetical Interpretation. (A convenient compend.)
 Brown's (J.) Harmony of Prophecy.
 Butler's (W. J.) Testimony of History.
 Caulfield's Fall of Babylon.
 Chandler's Antiq. and Auth. of the P. of Dan.
 Chauncey (W. S.) on Unaccomplished Prophecies.
 Clarke's (S.) Connection of the Prophecies.
 Clayton's Dissertations on Prophecy.
 Davidson's (D.) Test of Prophecy.
 De Burgh's Early Prophecies of a Redeemer.
 Dobb's Prophecies which have been fulfilled.
 Duffield (Geo.) on the Prophecies.
 Durell's Parallel Proph. of Jacob and Moses.
 Elliott's Warburton Lectures. 1849 to 1853.
 Ellis's (W. W.) Proph. relating to Christ.
 Faber's Calendar of the P. (Chiefly those which relate to Antichrist.)
 — P. relating to the Jews.
 Fairbairn on P. (Its nature, functions, etc.)
 Frazer's Key to the Unaccomplished Prophecies.
 Frere's Combined View of Esdras, Daniel, and John.
 Fry (John) on the Unfulfilled Prophecies.
 Fry's (T.) Scripture Prophecies.
 Greenhill's (Jos.) Proph. of the N. Testament.
 Habershon's Connection of the Prophecies of the Apocalypse and Daniel.
 — on the Chronological Prophecies.
 Hardy's Prophecies of the Bible, particularly those of John.
 Hengstenberg's Nature of the Prophecies.
 Holmes's (Robt.) Bampton Lectures. 1782.
 Hoare's (W. H.) Harmony of the Apocalypse with other Prophecies; with an Outline of the Various Interpretations.
 Horsley's (Bp.) Sermons. Ser. 15-18.
 — Prophecies of Messiah dispersed among the Heathen.
 Hurd's Introduction to the Study of the Prophecies. (Chiefly those relating to Popery.)
 Jeffries on the Perfection of Religion.
 Jennings's Jewish Antiquities.
 Jones's Key to Prophetical Language.
 Jortin's Boyle Lectures. 1730.
 Jurieu on the Accomplishment of Prophecy. (A strong attack on Popery.)
 Keith's (A.) Signs of the Times. 1833.
 Ketts's History the Interpreter of Prophecy. ("Written with great elegance and judgment." — BR. TOMLINE.)
 Kelly's (James) Lectures on Subjects connected with Prophecy.
 Lardner's Destruction of Jerusalem.
 Leach's Lectures on Fulfilled Prophecies.
 Lyall's Propædia Prophetica.
 McCaul's Warburton Lectures. 1846. (Prophecy as a Proof of Christianity.)
 McLaurin on the P. rel. to Messiah.
 McLeod on the Principal Prophecies.
 Maitland's Connected View of Prophecy. (A valuable collection of authorities from the Fathers down to 1849.)
 Marsh's Lectures. Lect. 20; 21.
 Mead on the Prophecies.
 Monthly London Lectures on Prophecy. (Able sermons by Collier, Bird, Pye Smith, Fletcher, Orme, etc.)
 Newton (Bp.) on P. which have been fulfilled.
 Newton (Sir I.) on Daniel and the Apocal.
 Nolan's (F.) Warburton Lectures. 1837.
 Philips (J. S.) on the Interpretation of Prophecy.
 Purves on Prophetic Time.
 Randolph's Prophecies cited in the N. Test. compared with the Hebrew Original.
 Roberts's Manual of Prophecy. (Compares the prophecies with the events which fulfilled them.)

- Robinson's Prophecies of the Messiah.
 Rule's Calculations of Time, etc.
 Sharp (Granville) on Several Important P.
 Sherlock's Use and Intent of Prophecy.
 Simpson's Key to the P. (Many editions.)
 Smith's (J. Pye) Dissertations.
 — Discourses.
 Smith's (Dr. John) Summary View of Prophecy. (A good abstract from Lowth, Newcombe, Newton, and Blaney.)
 Southwark Morning Lectures. (By Baxter, Fowler, Manton, Poole, Owen, etc.)
 Taylor's Comp. of Revelation with Daniel.
 Theol. and Lit. Journal. (Many articles.)
 Thompson (Ed.) on Prophecy and Miracles.
 Thurston's Researches on P.
 Tower's Illustrations of Prophecy.
 Turner's Origin, Character, and Interpret. of P.
 Twell's Boyle Lectures. 1733.
 Van Mildert's Boyle Lectures. 1802-1804.
 Vint's Dissertations on Prophecy.
 Wangh's (J. S.) Diss. on the Prophecies.
 Ward's (Wm.) Declensions and Restorations of the Church.
 Wellwood on Prophecy.
 Whiston's Boyle Lectures. 1707.
 Whitaker's General and Connected View.
 White's Christianity and Moham-
 medanism.
 Whiteley's Scheme and Completion of P.
 Williams's Boyle Lectures. 1695.
 Wilkins's Hist. of the Destruction of Jerusalem as Connected with P.
 Winchester on the Prophecies.
 Zouch's Attempt to Illustrate some of the Prophecies. (Learned and cautious.)
 A "Dictionary of Writers on the Prophecies," with the titles, was published in 1835, by the Editor of the London Investigator.—M. BROOKS.

PROPHECY AS A PROOF OF REVELATION.

- Bates's Div. of the Christian Religion. Ch. 4.
 Berriman's (W.) Sermons.
 Bonnet's Inquiries.
 Boyle on the Fulfilment of Script. Prophecy.
 Brown's Harmony of Scripture Prophecies.
 Chalmers's Evidences of Christianity.
 Conybeare's (Bp.) Sermons.
 Flemming's Fulfilling of Scripture.
 Gordon's Christianity Supported by P.
 Hey's Lectures. Chap. 1.
 Horsley's (Bp.) Sermons.
 Jenkins's Reasonableness of Christianity.
 La Pluches's Truth of the Gospel.
 Paley's Evidences. Part II. ch. 1.
 Powell's (Samuel) Sermons.
 Skelton's (P.) Sermons.
 Warburton Lectures, viz.:
 Allwood, 1815. Aphthorpe, 1786. Bagot, 1780. Davidson, 1824. Halifax, 1776. Hurd, 1772. Nares, 1805. Nolan, 1837. Pearson, 1811.

HARMONY OF REVELATION AND SCIENCE.

- Bonar, Concordia Scientiæ cum Fide. 1665. (Curious.)
 Bouterwick's Religion und Vernunft.
 D'Aubigné, Foi et Science.
 Erdman's Vorlesung. zu Glauben u. Wissen.
 Kuhn's Glauben und Wissen.
 Pauvert, Harmonie de la Religion, et de l'Intelligence humaine.
 Wiseman (Nic.) Sur le Rapport entre la Science et la Religion.
 American Eclectic Review. 2:186.
 American Quarterly Observer. 2:24.
 Bibliotheca Sacra. 13:80. 14:338, 461.
 Blackwood's Magazine. 6:35.
 Bridgewater Treatises.
 Brougham's Advant. and Pleas. of Science.
 Buckland's Reliquiæ Diluvianæ.
 Combes's Relation between Science and Religion.
 Dick's Christian Philosopher.
 Dingle's Harm. of Revelation and Science.
 D'Oyly's (George) Sermons.

- Exley on the First Chapter of Genesis.
 Farrar's (Adam) Sermons at Oxford.
 Forbes's Progress of Science.
 Hampden's Philosoph. Evidence of Christianity.
 Harcourt's Doctrine of the Deluge.
 Harris's Pre-Adamite Earth. (Popular.)
 Hitchcock's Relig. Truth illust. from Science.
 London Quarterly Review. 79:49.
 Mailler's Philosophy of the Bible.
 Melville's (Henry) Sermons.
 Morell's History of Philosophy and Science.
 Nares's Bampton Lectures. 1805.
 Nolan's Bampton Lectures. 1833.
 North American Review. 39:293.
 Pendleton's Science a Witness for the Bible.
 Pratt's Scrip. and Science not at Variance.

- Ragg's Creation's Testimony to its God.
 Scott's (R. E.) Limits of Physical Science.
 Silliman's Consistency of the Discoveries of Modern Geology with Sacred History.
 [Taylor's] Nat. Hist. of Enthusiasm.
 Troup's (George) Art and Faith.
 Tullidge's Triumphs of the Bible.
 Walker's (James) Sermons.
 Warburton's (Bp.) Sermons.
 Wiseman's (Nic.) Connection between Science and Religion.
 Williams's (Cha.) First Week of Time.
 Wood's Mosaic Creation illustrated by Discoveries and Experiments in the Present Age. 1811.
 Worgan's Divine Week.
 Wright's Creation and Geology.

UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

- Pro.*
 De Salles, Hist. générale des Races humaines.
 Humboldt's Ansichtender Natur.
 Agassiz's Origin of the Human Races. (Maintains that all mankind are of one species, but did not originate from one pair.)
 Amer. Biblical Repos. 2d series. 10:29.
 Bachman's Doct. of the Unity, etc. examined on the Principles of Science.
 Cabell's Testimony of Modern Science to the Unity of Mankind.
 Caldwell's Unity of the Race of Man. Christian Examiner. 49:111.
 Christian Quart Spect. 3:56.
 Christian Review. 16:226.
 Dawson's (J. W.) Archæa.
 Democratic Review. 11:111.
 Hamilton's Pentateuch and its Assailants.
 Johnes's Philological Proofs of the Recent Origin of the Human Race. (From a comparison of the languages of Europe, Asia, Africa, and America.)
 Kames's Origin and Diversity of Mankind.
 Knox's Races of Men.
 Latham's Varieties of Mankind. — Man and his Migrations.
 Lord's Theol. and Lit. Jour. 3:424.
 Meade's (Bp.) The Bible and the Classics.
- Monthly Review. 119:18.
 North Amer. Rev. 73:163.
 North British Review. 4:177.
 Pickering on the Races of Men.
 Presbyterian Quarterly Rev. 3:177.
 Prichard's Physical History of Mankind.
 Princeton Rev. 21:159. 22:313,603. 31:103.
 Prot. Episc. Monthly Review. 3:68.
 Quarterly Review.
 Smith's (Sam. S.) Causes of the Diversity of Figure, Color, etc.
 ———— Strictures on Lord Kames.
 Smyth's (Tho.) Unity of the Human Race. (Reviews Agassiz.)
 Tullidge's (Henry) Triumphs of the Bible.
 Van Arminge's Natural History of Man.
 Wartz's Anthropology of the Uncivilized Races.
- Con.*
 Gobineau's Moral and Intellectual Diversity of Races. Tr. by Hotz; with notes.
 Morton's (Dr. S. G.) Types of Mankind.
 ———— Archæology of the Amer. Indians.
 ———— Hybridity in Men and Animals.
 ———— Crania Ægyptiaca.
 Nott & Gliddon's Types of Mankind.
 ———— Indigenous Races of the Earth.

CANON OF SCRIPTURE.

- Cochleus de Canonica S. S.
 Credner's Geschichte des Canons.
 Frick de Cura Vet. Ecc. circa Canonem S. S.
 Kortholtus de Canone.
 Millii Prolegomena ad Nov. Test.
 Morus de Canone Scripturæ.
 Planck de Signif. Canonis in Ecc. Antiq.
 Reuss, Histoire du Canon, etc.
 Schmidii Vindicatio Canonis V. et N. T.
 Strosch, Hist. critica de Librorum N. T.
 Van Mastricht, Commentatio de Canone, etc.
 Weber's Gesch. des Neutestamentl. Kanons.
 Wolfius de Integritate Codicis sacri.
 Alexander (A.) on the Canon of S. S. Amer. Quart. Church Review. 17: 583.
 Blair (John) on the Canon of Scripture.
 Bryant's (Jac.) Authent. of the Christ. Relig.
 Christian Quart. Spect. 10: 69.
 Cosin's Scholastic Hist. of the Canon.
 Dupin's Complete Hist. of the Canon, etc.
 Findlay's Vindication.
 Gausson on the Canon of Scripture.
 General Repository. 4: 1.
 Giles's (J. A.) Hebrew Records.
 Jenkins's Reasonableness of Christianity.
 Jones's (Jer.) Method of settling the Canon. (Best short treatise.)
 Kitto's Journal. 7: 174.
 Lardner's Credibility of the Gospel Hist.
 — Antiquities.
 Nye on the Canon.
 Owen's Introd. to Comment. on Hebrews.
 Prideaux's Connection of O. and N. Test.
 Richardson's Vindication. (Reply to Toland's Amyntor.)
 Stuart's (Moses) Defence of the O. T. Canon.
 Townley's Illustrations of Biblical Literature.
 United States Literary Gazette. 5: 327.
 Westcott's Hist. of the Canon of the N. T. during the First Four Centuries.
 Wadsworth's Hulsean Lectures. 1847.

INSPIRATION.

- Carpzovius de Divina Inspiratione.
 Credner de Librorum N. T. Inspiratione.
 Dupin, Prolegomena.
 Gausson, Théopneustie.
 Grotius de Veritate Relig. Christianæ.
 Henrici Lucubrationes.
 Huetii Demonstratio Evangelica.
 Potter, Prelectiones Theologicæ.
 Quenstedtius de Divina Inspiratione.
 Sontagii de Inspiratione, ejusque Ratio.
 Waltheri (Mich.) Dissertations.
 Appleton's (Pres.) Works. Lect. 26, 27.
 Bailey's (Benj.) Essay on Inspiration.
 Bannerman on Inspiration.
 Bateman (Josiah) on the Inspiration, etc.
 Baylie's (J.) Authority and Inspiration, etc.
 Bennet's (Benj.) Sermons. (Fourteen on this subj.)
 Bibliotheca Sacra. 12: 217. 15: 29, 314.
 Bingham (W. A.) on the Insp. of Scripture.
 Bogue's (David) Essays.
 Burgon's Bible and Modern Thought.
 Burnet on the Thirty-Nine Articles. Art. 6.
 Butler's Analogy of Relig. and Nature. Part II.
 Butler's (W.) Testimony of History.
 Calamy's (Edmund) Sermons.
 Calmet's Dissertations.
 Campbell (Geo.) on the Four Gospels.
 Carlyle's Origin and Authority of the S. Scr.
 Carson's (A.) Refutation of Henderson.
 — Review of Wilson, Smith, and Dick.
 Cellerier's Divine Origin of the Old Testament.
 Chalmers's Evidences of Christianity. Christ. Examiner. 8: 362. 32: 119, 204. 35: 340.
 Christian Review. 9: 1. 12: 219.

- Davidson's (Sam.) Text of O. T. considered.
- Davies's (S.) Nature of the Divine Agency as to Inspiration.
- Dick (John) on Inspiration.
- Doddridge's Dissertations on the New Test.
- Dyer on the Inspiration of Sacred Scripture.
- Eclectic Review. 4th Series. 1:91. 11:365.
- Emmons's (Nathaniel) Sermons.
- Findlay's Vindic. of the Sacred Books and Josephus. (Reply to Voltaire.)
- Fuller's Part of a Body of Divinity.
- Gasparin on Plenary Inspiration.
- Gausson's Theopneustia. Tr. by E. N. Kirk.
- Gerard's Institutes of Criticism.
- Haldane (Robt.) on Inspiration.
- Hawker's Evidence of Plenary Inspiration.
- Henderson (E.) on Divine Inspiration.
- Hervey's (A.) Five Sermons.
- Hinds on the Inspiration and Authority, etc.
- Howarth on Revealed Religion.
- Jenkins's Reasonableness of Christianity.
- Kelly's Exam. of Davidson's Statement.
- Kitto's Journal. 5:437. 7:315.
- La Mothe on Inspiration.
- Le Clerc's Letters.
- Lee's Nature and Proofs of Inspiration.
- Leslie's Easy Method with Deists.
- Lond. Quart. Rev. 10:286.
- Lowe's Insp. a Reality. (Reply to Macnaught.)
- Lowth's (S.) Insp. of the Holy Scriptures.
- Lowth's (W.) Authority and Insp. of Sac. Scr.
- McCaul's Testimonies to the Authority, etc.
- Macleod's View of Inspiration.
- Maenaught on Inspiration.
- Marston's Manual on the Inspiration, etc.
- Methodist Quart. Review. 5:594.
- Michaelis's Introd. to the New Test. Ch. 3.
- Middleton's Miscellaneous Works.
- Morell's Philosophy of Religion.
- Morris's (A. G.) The Bible, What is it?
- New Englander. 7:515.
- Newton (Bp.) on the Prophecies.
- Noble on Plenary Inspiration.
- Paley's Evidences of Christianity.
- Parry on the Insp. of the Apostles.
- Powell's Nature and Extent of Inspiration.
- Prettyman's Elements of Christian Theology.
- Princeton Review. 29:598, 660.
- Redford's Holy Scriptures verified by Science, History, and Human Consciousness.
- Scott's (Thomas) Essays.
- Secker's (Abp.) Sermons.
- Seed's Sermons at the Moyer Lecture. 1747.
- Simpson's Plea for the Sacred Writings. (A masterly refutation of Deism.)
- Spirit of the Pilgrims. 1:402, 474, 624. 2:9, 70, 185, 237, 289. 3:369, 420.
- Stennet's Authority and Use of Scripture.
- Storr on the Historical Sense.
- Stuart's (Moses) Critical History and Defence of the Old Testament Canon.
- Taylor's (D.) Truth and Insp. of Scripture.
- Thomson's (Alex.) Lectures.
- Tillotson's Sermons.
- Tomline's Introd. to the Study of Scripture.
- Townsend's (George) Works.
- Van Mildert's (William) Sermons.
- Vaughn's (J.) Lectures. Lect. 9.
- Wardlaw's (Ralph) Discourses.
- Watson's (Rich.) Theological Tracts. — Apology for the Bible.
- Westcott's Elements of Gospel Harmony.
- Wettenhall's Div. Authority of Sac. Script.
- Whitehead's (Robt.) Warrant of Faith.
- Whittington's Inspiration of the Old Test.
- Whitby's Preface to Commentary on N. T.
- Wilkinson's (T.) Inspiration of Scripture.
- Williams's (Bp.) Boyle Lectures. 1695, 1696.
- Wilson (Bp.) on Plenary Inspiration.
- Wilson's (John) Essay on Enthusiasm.
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- Wordsworth's Five Lectures in Westminster Abbey. 1861.

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- Alexandri Historia Eccles. Vet. Test.
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 Andilly, Histoire de l'ancien Testament.
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 Berruyer, Histoire du Peuple de Dieu.
 Buddæi Historia Ecclesiastica V. T.
 Capelli Historia Sacra et Exotica.
 Carpzovii Apparatus Historiæ Criticus.
 Eusebii Chronicon.
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 Hornii Historia Ecclesiastica.
 Josephi Opera.
 Kurtz's Biblische Geschichte.
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 Nichol, Hist. Sacra. (Acta Erud. 1712.)
 Robinson, Annales Mundi, sacri et secularis.
 Saurin, Discours historiques, critiques, etc.
 Schmidii Compendium. (Acta Erud. 1708.)
 Selden de Diis Syriis.
 Simon, Hist. critique du Vieux Test.
 Spanheim, Introd. ad Hist. et Antiq. Sac.
 Spondanii Annales Sacri a Creatione.
 Vitrinæ Hypotyposis.
 Vossii Historia de Idolatria.
 Witsii Miscellanea Sacra.
 Basnage's History of the Jews.
 Bedford's Scripture Chronology demonstrated by Astronomical Calculation.
 Bell's Mission of St. John.
 Biscoe's Hist. of the Acts of the Apostles confirmed from other Authors.
 Blome's Hist. of the Old and New Test.
 Calmet's History of the Old and New Test.
 Clarke's Bible History. (Malachi to Christ.)
 Craddock's Hist. of the O. Test. methodized.
 Craddock's Apostolical History methodized.
 Ellwood's Sacred Hist. of the O. and N. T.
 Fleury's Hist. of the Israelites.
 Gale's Court of the Gentiles.
 Geneste's Parallel Histories of Judah and Israel. (Valuable matter.)
 Gleig's (G. R.) History of the Bible. (Maps.)
 Hall's (Bp.) Contemplations.
 Hawker's (Robt.) Extracts and Notes.
 Hawkins's Objects and Uses of the Historical Scriptures of the O. T.
 Howard's Scripture History of the Earth.
 Howell's Hist. of the Bible. (Plates.)
 Jamieson's Use of Sacred History.
 Jones's (Jos.) Chronol. and Analysis of Sc.
 Kimpton's History of the Bible.
 Kurtz's History of the Old Covenant. Trans. by J. Martin.
 Kurtz's (J. G.) Manual of Sacred History. (Learned and interesting.)
 Palfrey's (J. G.) Academical Lectures.
 Parker's (S.) Old Test. Illustrated.
 Shuckford's Connection of Sac. and Prof. Hist.
 Simon's Critical History of the Old Test.
 Smith's History of the Old Testament.
 — History of the New Testament.
 Stackhouse's Hist. of the Bible. (Poor.)
 Stillingfleet's Origines Sacre.
 Thompson's (And.) Scripture History.
 Trimmer's Sacred History.
 Watts's (Isaac) Scripture History.
 Wheeler's (J. S.) Analysis of N. Test. Hist. (Very valuable.)
 Winder's History of Knowledge.
- There exists a vast multitude of Bible histories, but few are as lucid and interesting as the Bible itself. Some, however, are useful as school-books, and some as works of general reference.

DEISM.

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 Barthius (Jo. Henr.) de Vera Religione.
 Bodini (Joann.) Colloquium.
 Celsii Opera.
 Chawin, de Naturali Religione.

- Connor, *Evangelium Medici*.
 Constant (B.), *Religion considérée dans ses Sources, ses Formes, etc.*
 De la Serre, *Examen de la Religion*.
 Diderot, *Pensées philosophiques*.
 Gebhard, *Cogitationes rationales*.
 Gunlingii *Observationes Selectæ*.
 Herbert de Veritate. (The first to make Deism a science. 1624.)
 — de Causis Errorum.
 — de Religione Gentilium.
 Hobbesii *Opera Philosophica*.
 Holbach, *Christianisme dévoilé*.
 Langsdorf's *Gott und die Natur*.
 Leibnitz, *Opera Theologica*.
 Machiavellii *Discursus in Livium*.
 Meyeri *Philosophia*.
 Mirabaud, *Système de la Nature*.
 Muralt, *sur la Religion essentielle*.
 Parizot, *la Foi dévoilée par la Raison*.
 Peyrerii *Preadamitæ*.
 Roell, *de Religione Naturali*.
 Rousseau, *Confessions, etc.*
 — *Emile*.
 — Various other works.
 Sué, *Lettres sur la Religion*.
 Vanini *Amphitheatrum*.
 Voltaire, *Epître à Urane*.
 — *Lettres philosophiques*.
 — Various other Works.
 Blount's *Anima Musedi*.
 — *Life of Apollonius Tyaneus*.
 — *Oracles of Reason*.
 Bolingbroke's *Letters on History*.
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 — Various other works.
 Browne's *Religio Medici*.
 Chubb's *Discourse on Miracles*.
 — *Foundation of the Christ. Religion*.
 — *Subjects of the Old Testament*.
 — *True Gospel of Christ asserted*.
 — *on Redemption*.
 — *Four Dissertations*.
 — *Collection of Tracts*.
 — *Previous Question*.
 Collins's *Enquiry into Human Liberty*.
 — *Ground of the Christian Religion*.
 — *on Free Thinking*.
 — *Scheme of Literal Prophecy*.
 — *Man's other Voices*.
 — *Vind. of the Divine Attributes*.
 Elwell *on the Incarnation*.
 English's *Grounds of Christianity examined*.
 Evanson's *Doctrine of the Trinity*.
 — *Dissonance of the Evangelists*.
 Evanson's *Letter to Dr. Hurd*.
 — *Letter to Dr. Priestley*.
 Hartley *on the Human Mind*.
 Hobbes's *Historical Narration of Heresy*.
 — *Human Nature*.
 — *Letter on Liberty and Necessity*.
 — *Letter to the Duke of Newcastle*.
 — *Leviathan*.
 Hume's *Essay on Miracles*.
 — *Treatise on Human Nature*.
 — *Dialogues*.
 Kames's (Lord) *Essays*.
 Lyon's *Infallibility of Human Judgment*.
 Morgan's *Moral Philosopher*.
 — *Deism fairly stated*.
 — *Conceptions of the Jews considered*.
 — *Defence of the Moral Philosopher*.
 — *Physico-Theology*.
 — *Reply to Chandler*.
 — *Sacerdotism displayed*.
 New Harmony Gazette. Pub. from 1825 to 1834, by R. Dale Owen.
 Newman's (F. W.) *Theism*.
 Paine's *Age of Reason*. (Numerous replies, viz., by Disney, Drew, Estlin, McNeille, Scott, Simpson, Watson, etc.)
 Palmer's *Principles of Nature*.
 Shaftesbury's *Charac. of Men, Manners, etc.*
 Syke's *Innocency of Error*.
 Taylor's *Translation of the Arguments of Celsus, Porphyry, and Julian*.
 Tindall's *Christianity as old as Creation*.
 Toland's *Amyntor*.
 — *Pantheisticon*.
 — *Christianity not Mysterious*.
 Volney's *Works*.
 Woolston's *Discourses on Miracles*.
 — *Defence of do.*
 — *Moderator*.
 — *Supplement to Moderator*.
 — *Second Supplement to Moderator*.
 A multitude of other Deistical writers might be cited, especially in the German language, but the arguments are the same in all.
 Con.
 Origen, *contra Celsus*.
 Abbadié, *Verité de la Relig. chrétienne*.

- Baumgarten, Opera.
 Bergier, Déisme réfuté par lui-même.
 Bullet, Réponses critiques. (Refutes many cavils of the infidels of the 18th century.)
 Carpovii Apparatus Historico-criticus.
 Crouzas, Examen du Pyrronisme, ancienne et moderne.
 Deylingii Observationes Sacrae.
 Diëcanni Schediasma de Naturalismo.
 Fabricii Delectus Argumentorum Veritat. Religionis Christ. versus Atheos, Deistas, Judæos, etc.
 Grotius, de Veritate Relig. Christianæ.
 Houtteville, le Christianisme prouvé par les Faits.
 Huetii Demonstratio.
 Jacquelot, Défense de la Religion.
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 Allix's Reflections on the Old Testament.
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 Apthorp's (East) Prevalence of Christianity before its Civil Establishment. (Gives a very useful account of civil and ecclesiastical historians.)
 Asgill's (J.) Reply to Woolston on Miracles.
 Atkinson on Christianity. (Reply to Tindall.)
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 Conybeare's Defence of Religion. (Reply to Tindall. "The best-reasoned book in the world." — WARBURTON.)
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 Ogilvie on the Cause of Skepticism. (Remarks on Herbert, Shaftesbury, Bolingbroke, Hume, and Gibbon.)
 Paley's Evidences.
 — *Horæ Paulinæ*.
 Patton's (Will.) Christianity the True Theology. (Reply to Paine.)
 Pearson's (Geo.) Hulsean Lectures.
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 Schmucker's Modern Infidelity.
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 Warburton's View of Bolingbroke's Philos.
 — Divine Legation of Moses.
 Waterland's Scripture Vindicated. (Reply to Tindall.)
 Watson's Apology for Christianity. (Reply to Gibbon.)
 — Apology for the Bible. (Reply to Paine.)
 Webster on the Jewish Dispensation. (Reply to Morgan.)
 West on the Resurrection of Christ.
 Whately's Historic Doubts relative to Napoleon Buonaparte.
 Whiston's Account of Scripture Prophecies.

- Whiston's Examination of late Discourses. (Reply to Collins.)
 — Reason and Philosophy no Enemies.
 Whitby's Necessity and Use of Revelation.
 Wilson's (John) Dissertation on Christianity. (A powerful work, built on Butler's Analogy.)
 Witherspoon's Works. (Lectures. Lecture 8.)
 Witty's First Principles of Deism.

See large lists of writers on the deistical controversy in LELAND on *Deistical Writers*, and VAN MILDERT's *Boyle Lectures*.

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 Law's Appeal to all who doubt the Gospel.
 Leng's Boyle Lectures. 1719.
 Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought.
 McBurnie's Errors of Infidelity. ("An armory, hung all over with keen weapons."—EVANG. MAG.)
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 Moore's Christian System Vindicated.
 Morgan's Christianity and Modern I. compared.
 Neume's (Erskine) Christianity and Infidelity contrasted. (An account of the deaths of many prominent persons.)
 Nelson's Cause and Cure of Infidelity.

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 Ragg's Creation's Testimony to its God.
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 Ripley's (Geo.) Latest Form of Infidelity. (Viz., German theology.)
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- In FABER's *Difficulties of Infidelity*, New York edition, 1853, is given a list of all the books known to have been written on the evidence of revealed religion.





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